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This page is graphically intense with long load times due to photos. However, the photos and narratives by the men who served at Osan Air Base makes the wait well worthwhile. The opinions expressed are those of the author and in no way represents any official statement of Osan AB or the USAF. 
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Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Jack Terwiel, Capt, USAF (Ret) of the Osan Retired Activities Office and Ken Shallenberger (1974-1976) for his photos. Thanks for the photos of Harry Tezlaf for his photos of his second tour in Osan. Special thanks to Jackie Turner, 7th AF Historian, and John Okonski, 51st FW Historian, for their assistance with photos and guidance on the history of Osan AB. Thanks to the 36th Fiends site for the use of its materials dealing with the 36th TFS. Thanks to the 51st FW History Office for use of their photos. Special thanks to Ms. Jin Dal-lae of the Jisan-dong Ward Office for taking the time to research and provide historical materials on Songtan and Pyongtaek. Much of the information on Pyongtaek and the Songtan area extracted from the Pyeongtaek History, Pyeongtaek Si Sa. Thanks to the Songbuk Elementary School for permission to use their photos from their private collection.  View of Osan AB (USAF Photo) THIS IS A WORK IN-PROGRESS AND FACTS ARE BEING ADDED/DELETED DURING THIS PROCESS. THIS IS NOT A COMPLETED HISTORY.1975Commander, 51st Composite Wing (Tactical), Osan AB: Col. Vernon H. Sandrock, Aug. 12, 1975 -- June 15, 1977The following are photos of a trip to Seoul on the tollway by Ken Shallenbarger posted to the Osan Retired Activities Office. Of note is the construction that is going on in Seoul with high-rise apartments going up. The Miracle of the Han was starting with increased affluence. Factories were being built and the economy was booming. The ROK government established a protectionist system where by it exported, but limited imports. This would be a bone of contention well into the 1990s when it entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) after its signing of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Prior to the transformation to an export economy, the ROK relied of foreign currency from the remittances of its labor force overseas. Now it took its construction industry that had built cities in Saudi Arabia, Libya and elsewhere and turned it onto the local economy. With government subsidized housing, small apartments (15 pyong) sprouted everywhere to house the lower classes. Unfortunately, it was also during this period that the Chaebols (family-owned businesses protected by the government) started gaining extreme wealth and power -- but kept in check by the iron-fist of President Park Chung-hee. There still was an absence of cars on the highways. The explosion of Korean cars on the highways was not until the mid-1980s-early 1990s when the newly-emerged Korean middle class would start owning their own cars. Then the infrastructure weakness in roads was heightened with massive traffic jams -- especially during holiday seasons.
Songtan Area: ROK Self-Help Programs under President Park Chung-hee and his administration were demonstrated following planned courses of action designed to build national fiber, bolster cultural pride and promote self-reliance. A primary viehicle for this purpose continued to be the community development program (Saemaul Undong) designed to help the rural population attain economic self-sufficiency. During 1977 all villages completed the programs's first phase as average annual rural income rose to 1.5 million won ($2,887), exceeding average urban earnings. In Sep, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced plans to release $1.08 billion to improve living conditions and the overall environment in the less developed rural villages in order to achieve more balanced economic growth, facilitate the nation's modernization process at the grass roots level, and help curb rural migration to the cities.
Park Chung-hee Meets With Osan AB Commanders In 1975 Park Chung-hee visited the Songtan and Osan AB areas. At that time, the Osan AB commander requested another road to access MSR-1 due to the congestion along the one road (Shinjang Road) currently used. Park Chung-hee gave his approval. Also the expansion of the road to connect to the Hill 180 Gate to the Main Gate was approved. Prior to 1975, it was simple a dirt road up Milwal and then winding alleys to the Hill 180 gate. There was a small road from the Hill 180 gate that ran down the ridgeline to near Seojong-ni station and then left to Seojong-ni or right to K-6 at Anjung-ni. In one sense, this project tied in with Park Chung-hee's Saemual Undong (New Village Program) as it would aid in the growth of Songtan with a lot of the self-help labor coming from the community itself. The ROK government proceeded with its programs to electrify the villages and replace thatch-roofed houses with tile roofs thus erecting electric poles to the farm hamlets surrounding the Shinjang area -- including Namsan-teo, Jwa-dong, Jungang-dong and Jisan-dong areas. The road expansion projects in Songtan fell under the Saemaul Undong (New Village) Program. Though initially conceived as a rural self-help program, in 1977 it was extended to Seoul and other urban centers as a means of aiding low-income residents. The focus of the urban renewal projects in slums and commercial areas, a conservation program to reduce waste of oil, electricity, water in government offices and business firms, and initiation of monthly neighborhood meetings with community leaders to discuss urban problems and formulate new Saemual programs. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History (1977), p83) The US had agreed to give the ROK a $2 million AID loan to finance surveys on various economic projects during the ROK's third five-year economic plan (1972-1976) (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p158, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA). Similar aid was forthcoming for the ROK's fourth five-year economic plan. Politically, it was wise to give the Americans anything they wanted dealing with the improvements to the area. In the long-run, they were funding the improvements through grants and aid. The second reason Park Chung-hee would have supported this project was it would have employed a large group of the workers that were laid off after the massive Seoul-Pusan road was completed. Some of these displaced crews were now expanding and upgrading roads to the secondary towns in Korea. The construction companies that came about due to the Seoul-Pusan project would prove to be the backbone of the Miracle of the Han drive to industrialize the country as it trained unskilled laborers (coolies) into skilled equipment operators and construction workers. As "chaebols" (government sponsored conglomerates), these construction companies enabled Seoul to be rapidly built up into a city of high-rise apartments and soon branched out into other labor-intensive manufacturing areas. (SITE NOTE: The Seoul-Pusan highway opened up on 30 Jun 1970. The $1.4 billion project for the 267-mile highway was a solely ROK project that took three years to build. However, once completed thousands of laborers were idled. Many of these skilled laborers became the backbone of the spectacular high-rise growth in Seoul, while others would be exported to projects in the Middle East. Though the World Bank and other financial groups had condemned the Seoul-Pusan highway as foolhardy, it proved to be the spark that became the Miracle of the Han.) The construction would start almost immediately as very little planning was needed to construct an overpass and lay out the grid pattern for the area. The process of condemning the land for public domain was not a problem. Under a dictatorship such as Park Chung-hee's it was simply a formality -- and did not need to be fought in the courts. People were offered monetary compensation in lieu of replacement land. In all cases, the money offered was a pitiance that did not cover expenses. If the people were "squatters" -- as many North Korean refugees were -- they were simply evicted. TDY GI Remembers Songtan Kalani O'Sullivan was with the 610 MASS out of Yokota AB, Japan (1972-1976) and used to fly into Osan TDY sometimes. Kalani stated in March 2005: This was over thirty years ago so the memories are rather fuzzy. I remember in mid-1970s when the Songtan area was really very small. To be truthful, I was NOT impressed with Songtan at all. We had numerous TDYs into Osan between 1974 - 1976 so they seem to blur together. Our time on the ground was used to recover and turn our aircraft for the next day's launch. If we were lucky, we would have some time downtown to toss back some beers.  MOH winner Col Lewis L. Millet with Col Richard Phillips, 51st FW Commander (6 Oct 1975) (Stars and Stripes) MOH Winner Visits Osan AB Reflecting on what he saw and heard during those observances, Millett said, "you have to stop and think of the price we paid, but one thing about it, the people here have done something amazing with the bloodshed that happened here 25 years ago. "They've proven that we were right in coming over here and helping them retain their independence," he continued. "I was surprised, I never expected it," he said of winning the nation's top award for heroism in combat. "Of course, a lot of real fine people had to die so that a few might get decorated. There's an awful lot of men who lie buried over here, and the only recognition they received was the purple heart." (See 13 Oct 1975 Stars and Stripes article for writeup.) The Diamond Area The Diamond area has always been the heart of the operations of Osan AB. View of Osan AB (USAF Photo)  Within the Diamond areas, hangars provided space for various aircraft activities: scheduled inspections; landing gear tests; weighing of aircraft; major work and maintenance of fuel systems and airframes; and technical order compliance and modifications. These activities can be more effectively accomplished while the aircraft is under complete cover. Hangars provided covered floor space to accommodate aircraft. The maintenance hangars are a mix of those constructed in the 1950s -- and upgraded in the 1970s -- to those built in the 1980s. The first large hangars were constructed for the F-86s in Diamond A in the 1950s and these were later used by the Matadors in the late 1960s. The aircraft maintenance facilities included: aircraft maintenance hangars, special purpose hangars, hangar access aprons, weapons system support shops, aircraft system testing and repair shops, aircraft parts storage, corrosion control facilities, and special purpose maintenance pads. The aircraft maintenance area included utilities, roadways, fencing, and security facilities and lighting. The aircraft maintenance facilities allowed simplified access among maintenance areas, aircraft, and support areas. Aviation operations support facilities included those facilities that directly supported the flying mission. Operations support included air traffic control, aircraft rescue and firefighting, fueling facilities, airfield operations center (airfield management facility), squadron operations/aircraft maintenance units, and air mobility operations groups. In the 1970s-2000s, the helicopter alert pads were located adjacent to the taxiway near Diamond B. Aircraft fuel storage and dispensing facilities are provided. Operating fuel storage tanks are provided where dispensing facilities are remote from bulk storage. Bulk fuel storage areas are accessible by tanker-truck. Both bulk storage and operating storage areas provide for the loading and parking of fuel vehicles to service aircraft. Hydrant fueling systems are authorized. Aviation fuel storage and operating areas also require lighting, fencing, and security alarms. On 5 April 1986, a 40,000 gallon fuel tank (located outside Diamond A) exploded killing in the initial blast one USAF NCO and fourteen contractor personnel who were cutting the grass nearby. Over the past 50 plus years, different forms of protection were built for aircraft and munitions stored within the Diamond area.
 Matador Missile on Diamond A (30 Dec 1958) (USAF Photo) After the Matadors were decommissioned, Osan AB had no active wing, however, many aircraft staged out of Osan AB including Forward FAC aircraft.    The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron flying the OV-10A Broncos was assigned to the 314th Air Division on 15 Jan 1972 at Osan AB. On 30 Sept 1974, it was assigned to the 51st Composite Wing at Osan AB when the Wing assumed control of the base. Marvin Metzinger wrote in Aug 2007, "The A diamond belonged to the 19TASS, they worked almost exclusively with the US and ROK Army, and were part of the 5 TAC Air Gp, 314 AD. We had very little contact with them and even their Sqdrn building was fenced off and required an escort to enter. Around 1980 they became part of the 51 wing (the Tac Air Gp went away) and merged some offices, like Stan/Eval and Wing Weapons. Then the units began to work together more closely and even had parties together. Prior to that, we hardly knew them and rarely met any of their aircrews or maintenance personnel. Like all FACs, they would deploy with the army units and be gone for weeks at a time. They sort of operated in their own little 'sphere' of operations, 5 TacAir Gp and 314 AD, during the 1970s.  OV-10 Coming out of Osan Hangar (1979) (USAF Photo)  Diamond B: The Det 1, 347th TFW operations (35th, 36th and 80th TFS) had been pulling nuclear alerts in the Diamond area since 1958 with F-100s. The alerts continued with F-105s (1968) and F-4s (1968-1971) on one-month rotations out of Yokota AB, Japan. Though Osan AB was much more "civilized" than Kunsan, it had no real alert facilities until August 1958. Operation "Big Nickel" [would] redeploy 20 F-100 aircraft and 90 personnel from K-8 to K-55. (Source: Baugher site: B-57:) This was the move of the 8th TFW from Kunsan (K-8) to Osan (K-55) in 1958. USAF Memories: Dick Seeley stated, "Later in the year we moved our detachment operations to Osan AB, Korea and we took on a more serious mission." Later the 8th TFW would move their alert operations to Kadena, but in 1960 would move the alert back to Osan AB after the alert facilities were built.)" The "more serious mission" was standing nuclear alerts with their F-100s. The new "alert facilities" were Building 1185 near Diamond B. The special weapons were stored revetted bunkers in the center of Diamond C.  36th TFS F-100 #356. (1958) (Kiyo Noriye) During the Pueblo Incident, the Diamond area was a hive of activity. During the intial hours of the Pueblo Incident when no one knew what was going on, the alert forces of Det 1, 347th TFW with their F-105s were observed uploading their special weapons, then downloading them and uploading conventional weapons, then repeating the process. (NOTE: These were still the 35th, 36th and 80th TFS who had been transferred to the 347th after the 8th TFW departed to George AFB.)   (L) F-105s of 12th TFS, 18th TFW at Osan AB (R) 12th TFS Ops Bldg (Jan 1968) (Tom Utts) Soon the F-105s from the 18th TFW arrived to take on the conventional alert and the Det 1, 347th TFW returned to their nuclear alert. The following is from Tango Way relating Bill Bayless' experiences during the Pueblo Incident while deployed to Osan. He was an Engine Mechanic of the 18th TFW at Kadena and was part of the contingent that immediately deployed with their F-105s to Osan AB on 23 Jan. He stated, "We lived in barracks on the alert pad. The nuclear weapons bunker was across the street. The barracks consisted of four bays with a central shower and latrine. We put ninety-six men in a barracks designed for thirty-two. I set my alarm for 0300 so that I might have some hot water for a shower." In this, he is talking of staying in the Building 1185 between Diamonds B and C while the nuclear weapons bunkers were in the center of Diamond C.  Barracks
The Det 1, 347th continued their nuclear and air defense alert commitment at Osan. A former pilot wrote, "I was PCS’d to Yokota, AB with the 36th TFS after the Pueblo Incident in January 1968. Over the next 3 years, I pulled TDY duty in Korea with 90+% at K-55/Osan, AB. I was an F4 Pilot and remember: Pulling Nuke Alert, from the "Greenhouse" and the Diamond. Pulling Air Defense alert, conventional alert,..." In early 1971, the Det moved all their F-4C equipment to Kunsan to assist in the changeover of the 35th and 80th TFS to the 3rd TFW. Later the 36th TFS joined the 3rd TFW but returned to Osan AB in Oct 1971. In Nov 1971, the 51st ABW took over Osan AB and the 19th TASS joined the wing. In 1974, the 36th TFS was assigned to the 51st Composite Wing.
