Namsan Village Choga-chip (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: This house is to the middle right in the 1968 photo below. This photo taken from top of hill with a telephoto lens. This is the same house as in the 1953 photo by Robert Spiwak.)

Namsan Village (1968) (Bill Bayless)

In the mid-1970s during the major reconstruction in Shinjang, a road was built to the Namsan Village area. From the Main Gate it proceeded straight until the base of Hill 170 but did not extend up the hill whose paths still remained dirt covered. In the mid-1980s (between 1980-1983), the road and rail overpass to the Doolittle gate was built and the back gate opened. In conjunction with this construction, a new road (Mokcheon Village Road) was cut from the new access road to the Namsan village road. This road passed the Bravo Gate and then proceeded to a Y-intersection where one turned left to the Main Gate.

In the late 1990s, the small road up the hill in the Namsan Village area was paved with concrete. In the 2000s, this road was expanded and new apartments built on the hill. By the mid-2000s, other apartment complexes were being added in anticipation of the influx of personnel when the Yongsan Garrison was scheduled to close.

View Train Track from Namsan Village (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Namsan Village outside gate (1968) (Bill Bayless)

(L) Namsan Village near Hill 170 (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Namsan Village looking toward Bomb Dump Hill (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

(L) Namsan Village looking towards Songtan Catholic Church (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Namsan Village Yongwasa Buddhist temple with Rental Village under construction above it (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

(L) Perimeter Wall near Main Gate (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) 1960s house on slope before dimple area of Hill 170 near Bravo Gate (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

(L) Deserted 1960s house overgrown near perimeter (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Deserted house 1970s house on hill overlooking Shinjang area (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

"BLACK PANTHERS" 35th TFS

"FLYING FIENDS" 36th TFS

"HEADHUNTERS" 80th TFS

Nuclear Alert with Det 1, 347th TFW After Nov 66, the 6441st TFW departed Yokota AB for Tahkli RTAFB, Thailand taking some of the F-105s of the old 8th TFW with it. The nuclear commitment was then switched back to the 41st Air Division again in Nov 66 with the F-105s of the 35th, 36th and 80th TFS. The 35th and 36th TFS converted to F-4Cs in 1967, but the 80th did not convert until 1968 after it was assigned to the 347th TFW.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated on 21 Dec 1967 and organized on 15 Jan 1968. The 34th, 35th, 36th and 80th were transferred to the 41st Air Division on 15 Nov 1966 and transitioned to the F-4C. (NOTE: The 34th TFS was assigned to the 41st Air Division at the same time as the other squadrons on 15 May 1966 but was attached to 388th Tactical Fighter Wing in Korat RTAFB, Thailand flying F-105s. When the units switched to the 347th TFW in 1968, it also switched but remained attached to the 388th TFW still with F-105s.)

The 35th and 36th had transitioned to the F-4C in 1967. The 80th were still flying the F-105s and did not transition to the F-4C until after it was assigned to the 347th TFW. All three squadrons pulled the nuclear alerts at Osan.

The 347th TFW aircraft were standing alert at Osan when the Pueblo Incident occurred on 23 Jan 1968, but were ineffective to respond simply because they were standing a nuclear alert and their aircraft were configured for this mission. At USS Pueblo Veterans Association site, Edward A. Lewis of Salem, New Hampshire was assigned to the 6314th Support Wing at Osan in Jan 1968. He stated, "In January, there were about a half dozen aircraft each at Osan and Kunsan. They were TDY from Japan and were "specially configured." It would have taken too long for them to be reconfigured in time to aid the Pueblo. As it was, they were downloaded and uploaded several times over the next day or so until other aircraft could be flown in from Japan."

The 36th TFS as part of the Det 1, 347th TFW operations pulled nuclear alerts in the Diamond area at Osan AB according to AFHRA records since 1968 (F-105 (1968) and F-4C (1968-1971)) on one-month rotations. The 36th FS history shows rotations to Osan AB for "1 Oct–24 Nov 1968, 18 Feb–24 Mar 1969, 27 May–1 Jul 1969, 9 Sep–18 Oct 1969, 27 Dec 1969–31 Jan 1970, 10 Apr–9 May 1970, 20 Jun–11 Jul 1970, 4 Sep–2 Oct 1970, 27 Nov–26 Dec 1970" out of Yokota AB, Japan. (Source: 347th Wing and AFHRA: 36th FS.)