 "The Green house (Bldg 1185) is directly south of the 'doorstop' ramp along the taxiway, between B and C diamonds. If you ran out of the Greenhouse front door, thru the ditch and gate in the perimeter taxiway fence, you would be on the doorstop. The doorstop area was sometimes used for a 'scramble scenarios' and exercises for the 36th. It allowed the aircrews to stay at ops and physically run to the acft parked on the doorstop ramp. When the families were around (1980s), the doorstop area was used for Santa to pull up and distribute candy to the kids or group photos - see 1984 photo (it was the preferred location for photos, because it didn't require a lot of 'coordination' to arrange, nor disrupt Mx actions in diamond)."  Later Marvin wrote, "That picture shows the generator buildings on the east side of 1185 bldg. Because the 15 TRS and 36 TFS alert facilities were in the building, there were large electrical generators connected to the building. They provided emergency power to 1185 in case of power failure to the base or just to our bldg. It was funny, we had a test scheduled every month to make sure the generators would work when needed. But we never, never had to test them because the power went off so regularly, that whenever they 'kicked on' we would annotate that as the monthly test! That also reminded me of the mini-tower. It was torn down in the late 70's (maybe early 80's), but it was on the roof of the Greenhouse and was the alternate/emergency tower. There was a small structure in about the middle of the roof that had radios, lights, etc. for relocation of the tower personnel. Once a quarter, when I was the plans officer, I would fire up the systems and do radio, lights and operational checks from the rooftop tower. One of the strange little things you remember! Ha!"  Diamond B (Marvin Metzinger) (Click to enlarge) (Note that the ammo bunker area were not there. It was a flow through area. The 36th alert area was comprised of two movable fences to switch between a small alert configuration or to encompass the entire Diamond B.  Marvin went on, "The F-4Es were on alert in the B Diamond and the Recce's were in the C Diamond. One leg of B diamond was fenced off for alert acft. There was a gate guard (SP) at the entrance near Bldg 1185. The fence that crossed the taxiway was removable and the entire B diamond was then 'contained' as a alert area. For example, in 1976 when the 'Tree Incident' occurred, the entire B Diamond was an alert area because nearly every acft was put on alert. Six of the Sqdrn acft were on 5 min, 6 were on 15 min alert and the remaining flyable acft were on 30 min. The entire Sqdrn lived in the 'Greenhouse' for about 6 to 8 weeks? Can't remember exactly how long we stayed on 'heightened' alert status, but it was quite a while, more that a month! really a tense time in ops. Marvin continued, "Like the 19 TASS, in the 1970s we hardly had any contact with them (15th TRS). They were 'locked' behind the iron door and we were "doin' our own thing" - it sounds a little strange, I know. But the 36th was always undermanned, as were most units at Osan, so we worked long hours, and rarely had time to socialize. "When I first got to Osan, we flew 5 days a week, did FCFs and other issues on Sat and then usually had a half day of 'ground school' for all the aircrews on Sunday. It was real hard to remember what day of the week it was, they all just ran together. After the Tree incident (Aug 1976), we got some time off and soon went to 5 1/2 day work weeks, with ground school and FCFs, etc. on Saturdays and ususally had Sundays off, unless you were on alert. "Alert took a lot of our time. Each aircrew was on alert about 3 or 4 times a month, for 24 or 48 hrs depending on the type of alert. My first tour, time really flew by because we were so busy, but almost nothing was done outside the Ops bldg. Everyday, zero dark early wake up from BOQ to Ops (tried to stop by the PO on the way to or from to check mail), almost always went to the O'Club for dinner (no other dining was available for Officers), then back to the BOQ (maybe some card playing or letter writing, lots of times mission planning for the next day's flight(s), that is about all we did. When we started getting Sunday's off, that's when Paradise Lake became real popular and the hills around that area - the first real 'free time' we aircrews had seen since I arrived.  36th TFS F-16C Blk 40 in front of Whiskey Arch (USAF Photo) Diamond C: Marvin Metzinger wrote in Aug 2007, "The C diamond was divided into four sections, 1,2 3,4. 1 was closest to the runway on the west side, belonged to the Jolly Greens. Two bldgs for maintenance, 2 bldgs for spare acft, one bldg was their ops bldg and alert facility. That was the bldg with the pad in front, just off of the taxiway (don't remember bldg numbers). (NOTE: Starting in September 1964, Osan AB was supported by the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), 36th Air Rescue Service (ARS), Detachment 4. The unit flew the HH-43B Huskie which was dubbed "Pedro." Two HH-43B Pedros were assigned to Osan AB -- aircraft 60-251 and 60-252 as of September 64. Assigned under the under the Air Rescue Service (ARS) based in the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) region. The MATS, 36th ARS, Det 4 became Provisional Air Rescue Component (PARC), Det 9 on 25 July 1965 and remained with this designator until 8 January 1966. MATS changed to the Military Airlift Command (MAC) in 1969. On Dec 1969, the designator changed to MAC, PARRC, Det 4. The unit designator of MAC, 41st ARRW (Air Rescue and Recovery Wing), Det 9 which it maintained from February 1969 through June 1970. The Jolly Greens was Det 13, 4485ARRWg (Jolly Greens) with the HH-53 in the 1970s.) "Section 2 was closest to the munitions storage area on the west, that was the Recce area. The revetments with the high dirt mounds around them. "Section 3 was used for 'Special' Alert, T-33 parking, and along with section 4 was the usual location for the PI F-4 acft when they arrived for ORIs, exercises or to replace our deployed acft for Cope Thunder, Sage, etc. Also used for Xcountry acft. Just off this area is the U-2 buildings and ramp. They had two hangars and an ops bldg. The acft was prep'd and then taxi'd out quickly to TO w/o stopping, except at the end of runway for final checks. The 3rd Generation area, the flowthrough area, Txy AA and JJ were all 1980's projects, don't remember the dates for sure, but early 80s, 82or 83? The "special weapons" (nuclear devices) were stored in the middle of Diamond C in revetted bunkers. With the movable security fences, the "special weapons" could be transported within the secure area directly to the aircraft on Diamond C. (SITE NOTE: The nuclear SIOP previously handled by the Det 1, 347th TFW and then handed off to the 36th TFS was moved to 18th TFW at Kadena in 1974. In 1977, it was a tertiary mission and nuclear training was for familiarization purposes only. In fact, in late 1977 the nuclear storage facilities at Osan AB were closed. Nuclear Weapons storage shifted to Camp Ames at Waegan near Taegu. (Source: Nautilus.org.))  Osan Korea - DET II Here is a pilot being readied for flight. The steps up to the a/c are covered for two reasons: keep the sun/heat off of the pilot and to keep prying eyes from seeing what's going on. (1981) (Mike Troiano) (SITE NOTE: This is on the U-2 Ramp with the large hangar behind it.) The U-2 Black Cats of the 5th TRS celebrated its 30th Anniversary at Osan AB in 2006. In Mar 1975 the 100th SRW with its U-2s were ordered to deploy to Osan AB, Korea. (See U-2: 1976) In 1976, Detachment 2, 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (later the 5th RS, 9th RW) began monitoring and intelligence-gathering duties. Construction of a 4,500 square foot building for the tenant organization flying the U-2 aircraft was worked on by the 554th CESHR (RED HORSE) a twelve-hour shift, seven days per week. The entire facility was renovated, painted, and occupied within ten calendar days. They have been in the same location on Diamond C ever since their first U-2 arrival in the 1975. The U-2s screaming engines are heard throughout Songtan whenever it takes off and lands -- a daily occurrence for thirty years.      36th TFS F-4Es over Diamond C (1984) (USAF Photo) (NOTE: Notice the Jolly Green Ops bldg in the lower right-hand corner. The Jolly alert pad is outside the diamond, next to the taxiway A on a small pad in front of their Ops bldg. There is a helicopter on the alert pad. The helicopters on Diamond C are either in maintenance or parked, In the center of Diamond C are the "special weapons" revetted bunkers. To the left in front of the two large hangers is the U-2 pad. To the lower left corner of the picture is the Base Ops ramp.) Diamond D: In the 1950s, Diamond D was where the F-86s of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing (December 1952 - November 1954) were revetted. After that the 58th Fighter-Bomber Wing (March 1955 - November 1957) parked their F-86s in the area, but after the MAC ramp (Military Airlift Command) was added, its "diamond shape" was erased. In the 1950s, the F-86s were in low revetted positions at the base of Hill 170. After the Korean War, the area was used for cargo aircraft with the base flight aircraft near Base Operations. The area was expanded in the 1960s to accomodate more cargo aircraft and removing the "legs" of the diamond. In 1975, the 611th MASS took over the area with the new expanded MAC ramp to accommodate C-5A aircraft -- the first landing being in 1972. The Marshalling area and MAC ramp were expanded in the 1970s -- and now is called the AMC Ramp (Air Mobility Command). On 17 Aug 1978 the 554th CESHR (Red Horse) completed construction of revetments on "D" Diamond at Osan AB. Prior to this, on 1 August 1978, the quick turn construction project at Osan AB commenced, with an estimated completion date of 1 December 1978, This project would be the largest construction project ever attempted by a Red Horse unit in Korea since the Korean War. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980)  2nd South African Air Force (2SAAF) F-86 with base of Hill 170 in background. Now the Cargo Marshalling area and called Diamond D. (1953) (John Batchelder)  67th FBS with early tail markings. Base of Hill 170 in background. Now the MAC Ramp area and called Diamond D. (1953) (John Batchelder)  Base Camouflage Scheme a Success -- BUT Perhaps Too Much So Marvin Metzinger wrote in Aug 2007, "The camouflage of the taxiways and runways. This was not the typical Korean 'squiggle paint' on buildings, seen all over the ROK. This was a real effort to camo the base. That was a project in 1980 (I think that was the date, between 79 and 81) directed by Higher HQ, forgot the name - Project Warrior (?don't remember, for sure?). But, WOW did it work well! The base 'virtually' disappeared from the air! Transient aircraft, MAC aircrews, etc. complained that they couldn't find the base - if the Instrument landing systems were not ON and working! Even for us local area aircrews, it took a while before we could comfortably find the runway environment. Most pilots looked for the river, and then the 'hook or bend' until they found the base area - this depended on the rains and river level, of course! "The runway was done very well and several people tried to land on the taxiway A, more than once! A and B diamonds were so well done that from the air, it was hard to locate them, at all! The 'H TAC' building had almost disappeared into the side of the hill! It went from a standout target, to a really difficult to find area that blended into its surrouondings. Pilots had to find entirely new visual clues to locate the runway and surroundings from the air. The MAC ramp was almost non-existent! Some of that camo can still be seen on the ramp and notice how the sides of the ramp areas just 'disappear' into the surrounding.  Camouflage of Osan AB (Marvin Metzinger) (Click to enlarge) "Some of the roads on the main base and non-tactical buildings tended to standout, because they were not involved/re-painted. So there was discussion as to how far the camo effort needed to continue. At the end of phase one, we were given a briefing on the 'success' of the project and plans for the second phase, which I don't think ever happened. It consisted of deception camo, like - painting cars, sidewalks, or parking lot lines on a rooftop, painting bldgs on a roadway, a water tower on a large bldg, etc. I don't know if it was a funding issue, or complaints from the transient aircrews, or why it was stopped. It was amazing how effective it was. "There were plans to expand the camo'd areas in phase two, but for some reason it was stopped/cancelled. I wasn't part of the group involved, so I don't know the details. But as suddenly as it happened, it just stopped, I never new why? The only reason we ever came up with, was that it didn't fit in with the 'beautification of the base' ideas that were being proposed at the time. I think, in an effort to make the base more 'family friendly' and attract more accompanied tours. We speculated that it made 'the wives' and non-combatants in Hq staff feel like they were in a 'combat zone' (they were!) and was not conducive to promoting accompanied tours. It was and is a great idea for any base that takes its mission seriously, it was VERY effective! 611th MASS Moves to Osan AB On 15 January 1975, the 611th was moved to Osan AB, Korea. On 1 January 1972, it became a direct reporting unit under the 61 MASW upon deactivation of the 65 MASG. In October 1978, for reasons of geographical proximity, the 611 MASS became a subordinate of the newly established 316th Tactical Airlift Group (TAG) at Yokota AB. It was the only one of the four MASSs in the Pacific not to be aligned under the also newly established 834th Air Lift Division (ALD) located at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. On 1 November 1983, the 611th realigned under the 834 ALD, where it remained until 1 April 1992, at which time the 834 ALD was deactivated. The 611th would then report directly to Headquarters, 22nd Air Force at Travis AFB California. On 1 June 1992, when the Military Airlift Command reorganized and became the Air Mobility Command, the 611th was re-designated as the 611th Air Lift Support Squadron and placed under the 603d Air Lift Support Group at Kadena AB. At this same time, the 611th Aerial Port Squadron was deactivated. On 1 July 1994 the 611th was re-designated as the 631st Air Mobility Support Squadron. With this name change came the realignment of the unit under the 615th Air Mobility Support Group tying us once again to Hickam AFB, Hawaii as it was in the beginning, over 40 years ago... On 15 Mar 2001, the 631st was re-designated as the 731st Air Mobility Squadron. Along with this change, the 615th changed it's name to the 715th Air Mobility Operations Group. (Source: Osan AB Public Affairs) Osan Developments: Osan AB was judged the most improved base in the Pacific during FY75, is the first recipient of the newly established PACAF Commander's Award.
The following is from Robert G."Andy" Anderson's Red Horse Country:
36th TFS Developments 14 Jul 1975 F-4Es participated in the Sin Gal Highway Airstrip Landing Exercise, the first of its kind in South Korea during Team Spirit 75. Several highways in South Korea are designed for emergency use as landing strips. (Source: 36th Fiends History.) (SITE NOTE: On June 7, 1976. the Team Spirit Exercise was first carried out. This type of exercise had been carried out for years in Korea testing the forces from Japan, Okinawa and stateside. However, this was the first time they were tied together into an all-encompassing scenario that tasked various units in the war skills that they would be expected to perform in the event of an invasion by North Korea. Instantly, North Korea rattled its sabre threatening violence. It continued to rattle its sabre for the entire time that Team Spirit was in existence. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p194, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA) Kalani O'Sullivan wrote in Aug 2007, "I was with the 610MASS pushing Marines/Army on USAF C-130s from Iwakuni-Osan-Taegu-Kadena-Clark on these exercises in Korea during 74-76 -- while fixing any C-141/C-5s that were broke in Korea at any base we stopped at as a side duty. At that time, Team Spirit was simply another *&(^*(* exercise -- and not the monster it grew into later. We lived for two years with 15 days at home and one month on the road -- with too many divorces along the way to want to remember those days. In 75 perhaps the name wasn't official, but it certainly was Team Spirit.) Osan AB Developments On 28 Feb 1975 the 51st Services Squadron was inactivated. On 15 Apr the 6168th Air Base Squadron was reassigned to the 51st COMPW (T) from Hq 314th AD. The United Nations Command/USFK announced reduced dependent access to exchanges, commissaries, and Class VI (liquor) Stores. On 1 Dec 1975 the Pacific House Dining Facility was closed for a renovation project that would probably take six months. Enlisted personnel in the grades of E-6 and abover were once again given BAS due to the crowded conditions in the remaining Dining Facility. Two-year accompanied tours (seven in all) were granted for select key personnel assigned to the 51st COMPW(T) (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) USFK Developments On 3 Jan in responding to a US News & World Report release that major US military withdrawals from the ROK are in the offing, DOD reaffirmed that there was "no plan to reduce the present level of US forces in Korea." A similar pronouncement was made by President Ford during his 22-23 Nov 74 visit to the ROK. Present US strength is approximately 40,000. (Source: 8th Army Chronology (1975)) On 18 Jan a Japanese news agency claims the US has 3,500 tactical nuclear warheads deployed in the ROK, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines. The arsenal in Korea is reported to include 150 ADMs and 210 artillery munitions. (NOTE: The Air Defense Missiles (ADM) are the Nike-Hercules batteries which would be turned over to the ROK in 1978 -- minus the airburst warheads.) A variety of joint-exercises were instituted. On March 17, 1975, a small array of exercises, which had been carried out since 1961 were incorporated into the Doksuri (Foal Eagle) Exercise. On May 5 the Ulchi Exercise (ROK) and the Focus-Lens Exercise (the ROK and the US) were combined to become the Ulchi Focus-Lens Exercise. According to the New York Times on 12 Jun 1975 the War Scare eased in Seoul, but Both Koreas remained in a high state of military alert. A war scare swept through Seoul after the fall of Indochina but soon died down. Blackmarketing was becoming critical. On 20 May the command announced reduced dependent access to USFK exchanges, comissaries and Class VI outlets. Action is predicated by overtaxed physical and logistical resources and a ROK/US SOFA Joint Committee recommendation to alleviate the situation. After this date, dependents acquired in the ROK were to be authorized entrance to cited facilities only if they had spent one year or more with their sponsors out-of-country. Some 3,000 will be denied shopping privileges and ration control plates. Exceptions were to be made on a case-to-case basis. On 1 Nov 75 the USFK instituted a new ration control policy in order to curb black marketing and insure equitable distribution of goods. Changes reduce monthly amount families can spend in exchanges and increase dollar limit for unaccompanied personnel. Commissary purchase ceilings are increased for families of up to three persons, remain the same for those of four, and are reduced for larger households. Other major revisions include limitations on cosmetic purchases and a 20 percent liquor ration reduction for all individuals. (Source: 8th Army Chronology (1975)) On 20 Jun 1975, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger acknowledged that the US had tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Korea. He warned that America "cannot foreclose any option" in defending against a NK invasion, but adds that nuclear weapons would be used only as a last resort. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p187, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA) On 1 Jul 75, I Corps (ROK/US) Group commemorated the fourth anniversary of its reorganization as an integrated corps. The binational headquarters, situated 19 miles north of Seoul near Uijongbu, controlled a composite of ROKA/ROKMC/EUSA combat elements (12 divistion, 4 brigades) which comprised the largest Army corps in the Free World. (Source: 8th Army Chronology (1975)) (NOTE: This was the predecessor of the Combined Field Command when I Corps departed the country for Camp Zama, Japan and the hat was switched to the Commander of the USFK.) On 2 Jul 75 The National Observer reported that the DOD recently decided that relocation of the 2d US Infantry Division to a position south of Seoul was impossible due to the $500 million cost of such a move. (Source: 8th Army Chronology (1975)) (NOTE: In 2003 when the US announced unilaterally that the 2d ID would relocate south of the Han River to Pyeongtaek, the cost was estimated at $3.5 billion -- including the closure of Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. The ROK had wished to retain the 2d ID on the DMZ because it ensured a "tripwire" for guaranteeing the US involvement in case of a North Korean attack. In truth, the ROK was heavily dependent upon the USFK high-tech weaponry to defend the DMZ even though it had the responsibility for the entire DMZ -- minus the small UNC area at Panmunjeon. However at the same time, there was growing anti-Americanism and demands from "progressive" civic groups for the US forces to depart Korea.) On 25 Jul 1975 a DOD spokesman announced that the USAF fighter squadrons at Osan and Kunsan area at their normal 18-20 aircraft strength. Units had been operating at the 13-17 level during the Vietnam era. USFK manning increased from 38,000 back to 42,000 levels. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p187, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA) The UNC flag is removed from most US military installations in Korea on 9 Sep 1975 This action, begun on 16 August, leaves the flag at sites where approximately 300 US forces are directly connected with UNC functions and lowers it at those bases where American personnel are serving under the 1954 US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. AP reports the move is designed to counter the Communists' 11 August demand that US troops serving under the UN flag in Korea be withdrawn. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p189, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA) Surprisingly after the episodes of racial tension in Korea between Korean nationals and blacks, a Pentagon study announced on 17 Dec 75 revealed that the 2d ID has a greater ratio of blacks, 30.1 percent, than any other active Army division. It was reported that blacks consider Korea a good country with very little racial prejudice. The study shows that blacks comprise 31.7 percent of all first-term reenlistments, and that black strength in the Army rose from 17 to 22 percent between 1 Jul 72 and 1 Jan 75. (Source: 8th Army Chronology (1975)) ROK Developments The tensions on the peninsula increased. On March 19 Tunnel No. 2 was discovered. As a result, the ROK took measures to bolster their defense posture. On June 30 the ROK Combat Reserve Forces was created. On Sept. 22, the Civil Defense Corps was created. Internationally, on April 23, 1975, the ROK signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. (SITE NOTE: It was later found that Park Chung-hee had secretly attempted to gain nuclear weapons but was blocked by the US.) On 9 Apr 1975 some 3,000 youths from five universities clash with police in a "demand for restoration of democracy." President Park issued Emergency Measures 8 and 9. The former withdraws troops from and reopened Korea University which was closed on 8 Aprl due to student demonstrations. The latter banned all acts opposing the 1972 Yushin Constitution which strengthened presidential authority. It also limited the outflow of capital from the country. On 14 Jan at a nationally broadcast press conference, President Park said he would not oppose dissolution of the UNC provided that effective measures were implemented to maintain the 1953 Armistice Agreement. He adds that loss of the UN banner in Korea would have no bearing on the continued presence of American troops here, since they are deployed under the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. On 3 Jul 75, among the nations backing the US 30 Jun proposal to the UN are Britain, Canada, Costa Rica, Japan, New Zealand, Uruguay and Netherlands. The resolution would dissolve the UNC by 1 Jan 76 provided US/ROK military officers are designated successors in command and the 1953 Armistice Agreement is continued. In Aug 75 some North Korean-supporting nations place a proposal on the agenda for the fall's UN General Assembly which called for the dissolution of the UNC, withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in the ROK under the UNC, and a the replacement of the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. (Source: 8th Army Chronology (1975)) Interviewed by the New York Times, ROK President Park Chung-hee stated that his nation currently would need only US naval, air and logistics support to counter a NK attack if mounted without external aid from Communist allies. Further, given the expected completion of the $1.5 billion Military Assistance Program (MAP) for ROK force modernization and the anticipated raising of an addition $5 billion (US equivalent) in local defense taxes, he avered that by 1980 the ROK would not need American assistance to repel unsupported NK aggression. He asserted, however, that until strengthening of ROK forces was completed "...it is absolutely necessary for US forces in Korea to be kept at their present level." Commenting on relations with the North, he offered to meet personally with Kim Il-sung to discuss easing of tension on the peninsula. (Source: 8th Army Chronology (1975).) The UNC flag is removed from most US military installations in Korea on 9 Sep 1975 This action, begun on 16 August, leaves the flag at sites where approximately 300 US forces are directly connected with UNC functions and lowers it at those bases where American personnel are serving under the 1954 US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. AP reports the move is designed to counter the Communists' 11 August demand that US troops serving under the UN flag in Korea be withdrawn. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p189, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA) On 1 Aug 75 the ROK government dedicated the new National Assembly Building on Yoido, an islet just south of Seoul. Six years and 13.5 billion won ($27 million) were expended on the parliament structure, th largest of its kind in the Orient. A number of downtown Seoul government, civic and commercial buildings are being relocated to Yoido which is envisioned as a model urban center. Tensions over Human Rights Violations There was growing criticism of the Americans against human rights violations by the Korean government. In 1975, Jimmy Carter in running for President told the Washington Post that he saw no reason for American troops to be stationed in South Korea and that, if elected, he would pull them out along with the nuclear weapons stationed there. In the 1992 publication, Kim Young-Sam and the The New Korea (p99) it states, "Carter apparently wanted to removed the "trip-wire" U.S. force to avoid any possibility of an American entanglement in a future land war in Asia. But Carter also appeared to be motivated by his and his advisers' deep antagonism to the authoritarian government in South Korea and its violations of human rights. It appears that they were also heavily influenced by the so-called Koreagate scandal of 1971 involving a lobbyist for South Korea, Tong-sun Park, with ties to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency." Koreagate involved the dispersal of between $500,000 to $1 million annually in cash gifts and campaign contributions. President Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw the ground troops of the US from South Korea caused grave concerns for the national security. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of the superiority of the North Korean forces, but did recommend a scaling down of the American forces.
1976 Songbuk Elementary School (1976) (Songbuk Elementary School) (NOTE: The soil embankment at the front of school has been replaced with concrete bleachers.)  Pyeongtaek girl students after school (1976) (John Madden) (NOTE: The school bags were standard for all students as this was prior to the backpack era. Girls most likely high school as middle school girls only allowed shoulder length hair. Uniforms were required for middle school and high school students. Notice the dress length indicating a strict dress code.) The Jaeil Theater was a fixture in Songtan since the 1960s. However, by the 1976 there was also the Seojung (later Jungang) Theater that was at the top of the Milwal Road as well. According to local residents, this theater could seat about 200, but never had more than 30 people at a time. The Jaeil Theater was up the street from the "Y" intersection leading to Shinjang Mall Road. (NOTE: Across the street from the Kyungmin Bank is the Woori Bank. Up the block at the florist, turn right and there is an empty area across from the Jungang Sauna. This is where the Jaeil Movie Theater was located.)  
(L) Jaeil Theater (Circa late 1970s) (51st FW Archives) (R) Jaeil Theater (1976) (Harry Tezlaf)  
(L) Old Jaeil Theater location (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (Notice the house in the background of old photo and the house in this photo.) (R) Old Jaeil Theater location (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)  Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1) at the old intersection to the Shinjang Mall Road. (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (The road is heading up the ridgeline. The Kyungmin Bank is on the left. Behind the bank was where the bus depot was. One block up to the right behind the Woori Bank was where the Jaeil Theater was.) Fatal Accident Off-base near Main Gate On 14 Aug 1976 a retaining wall near the main gate of Osan AB collapsed at approximately 0245 hours causing the deaths of three local nationals. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) (SITE NOTE: In attempting to research this incident, long-time local Koreans stated that they seem to remember it, but not the specifics. The only area that there was a retaining wall near the main gate was on the Namsan-teo side. The Namsan Village road had not been built at the time and the perimeter was further out from the base than it is in the present. The perimeter extended out to the area where there was a spring directly below fenceline in the Aragon alley vicinity. The well -- now long sealed -- was used by the Chicol Village residents along with the well now sealed under the Young Chon Hotel. The well was at the base of the hill. The August date suggests that it might have been during the monsoon season creating weakened earth conditions and early morning hours suggests the wall collapsed onto some houses while the residents were inside. There is one area at the end of the old Aragon Alley where the hillside seems to have collapsed leaving a hole in the hillside, but we don't know if this is the area.) Construction on Shinjang Road Overpass Started Construction on the overpass officially started on 29 Sep 1976. The Milwal Road expansion had taken place with the left side (heading up the hill) being cut back about fifteen feet and the right side cut back about 7 feet. The Shinjang Road was straightened so that it went straight ahead to the Main Gate. Then the road was cut to the overpass. The people who lost their homes were compensated with money -- not land -- but the monetary sum didn't cover the personal losses. The majority of the people affected were the North Korean refugees who had resettled in the Milwal area. The first step in the construction was to widen Milwal Road by 7 feet on the right side and 3 feet on the left side (as one looked up the hill). The construction literally chopped homes in half to make way for the road expansion. The road to Hill 180 Gate was simply a graded dirt road that followed the perimeter. Mr. Son Kwang-chil, the owner of Hanyang Kalbi, has been a resident of Milwal Road since 1957. He watched the small dirt road widened on both sides that cut down the houses fronting the road. The monetary compensation amounted to very little. The second phase was to clear the path from the main gate to Milwal Road. They simply bulldozed the one-story shanty-town structures (that had just been replaced with concrete after the 1968 fire). Thus when the path was finally cleared, there were only one story structures along the two-lane Main Gate road. The third phase was to construct a road from the Main Gate Road to a planned overpass. The planned road would go over the overpass up to the Jwa-dong area. The road would continue over the Jwa-dong hill with with a road that would become Terminal Road. This area was the old shanty town area filled with twisted alleyways. The construction process was simply to raze a two-lane road straight ahead to the railroad tracks to allow the start of construction on the overpass in 1976. Mr. Oh Sun-soo and his family owned land just outside the Main Gate. The shop (GQ Tailor) and home was torn down to make way for the Milwal Road expansion. Of course, Mr. Oh Sun-soo complained that his family was not recompensed adequately -- holding up a "zero" hand sign gesture. However, the family picked up and restarted the business in a new location. The fourth phase was to construct the overpass. Construction on the overpass officially started on 29 Sep 1976 and was completed on 10 May 1977. It was constructed by the Kaelim Construction Company. The overpass was 15 feet wide and 180 feet long. Maximum carrying load was 54 tons. (Source: Marker on Shinjang Overpass Bridge) The road connected to MSR-1 (Jwadong Road). The fifth phase (after the overpass was completed) was to construct the Jungang Market Road along with the Rodeo Road (Fashion Road) from the Overpass. The "new" Jungang Market Road is where the Sambo Department Store was built and ran a block below the original Jungang Market Road and ran from the railroad spur parallel with the original Jungang Market road and curved up to meet the Shinjang Road near the Main Gate. Rodeo Road was cut from the overpass to the Shinjang Road. This area had been the "pink light" district that was off-limits after 10 pm. The road cut a two-lane road through the existing buildings and new construction was started on each side. The two story buildings built in the 1980s are easily identified as having ceramic tile facings. (NOTE: Though the lower floors have been extensively modified over the years, the upper floors still bare the ceramic tile facing on the buildings.) The sixth phase was to "modernize" the roads in the Songtan area into a grid system. (NOTE: Remember that in 1978, the population was concentrated around Osan AB and spreading out into the Songbuk dong area of the Morning Market (Songbuk Farmers Market).) The construction of the roads in this period can be differentiated from previous period roads as being laid out on a grid pattern, while older roads (alleys) followed the contour of the land -- and normally zig-zagged along till they ended in a dead end. At this time, the grid pattern was laid out in Shinjang 2-dong area starting just past the old structures of the shantiy town. One road was cut down the hill from Milwal Dong (at the present Capital Hotel) down through the old area and then ran diagonally to the base of the overpass. The rest of the roads ran in an east-west direction between north-south Milwal and Taegwang Roads. Starting at Songwang Church (Onori Church) and Songshin Elementary School, three east-west roads were cut from Taegwang School Road next to the railroad tracks to Milwal Road that followed the ridgeline to the west. The Taegwang School Road route was chosen because it was on elevated ground, while further west was the lower areas and rice fields that still were unreclaimed. The Taegwang School Road was cut from the overpass past the Taegwang Middle School and High School to the existing overpass that connected the road to the MSR-1 (Jijangdong Road). This overpass was extremely narrow and was expanded in 2002. The remainder of the land between Songtan and Seojong-ni was still rice fields. Also a grid pattern of narrow roads was also cut through the Seomi-ri and Jokbong areas and down the slopes of Milwal-dong, but for the most part followed the existing topographical pattern because of the two small hills at the base of Hill 180. The Hill 180 Gate Road was cut following the perimeter of Osan AB until it reached the Hill 180 Gate near Makum-ni. In effect, it simply widened selected existing alleyways that joined the Hill 180 Gate Road down the slope to Milwal Road running south. In the Jokbong area, the Milwal Road was intersected by an old path that ran along the ridgeline. This was also widened to connect to the narrow railroad overpass to Jijangdong and Taekwang School Road. During this process, the massive graveyard along the perimeter fence was relocated with much controversy by the local government. The graves were disinterred and the bones were cremated enmasse. The mass cremation stirred up much controversy as the graves belonged to mostly the North Koreans who had settled in the Milwal, Seomi-ri, and Jokbong-ri areas. However, as North Koreans did not possess any political power, their protests were disregarded. (SEE 1963 and 1968 for photos of this graveyard that abutted the perimeter fence in the Milwal area. In 1963, there were few graves there with a marker for a Chosun Dynasty scholar and very few houses in the area. However by 1968 the graveyard was a mass of mounds and the surrounding area was filled with mudwattle houses. Life was hard in those years and the poorest community was the North Korean refugees who were clustered around this area.) In the seventh phase, the Terminal Ridge Road was cut over the Jwadong Ridge down to the Songbuk Market Road. At the same time, the main road in the Jwadong area was cut from the Terminal Ridge Road through Jwadong to Jinangdong. (NOTE: The other roads in the area were not laid out until the mid-1980s when the city's population was swelling due to the movement of industries into the area. There were few houses in 1978 in the area and the other roads on a grid pattern one sees today were added after the population increased in the mid-1980s and Songtan-eup (town) became Songtan-shi (city) in 1981. At that time, the Bukbu-Jungang Route was constructed from the Terminal Ridge Road to Seojeong-ni and the planned population center was shifted to near the new city hall.)  Seoul, South Korea, April 8, 1976: "One if by sea, two if by Greyhound" might be the battle cry as three members of the U.N. Command Honor Guard, wearing Revolutionary War uniforms, board a bus at Yongsan Garrison. The retro garb and specially-decorated bus were in honor of America's Bicentennial; the musket-toting servicemembers were, left to right, Spec. 4 Elmer Jones of Port Orchard, Wash.; Pfc. David Anderson of Decatur, Ill.; and E4 Jeff Mabus of Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. (8 Apr 1976) (Stars and Stripes) Osan AB TV Reception Improved and Preparation for Color TV TV Service was improved in the Osan area in Nov 76 when a newly approved UHF channel became operational. The TV broadcasts were still in black-and-white, but future plans were announced to convert to color TV broadcasts. The Los Angeles-based American Forces Radio and Television Service advised its TV networks in early 1974 that it intended to convert to full color in the near future. Accordingly, AFKN, along with its sister networks, began planning for procurement of color TV equipment. Upgrade was necessary as AFKN, and other networks, have found that in many cases replacement parts for black and white TV systems were no longer being manufactured. In Apr 74 Department of the Army's Material Procurement Priorities Review Committee approved FY 76 funding of $828,000 for AFKN color TV equipment. (Source: UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1974, p. 210) 51st Composite Wing adds Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS) The Wing gained an F–4E tactical fighter squadron (36th TFS) and an OV–10 tactical air support squadron (19th TASS), but its support responsibilities continued under the direction of a combat support group. In Jan 1976, the Wing was further augmented by a tactical control squadron (621st TACS) and in Apr 1976 by a direct air support squadron (36th TFS) and a tactical air control center squadron (621st TACS). These additions, combined with the tactical air support squadron (19th TASS) already assigned, comprised the Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS). The 51st lost control of Taegu AB on 1 Oct 1978, but reassumed responsibility for that base when the Wing gained a second F–4E squadron stationed there in Jan 1982. In the interim, direct responsibility for KTACS had passed to a newly assigned tactical air control group, along with control of the Wing’s tactical control elements. On 1 Jun 1982, relinquished its tactical control mission when the Wing’s KTACS elements were reassigned to the 314th Air Division. In their place, received a squadron of A–10 aircraft (25th TFS). Based at Suwon AB, South Korea, this unit’s close air support capability complemented the Wing’s existing air superiority role; the new mission mix resulted in redesignation as a tactical fighter wing on 1 Jul 1982. (Source: 51st FW History.) Det 1 19 TASS at Camp Casey Detachment: 1, 19th TASS operated at Camp Casey, ROK from 15 Apr 1976 to 8 Jan 1980. U-2 Detachment Established at Osan: Det 2, 100th SRW The U-2 program remained under the reigns of the CIA from 1954 until 1974 when it was turned over to the United States Air Force. In February 1976, personnel from the 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SRW) at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base(AFB), Arizona and the 99th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron(SRS) at operating location UA, U-Tapao Airfield Thailand, deployed to Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea (ROK), to establish a 90 day test program. The first Temporary Duty (TDY) Commander was Colonel L. M. Kidder who was replaced in late March 1976 by Lieutenant Colonel R.B. Birkett. In April of that year the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the 99th SRS to move from U-Tapao to Osan. In mid-May 1976, Lieutenant Colonel David G. Young arrived with the last contingent from U-Tapao and replaced Lieutenant Colonel Birkett. Shortly after his arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Young established the "Blackcat" as the Operating Location(OL) nickname. In 1976, Detachment 2, 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (later the 5th RS, 9th RW) began monitoring and intelligence-gathering duties. In July 1976, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry C. Sinclair arrived as the first Permanent Change of Station(PCS) Commander. In September 1976, the 100th SRW was inactivated and OL-AO became Detachment 2 of the 9th SRW of Beale AFB, CA. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org, Blackcats.net and TaiwanAirpower.org: U-2.) 554th CESHR Squadron "Red Horse" Mike Grim of Fredericksburg, VA wrote in Aug 2007, "I was in the 554th 1976 to 1977 in the Paint shop.I was one of the first AB's almost everyone there was a Buck Sgt or above when I got there, I remember the 1st shirt asking me if I had a note from my mother. I then went back to Osan 1978-1983 Working in Base CE. Lots and lots of good times and people." The following is from Robert G."Andy" Anderson's Red Horse Country: The following is from Robert G."Andy" Anderson's Red Horse Country:
621st Tactical Control Squadron Moves to Osan The 621st Tactical Control Squadron moved without personnel and equipment from Udorn RTAFB, Thailand to Osan AB, ROK and was assigned to the 51st COMPW (T) on 8 Jan 1976. The unit was constituted 621st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron on 2 Jul 1946 and activated on 1 Aug 1946. After service in the Korean War the 621st was inactivated on 3 Feb 1958. Redesignated 621st Tactical Control Squadron, the unit was activated, on 7 Feb 1966 and organized on 23 Feb 1966. It was assigned to the 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) on 8 Jan 1976; It was transferred to the 5th Tactical Air Control (later, 5th Tactical Control) Group on 8 Jan 1980 where it remains until present. The 621st TACS would become the 621st Air Control Squadron of Osan AB.  621st Air Control Squadron: "PRO OBSERVATIO POSITIVA" = For Positive Control It was comprised of the 6130th Tactical Control Flight: 15 Jan 1979-15 Dec 1989; 6140th Tactical Control Flight: 15 Mar 1980-1 Jan 1982; 6140th Tactical Control Flight: 31 Jan 1987-15 Dec 1989; and 20th Tactical Control Flight, 15 Dec 1989-present. From 1976-1986, it maintained mountain-top detachments in Korea. Detachment 1 (Yongmun San, South Korea) : 15 Apr 1976-31 Aug 1986. Yongmun San (Dragon Mountain) was the closest radar site to the DMZ on top of a 5000 ft mountain. Detachment 2 (Mangil San, South Korea) : 15 Apr 1976-15 Apr 1986. Detachment 3 (Palgong San, South Korea) : 15 Apr 1976-31 Mar 1986. (Source: 621st TCS.) 36th TFS Developments The 36th TFS deployed four F-4E aircraft and 34 maintenance personnel to Kunsan AB during the closure ofthe runway at Osan AB. Between 9-11 Nov, the 36th TFS flew 107 of 109 scheduled sorties in a Sortie Surge. The concept had been initiated by a PACAF study and meant that training was designed around wartime situations, the maximum number of sorties gained by the minimum number of aircraft with quick turnarounds performed by maintenance technicians. Osan AB Developments On 1 Jan 1976, the 51st COMPW(T)'s T-33 aircraft operations were discontinued. The aircraft remained at Osan. (SITE NOTE: These aircraft were used for "milk runs" to provide flying hours for those rated officers who were bound to a desk -- mainly in the 314th AD -- so they could maintain their flight pay. The first T-33s were transferred from the 51st FIW in Naha AB to Osan AB back in Sep 1969 when they were no longer required for mission support by the 82nd FIS. The two remaining T-33A "Shooting Star" aircraft at Osan, were picked up by Republic of the Philppines Air FOrce (RPAF) crews on 7 Apr 1977, and flown to the Philippines (via Kadena) for permanent use by the RPAF. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980)) Between 3-20 Jun Exercise Team Spirit took place in Korea. The entire military community of Osan AB took part in the reception and beddown of more than 100,000 military augmentees that arrived from the CONUS and other PACAF bases. The exercise simulated the reaction and response of the US should the North Koreans attack the South. On 1 Jul the withdrawal of support to non-command sponsored dependents became offical at Osan AB, by an Act of Congress. On 10 July the newly constructed Mustang Recreation Center opened at Osan AB flollowing its completion by the 554th CESHR (Red Horse) unit. On 15 Sep ground was broken on Hill 180 where family housing units were constructed for key officer positions. On 1 Oct random urine testing as aprt of the Air Force Drug Abuse Control Program ended at Osan AB, Korea. Commander directed urine testing remained in effect. Wear of the winter parkas on and off duty, in and out of uniform , was authorized at Osan AB. On 3 Dec courtesty patrols composed of USAF and Army personnel began operating in Songtan-up in conjunction with Operation 40 Proof III designed to assist those personnel who had one too many drinks. This patrol supplemented the SP's Town Patrol and did not have the power to arrest. A serious racial incident took place on 5 Dec in the Papa Joe Club. The incident was provoked by alcohol and racial remarks by US Army personnel from Camp Humphreys. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) Jimmy Carter takes office Jimmy Carter was elected President (1976-1980). Carter made little effort to conceal his contempt for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He believed that as few as 200 atomic nuclear devices would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union. This brought him nose-to-nose with the military whose philosophy was to maintain overwhelming fire-power. Carter believed in nuclear disarmament -- and killed the B-1 program, substituting the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) project instead. (The secret B-2 program was also a factor in cancelling the B-1.) The ALCM had its origins in the AGM-86 SCA (subsonic cruise armed decoy) and, at the time of Carter's announcement, was planned as a bargaining chip to be given away at the armament limitartion talks. Carter worked aout a deal for the approval of the MX (later named the Peacekeepter) in exchange for military backing on the disarmament talks (SAL) in progress with the Soviet Union. (Source: Beyond the Wild Blue, Walter J. Boyne, pp248-249) First Team Spirit: On June 7, 1976. the Team Spirit Exercise was first carried out. This type of exercise had been carried out for years in Korea testing the forces from Japan, Okinawa and stateside. However, this was the first time they were tied together into an all-encompassing scenario that tasked various units in the war skills that they would be expected to perform in the event of an invasion by North Korea. Instantly, North Korea rattled its sabre threatening violence. It continued to rattle its sabre for the entire time that Team Spirit was in existence. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p194, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA) Kalani O'Sullivan wrote in Aug 2007, "I was with the 610MASS pushing Marines/Army on USAF C-130s from Iwakuni-Osan-Taegu-Kadena-Clark on these exercises in Korea during 74-76 -- while fixing any C-141/C-5s that were broke in Korea at any base we stopped at as a side duty. At that time, Team Spirit was simply another *&(^*(* exercise -- and not the monster it grew into later. We lived for two years with 15 days at home and one month on the road -- with too many divorces along the way to want to remember those days. In 75 perhaps the name wasn't official, but it certainly was Team Spirit. Remember one funny incident in I believe about Mar 75 when there was still frost on the ground. We came into Taegu and were put up in some dilapidated barracks, but atleast it had steam heat. The Marines we were shuttling we all bivouac'd in pup tents out in the cold. We had just gotten settled in when the door flies open and in storms a Marine Command Sgt Major (E-9) and he starts screaming at us that he's a senior NCO and he's sleeping on the ground. As E-5s and E-6s, we just pointed at our AIR FORCE stripes and said he should complain to the billeting office. We simply said, "Air Force don't sleep on the ground." He stormed out of there slamming the door behind him -- and headed to the billeting office. He slept on the ground with his troops." GlobalSecurity.org states that Team Spirit started in 1976 and lasted until 1993. No Team Spirit exercises have been held since 1993. Team Spirit continued to be scheduled from 1994 to 1996 but was canceled each year as an incentive to improve relations with the North. On March 6, 1997 it was announced that the government of the Republic of Korea and the United States had decided not to hold the Team Spirit exercise in 1997. Team Spirit was usually held in late March, Team Spirit, is a joint/combined exercise designed to evaluate and improve the interoperability of the ROK and U.S. forces. About 200,000 U.S. and South Korean servicemembers participted in Team Spirit. Tree Cutting Incident: On Aug. 18, 1976, two U.S. Army officers attempting to cut down a tree in the demilitarized zone were attacked and killed by North Korean border guards. Known as the "tree-cutting incident," it triggered a quick build-up of forces as tensions with North Korea increased. All units on the peninsula -- including the aircraft at Kunsan and Osan -- were placed on alert. According to Fiends Website, "18 Aug 1976 F-4Es were placed on alert following the murder of United Nations Command guards at Panmunjon, referred to as the "Tree Cutting Incident."" Unreported at the time was the reaction of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who wanted to bomb the North. Gen Stillwell issued an order to the troops that any commands for action would be issued by him -- not by "higher ups." This statement should have been unnecessary, but the volatile nature of the act entailed that he reemphasize that "higher ups" set the policy and he would issue commands to implement that policy. In the end, President Ford decided that the appropriate action was to cut down the tree. Of course, when the UNC forces entered the DMZ to cut the trees, it was not reported but there were fully-loaded B-52s circling overhead with F-4D/E fighters in the air poised to attack. The Tree-cutting incident is described at the VFW Post 7591 Site has a description of the incident. The Attack BeginsLater on Aug 21, a force of Americans -- without ROKs -- entered the area unannounced with a truck and a number of American soldiers armed with mattocks (axe handles as weapons are not authorized in the DMZ). From Operation Paul Bunyon, Gary Travis stated, "Engineers would cut down the poplar tree near the south end of The Bridge of No Return and Checkpoint Three. The bridge was site of POW exchanges in 1953 as well as the return of the surviving crew of the USS Pueblo, which was captured in 1968. Our battalion would have other companies in orbiting Hueys and our own Alpha co. would be near the worksite to provide immediate backup in case of any interference from the North Koreans." He continued, "Lest we cause an international incident, our people had axe handles and if necessary would use riot-control tactics. The rifles were on a stripped-down truck atop sandbags. The sandbags were used to deaden any mine explosion...the truck would be to the rear of the troops. The NK's had automatic weapons and would be able to inflict heavy casualties before our people got to their weapons. Thanks a lot, Kissinger." The tree was cut down and the troops left the area. The North Koreans took no action. (NOTE: Camp Bonifas was renamed for Capt. Art Bonifas.) Most significant, but not often mentioned was that the hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang was cutoff in August 1976 as a result of the Tree-cutting Incident. This hotline would not be resumed until 1995 after a nuclear standoff brought North Korea to the brink of being attacked. President Kim Yong-sam requested that the hotline be reestablished to prevent a future disaster. (See Operation Paul Bunyon.)
1977Commander, 51st Composite Wing (Tactical), Osan AB: Col. Fred B. Hoenniger, June 15, 1977 -- June 18, 1979Hondol Systems Number One Winter Health Hazard The most significant health hazard encountered during 1977 was carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning attributed to traditional Korean compressed coal home heating systems. The ondol (hot floor) heating methods are potentially hazardous due to the generation of CO when incomplete combustion of the coal occurs. Hundreds of CO deaths among the Korean population are reported annually. During Nov-Dec 76 four USFK servicemen died from CO poisoning despite an intensive prefventive health education effort launched prior to the winter heating season. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History 1977.)  Shinjang Road Overpass Completed Construction on the overpass officially started on 29 Sep 1976 and was completed on 10 May 1977. It was constructed by the Kaelim Construction Company. The overpass was 15 feet wide and 180 feet long. Max carrying load was 54 tons. (Source: Marker on Shinjang Overpass Bridge) In a ceremony on 9 June 1977 attended by Maj Gen Robert C. Taylor, commander 314th AD, and Brig. Gen. Vernon H. Sandrock, commander 51st COMPW(T), the Songtan-Up (town) officially opened a new, modern bridge over the railroad tracks connecting Osan Air Base with the Suwon-Pyontaek Highway (MSR-1). (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) 
In conjunction with this overpass construction, there was massive reconstruction of roads in the area. This entailed the straightening and expansion of Shinjang Road and the Milwal Road. Then the Taegwang School Road was built to Seojong and the roads in the Shinjang 2-dong area was laid out in a grid pattern. (NOTE: Shinjang 2-dong had not been established at the time.) Within the Jungang Market area, the Rodeo Road (Fashion Road) was expanded and the Jungang Market Road cut through the area. Then the road to the Hill 180 Gate was cut with roads running down the hill to form a grid.
Merchants of Songtan Upon completion of the roads, new building construction was started along the sides of the roads replacing many of the one-story structures with two-three story concrete buildings. As construction was still taking place on the road leading to the overpass, most of the first batch of new shops opened on the Shinjang Road between 1977-78. After 1978, most of the construction was complete along the Main Gate Road and new shops opened there. Along the road to the overpass, the Chunil Hotel and the Songtan Tourist Hotel started construction in 1977. Mike's All Seasons Shop Mr. Kim Chu'n-kyong was the original owner of Mike's All Season Shop which he established in 1977. He sold it in 1983 and the shop has remained a fixture on the Mall ever since. The shop is well-known to frequent shoppers at the Mall because of the variety of goods that can be custom-made at the shop. Bag Lady's Tour of Songtan states: "Mike's All Seasons: Quite possibly one of the most popular merchants in Songtan, Mike carries sportswear for every fan and does wonderful customized work. He is able to make T-shirts, sweatshirts, warm-up suits, hats, coins, etc. He has an extensive clientele and good prices. He is on the web! Bring a design for him to work up (silkscreen) for special events, etc.".)
  (L) Mike's All Season Shop (2002)(Unknown) (R) 2005: Employees of Mike's All Seasons Shop: Oh Young-seok, Kim No-mi and Song Sun-young (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) Mike's Arcade Mr. Kim Chu'n-kyong was the original owner of Mike's All Season Shop which he established in 1977. He sold it and started Mike's Arcade in 1983 just down the Mall. Along the way, there was a tussle over the "ownership" of the name, Mike between Mr. Kim and another merchant. Mr. Kim prevailed and the shop has been in continuous operation. Mike's Arcade is a family-operation and well-known amongst the frequent shoppers to the mall for its friendly service. Bag Lady's Tour of Songtan states: "Mike's Arcade: If you are pressed for time, and need to get some things fast--here is the place. It could be called a one stop shopping outlet. Located inside are a few areas: leatherwear, sweaters and souvenirs. One of the few places in the area to buy Korean Dolls, Mike's Arcade is located in the rear alley which hosts Mr. Lim's and Royal Bag and also on the corner of the main Shinjang Shopping Mall. Fountains are also available to purchase and usually line the side of his store in warm weather."
Osan AB Color TV Initiated The Los Angeles-based American Forces Radio and Television Service advised its TV networks in early 1974 that it intended to convert to full color in the near future. Accordingly, AFKN, along with its sister networks, began planning for procurement of color TV equipment. Upgrade was necessary as AFKN, and other networks, have found that in many cases replacement parts for black and white TV systems were no longer being manufactured. In Apr 74 Department of the Army's Material Procurement Priorities Review Committee approved FY 76 funding of $828,000 for AFKN color TV equipment. (Source: UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1974, p. 210) The equipment arrived in the ROK between Mar-Jun 77. The equipment was installed concurrently with the black-and-white operations without any disruption of services. On 1 Jul 77 programs were shown for the first time with regular telecasts starting on 2 Jul 77, All AFKN movies were to be in color by the year's end. In Dec 77, AFKN advanced its weekday sign-on time was from 1400 to 1200 hours. Generally the prime time evening shows showed the previous day were used to fill the schedule in the afternoons. The ROK government did not approve of the changeover to the color TV operations. It wanted the changeover delayed until local programming could convert to color operations. The USFK did not agree and forwarded the it to the US-ROK SOFA Joint Committee for resolution but they remained at variance. The AFKN decided to compromise and show color in the evening prime time shows and for sports events which constituted 45 percent of the AFKN telecast time. Live satellite television coverage of major US sports events by AFKN-TV increased substantially during 1977. A total of 25 live sports telecasts were received for USFK viewers compared to seven in 1976. Satellite coverage included NFL and college football (75 percent), World Series and All-Star baseball, and professional basketball games. The additional live programming became possible because of a marked expansion in DoD funding for satellite telecasts overseas. USFK viewer reaction to live TV programming was enthusiastic. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History 1977.) Hondol Systems Remain Number One Off-base Health Hazard The most significant health hazard encountered during 1977 was carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning attributed to traditional Korean compressed coal home heating systems. The ondol (hot floor) heating methods are potentially hazardous due to the generation of CO when incomplete combustion of the coal occurs. Hundreds of CO deaths among the Korean population are reported annually. During Nov-Dec 76 four USFK servicemen died from CO poisoning despite an intensive prefventive health education effort launched prior tot he winter heating season. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History 1977.) Only one USFK death resulted from overexposure to carbon monoxide in 1977, that of a USAF serviceman in Apr 77. On 11 Apr a 19-year old airman from the 51st Supply Squadron died at an off-base residence (Songtan) as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) Living quarters utilizing compressed coal heating systems were not approved for occupancy by USFK personnel, unless an alternate safe system was provided and the ondol arrangement made inoperable. CO Monitors were provided in the exchanges, but none were found fully adequate for the purpose intended. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History 1977.) Predominant Diseases There was a relatively high incidence of two diseases among the military troop population in the ROK. Both were debilitating but neither were fatal. The first of these was hepatitis, a virus of the liver, usully caused by contamination or poor hygiene in off-post areas. Despite a command-wide gamma globulin program, rate of incidence in 1977 was the same as in previous years -- four per thousand per year. The other, venereal disease was far more prevalent affecting 45 US military members per thousand per month. The CY 7 figure reflected the per annum average which is slightly higher than the rate in CONUS military commands. Unlike hepatitis, which can cause absences from duty of up to three months, VD does not result in a loss of appreciable man-days as most soldiers were treated on an out-patient rather than in-patient basis. Unsanitary conditions and availability of contacts add to the VD problem. Both diseases were the subject of frequent health lectures and command information bulletins and articles. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History 1977.) Nuclear Weapons Storage at Osan Deactivated During the mid-1970s, US nuclear weapons storage sites in South Korea included Osan Air Base, Kunsan Air Base, Kwang Ju Air Base, Camp Ames, Camp Colbern, and Batteries A-F of the 44th Air Defense Artillery's 2nd Battalion. The nuclear weapons storage site at Osan was deactivated late in 1977. (Source: Camp Ames.) 554th CESHR Squadron "Red Horse" The addition of 26 aircraft shelters and revetments anticipating the arrival of F-111, F-15, and A-10 aircraft were completed between 1977-1979. The following is from Robert G."Andy" Anderson's Red Horse Country:
U.S. Nuclear Reorganization in the Pacific; Nuclear Weapons Storage Closed at Osan (S/FRD) The physical security of stored nuclear weapons and other munitions was a matter of continuing study and interest. From 5 to 11 February and IG team visited the U.S. Naval Magazine at Guam. From 6 to 10 June another team, this time supplemented by an officer from CINCPAC's Operations Directorate, inspected the physical security of nuclear weapons stored in Korea at Camp Ames and Kunsan and Osan Air Bases. (As noted in the Operations chapter of this history, the nuclear weapons storage site at Osan was deactivated later in the year.) A third visit, again with Operations Directorate support, was made to two branch facilities of the Naval Magazine at Lualualei, Hawaii, the West Loch and Waikele branches, on Oahu. From 30 October through 3 November an IG team, again with Operations Directorate support, conducted an inspection of the Physical security of nuclear weapons stored at the U.S. Naval Magazine at Adak, Alaska." (Source: Nautilus.org.) (NOTE: Nuclear Weapons storage shifted to Camp Ames at Waegan near Taegu.)  Change in 36th TFS Mission "Air power remained a vital component of successful military operatons and the attainment of rapid and low cost victory, even if lower-level contingency operations or deterrence measures fail and a crisis escalates into major operations. It has been and will remain our clear asymmetric advantage over our enemies." (Source: FAS.) On 1 Jan 1977, the mission of the 36th changed. The primary mission of the 36th was air superiority, with air to ground being secondary. (Source: 36th Fiends History.) The 36 TFS was assigned a single air-to-air mission. The 36th TFS air-to-air mission caused the unit to the specialize to the degree that approximately 60-80 percent of their training involved air-to-air employment. Their purpose was to "maintain a high degree of proficiency through constant training, refine their current tactics to optimize their capabilities, and develop new tactics as necessary to counter the enemy threat. Their secondary mission involved air-to-ground employment, but it limited training to maintaining a familiarization level in deliveries and did not include the more sophisticated elements of weapon employment and advanced tactics." The overall impact of the switch to air superiority involved a trade-off between flexibility and specialization -- and the trade-off between associated quantity-quality advantages and disadvantages. The decision to specialize was based on the contention that the pilots cannot effectively maintain the proficiency necessary to accomplish both the air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Given the nature of the threat in Korea and Europe at the time and the requirement for air superiority, a significant air-to-air force was needed to be capable of performing consistently with the highest degree of excellence. On 18-20 January a HQ USAF air-to-air capabilities study group called Corona Ace visited Osan to study/observe local methods of aircrew training systems reliability, etc. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) On 10-12 Feb the 1st Test Squadron from Clark AB visited Osan AB and briefed on the air-to-air specialization and structured training program initiated by the 3 TFW at Clark AB. This program was primarily responsible for the assignment of a single DOC (air-to-air superiority) being assigned to the 51COMPW/36TFS. (Source: 36th Fiends History) In the early 70s, the 36th TFS was tasked to provide air superiority over South Korea. However, as the ROKAF picked up more and more 'defensive' air roles, the 36th taskings moved northward, providing air superiority of the DMZ and areas north. Then, escort missions were added to the taskings for both USAF and ROKAF units bombing up north. Continuous CAP missions were added as the air mission was moved farther northward. This of course is a flexible concept, but essentially, the 36th mission moved northward in an air superiority role all the way to the Yalu river. Counterair is directed at enemy forces and target sets that directly (airborne aircraft, surface-to-air missiles) or indirectly (airfields; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; command and control facilities) challenge control of the air. To support the offensive and defensive counterair capability with near-real time intelligence to provide advance warning of any planned surprise attack, a U-2 detachment was added at Osan in 1976 -- in addition to the RF-4C detachment of the 15th TRS, 18th TFW (though not yet officially assigned). The reconnaissance function was essential for a 24/7 alert on an enemy poised for attack just across the DMZ. From an Airman's perspective, "air superiority is the desired state before all other combat operations. Attaining air superiority provides both the freedom to attack and freedom from attack, as well as ensuring freedom to maneuver. Operating without air superiority radically increases risk to surface and air operations. It is a key factor is gaining the necessary security for follow-on operations. It can be localized (protection of high value assets) or theaterwide. It includes both offensive and defensive missions." (Source: FAS.) Although the least efficient method of gaining air superiority is by air-to-air combat, past experience and future considerations made this method plausible. Although the F-4E aircraft was fully capable of the multipurpose role, maximum effectiveness would be obtained by pilots specializing in either the air-to-air or air-to-ground mission -- realistically the units had to find a balance between the two. Given the North Korean strategy to infiltrate their Special Operation Forces (SOF) behind South Korean lines in the initial phases of the conflict meant the F-4Es were expected to sweep the skies of the MiGs flying cover for the slow-moving AN-2s carrying the SOFs. Once the SOFs were inserted, the DPRK aircraft were to withdraw to the northern bases next to the Chinese border where the allies would be afraid to attack for fear of inciting China to join the fray. From that northern base locations, the DPRK fighter mission would be to protect Pyeongyang and other key sites from aerial bombardment. Aircraft in hardened shelters made the offensive counterair option limited. Because the DPRK would have ceded air superiority early on, the F-4Es would most likely be tasked with its secondary air-to-ground role as soon as the DPRK fighters ceded the skies. This led to a problem with the role of the F-4E as the "swing fighter" capable of both air-to-air and air-to-ground employment. The problem was that the 36th TFS allotted 60-80 percent of their training time to their primary air-to-air role, while the remainder was for air-to-ground and other taskings. Under the single air-to-air mission tasking, the air-to-ground role (air interdiction) became a secondary mission with training reduced to familiarization only. If a war broke out, the lack of proficiency training in the air-to-ground role could impact the outcomes of the battles. Though the primary air interdiction tasking in the 1970s was given to naval fleet aviation (Navy/Marines) and Kunsan's F-4Ds, if the DPRK broke through the Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA) defenses, there would plenty of air-to-ground action to go around and there would be a time lag as naval and USAF units rushed to Korea. As a result, there were constant "negotiations" between the unit-level and Headquarters PACAF over training issues. Supposedly HQ PACAF showed flexibility in finding a balance between the numbers of qualified pilots in air-to-air versus the air-to-ground roles. However, others took a more pragmatic viewpoint. First, they viewed the issue from the perspective that the 36th TFS would NOT be tasked with its secondary DOC until all the DPRK had been destroyed -- which was not likely -- so the air superiority role was the ONLY tasking the squadron needed to be concerned with. Second, the 36th TFS would not be tasked with its secondary DOC until after the inital FRAG (90 days) was complete. After 90 days, the North would either have: (1) been defeated and its attempt to capture all the peninsula failed so the 36th TFS would continue in an air superiority role as the allied forces continued the mop-up operations; or (2) the invasion had been successful and DPRK troops had captured all the peninsula whereby the 36th TFS mission of maintaining air superiority would be on-going as the allies planned on retaking the peninsula. The Korean Military Environment in late-1970s On the ground the removal of the 7th ID from the DMZ in 1970 left the 2d ID in a support role with the ROK Army taking over the defense along the DMZ. On 9 Sep 1975, the UN flag came down over US bases in Korea after the ROK declared that it could defend itself against the North without assistance from the UN -- as long as China did not enter the fray. The ROK based its defense on the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the US. The ROK military upgrades promised if the ROK sent troops to Vietnam were underway. The first ROK F-4E arrived in 1977 and the F-5E/F replacements for the F-5A/B given to Vietnam were underway. However, amidst this ROK buildup, the US was attempting to find ways to disengage from Korea. Across the border, the North had arrayed 90 percent of its forces along the DMZ -- and threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" with its long-range artillery along the DMZ. Negotiations were underway to upgrade its military and air force with major equipment grants from Russia and China. The first of these new aircraft started arriving in 1976. If an all-out war in Korea broke out, the air-to-air arena would become more confusing because of the numbers of aircraft involved in a full-out wartime scenario. However, in the mid-1970s, they were developing systems and procedures to resolve the command and control problems with E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) -- later with the 460th AWACS permanently deployed to Kadena in the 1980s. In addition, there were advanced missile and fire control systems coming on-line along with higher level tactical employment concepts. The reconnaissance function was essential for a 24/7 alert on an enemy poised for attack just across the DMZ. A U-2 detachment was added at Osan in 1976 to provide near-real time intelligence on DPRK troops movements and military actions. In addition to the RF-4C detachment of the 15th TRS, 18th TFW -- though not yet officially assigned -- was in operation at Osan. The North's MiGs were just minutes away from Osan AB so early warning was essential. In the mid-1970s, the F-4E and follow-on F-16s became the "swing fighters" capable of both air-to-air and air-to-ground employment. Although the aircraft were fully capable of the multipurpose role, maximum effectiveness was obtained by pilots specializing in either the air-to-air or air-to-ground mission. However, in Korea, the unique circumstances created problems as there had to be a trade-off over proficiency in both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. The deployment overseas of the F-15s for air superiority and F-16s for air-to-ground were still on the horizon. The A-10 was to take over the CAS role. In Jan 1976, the 51st COMPW(T) was augmented by the 621st Tactical Control Squadron and its tactical air control center. These combined with the 19th TASS comprised the Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS) to provide support to the infantry units of the 2d ID and EUSA. Changing North Korean Strategy A point needs to be made that in mid-1970s that the North changed its strategy from active insurgency and infiltration into South Korea -- to a static battle with terrorist tactics (abductions of civilians, hit-and-run ambushes on the DMZ, and bombings) and subversion (sleeper cells). It is important to remember that the OPLAN taskings were changing the 36th Designed Operational Capability (DOC) and in turn, the wartime missions for the 36th -- as well as the peacetime 'training requirement' changes. The North changed its plans from attempting to overthrow the ROK government through communist-inspired demonstrations to a policy to foster open invasion to achieve its goals of replacing the established ROK government. Tunnel #2 (1975) and Tunnel #3 (1978) were discovered along the DMZ that seemed to confirm this change in strategy. Though infiltrators were still caught in 1977, there was a downward trend for infiltrations since 1971. This change in DPRK strategy to favor an invasion to affect a government change directly impacted on the 36th TFS air-to-air mission taskings -- and secondary air-to-ground tasking. But remember also that as the ROK increased its air capabilities, it took over more and more of the air defense role -- and by 1978, the 36th TFS role was strictly north of the DMZ in an air superiority role. This change in North Korean strategy has been reflected in the USFK Operation Plans (Oplan 5027: Major Theater Warfare) to this day. (SITE NOTE: There was an important change in the USFK strategy in the 1990s as the North's equipment started to deteriorate and its military readiness was weakened by nationwide famine caused by devastating floods. Starvation was rampant. Thus the USFK added the policy to "take the fight North" after the follow-ons arrived. This was significant as the US for the first time approved of a government change in the North by destroying the North and handing the reins of government to the South -- in effect ending the Korean War on allied terms. After liberals Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun came into office, this policy created severe friction between the allies as the "Sunshine Policy" (Peace and Prosperity policy) fostered rapproachment. This friction culminated in Oplan 5027 being shelved in 2006 without ROK agreement to the Oplan.) The North gave up on the idea that a "popular uprising" incited by communist agitators could overthrow the ROK government under the Park Chung-hee dictatorship -- and later Chun Doo-hwan's dictatorship. Infiltrations dropped off significantly after the attacks on President Park at the Blue House in Jan 1968 and the Pueblo Incident shortly thereafter. The overthrow of the ROK government would have to be by armed invasion to effect a change in government -- and the North turned its insurgents into "sleeper cells" and attempted to infiltrate the academia, unions and government functions dealing with the infrastructure (transportation, communications, electricity and water). (Source: Adam J. Hebert, "Keeping Watch on Korea", Air Force Magazine, Vol. 87, No. 6 (June 2004).) Open military provocations became the norm as with the Tree Cutting Incident on the DMZ in Aug 1976. The KCIA (later ANSP and then NIS), the government intelligence arm, continued to discover these North Korean spies clustered in cells well into the 1990s. The aim of these cells was subversion of the government. In October 1992, a North Korean 400-member spy ring in South Korea, directed by North Korean Communist party official Lee Son-sil, was uncovered by South Korea's Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP). It was revealed that the mission of the spy ring was to establish an underground command center for subversive operations in the South. According to the South Korean agency, The North Korean agents had infiltrated through South Korea's coastlines. (Source: S Korea's Anjibu Arrests Alleged NK Spies.)In 1977, the DPRK air force was made up of mostly obsolete aircraft. However by the beginning of the 1980's, the NKAF began a new round of modernization: in addition to 150 MiG-21's, the NKAF received from the USSR a batch of 60 MiG-23P fighter-bombers and MiG-23ML close-support fighters and from China - 40 Q-5 Fantan ground attack planes. (There is some discprenancy about this number. One source lists North Korea as receiving 150 Q-5's while most others believe that number to be 40). These elite 56th Guards and 57th Fighter Regiments are equipped with MiG-29 and MiG-23 and are based near Pyongyang to defend the capital. During the 1980s, the NKAF substantially increased its helicopter inventory from 40 to 275. Helicopters in service include Mi-2/HOPLITE, Mi-4/HOUND, and Mi-8/HIP. (Source: Global Security.org.) The invasion of the South would be a surprise attack with the massed forces along the DMZ attempting to breach the barriers of the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle areas A/B/C/D). As the North's forces pushed through the DMZ, the North Korean long-range artillery was poised along the DMZ to turn Seoul into "a sea of fire" in the opening moments of the conflict -- spreading panic throughout Korea. While the DPRK ground forces and tanks punched through the DMZ, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) would create havoc behind the lines with the assistance of the "sleeper cells." Amphibious SOFS would land via the coastline and attack naval facilities and secure landing points where DPRK forces were to land to open up secondary "fronts" on the allied flanks. The DPRK Special Operations Forces (SOF) were broken down into three types: airborne brigades, air force sniper brigades, and navy amphibious brigades. The airborne brigades were the elements that would be first inserted with the AN-2s and provided air cover by MiGs. These elements would create havoc in the countryside with the help of "sleeper cells" in South Korea and create a "second front" in the rear. The air force sniper brigades supported the navy sniper brigades missions by attacking military targets, assassinating key personnel as well as attacking targets in the Japan and Okinawa. The navy sniper brigades was similar to the air force sniper brigades and would infiltrate the ROK via the sea to attack naval resources and secure landing points for DPRK forces.
In the event of hostilities, the North's air forces primary mission would be to insert the DPRK airborne brigade and air force sniper brigade SOF units into South Korea using AN-2s from airbases along the DMZ. The airborne SOF forces were to be parachuted into the areas outside Seoul and in central areas of the South. The North Korean MiGs would fly cover for these missions -- and anticipated the actions of the US and ROKAF aviation elements in air-to-air confrontations. The DPRK realized that it could not maintain air superiority against the allied air forces/naval aviation in Korea and Japan after the initial element of surprise in the invasion wore off. In the southern and east coast portions of Korea in 1977, navy sniper brigade SOFs would be landing via their newly-developed submersible boats -- most likely in the Sochon area, South Cholla Province; the Mokpo, Pohang and Pusan area in the south; and Gangnung on the east coast. In the 1960s, the SOFs used scuba gear and flotation devices for infiltration, but by 1977 they had Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDV) and the first-generation submersibles that operated just below the surface of the water after being dropped off by mother ships or spy boats. They were to secure landing points for DPRK forces to breach the ROK defenses on the coastal flanks. If the main force succeeded in breaching the DMZ, they would consolidate below Seoul and sweep south in a pincer movement to join up with these forces as they swept south. (NOTE: Most likely that many SOFs would have inserted themselves in the South long before any planned invasion date via landings on the outer islands with mother ships -- as these areas were not monitored for infiltrations. The SOFs masquarading as South Koreans would then simply catch the island ferries to the mainland -- the preferred method of infiltrators in the 1970s. There was also the possibility of a large-scale invasion of Pusan just as the North tried in the intial phase of the Korean War. A little publicized fact is that the first shots of the Korean War were fired in that engagement when the ROK Navy sank a North Korean WWII-vintage LST loaded with North Korean troops off Pusan before the actual invasion on the DMZ areas.) By 2004, North Korea had the capacity to transport 20,000 special force troops at the same time. North Korea has 130 high-speed landing crafts and 140 hovercrafts. A North Korean hovercraft can carry one platoon of troops at 90 km per hour. In 2007, it was revealed that the DPRK had developed larger models of the hovercraft that were undetectable by present radar to transport up to company-size elements. Western experts pooh-pooh North Korea's ancient AN-2 transport planes as 1948 relics, but AN-2 planes can fly low beneath radar surveillance and deliver up to 10 troops at 160 km per hour. North Korea makes AN-2s and has about 300 in place. In addition, North Korea has hang-gliders that can carry 5-20 men each for short hops. During the intial breakout of hostilities, the DPRK MiGs will fly cover for the AN-2s delivering the SOFs behind South Korean lines.The North's tanks and infantry were to swiftly punch through the DMZ, consolidate around Seoul and then push south to capture the entire peninsula. All the while the SOFs were to be creating panic and disabling the infrastructure throughout the nation -- electricity, transportation, communications and water. Because of the SOF mission, it was paramount to swiftly neutralize the MiG cover of the slower-moving AN-2 aircraft carrying the SOFs infiltrating South Korea -- and then shoot down these AN-2 aircraft BEFORE the SOFs were able to deploy. For the DPRK air forces, once the SOFs were inserted, they were to cede that air superiority and fall back to the northern airfields near the China border. As the Oplan 5027 evolved, the ROKAF picked up more and more of the Air Defense missions. In the early 70s, the unit was tasked to provide Air Superiority for the entire South Korean peninsula. But, as the ROKAF picked up more and more 'defensive' air roles, the 36th taskings moved northward, providing Air Superiority of the DMZ and areas north. By 1978, the 36th had almost NO taskings for defensive operations south of the DMZ. Then, escort missions were added to the taskings for both USAF and ROKAF units bombing up north. Continuous CAP missions were added as the air mission was moved farther northward. Once the SOFs were inserted, the North's air force would withdraw to the northern bases along the China border near the Yalu River -- knowing that the allied forces would be very careful not to provoke the Chinese into entering the conflict on the side of the North. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was not considered a major threat. HOWEVER, the PLA infantry was still a formidable threat and one that would not be taken lightly. (SITE NOTE: In 1976, the USFK was not overly worried by the PLAAF as it had been crippled by the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution. The major problem was the advocacy of an imminent war doctrine under which the training of pilots was so haphazard that by 1968 the achievement levels of graduates were so low they could not be used in the units where they were assigned. (Source: PLAAF: Rand Report.) By 1977, the PLAAF was a disaster.) The 36th TFS role was to bottle up the North's air power to ensure that the allied forces could exert pressure on the North's forces south of the DMZ. Later the 36th TFS would provide MiG CAP missions to protect the air-to-ground aircraft attacking North Korean targets. As was said before, once the initial assault on the South was completed, the North's MiGs would fall into an air defense role to protect North Korean targets. In essence, the North's air forces were going to cede air superiority early on and rely on their ground forces to capture the entire penisula swiftly before the US follow-on forces could mobilize -- and then it could sue for ceasefire to win a "negotiated settlement" to the hostilities. Any negotiating relationship with the DPRK follows a standardized pattern of behavior that focuses on two specific goals: "[First,] the North Koreans negotiate to win concessions that strengthen the communist regime's political control. Second, they pursue objectives designed to enhance their military capabilities". For more than 50 years this isolated, perpetually failing regime has consistently achieved those two goals through manipulating US and -international fears of war and through pursuing its bullying style of negotiation. Five clearly identifiable stages mark the DPRK negotiating strategy. First, the regime will use or instigate a crisis to coerce ROK or US negotiators to the bargaining table. The second phase of the DPRK negotiating strategy usually culminates with an agreement that includes statements of guilt, apology, or major concessions from the United States, ROK, or UN participants to the negotiations. Third, after some time passes, North Korea will begin to dispute the terms of the agreement. Fourth, the DPRK will pull out or otherwise break the agreement (often sparking another crisis). And finally, the North attempts to shift blame for breaking the agreement to a third party—usually the ROK or the United States. (Source: Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy, 1999..)If the North captured the peninsula, it would hold the ROK populace and US POWs hostage to world and immediately sue for peace and start the "negotiation process" to win concessions through a long drawn-out process -- while at the same time, consolidating its stranglehold on South Korea. In 1977, it knew the world feared another war -- and especially after Vietnam, the US was seeking ways to disengage from Korea. What kept the DPRK in check was that its closest ally, China, was starting to open its doors to the US after Nixon's visit to China. In pursuing detente with the Soviet Union and an opening to China, the United States acknowledged it could no longer shoulder alone the costs of containment in both Europe and Asia. The Nixon Doctrine, the return of Okinawa to Japan, strategic arms control, the liquidation of the war in Vietnam, restricting imports, and cutting the dollar's link to gold were all attempts to assure an orderly transition as the United States entered a period of relative decline and began to reduce its military presence in Asia. (Source: The Nixon `Shocks' And U.S. - Japan Strategic Relations, 1969-74, Working Paper No. 2, Michael Schaller, The University of Arizona.) The US was reducing its presence in Asia which is exactly what China and Russia wanted. Any conflict in Korea would upset the apple cart. Defensive Counterair Defensive counterair (DCA) is defined as "all defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace." (Source: DoD Dictionary.) The concept was to protect the "defense area." The Defense area is defined as "the area extending from the forward edge of the battle area to its rear boundary. It is here that the decisive defensive battle is fought." (Source: DoD Dictionary.) In a nutshell, "defensive counterair" for the 36th TFS was to shoot down any enemy aircraft entering into Korean airspace from the DMZ to Pusan. But this role would be by definition only. In truth, there were NO Air Defense units in PACAF (except the Hawaii ANG), while there were several in USAFE. The F-102 Fighter Interceptor squadrons at Kadena had been phased out in the early 1970s. The Air Superiority tasking was much more difficult and with higher standards (greater quantity and types of sorties required) than Air Defense. "Defensive counterair" would be the primary mission of the 36th TFS in the initial phases of a North Korean invasion. As was mentioned before, the US aviation elements would be engaged in air-to-air combat immediately with the North Korean MiGs who would be providing air cover for the AN-2s carrying DPRK SOFs. The AN-2s would be staged from bases along the DMZ and carry SOFs to be parachuted into areas around Seoul and the central provinces of Korea. For the North, it would be a short-lived "surge" for the MiGs to cover the insertions into the South. By 1978, the air defense mission south of the DMZ had been turned over to the ROKAF, but the 36th TFS maintain air superiority from the DMZ northward to the Yalu River. As such in the initial hours of an invasion, the 36th TFS would be responsible for denying the MiGs access to South Korea air space. With MiGs flying cover over the ancient AN-2s, the 36th would have its hands full engaging the MiGs in air-to-air combat over the DMZ and southward. The ROKAF aircraft flying air defense would have a turkey shoot on the AN-2s -- IF THE MIGS COULD BE KEPT AT BAY. If the advantage of air superiority was lost, it would spell disaster as the SOF insertion behind the lines would be virtually uncontested -- and confusion and havoc would reign in the major cities. After the SOF insertion mission was completed, the DPRK fighters would fall back to bases near the Chinese border -- where the allies would fear to bomb because of the potential of China entering the conflict. From these bases, the MiGs would operate to protect Pyeongyang and other critical assets in North Korea as directed. Pyeongyang and other key cities had built underground shelters and nerve centers over the past 50 years in anticipation of bombing in case of a war. The 36th TFS tasking would change to "offensive counterair" as they would be tasked to take on the MiGs over the North. Other units such as the 8th TFW having the air-to-ground mission would attack pre-identified key targets. The 36th TFS would be assigned to provide air cover for the missions -- engaging the DPRK MiGs now flying from the relative safety of their bases along the Yalu River. (SITE NOTE: After the introduction of air/sea/land cruise missiles with their amazing accuracy in the 1980s, the strategies of the North changed to sheltering of their aircraft within mountains or tunnels -- and the hardened shelters at the bases. However, the DPRK basic strategy remained to use the threat of Chinese intervention to keep the bombing of their northern bases to a minimum.) With the 36th TFS tasked with maintaining air-to-air superiority, the 36th would engage in more Dissimilar Aircraft Combat Tactics (DACT) training to maintain their "edge" in aerial combat with the MiGs of the North. The DACT training initially pitted their F-4Es mostly against the T-38s using Soviet air tactics of the 26th TFTS Aggressor Squadron of Clark AB. On 24 Jan 1978, eight F-15s from the 1 TFW arrived at Osan AB for DACT with the 36 TFS. It was the first operational deployment of the F-15s since their introduction to the USAF. (Source: 36th Fiends Site.) Later DACT was scheduled with F-15s from Kadena when they deployed to Osan AB -- and even Marine A-4 aircraft from Iwakuni MCAS. Air Superiority (or Offensive Counterair) However, "offensive counterair" was the preferred method for air superiority, allowing the units to choose the time and place of attack, thus retaining the initiative. (Source: FAS.) The first priority of battle: accomplishing the counterair campaign. As General Robert J. Dixon said in 1974, "Ground forces that do not enjoy protection from an attack and are without benefit of substantial air support will not prevail over a force possessing these essentials." (Source: General Robert J. Dixon, "The Range of Tactical Air Operations," Strategic Review, Spring 1974, p. 24.) "Offensive Counterair" operations (OCA) are meant "to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, but as close to their source as possible. Offensive counterair operations range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. These operations include attack operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, fighter escort, and fighter sweep." The commander must balance the level of air superiority necessary to conduct operations with an acceptable level of risk versus the effort required to achieve that level of air superiority.The problem with "offensive counterair" in the North Korean environment in 1977 was that North Korea had approximately seventy air bases, including jet and non-jet capable bases and emergency landing strips, with aircraft deployed to between twenty and thirty of them. The majority of tactical aircraft were concentrated at air bases around P'yongyang and in the southern provinces. P'yongyang could place almost all its military aircraft in hardened -- mostly underground -- shelters. North Korean aircraft were sheltered in underground hangars and plenty of runways were available. It seemed highly improbable that the NKAF would be knocked out in one strike. North Korea deployed about fifty percent of its fighters in the DMZ front area which made it possible for a surprise attack to all areas of South Korea. The probability of destroying enemy air forces on the ground was seriously degraded by their sophisticated air defense systems and dispersed and hardened aircraft shelters. In addition, key factories and nerve centers had been moved underground over the past 50 years and there was little in the form of meaningful targets in the area. In addition, Pyeongyang and other major cities had vast underground shelters for the populace in anticipation of the "War with the US imperialists." In essence, "offensive counterair" would lack effective targets as they had been moved underground, into hardened shelters or into caves within mountains. But on the positive side was that the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had been severely impacted by the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution. In August 1966, all non-flying schools suspended classes. This situation lasted for nearly six years, halting virtually all non-flying and ground training. In many instances, military school compounds were occupied or destroyed as well as teaching materials, books, and equipment. Instructors, researchers, and staff were often scattered throughout China. In the worst cases, they were killed or died. The expected training goal for the thirteen non-flying schools during the Cultural Revolution years was 21,900 students, but only 5,650 graduated. In matters involving flight safety, education, training, strategy, and tactics, PLAAF historians claim the Cultural Revolution actually caused atrophy. For the PLAAF, the cessation of education was more complicated than it was for society as a whole. The problems resulting from the “stop classes, make revolution” activities were disruptive but did not pose the most harmful consequences. ... The major problem was Lin Biao’s advocacy of an imminent war doctrine. ... the training was so haphazard that by 1968 the achievement levels of graduates were so low they could not be used in the units where they were assigned. (Source: PLAAF: Rand Report.) (SITE NOTE: By 1976, the PLAAF was in shambles. It would not be until the 1990s before the PLAAF had fully recovered from the effects of the Cultural Revolution. Since China began opening its doors in the late 1970s, the PLAAF’s five commanders have emphasized direct contact with foreign air forces by leading an average of one delegation abroad per year and hosting visits to China by an average of two to four foreign air force commanders annually. In other words, the Chinese PLAAF were attempting to reduce the tensions between China and its neighbors.) What this meant was that the Chinese Air Force was NOT a threat in 1976. However, the PLA soldiers were a formidable entity -- enough to worry the US about China's potential entry into a Korean conflict -- and inhibit planned offensive actions against the northern bases close to the Yalu River in case of war. Air Interdiction "Air interdiction" is the use of aircraft to attack tactical ground targets that are NOT in close proximity to friendly ground forces. It differs from close air support because it does not directly support ground operations and is not closely coordinated with ground units. Unlike strategic bombing, air interdiction is not meant as an independent air campaign; its ultimate purpose is still to allow ground operations rather than to defeat an enemy by air power alone." In other words, it "shapes" the battlefield. (Source: DoD Dictionary.) Air interdiction was an air-to-ground function and a secondary mission of the 36th TFS. However, as was explained previously, the North was going to cede air superiority early on, and apparently leaving the 36th TFS to assume its secondary function. The concern was that the pilots having air-to-ground proficiency as familiarization only, would not have the proficiency to perform adequately in real world combat operations. But the truth was that these secondary taskings were not even considered in any of the OPLANS until well past the initial FRAGs (about 3 months), and then only if Air Superiority was assured for both the north and south. Essentially this would have been after all DPRK aircraft were eliminated -- which was not very likely. Thus realistically, the 36th TFS would probably never have been tasked with air interdiction despite it being a secondary tasking. Thus the DOC training became a heated topic between units in the field and headquarters PACAF. There were constant "negotiations" in the late 1970s between PACAF and units on training proficiency standards. Development of the defense suppression DOC was an evolutionary process, involving almost continual negotiation between the unit and higher headquarters to resolve differing viewpoints on how the aircrews should be trained and what skills the individual aircrew needed to possess in order to be truly mission-ready. This evolution uncovered unexpected doctrinal and procedural problem areas, not all of which were fully resolved under the GCC system. (Major Donald J. Alberts & Captain Leroy Mock, "Increased Air-to-Air Specialization Training," Air University Review (Nov-Dec 1978).) However, there is a clarification to be made. During the initial hours of the invasion, pandemonium would reign as the primary goal for the allied forces would be to prevent the DPRK forces from breaching the DMZ. ROK aircraft fulfilling the air defense role would be attempting to shoot down the AN-2s before they deposited their payloads of SOFs. The 36th TFS would have its hands full with MiGs flying cover for the AN-2s. In its air superiority role, its mission would be to take on the DPRK MiGs in aerial combat. The 8th TFW would be flying air-interdication missions along with ROK aircraft. At this point, the USAF and Navy/Marine aerial support would still be headed toward Korea. The 8th TFW and 51st COMPW(T) alone would initially provide all the USFK air resources providing aerial combat support until the forces from Japan and Okinawa could arrive. The ROK Army forces -- and US Army forces of the 2d ID -- would be engaged along the DMZ. The ROK Navy at that time primarily a coastal fleet with outdated craft would have its hands full trying to protect the porous coast line from infiltrators. The DPRK submarines -- noisy WWII deisel subs -- were to block the sea lanes to prevent reinforcements sent by sea. After the DPRK air forces had withdrawn from the battlefield, air interdiction would be involved initially in air-to-ground targeting of DPRK forces that hopefully would have been stalled along the DMZ from tank traps in the western corridor above Seoul. The USFK and ROK infantry forces were continuing to fight to stop the North's tanks and infantry. In the 1970s most of the roads near the DMZ were crude two lane affairs (much of it dirt) fitted with strategic "tank traps" -- concrete slabs that would be detonated to drop onto the roads to impede usage by advancing North Korean tanks. Theoretically, once blocked, the North's invasion movement south would be stalled as they bypassed the obstacles -- becoming immobile targets for US air power. The narrow roads and most of these barriers would not be removed until the 2000s. Air interdiction would be aimed at crippling these invasion convoys -- and try to prevent the remaining DPRK units from reconsolidating their forces below Seoul for the push south. Initially, this would have been handed over to the ROKAF and the 8th TFW F-4Ds. If the situation became critical, 36th TFS F-4Es might be pressed into air-to-ground action, but this would have been only as a last resort measure. Within 24 hours, the Seventh fleet aircraft would be arriving to assist in naval bombardment, CAS and air-interdiction along with the ROK aircraft. US Army forces from Japan would be parachuting directly into action after 48 hours. The 8th TFW F-4Ds would continue their air interdiction mission, while the 36th TFS would provide air superiority and MiG CAP for any air interdiction missions over the North. Kadena's aircraft would start arriving after 48 hours and immediately pressed into battle. Air interdiction targets would be handed off to aircraft from Kadena whose primary tasking had been air-to-ground. Their tasking would be to cut the DPRK supply lines to support their invasion. Within 72 hours, the Marines from Okinawa would arriving with their tanks and equipment at either at Inchon or near Pohang -- dependent on the ROK ground situation. Around this time, some of the F-4E aircraft from Clark AB would be arriving to assist the 36th TFS in their air superiority role. (NOTE: Both units had near identical air superiority DOCs and DACT training -- and the 36th TFS training was based on the 3rd TFW program.) If the DPRK invasion succeeded in breaking through the DMZ, the North would attempt to consolidate its forces to the south of Seoul before it proceeded with its march south -- in a pincer movement, like that used in the Korean War. On arm would swing along the west coast through Kunsan and onto Mokpo. The other arm would head directly to Taegu and then on to Pusan. Remember that the Seoul-Pusan "super-highway" (Kyongbu Expressway) had just been completed on 30 Jun 1970 -- and despite its four military landing zones, it was the prime target to rapidly move on Pusan. The first ROK-US landings on the San Gil highway portion near Suwon on 1975 were to practice tactics for the air-to-ground functions under air interdiction taskings. This was again practiced in Team Spirit 77 -- though the 36th TFS had by then assumed its sole air-to-air DOC. The 36th TFS air superiority role would be all the more important as the allied air forces attacking the advancing DPRK troops would need free movement to attack the enemy at the locations and under the conditions of their choosing. The USFK -- including USFJ units -- and ROK forces were to hold out for two weeks to allow the follow-on forces to arrive from CONUS. All additional taskings for the air-to-ground missions were to be filled by follow-ons, not the 36th. These follow-ons were to arrive in phased packages over a 90-day period. It was thought in the 1970s that if the DPRK could not capture all of the ROK within 90 days, it would be crushed simply because its supply lines would have been stretched to the breaking point -- and the USFK and ROKAF would has started to break the chain. Under this view, the ROK Army and ROK Air Force were earmarked with a 90-day supply of ammunition by the US under the War Readiness Stocks for Allies -- Korea (WRSA-K) program. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 established the WRSA program, which allowed the stockpiling of U.S.-owned war reserve materiel during peacetime in selected allies' territory. Since 1974, a total of 600,000 tons of ammunition, ranging from rifle ammunition to missiles, had been stored at sites throughout the country. But the bottom line was that the air interdiction role for the 36th would not even be considered until 90 days after the initial invasion -- even though it was a secondary tasking. In reality, the 36th TFS would have air superiority as its only mission. Air Defense and Air Interception In conjunction with this change to the sole air superiority mission, the ROK air defense role (as part of air superiority) was also assumed. In the mid-1970s, the US was moving away from the strategy of using missiles (Nike-Hercules and Hawk) as the primary air defense against attacking enemy aircraft. The US turned over existing Nike-Hercules equipment (last in 1978) and Hawk batteries (last in 1980) to the ROK. This increased the role of air interception by both ROKAF and US aircraft as part of the air defense of the ROK airspace. In peacetime, most of the air intercepts were for Russian bombers (i.e. Bears) flying down the coast -- though a few DPRK MiGs did stray across the border causing the 36th alert aircraft to scramble. (SITE NOTE: Coastal air defense utilized aircraft patrols for infiltator boats as part of a combined force of ROK Navy, ROK maritime police and ROKAF aircraft -- and when an infiltrator boat was spotted, the 36th TFS alert aircraft were called upon to assist.) "Air interception" is "to effect visual or electronic contact by a friendly aircraft with another aircraft. Normally, the air intercept is conducted in the following five phases: a. climb phase--Airborne to cruising altitude. b. maneuver phase--Receipt of initial vector to target until beginning transition to attack speed and altitude. c. transition phase--Increase or decrease of speed and altitude required for the attack. d. attack phase--Turn to attack heading, acquire target, complete attack, and turn to breakaway heading. e. recovery phase--Breakaway to landing." (Source: DoD Dictionary.)In 1977, the reason the ROK had not accepted the full responsibility for its airspace was that they were still in transition to upgraded aircraft. The ROKAF received its first F-4Es in 1977 and was still fielding its F-5E/F fighter interceptors to replace the R/F-5A/Bs transferred to the Vietnamese Air Force in 1972. Thus the 36th TFS picked up the slack by handling air defense -- in conjunction with the ROKAF aircraft. However, as time wore on, the ROK took over more and more of the air defense role until the 36th TFS only had an air superiority mission over North Korea. (SITE NOTE: Washington reduced its military aid to Seoul in the early 1970s as a warning against the authoritarian rule and human right abuses of the Park regime. In response, Park Chung-hee sought self-sufficiency through defense budgeting -- as U.S. grant aid was terminated in 1976 -- and US-supported indigenous arms production. Despite a covert nuclear weapons program by the ROK and the illegal conversion of the Honest John missile, the US never abandoned the alliance with the ROK. The Republic of Korea Air Force (Hankook Kong Goon) was one of the largest operators of the Freedom Fighter, receiving 88 F-5As, 30 F-5Bs, and 8 RF-5As. The first F-5s arrived in Korea in early April of 1965. As a favor to the United States, in 1972, Korea transferred 36 F-5As and all its RF-5As to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. To make up the difference, the US government agreed to supply Korea with F-4 Phantoms and later-model F-5Es. The first F-5Es entered Korean service in 1974, when 19 ex-Vietnamese Air Force aircraft were delivered. This laid the foundation for the acquisition of 126 new-build F-5Es and 20 F-5Fs. The first F-5Es were allocated to the 1st Fighter Wing (115th, 122nd, and 123rd Tactical Fighter Squadrons) based at Kwang Ju air base. (Source: Fightertown.))However, by 1978 the 36th TFS had turned over most of their air defense responsibilities to the ROK and were only responsible for the area over the DMZ. As the ROKAF F-4Es came on line, the air superiority roles south of the DMZ were also turned over to the ROKAF, leaving the 36th with the air superiority role and MiG CAP missions over North Korea up to the Yalu River. Forward FAC and CAS For all intents and purposes, the Forward FAC missions had nothing to do with the F-4E -- and the 19th TASS worked exclusively with the USFK infantry units as the combat "eyes in the sky." On 30 Sept 1974, the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) flying the OV-10A Broncos had been assigned to the 51st COMPW(T) from the 314th Air Division (AD) when the Wing assumed control of the base. In 1977, the direct responsibility for Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS) was passed to the 5th Tactical Air Control Group, along with control of the Wing's tactical control elements. On 8 Jan 1980, the 19th TASS was assigned to the 5th Tactical Air Control Group (TACG). On 1 Jun 1982, the 51st COMPW(T) relinquished its tactical control mission when the Wing's KTACS elements were reassigned to the 314th AD. In place of the 19th TASS, the 51st COMPW(T) received a squadron of A–10 aircraft (25th TFS) in 1982. Based at Suwon AB, South Korea, this unit's close air support (CAS) capability complemented the Wing's existing air superiority role; the new mission mix resulted in redesignation as a tactical fighter wing on 1 Jul 1982. (Source: 51st FW History.) The 25th TFS A-10s assumed the CAS missions in support of the USFK ground forces and this mission was removed from the 36th TFS plate -- though the 36th still maintained its air-to-ground proficiency through familiarization training. In addition, in the event of a break out of hostilities, the Marine A-4s at Iwakuni, Japan and other 7th Fleet naval aviation assets would immediately provide CAS to USFK forces. (SITE NOTE: To this day, the 7th Fleet aviation assets provide "back fill" for the USAF units of Osan and Kunsan AB when they deploy out of country.) DOC and SORTS Designed Operational Capability (DOC) Statements and the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) are closely related. The "DOC STATEMENT" defines the wartime mission of the unit and identifies the resources and training necessary to accomplish that mission. "SORTS" compares the resources on hand to those identified in the DOC statement and reports the results of the comparison. Each unit's SORTS statement was included in the daily Situation Report (SITREP) forwarded to higher headquarters to advise on the mission ready status of the unit (as stated in the DOC). The DOC was the mission for which a measured unit was equipped, organized, or designed. "Measured Units" were those AF active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units that were registered in SORTS with a unit descriptor code (UDC) indicating combat or combat support. The "DOC Statement" was the document prepared by the parent MAJCOM for each measured unit which summarized the DOC of the unit and contained unit identification, mission tasking narrative, mission specifics, and resources to be measured. It provided unit commanders a clear definition of their unit's wartime capability, based upon the authorized manpower and materiel strength of the unit. Though the DOC statement was NOT a tasking document, it may have reflected operational plan (Oplan) tasking/other document tasking or Functional Manager tasking. The primary purpose of the DOC statement was to serve as the baseline for SORTS reporting. It defined the total capability of the unit and documents the resources required to provide that capability. DOC statements of flying units were usually classified secret due to information in the Mission Tasking Narrative block. SORTS was the system used to report the status of a unit's resources and training by which commanders, up to and including the National Command Authorities (NCA), could track the readiness of the force structure on a daily basis. The primary purpose of SORTS was to provide a timely and accurate assessment of the status of the resources required by a unit to accomplish its wartime mission. In other words, SORTS measured the DOC. It also provided a data base of essential resource and training information. Sorts measured unit capability in four areas: Personnel, Equipment and Supplies On Hand, Equipment Condition, and Training. SORTS was most beneficial during Crisis Action Planning. SORTS was used to help in unit selection during crisis planning. During crisis, or time-sensitive, planning, a unit's status (C-level) was critical to whether the unit is equipped and prepared to perform its designated wartime mission. A SORTS report was a snapshot of the unit's status at the time of the report. On the other hand, DOC statements were of little use during crisis action planning. SORTS supported the information requirements of users for deliberate and peacetime planning as well as the Services' management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces used by the combatant commands. DOC statements were used during deliberate planning. For example, they reflect which units can provide a certain capability. (Source: FAS: DOC and SORTS, 1995.) (SITE NOTE: Though the DOC system was revised on 1 Jan 1978, the DOC and SORTS still remain in use for contingency wartime planning.) Graduated Combat Capability Training The Tactical Fighter Force was undergoing a fundamental change in training methodology away from the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) system of Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 51-34 toward the Graduated Combat Capability (GCC) system as outlined in MCM 51-50. Under the old DOC system, which applied until 1 January 1978: ". . . units with multipurpose fighter aircraft (e.g., the F-4) would be assigned a primary and a secondary Designed Operational Capability…. Each DOC entails specialization in either air-to-surface or air-to-air weapons employment. The air-to-air DOC encompasses two segments: air superiority, which involves offensive air-to-air weapons employment; and air defense, which involves area or boundary defense. The air-to-surface DOCs are divided into conventional and nuclear weapons employment."This guideline was not universally applied, at least not in PACAF, which had already further specialized into single DOC functions and was enlightened enough to have created a defense suppression DOC for an F-4 operational unit. Development of the defense suppression DOC was an evolutionary process, involving almost continual negotiation between the unit and higher headquarters to resolve differing viewpoints on how the aircrews should be trained and what skills the individual aircrew needed to possess in order to be truly mission-ready. This evolution uncovered unexpected doctrinal and procedural problem areas, not all of which have been fully resolved under the GCC system. In addition, there was an upheaval in the F-4 (and F-16) fighter community at the time over the merits of specialization versus multi-tasking proficiency. Specialization meant the pilot was ready for combat in a shorter period of time, versus multi-tasking where the proficiency qualification period may be up to six months. The severe impacts to Korea was that the time required to become proficient in the unit's mult-taskings at remote 1-year tour locations -- like Kunsan's -- meant that by the time one got proficient, it was time to rotate out. When one factored in mid-tour leaves and such, the "usable" tour length of the pilot was very short. However, given the state of North Korea in 1977, the possiblity of the USAF units swiftly taking on the secondary mission of air-to-ground taskings after the initial breakout of hostilities implied that the treating of air-to-ground proficiency as simply familiarization training might be a mistake. The primary benefit of specialization was the reduction in the period to become proficient. By reducing the unit taskings or downgrading the proficiency level (e.g., to familiarization training) , the proficiency qualification times were shortened and the "usable" tour length for the pilot extended. As an off-shoot, another idea bandied about was the acceptance of one base's proficiency qualifications at another base with the same DOC. Reassignment policy concerning pilot transfers to a different unit with the same aircraft considered the pilot's specialty and that of the gaining unit. Various personnel assignment schemes to swap personnel from bases with the same DOC (i.e., Osan and Clark) as a follow-on assignment were tried to eliminate requalifications. The transfers between Osan and Clark worked excellent, but as with any system there were hiccups when the USAFE the proficiency training did not match PACAF requirements. The transfers from USAFE to PACAF were being authorized by HQ personnel assignments from Air Defense DOC to Air Superiority DOC units and these transfers were NOT readily acceptable. HQ said they were fully mission-ready (MR) and qualified, but the requirements were so different that they were no easy way to certify as MR in PACAF an Air-to-Ground (A/G) aircrew sent from USAFE. The problem between USAFE and PACAF reassignments was that there was a big difference between an Air Defense Mission (USAFE) and Air Superiority Mission (PACAF). There were NO Air Superiority units in USAFE except Soesterburg (which had both an Air Superiority and Air Defense tasking). On the other hand, there were NO Air Defense units in PACAF (except the Hawaii ANG, which later changed), while there were several in USAFE. The Air Superiority tasking was much more difficult and with higher standards (greater quantity and types of sorties required) than Air Defense. DOC training involved two separate but related training standards, sorties and events. To stay mission-ready (MR), an individual had to fly no less than a specified number of creditable sorties in a six-month period. Further, in a completely separate count, he had to accomplish a designated minimum number of discrete training events, such as dropping x low angle bombs, y high angle strafe passes, z armed reconnaissance routes, etc. Events and sorties taken together were thought to guarantee skills and proficiency in the use of the weapon system to accomplish mission tasking. Failure to achieve a given number in either category caused regression to a nonmission-ready status. Prior to 1 January 1978, air-to-air training for air-to-surface DOC units within PACAF was limited to 16 sorties per six-month period, of which two sorties had to be basic fighter maneuvers (BFM) offensive and two had to be BFM defensive. Failure to meet these goals did not result in regression (an exception to the general rule) but had to be waived by Hq PACAF/DO. Graduated Combat Capability (GCC) training is subtly different from the old standards of sorties and events. The current method of training, in PACAF at least, is based on the philosophy that flying a given number of sortie types, using scenarios that necessitate the performance of real-world tactics, should allow the aircrew to maintain a given combat capability at a certain level of proficiency. For air-to-surface units, nonscenario basic weapons qualification rides are also provided. There are certain prescribed events that must be accomplished, but in general, these are not tied to any specific numbers. "The term 'event' in this context is synonymous with 'task' and is not intended as an item to be 'logged' in any specific numbers." The number of air-to-air sorties depends on the specific combat capability assigned to the unit (here in PACAF, these sorties are currently prescribed). For example, an air-to-surface unit might be assigned the requirement to maintain GCCs of basic air support, basic nuclear proficiency, Maverick air interdiction. Each of these Graduated Combat Capabilities is separate and distinct, but there is some trade-off in the sorties thought to enable proficiency in each GCC. Not every member of the unit has to be mission-ready in each GCC at any given time. The current number of recommended air-to-air sorties in PACAF for an aircrew member maintaining MR status in the above-mentioned four distinct GCCs is 14. (Major Donald J. Alberts & Captain Leroy Mock, "Increased Air-to-Air Specialization Training," Air University Review (Nov-Dec 1978).) (SITE NOTE: GCC is still applied to all specialties in the USAF, ANG and Reserves by setting a minimum numerical standard for wartime tasks to be completed to show proficiency in one's specialty field.) During this time, there was a change in the training methodology away from the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) system toward the Graduated Combat Capability (GCC) system. The support of the GCC system was that each unit would be able to analyze their own mission requirements and then more clearly identify the ESSENTIAL training requirements to support that mission -- with other tasks becoming secondary training requirements. The point being that each unit had a mission tasking that was different -- and therefore, the pilots of that unit needed training to meet the specific local needs based upon its wartime tasking. Knowledge of the probable area of employment, enemy strength and weakness, and contingency plans was a necessary part of this evaluation. The push was for improving the amount and quality of air-to-air training while reducing the stress on non air-to-air specialized aircrews. This reflected the 36th mission change to air-to-air -- including air defense role -- as primary and air-to-ground as secondary -- while the nuclear SIOP commitment was switched to Kadena in 1974 and became only a tertiary training requirement (familiarization). It was thought that through proper selection of training tasks to be accomplished, aircrews could master a portion of the total possible air-to-air knowledge and skills that directly related to the aircrew's probable combat configuration and weapon availability. In other words, pilots did not need to waste time on proficiency that would not be required in their local or deployment wartime tasking. There was an additional problem as young inexperienced pilots appeared in the "front-line" units without the training required to bring them to a combat-ready status in an operational squadron. In the CONUS peacetime units, there was time to gradually increase their capabilities, but in the "front-line" units where a war could occur tomorrow, these young pilots were a massive liability, There were so many "can't do's" applied to their flying combat-related and required tasks that if a war occurred, they would not be combat ready. At the time, there were additional problems with these "unseasoned" pilots flying with "seasoned" WSOs who not only had more sortie time and experience -- but also rank. However, the unseasoned pilots were the aircraft commanders regardless because of their pilot rating. The question raised was why a WSO with combat experience and extensive flying hours -- including command positions on the ground -- was relegated to an subordinate position to a lower-ranked pilot with minimal time on the F-4 airframe while in the air. Many proposals were brought up at the time to improve pilot proficiency. A major cost generated by specialization would be attributed to the increase in the dissimilar aircraft training support. There were proposals for increases in dissimilar air combat tactics (DACT) training, but voices of caution claimed these would come at the expense of air-to-surface sorties. At Osan, initially DACT training was mostly handled by the T-38 "aggressor" aircraft of the 26th Tactical Fighter Training Squadron from Clark AB which would deploy to Osan to conduct DACT with F-4E aircraft of the 36th TFS. Later DACT was scheduled with F-15s from Kadena when they deployed to Osan AB and even Marine A-4 aircraft from Iwakuni MCAS. Specialized Air-to-Air Combat Training In the past, the reason the USAF has generally been more effective than its enemies is directly attributable to the skill, courage, and training of our pilots rather than to the aircraft they flew. But training is credited as the primary reason for the USAF successes. Until the late 1960s, "the USAF concentrated primarily on air-to-ground tactics and training while air-to-air training was reduced to intercept practice with minimum emphasis on fighter-versus-fighter dogfighting. It took the air war over North Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars to bring us back to reality. The average pilot was not adequately trained to engage in a dogfight with the enemy, the long-range missiles were of limited value when visual identification was required prior to engaging (usually inside of minimum range) or had to be launched against a maneuvering target, and the tactics and maneuvers currently taught were largely ineffective against a highly maneuverable enemy. The reaction to this dilemma was the same as in the past: increased emphasis on air-to-air training and tactics in tactical fighter training (TFT) courses, the initiation of top-off courses in advanced air-to-air training, and, finally, the creation of a special squadron to provide dissimilar air combat training employing enemy tactics." By 1977, "the USAF has made a quantum jump in air-to-air combat training from the conditions that existed in the 1960s." They had a fighter lead-in program to screen aspiring young fighter pilots and provide better training in an effort to produce a higher-quality pilot. Air-to-air combat training had reached new highs by the expansion of dissimilar air combat tactics training. The tactical fighter training program had been expanded to provide more sorties per student. "Operationally, specified F-4 units have air-to-air combat as their primary mission, and most of their training is concentrated in this area. As for aircraft, the F-4 has improved maneuverability with leading edge slats (LES), the 20-mm cannon is installed in all our latest fighters, missiles have been improved in an effort to provide a dogfight capability, and the need for an air superiority fighter has been realized in the F-15 and future F-16." "These advances by themselves were not sufficient to assure air superiority. They were only a start and there were still many problems to be solved to ensure command of the air in the future. The probability of destroying enemy air forces on the ground was seriously degraded by their sophisticated air defense systems and dispersed and hardened aircraft shelters. In the case of North Korea, they had mastered sheltering aircraft within tunnels dug into the mountainside. With the probability of radar and communications jamming, the air war could quickly be limited to many visual, multiship engagements, the outcome resting on the individual pilot's ability. The move was to specialize a significant portion of our fighters and pilots in close-in, maneuvering air-to-air combat, and the kill ratios must be highly in our favor. "The pilot world had increased its awareness of the need for air combat training both in the tactical fighter training and the operational units. However, TFT produced a multi-trained pilot with limited capabilities in either air-to-air or air-to-ground employment procedures, and most operational units are faced with the problem of maintaining a proficient capability in both missions." (Source: Maj Robert A. Heston, "Specialized Air-to-Air Combat Training," Air University Review (Sep-Oct 1977).) A critical look at the air-to-air combat training conducted at the F-4 TFT schools and the situation in the operational units in 1977 revealed:
Changing Asian Geopolitical Situation and Improved ROK Military Capabilities We speculate that the change in the DOC was a direct reflection of the changes in the geopolitical and military picture in Asia as a whole after the collapse of Vietnam. In essence, the DOD was desperately trying to find ways to remove the defense burden on US forces stationed overseas as it started the post-Vietnam War drawdown. Following the Nixon doctrine of 1969, the DOD was shifting many of the previous USAF taskings to the host nation forces. The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 demanded that allied nations were expected to shoulder more of their own self-defense. The reductions of US forces throughout Asian allied countries could be seen as pressure to get them to shoulder more of their defense costs. The ROK military upgrade programs of the 1970s was blessed, funded and instituted by the US -- and ultimately saw the removal of the 7th ID from the DMZ in 1970 -- and on 9 Sep 1975, the UN flag came down over US bases in Korea after the ROK declared that it could defend itself against the North without assistance from the UN -- as long as China did not enter the fray. The ROK based its defense on the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the US.   36th TFS Fiend drawings (1976) (Marvin Metzinger)  36th TFS (1977) (36th Fiends Site) (SITE NOTE: Those party suits were mandatory for every USAF officer in Korea for years. Like the embroidered unit jackets garishly emblazoned with the unit's patches, these were intended to promote group cohesiveness and esprit d'corps during social events.) Team Spirit 77 Exercise Team Spirit 77 commenced on 26 Mar 77 and terminated between 1-8 April. The 51 COMPW became actively involved in Exercise Team Spirit 77 with the formation/activation of the 51 COMPW Battle Staff at 0700 hours local on 26 Mar. 51 COMPW flying activities commenced on 28 Mar 77, highlighted by recovery and launch of aircraft at the Singal emergency landing highway strip on 29 Mar 1977. This exercise was designed to enhance the combat readiness of the forces assigned as components and supporting forces of the UNC, for the defense of the ROK. The 36th TFS flew a total of 263 missions and 262 sorties for 359.5 hours during Team Spirit, and the 19th TASS flew 756 hours, and 206 sorties. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980)
 ROKAF Taxi out at Sin Gal Highway strip landing in Team Spirit 1977 (1977) (36th Fiends Site) SR-71 Blackbird Recovers at Osan The SR-71 Blackbird recovered at Osan AB in Nov 1977. (1) a/c 967; FSR Nudson, Ken' Det-2, Osan AB, Korea; 01 - 03 Nov 1977; Recovery (Source: Trip Log: SR-71.) Osan AB Developments On 17 Jan the construction of ten family housing units for command-sponsored Senor US Military personnel at Osan was completed -- on Hill 170 and 180 sites. On 20-23 Jan the HQ PACAF Inspector General conducted a Nuclear Capability Inspection of the 51 COMPW. There were 26 areas evaluated, of which 15 were rated excellent or higher. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) (SITE NOTE: The nuclear SIOP tasking for the 36th TFS was switched to the 18th TFW in Kadena and the DOC tasking was only for familiarization. However as a tertiary tasking, nuclear weapons were stored in revetted bunkers in the C Diamond area and nuclear training exercises were performed in the C Diamond area.) On 18-20 January a HQ USAF air-to-air capabilities study group called Corona Ace visited Osan to study/observe local methods of aircrew training systems reliability, etc. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) On 10-12 Feb the 1st Test Squadron from Clark AB visited Osan AB and briefed on the air-to-air specializzation and structured training program initiated by the 3 TFW at Clark AB. This program was primarily responsible for the assignment of a single DOC (air-to-air superiority) being assigned to the 51COMPW/36TFS. (Source: 36th Fiends History) On 1 Apr the design for the alteration, upgrading and repair of Building 818 begins. This building houses UNIVAC 1050-II Computer System at Osan and was originally built in 1952. On 14 Apr the 51 COMPW requested a second 1050-II Computer system from PACAF. The two remaining T-33A "Shooting Star" aircraft at Osan, were picked up by Republic of the Philppines Air FOrce (RPAF) crews on 7 Apr 1977, and flown to the Philippines (via Kadena) for permanent use by the RPAF. On 31 May 1978, the 36th TFS scrambled two F-4E aircraft to protect US Reconnaissance aircraft from possible North Korean Air Force threats. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) (SITE NOTE: This "reconnaissance aircraft" would be a RF-4C from Det 1, 15th TRS of Osan AB. The unarmed RF-4C would fly along the DMZ and made a tempting target for any North Korean aircraft waiting to ambush the aircraft.) On 30 Sep the 802nd Army Engineering Battalion completed the leveling of the rough terrain immediately Northwest of the approach end of Runway 27. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) Murder in Anjung-ni According to the Pyeongtaek History, on 12 Nov 1977, John Slaw (?) murdered Yu Eu-hae after she refused to have sex with him by strangling her. The murder occurred in Pyongson-myeon, Anjong-ni indicating the individual was most likely from Camp Humphreys. Outcome of this incident unknown. However, because it was a serious crime, the ROK police would have retained jurisdiction -- though the individual would have remained in US custody until a final verdict by the Korean courts was reached. (Source: Pyeongtaek City History CD, "Pyeongtaek Si Sa.") Trans-Korea Pipeline (TKP) Operations Requirement for petroleum pipeline delivery was recognized early in the Korean War when assault pipelines were used to augment the totally inadequate rail and highway delivery systems. Studies in 1968 revealed that the petroleum distribution system in Korea could not support wartime requirements for a sufficient period to allow construction of facilities stated in contingency plans. Therefore, constructionof the 258-mile underground high pressure TKP, completed in 1970, was justified solely as a contingency requirement. Since peacetime delivery requirements are less than the throughput capacity of 40,000 barrels (barrel=31.5 gallons) per day from Pohang to Seoul, two domestic companies (Honam Oil and Korea Oil Corporations) signed agreements with the US Government in mid-1971 to lease portions of this excess. By Sep 72 the latter had constructed a pipeline goining its refinery in Ulsan to the TKP, the two pipelines intersecting at Taegu. Previously, products had been transported by tanker from the refinery to Pohan and then pumped into the TKP. During 1977 the pipeline moved 2,513.8 thousand barrels (MBBLS) of petroleum for military use and 7,941.6 MBBLS of commercially owned product. (Amounts moved in CY 76 were 2,413.3 and 6,251.6 MBBLS respectively.) Revenue for commercial throughput agreements totalled approximately $1.3 million. Grassroot US Movement to Disengage from Korea: Along with the U.S. assistance to upgrade the Korean military hardware, there was a move to disengage from Korea. On 9 Jan 1977 controvery continued over President-elect Carter's plan to gradually withdraw US ground troops from Korea. Voicing caution were the New York Times which said such reduction would not only alarm Seoul and Tokyo, but also Peking which is concerned with growing Soviet strength in Eastern Siberia; the Association of the US Army which outlinesthe risks and has tehm entered in the Congressional Record; and DOD position papaers on Korea which point out that "the presence of US troops shows resolve, deters aggression and is no more expensive than basing the forces in CONUS." Additional, General Vessey, CINCUNC, notes in a Washington Post interview that "NK has tow powerful allies less than 500 miles from Seoul, while the only country committed to the ROK's defense is 8,000 miles away." On May 11, 1977, the ROK-US started the talks on the reduction of the USFK. In the U.S., there was a grass-roots movement to bring the American troops home -- a fallout from the stinging defeat in Vietnam and bitter memories of that war. President Jimmy Carter had made this a campaign promise during his run for the Presidency. The fall of South Vietnam, the growing criticism of the Americans against human rights violations by the Korean government, and President Carters withdrawal plan caused grave concerns in Korea with respect to national security. US-Korean relations became strained in connection with the kidnapping of Kim Dae-Jung in August 1973 by the Korean CIA (KCIA), coupled with Congressional investigation of activities of Korean officials and businessmen in the United States in what became known as the Koreagate affair with investigations of Korean businessman, Park Tong-son. 1978 Congregation in front of Shin Hung Presbyterian Church in Seomi-ri. Shin Hung Church is the oldest church in Songtan. (9 Apr 1978) (Songtan Shin Hung Kyohwi 40th Anniversary Edition (1952-1992)) Songtan-Up areas Off-limits On 11 Feb 1978 in an effort to alleviate Venerial Disease, a large section of the Songtan-Up market place area was placed off limits to the USFK personnel except for legitimate sight-seeing and shopping. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) These areas would be mostly the areas on both sides of the railroad tracks where unlicensed prostitutes abounded. This would have been the area called "Keoji chon" or "Beggars Village" -- the poorest area of Songtan. It was to the left as one crossed the Mokchon crossing. It ran from the railroad tracks, up the hill crest and down to the "Pink Town" area. In this area were orphans who were organized into beggar groups that would be seen with thatch baskets on their backs and used hooks or tongs to pick up anything that might be of value -- including things that were left unattended. (Source: Yi Kyong-chu (Kasey Lee)) Adjacent to Keoji-chon on the hill was "Goo-chang-teo." This area ran from "Keoji-chon" boundary to the rail spur. (Source: Kang Shin-kol). According to Yi Kyong-chu, the areas on both sides of the railroad tracks were called "Pink Town" because of the red Christmas tree lights that were strung across the buildings. This was an area of "uncarded" (unregistered) prostitutes. Across the railroad crossing was an alleyway that led to the Jaeil Theater. The "5-Spot" bar was on one's right. The areas of Jwa-dong remained off-limits at night and all the bars that used to cater to black GIs -- and soldiers from Camp Humphreys -- were shut down. The area was well-known for its brothels catering to mostly Koreans. Venereal disease affected 45 US military members per thousand per month. The CY 77 figure reflected the per annum average which is slightly higher than the rate in CONUS military commands. Unlike hepatitis, which can cause absences from duty of up to three months, VD does not result in a loss of appreciable man-days as most soldiers were treated on an out-patient rather than in-patient basis. Unsanitary conditions and availability of contacts add to the VD problem. Both diseases were the subject of frequent health lectures and command information bulletins and articles. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History 1977.) Osan Fire Department Battles Rice Fire On 19-20 Feb members of the 51st Civil Engineering Squadron and Osan AB's Fire Department assisted the Songtan-Up Fire Department in fighting an out-of-control rice straw fire. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980)  Outside Main Gate after the Overpass to MSR-1 built and construction along Main Gate Road complete (1978) (Ken Shallenbarger)
 Children's ride (NOTE: The horses were on springs and children bounce up and down on them for a pitiance. These are still seen along the streets and in parks in many urban areas pushed by old "harabojis" (grandfathers).) (1978) (Ken Shallenbarger)
  Intersection of Overpass and MSR-1 looking north towards Osan-ni (1978) (Marvin Metzinger)   2007: (L) Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1) buildings from 1970s era (R) Intersection of Overpass Road and Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1) looking south towards Pyeongtaek (Aug 2007) (Kalani O'Sullivan)
 Heading towards Main Gate area (1978) (Thomas Utts) (NOTE: Construction at Main Gate indicates the time period to be near 1978 when the Shinjang Road was being expanded. Note the stairs coming down at the Main Gate. Most of the shops have changed.)
 Heading down Shinjang Mall Road (1978) (Thomas Utts) (NOTE: Most of shops in the photo are changed. Mike's sign on right is Mikes Tailor Shop (now defunct) run by Mr. Chae. Aragon Club to the right. The Shinjang Mall Road turns right at the Victoria Hotel (with VFW sign) as it nears the rail spur.)
 Jungang Open Market (1978) (Thomas Utts) (NOTE: Shot taken towards Fashion Alley (Myongdong Road). The Seoul Glass (window) shop Is now the Power Shop and the shop in the right foreground is now the Pyramid Shop.)
  2005: (L) Jungang Open Market looking towards Shinjang Road (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (NOTE: The Power Shop is in the location of the Seoul Glass Shop in 1978.) (R) Jungang Open Market looking towards Fashion Alley (Myongdong Road) (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (NOTE: The Pyramid Shop is in the location of the shop in the right foreground with the awning in 1978. The owner of the Pyramid Shop in picture pointing out the shops in the 1978 photo.)
Merchants of Songtan Upon completion of the roads, new construction was started along the sides of the roads. Along the road to the overpass, the Chunil Hotel and the Songtan Tourist Hotel started construction constructed in 1977. Old shops within the Jungang Market Road area -- such as the Seoul Glass Shop dating to the 1950s -- operated from the same locations, but in upgraded concrete buildings. Along the widened Shinjang Road and the Main Gate Road, new shops opened up in the two or three-story concrete structures that were built. Lucky Shop The Lucky Shop began as the "Lucky Yongchang" (Lucky Tailor Shop) in 1978 after the street was constructed and new store fronts were built. Except for cosmetic changes, the shop is in the same location run by its owner, Choi Jae-hyun.  Shops outside Main Gate (Jan 1978) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The shop on right has sign that reads "Lucky Yongchang" (Lucky Tailor Shop). Note that building is same with picture below except for cosmetic changes.)
  2005: (L) Lucky Shop Outside Main Gate (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Lucky Shop Owner Choi Jae-hyun (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) Lim's Brass Shop becoms Viking Store In 1978, Mr. Lim started Lim's Brass Shop in what became the Shinjang Mall Road. Currently Mr. Lim operates the Viking Store selling gifts and souveniers on the Mall.  Shopping for brass at Lim's Brass Shop -- Girls unknown (1978) (Ken Shallenbarger)   (L) Mr. Lim of the Viking Store (R) Viking Store (R) Exterior of Viking Store on Shinjang Mall (Nov 2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) OB Makju and Chicken Bar to Twin Blanket Shop Mr. Kim Young-hi used to own the OB Makju and Chicken bar to right of the 1978 photo above. The bar was established in 1978. Afterwards, Mr. Kim established the Twin Blanket Shop in 1985 near the same location.
 Rodeo Alley (1978) (Thomas Utts)   (L) Rodeo Alley (2002) (Unknown) (R) 2005: Mr. Kim Young-hi, owner of Twin Blanket Shop. (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) Ebenezer's Jewelry The Ebenezer Jewelry Store has been changed over the years as the Songwang Bag Shop, then Songwang Blanket Shop and finally the Ebenezer Jewelry Store -- though the sign says in hangul "Songwang Sa." Strangely, the sign has a biblical reference to the name, Ebenezer, printed on the store sign. (1 Samuel 7-12: "Then Samuel took a stone and set it up between Mizpah and Shen. He named it Ebenezer, saying, "Thus far has the LORD helped us.") The shop carries jewelry, watches and clocks. Mrs. Choi Hong-ryon shown in the 1974 photo, is now 72 and has turned the ownership of the shop over to her son. Mrs. Choi is well-known amongst the long-time residents as a "nice adjema" -- a complement indicating her giving and generous nature.
 Mrs. Choi Hong-ryon of Songwang Blanket Shop (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)
My Shop My Shop is located in the basement area of a building to the left just as you enter Rodeo Alley from the Shinjang Mall. The shop is primarily clothing for younger people and is a family operation with Mr. Park Young-sim as the owner. Prior to this shop in 1974, Mr. Park operated a shop on Aragon Alley at the end of the lane.   2005: (L) Looking up the street to the Opera Club. (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Mr. Park Young-sim, owner of My Shop on Rodeo Alley, with daughter and grandson (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) Chunil Hotel Opens On Dec 1978 the Chunil Hotel opens with 33 beds. In 1979, the Chunil Hotel signed an Accommodation Services Contract with Osan Air Base. In 1997 Asia Hotel Opened -- though some sources say Feb 1998. (297-65, Shinjang 2-dong New road on right) In 2004, the Chunil Hotel merged with the Asia Hotel. In Sep 2004 the hotel expanded to 88 room. In 1997 Asia Hotel Opened. In 2004, the Chunil Hotel merged with the Asia Hotel. In Sep 2004 the hotel expanded to 88 room. In Dec 2004, it was registered as the Asia Tourist Hotel. (See Asia Hotel for details of hotel. This site features an exceptional map of the area.)   (R) Mr. Kim Jae-won, owner of the Asia Hotel, in front of the Asia Hotel. (Sep 2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (L) Asia Hotel (Jan 2006) (Kalani O'Sullivan)
Songtan Tourist Hotel The Songtan Tourist Hotel was built in 1978 after the major reconstruction of the infrastructure in the area. The new overpass was built in 1978 and the Songtan Hotel was right at the base of the overpass. For many years stood unchallenged as the best hotel in Songtan. Soon other hotels were built in the area that challenged its supremacy.
  2005: (L) Songtan Tourist Hotel (Aug 2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Songtan Hotel Front Desk Ms. Choi (Aug 2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)     Songtan: (Top L) Railroad tracks looking north (Notice the Shinjang Rail Overpass in distance. The large building in the top left is the Songtan Tourist Hotel built in 1978.); (Top R) Hanil Church's steeple is evident across from overpass. (Bottom L) Milwal Road in Shinjang-2 dong with Seojong (later Jungang) Theater at top of hill. Large buildings below it are the Songshin Elementary (right), Taegwang Middle School (middle) and Pokchang Elementary School (left) (Bottom R) Hill 180 with houses spread all the way up the hill. (1985) (Songbuk Elementary School) The following are photos by Harry Tezlaf were posted to the Osan Retired Activities Office. The vehicle overpass of the train tracks has been completed and the construction of new buildings in Songtan continued. The periodic flooding of low-lying areas continued as flood-control projects for the Chinwi River Floodplain was another 15 years away. The Seojongni area developed into a distinctly different area -- strictly Korean -- and not associated with the Americans except that it had the train station. The Americans clustered in the Songtan area and housing was spreading out around the base of Hill 180 in the Shinjang dong area. MSR-1 (Rte 1) from Osan-ni still ran along the base of the hill near the overpass past the Express Bus Terminal continued past the Seojong-ni Train Station and onto the Pyeongtaek Train Station. The business district was growing along the top of the hill up to MSR-1 in the Songbuk-dong area along Jean Road which branched off the MSR-1. Most of the present Jisan-dong was still rice paddies that would not be reclaimed until the 1990s.
 Golf Course -- 9 holes (1978) (Courtesy Ken Shallenbarger) (SITE NOTE: Gary Dawson of Chandler, AZ wrote in Aug 2007, "My father was stationed at Osan from 1979-1981. I actually learned how to play golf on the nine hole course while we were there. What memories! I would love to see more pictures of the golf course during that time period. I love your website. I am now a golf professional in Phoenix, Arizona.")
 Tree Trimming On-base near Education Office and La Cantina Restaurant (1978) (Thomas Utts)
Osan AB Housing Units On 16 Feb 1978, the architect and engineering firm of Lyons Associates from Seoul, Korea was contracted by the Osan AB Civil Engineers to conduct a feasibility study on additional facilities at Osan, which would be required to support a proposal of adding 200 military family housing units and "command sponsored" tours. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980)
Off-base Housing Units However, the lack of on-base housing was off-set by the opening of new apartments in Songtan in the late-1970s, called the Foreigners' Apartments near the present Jisan Stream Road. The housing was small cramped and totally inadequate by reports. According to Kim Jae-won, owner of the Asia Hotel, but employed at the time at the Base Housing Office, these units were constructed by the Pyeongtaek-gun authority while Songtan was still "Songtan Eup" (town). He referred to their construction as "dormitory" type and was constructed because the base had requested additional housing. According to Curley Knepp, then with the Audit Office, when he was shown these apartments, he could not believe how small, cramped and dirty they were with holes in the walls. Marvin Metzinger wrote, "I contacted some old Fiends who lived in the "Foreigner's Apts" in 1975-76-77. They were the only places available for un-accompanied wives and dependents to live, at the time. Few if any non-Korean families lived 'on the economy' because there was no plumbing or heat, except andol. The only accompanied billets were in the Air Division and Wg Hq senior staff. Those people lived in the Hill 170 housing [not sure of the hill number] - a small area near the main gate, on the left side of the main road [on the top of the hill across the main road from where the Commissary was later built]. The "Foreigner's" building was on the MSR1 [the road from Pyongteak to Suwon] just past the Bus station. ... The Apt bldg was sort of like the Korean hotels of the era plus small kitchenettes and some appliances. They had electricity, running water and radiator heating- no andol. To get to the apt bldg, exit the main gate, straight ahead across the railroad tracks to the main road, MSR 1, turn left toward Osan / Suwon and pass the bus station on the right side, about 1/2 to 3/4 mile down, just before crossing the small bridge, the "Foreigner's Apts" were on the left side of the street." He later wrote, "When Mustang Valley was opened, it made the Foreigner's look pretty 'bad' and I don't know of anyone who stayed there after about 1978-79! The people/wives had to be 'real adventerous' to put up with the marginal living conditions there. When my wife joined me, we chose to live on the economy w/o running water, etc. just because the places were cleaner, nicer, larger and less expensive, plus I had lived with an outhouse and outdoor plumbing before in the USA [in my youth] - wasn't that big a deal to us. After 1980, I didn't know anyone living on the economy [outside the base fence] except those with Korean wives and/or family." The "Air Force Village" (or "Foreigners Apartment" (Miguk Apatu)) in Songtan was visualized as a Off-base extension of on-base housing. Using the concept of the USAF renting the off-base housing units from the KNHC. Thus the plans were set in motion to create a enclosed American community off-base with its own shoppette and laundromat -- including gate guards where identification would be required for entrance. Later during its implementation, the problems would arise over the spaces within the area remaining unoccupied and other problems dealing with the KNHC losing money on the operations. This apartment complex still exists adjacent to Buraksan Mountain Road near the Songtan Public Library. The fence still has the concertina wire running along the perimeter. (SITE NOTE: Because of the lack of dependent families, the "Air Force Village" was opened up to all-ranks. According to Curley Knepp, who lived near the Air Force Village, there was a small BX and laundromat on the site that he used. Only about half of the Air Force Village was USAF and the other half was open to the Korean populace because there simply were not enough command sponsored families to fill the apartments. This was because 201 units at Mustang Village was opened in 1980 and also leased from the KNHC.) Osan AB still did not have any schools in 1978 but plans were in the works to start an DoD elementary school on the base in 1979. As was mentioned before, there was housing for Americans built of cinderblock near Hobak Hill of the Shinjang 1 area and in the Mokchon area near the railroad tracks. These units had indoor toilets, but hondol heat. Housing in the Namsan-teo area and the older areas of Chicol Village (Aragon Alley area) was Korean-style with hondol heat but outdoor "water closets" (outhouses). These units were rented by mostly non-command sponsored families and GIs drawing BAS living downtown at their own expense. 554th CESHR Squadron "Red Horse" An airfield taxi and runway overhaul project concluded in 1978. The following is from Robert G."Andy" Anderson's Red Horse Country:
Det 13, 33rd ARRS Save Lives On 8 Feb 1978, Detachment 12, 33rd Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, evacuated six ROK soldiers from the scene of a bus accident near the UN Buffer Zone. The helicopters and crews were guided into the landing zone by Detachment 1, 621st TCS radar site personnel at Yongmunsan. The injured soldiers were taken to the US Army 121st Evacuation Hospital at Yongsan Garrison, Seoul. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) On 20 Jun 1978 Capt Ralph Canady, 2nd Lt Van Leffler, and TSgt Donald Peavy of Det 13, 33rd ARRS, were credited with saving the lives of 20 Korean Nationals who were trapped by flood waters in the middle of the Tong Bok Chon River, 20 miles south of Kwangju. More than 9 inches of rain fell the day prior to the rescue. OV-10A Crash On 25 Apr the crash of a OV-10A "Bronco" aircraft of the 19th TASS at Sonhae-ri, Korea approximately 25 miles northeast of Seoul, kill two 19th TASS personnel, Captain Morris A. Ward, Jr. and Sgt Carl E. McGee, Jr. (Source: HQ 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology 30 November 1940 - 31 December 1980) SR-71 Blackbird Recovers at Osan Three Times The SR-71 Blackbird recovered three times at Osan AB in 1978. (1) a/c 975; FSR Gideon, Paul; Det-2, Osan AB, Korea; 20 - 21 April 1978 Recovery; (2) a/c 975; FSR Edgar, Larry Det-2, Osan AB, Korea; 04 - 07 Dec 1978 Recovery; (3) a/c 967; FSR Eaton, Bob: Det-2, Osan AB, Korea 11 - 13 Dec 1978; Recovery (Source: Trip Log: SR-71.) 36 TFS Developments
Osan AB Developments On 1 Jan 1978 the 51st COMPW (T) began operations under the Production Oriented Maintenance Operations (POMO) three-squadron aircraft maintenance concept. The new squadrons were the 51st Aircraft Generation Squadron (AGS); 51st Component Repair Squadron (CRS); and 51st Equipment Maintenance Squadron (EMS).
In Apr 78, President Carter sharply modified the withdrawal schedule. Citing Congressional uncertainty and delays in pledged American compensatory aid to the ROK, the US chief executive reducted 1978's scheduled pullout of three infantry battalions to one battalion. The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 approved in Sep, authorized cost-free transfer of equipment to the ROK until 31 Dec 82 in conjunction with US combat force reductions; the Act also stated "it was the sense of Congress that any additional pullout of US troops from Korea might jeopardize security of the entire Northeast Asia region." (Source: HQ USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report, 1979, pp13-14)
1979Commander, 51st Composite Wing (Tactical), Osan AB: Col. James T. Boddie Jr., June 18, 1979 -- May 16, 1980   (L) Lim Sim-uk with Gen Rodgers, 314th Air Division Commander (1979) (Lim Sim-uk); (R) Mr. Lim Sim-uk of Lim's Custom Tailor Shop on Shinjang Mall (22 Mar 2008) (Kalani O'Sullivan)
 Songshin Elementary School (1977) (Marvin Metzinger) (NOTE: Taegwang Middle School in the background) Education The Songshin Elementary School was established on 1 Jan 1963 with 6 classes. This was to meet the first major influx of students created by the refugee populations. The first graduating class was in 1968. By 1979, it had 63 classes as the population exploded. However, this influx of students was from the Miracle of the Han that moved factories and people into the area from the overcrowded Seoul area. (NOTE: However, by 2005 falling populations in the agricultural areas have caused rural school closures in the surrounding areas and the student population was split away to other under-utilized schools. In 2005, the classes had dropped to 24 classes.) Alongside the Songshin Elementary School in 1963 was the Songwang Middle School in tents. In 1968, the Taegwang Middle School was established on the same location. In 1969, the Taegwang Chongup High School was established and became the Taegwang High School in 1972. (NOTE: By the 2000s, the declining school age populations had caused schools to close and Taegwang High School started showing a decline is class sizes by the 1990s, but Taegwang Middle School showed an increase in student population because of the consolidation of students caused by middle school closures.) On 5 Nov 1979, the Osan American Elementary School opened with 35 students, 2 teachers, and a principal, serving grades 1-5. At the close of SY 79-80, the enrollment had nearly doubled and a third teacher had been added. In September 1980, a room in the Adult Education Center was modified to accommodate a Kindergarten. (Source: Osan American Elementary School) The optimum student capacity was 45-60 students, but by 1980 the student enrollment had increased to 114. Only an elementary school was operated. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History (1980), p343) Songtan Dependence on Military Business In Songt'an, by the late 1970s, 80% of its 60,000 residents, including approximately 2,500 prostitutes, lived on income earned from U.S. military personnel. (Source: Editorial Board, Tosô, Publishers, Sarang ûi P'umasi,(Love for Sale), p. 94.)  Songtan just outside the Main Gate (1979) (Ed Turi)  Songtan at the intersection to Overpass and Milwal road (NOTE: The sign post is very unusual and not shown in other photos of Milwal of the time. Sign post says to "Preserve the Environment for Future Generations." Buildings still under reconstruction after road expansion.) (1979) (Ed Turi)  View of Mokchon Residence Alley from rooftop of Lt. Col. Hunt (1979) (Ed Turi) Photos by Ed Turi of off-base area in 1979. (Address unk: Photos posted on Osan AB Yahoo Group)
Photos by Ed Turi of Osan AB in 1979. Ed then assigned to 1st CEG, Det 9 on Hill 180. (Address unk: Photos posted on Osan AB Yahoo Group) 554th CESHR Squadron "Red Horse" The following is from Robert G."Andy" Anderson's Red Horse Country:
Mustang Village and Family Housing Off-base Prior to Jul 1973, command-sponsored dependents was at a manageable level at about 4,000. The USFK pushed for opening command-sponsored tours to enhance combat readiness by increasing continuity with a two-year tour, improve morale and reduce personnel turnovers. However, when the USFK lifted the restricted area designation in four locations, Seoul, Taegu, Pusan and Chinhae, due to dangerous and/or primitive conditions, the number of declared dependents exploded. Many individually sponsored dependents converted to command sponsorship. By Jan 76, the number was at 8,000 -- and individual sponsorship rose to over 10,000. In Jul 1976, the USFK was directed by Congressional mandate, to deny support services (post/base exchanges, commissaries and Class VI facilities) to all non-command sponsored dependents in the ROK when the sponsor's tour remained in the "all others" (unaccompanied) category; medical support would continue to be provided under existing law. As a result, the number of individually sponsored dependents decreased to 5,351 by Jul 77 -- but at the same time, command-sponsored declined to 5,639. In May 1977 to counter the downward trend, the USFK authorized 3,150 command-sponsored positions and distributed them to staff agencies at Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan/Chinhae areas. By 1979, there were 7,135 command-sponsored families in the USFK, but only about 1000 found housing on base -- and at Osan the family housing units were reserved for the O-6 and above. At the beginning of 1979 US government owned quarters for command sponsored families totalled 936 housing units. There were 300 at Yonsan, 110 at Pusan, 96 at Taegu, 44 at Chinhae and 14 at Osan AB. (Source: 1979 HQ USFK/EUSA Annual History) Though the Mustang Village was under construction, the majority of command-sponsored families at Osan AB lived off-base. In addition, there was the growing number of non-command (individually) sponsored families that also resided off-base. Most lived in the housing areas in the Namsan Village area or in the more expensive Mokcheon village area. Those living off-base were subject to high rents and inadequate living conditions (hondol heating system, non-potable water supplies, etc.) These areas were subject to flooding during the rainy season. Those living further from base were the exception during this time period as the apartment boom -- i.e. Life Apartment or Foreigner Apartment on Jisan Cheon (Stream) Road -- would not take place until the mid-1980s. An Oct 79 station housing allowance survey conducted by ACofs, J1 indicated average monthly rent and utility costs for two/three bedroom economy housing units were $475/$575 respectively. In addition, many Korean landlords required initial cash deposits ranging from $500 to over $20,000. (Source: 1979 HQ USFK/EUSA Annual History) In early 1979 project construction schedules for the 201 apartments at Osan completed by the Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC), ROK Ministry of Defense (MND) and Corps of Engineers representatives. Construction on the Osan AB housing units (50 two-, 100 three- and 50 four-bedroom) was well advanced by the end of CY 79, with the first 100 apartments scheduled for occupancy in Jan 80 and the remaining 100 by early 1981. The Osan complex, named Mustang Valley Village, was to consist of six four story apartment buildings and a support facility, As a result of extensive negotiations between USFK and KNHC, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed on 4 Dec 1979 which established USFK monthly rental costs for the Osan AB apartments at $390 per unit, with payments to be made one year in advance; lease price was to be negotiated annually based on demonstrated costs and expenses. The USAFK had previously received congressional sanction and leasing authority for Osan AB family housing project in Oct 78. (Source: 1979 HQ USFK/EUSA Annual History) Osan Elementary School Opens In Oct 1979, the Osan Elementary School opened with an enrollment of 37 with an optimum capacity of 45-60. The school term formally opened in temporary quarters in November 1979. There were five DOD Dependent schools in operation at the time: Seoul Elementary/High School; Taegu Elementary/High School; Pusan Elementary/High School; Chinhae Elementary and Osan Elementary. (Source: 1979 HQ USFK/EUSA Annual History) On 5 Nov 1979, the Osan American Elementary School officially opened with 35 students, 2 teachers, and a principal, serving grades 1-5. At the close of SY 79-80, the enrollment had nearly doubled and a third teacher had been added. In September 1980, a room in the Adult Education Center was modified to accommodate a Kindergarten. (Source: Osan American Elementary School) The optimum student capacity was 45-60 students, but by 1980 the student enrollment had increased to 114. Only an elementary school was operated. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History (1980), p343) (NOTE: A permanent school designed for 275 students in grades kindergarten through 6 opened in August 1982, and an addition was completed in December 1987, allowing the school to expand its student population. Osan American High School opened in 1995 to accommodate 250 students in grades 7 through 12. A 4-teacher K-2 annex school opened in August 1999 at Camp Humphreys. Plans are for a 3 Kindergarten classroom building to open in SY 02-03. Students come from the communities of Osan AB and Camp Humphreys (U.S. Army).) 6903 Electronic Security Squadron (Skivvy Nine) On 1 Aug 1979, the 6903rd Security Squadron became the 6903rd Electronic Security Group (ESG). After the Korean War, there was a mix of units at Osan.The Air Force commands that oversaw Skivvy Nine over the years were the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), Electronic Security Command (ESC), Air Force Intelligence Command (AFIC), and Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). Skivvy nine has been the intelligence "ears" with its Korean linguists in ground listening post roles. They currently operate the direct downlinks from U-2 aircraft. Their Army intelligence counterparts have operated from Camp Humphreys since the 1970s. The home of Skivvy Nine was Hill 179, but much of its operations has now been moved to the HTAC (Hardened Tactical Air Center).  6903rd SS on Hill 170 That not much can be said about their intelligence work goes without saying, but they were well-respected by the Osan military community because their work gives the USFK the edge in combat survival. Over the years, the unit has worked closely with its sister intelligence squadron, the 607th Air Intelligence Squadron, to keep air commanders of the 314th Air Division and later 7th AF informed. Many of the Skivvy Nine personnel spent multiple tours at Osan because of their Korean/Chinese language fluency. For the single Korean linguists, their fluency was a boon for them in "talking up" the local Korean bar girls. However, the 6903rd Electronic Security Squadron (ESS) in 1979 had a human side to its history. The following was posted on a Noman's blog on 24 Oct 2006 by Effluent. The Night of the Tar Paint
USFK Developments: US President James Carter announced that the US would consider withdrawal of USFK. The shock of this announcement shook South Korea to its foundations. It
never expected that the US would ever desert its "little brother." Carter had
made this a campaign promise and proposed this after he became President. The
Carter administration's military disengagement program was to pull out 37,000
American ground troops over a period of five years beginning in 1978. The
forces were reduced by 3,900 in February 1979.
Political Unrest and Assassination of Park Chung-Hee: Brutal police repression of strikes and arrests of political leaders
demonstrated the absence of political liberty. On October 16th students clashed
with police in Pusan and quickly spread to other areas of the country. On
October 17th martial law was declared. The student uprising continued with the
worst violence since 1960. Tensions mounted as the violence was feared to
spread to Seoul. In the midst of this, Park Chung Hee was assassinated. Chun Doo-Hwan Overthrow of Government: The overthrow of the government by Chun Doo-Hwan is simply referred as the
"12.12 Incident." On the night of December 12, Major General Chun Doo-Hwan,
Commander of the Defense Security Command and chief investigator in President Park's slaying, ousted General Chong Sung-hwa, ROK Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander, under the pretext of possible complicity in the slaying of President Park. General Chun became the new strong man in South Korea. The December 12 incident
raised a serious issue between the commander of the USFK and General Chun
because of his mobilization of troops without the authorization of the
commander of the US-Korean CFC, which was established in Nov 78, with the
commander of the US 8th Army as commander of the CFC. Therefore, any troop
movement of Korean troops without the approval of the commander of the CFC was
regarded as illegal. However, the US recognizing particular situation in Korea,
raised no serious objection. According to the U.S. Embassy Background Paper dealing with the incidents following on and following the Dec 12 coup: ROK Self-Help Programs The national self-help program, Saemaul Undong or New Community Movement, continued to produce significant results during 1979. Under the program, inaugurated in late 1971, government help is channeled to rural areas for community development projects to improve farm programs. The local areas plan its own projects and supplies its own labor, supervisory personnel, and supplemental funds. Programs were designed to promote self-reliance in all the Republic's 12,000 villages by stimulating both national and local community pride, with attainment of economic self-sufficiency in non-urban areas as the ultimate goal. An important element in the movement was the application of modern agricultural techniques to supplant non-productive farming methods traditionally used by rural families. Concurrently, Saemaul Undong sought to reinforce cultural patterns such as frugality, diligence and respect for authority. In 1973 increased emphasis was placed on establishment of small-scale, labor-intensive industries in rural areas to provide off-season employment and augment farm income. The movement's success was reflected in sharply rising average household incomes, which prior to 1971 were roughly 60 percent of average urban earnings. By end CY 78 average rural household income had reached $3,678, surpassing urban sector average household revenues by a comfortable margin. Since inception of rural Saemaul programs, over 26,000 miles of new farm roads had been constructed and approximately the same mileage improved or rebuilt, irrigation and flood control projects completed for 2.4 million acres of rice paddy and flood control projects completed for 2.4 million acres of rice paddy, rural electrification extended to virtually all of the ROK countryside, and traditional thatched roofs replaced with tile in nearly all villages. CY 79 projects included building of 113 small bridges and 212 miles of farm roads, paving of approaches to 154 villages and river bank flood control construction totalling 780 miles. In 1975 the Samaul concept was expanded to include urban and factory level programs. Business and industrial firms were encouraged to: create in-house consultative bodies to shift the nature of Labor-management relations from confrontation to one of cooperation; build or expand dormitories, dining facilities and medical care centers; organize Saemaul consumer cooperatives to provide employees with living necessities at low cost; and establish management-labor stock sharing systems. Many enterprises also built their own schools or offered special classes in factory areas to provide young workers the opportunity to further their education while developing new skills which would help further national economic goals. In 1979 the factory-level Saemaul program extended to 5,600 industrial firms throughout the ROK. Success of the Saemaul movement attracted wide attention abroad, particularly in developing countries. By year's end nearly 8,000 foreign government officials, community development specialists and journalists had visited model Saemaul villages and projects to observe methods/techniques used in the rural modernization program. (Source: 1979 HQ USFK/EUSA Annual History) ROK Social-Welfare Programs In the social welfare field, major emphasis in 1979 was placed on expansion of health and medical services. ROK Government plans for construction of nine government-operated hospitals and improvement of facilities at 23 existing hospitals and 54 health centers. On 1 Jul 79 the Ministry of Home Affairs broadened medical insurance benefits to cover all enterprises employing more than 300 people. Coverage to include government officials and private school teachers had been effective since 1 Jan 79. These expansions nearly doubled the number of beneficiaries, bringing total number eligible for medical insurance to an estimated eight million,or 21.2 percent of the population. Free medical care was provided to 2.1 million low-income, jobless and other needy citizens, including inhabitants of off-shore islands treated by medical personnel from visiting hospital ships. Other social welfare program improvements made during 1979 included extension of free legal aid to low-income farmers and office workers, lower-ranking civil servants, ROKF enlisted personnel, disabled veterans and victims of natural disasters. Special education programs for physically and mentally handicapped children received greater stress, with plans announced for establishment of 32 additional schools by 1985 and for addition of 1,280 classes for handicapped pupils at existing special schools. In a government-sponsored program to assist the needy, thousands of jobless were temporarily hired throughout the year for public works projects. The ROK government also initiated a "Help the Needy Neighbor" campaign which raised through public donations $6.4 million for maternity and child centers, homes for the ages, and other welfare facilities. (Source: 1979 HQ USFK/EUSA Annual History)
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