The following is excerpted from the 80th TFS Headhunter Site for the sister squadron of the 36th TFS:

"Throughout the 1968 - 1971 time frame the primary mission of the 80th was to deploy on a rotating basis with the 35th and 36th TFS to Osan AB, Korea, providing a nuclear strike alert posture against targets in North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The squadron maintained several aircraft on fifteen-minute nuclear alert full time, and engaged in a vigorous conventional weapons training program. On several occasions the squadron reacted to provocations by the North Koreans by putting crews and aircraft on heightened states of air defense and conventional weapons alert.

In 1970 all PACAF F-4C Wild Weasel aircrews were transferred to the 80th. At this time the squadron was composed almost exclusively of Wild Weasel aircrews. These crews trained in Wild Weasel tactics while maintaining all weapons qualifications and pulling nuclear alert as a primary commitment.

On 15 February 1971, shortly after its twenty-ninth anniversary, the squadron was deactivated in a general reduction and realignment of US military forces in Japan, Korea and Okinawa. Shortly after this order was issued it was announced that the squadron designation would be reactivated in Korea without equipment and personnel. At the time of deactivation the 80th personnel, including all the Wild Weasel crews, were transferred to the 35 TFS and later in the spring these crews and all the F-4C aircraft deployed to Kadena AB, Okinawa to form the 67 TFS under the 18th TFW. A year or so later, the F-4C Wild Weasels, trained by and formerly in the 80th TFS performed with distinction in combat during Linebacker II.

Assassination Attempt on Blue HouseIn 1967, infiltration and violent confrontation along the DMZ increased to almost daily incidents. On 7 Jan 1968 ROK President Park Chung-hee presided over an emergency national security council meeting at Wonju to coordinate a "pan-national" anti-communist effort. An advisory body was formed to advise the President.

On 21 Jan 1968, a band of 31 communist agents were intercepted in the northern suburbs of Seoul by the Korean National Police. In the ensuing fire-fight, 5 agents were killed and one captured. Six civilians were killed, five wounded. The suicide team was dispatched on 16 Jan to destroy the Presidential Mansion. A captured agent identified the men as officers from the 2,400 man, 124th Army Unit, 283d NK Army Group, being trained for guerilla operations in the South. In the end, a total of 34 soldiers, policemen and civilians killed by the attack.

The Blue House Raid: The officers on the detachment knew that their mission might well decide the outcome of the Second Korean Conflict. North Korean Lieutenant Kim Shin Jo, a participant captured during the mission, explained that killing the ROK president "would create political problems within the South Korean government and would agitate the South Korean people to fight with arms against their government and the American imperialists."4 With one stroke, the spearhead group of the 124th Army Unit might push the Republic of Korea into chaos and open the way for reunification from the north.

Late on the evening of 17 January, the team changed into ROK Army uniforms, donned dark coveralls, and penetrated the U.S. 2d Infantry Division sector. They cut several holes through the famous chain-link fence and slipped the entire group through, all within thirty meters of a manned U.S. position. They moved carefully for two days and nights through the American division's sector. The North Koreans even camped the second night on a forested hillside within a few kilometers of Camp Howze, the U.S. divisional headquarters.

The infiltration went smoothly until the afternoon of 19 January, when the team unexpectedly encountered four South Korean woodcutters. Seizing on an opportunity to impart a bit of indoctrination to these representatives of the ROK's "oppressed masses," the special operators harangued the terrified woodcutters about the coming insurrection and the glories of North Korean communism. At the same time, they apparently gave some inference as to the nature of their impending raid. After a few hours, the KPA officers released the woodsmen unharmed with a stern warning not to go to the police. The special forces leaders calculated that their assassination mission was within hours of completion and that the civilians would probably not go to the police immediately, nor would the authorities believe such a wild tale.

This proved to be a fatal mistake on their part. The South Koreans went to the police that very night. The local police chief believed them and notified his chain of command, which reacted promptly in accord with Presidential Instruction #18. By morning, the ROK's new counterguerrilla structure commenced operations. Unfortunately, the ROK leadership did not know the exact mission of the 124th Army Unit, so the police and the military tried to guard all important sites and at the same time search the approaches to Seoul. Even with massive resources employed, however, the ROKs could not cover everything. The stealthy raiders entered the city in two- and three-man cells on 20 January. They quickly became aware of the frenzied atmosphere in the capital. Eavesdropping on busy police and ROK Army radio nets, the KPA team's leaders plotted the identities and movements of their foes. Obviously, the original plan had to be abandoned. The 124th Army Unit would have to improvise. The North Koreans were well trained, and their commander saw a possible way to make use of the heightened alert. Maybe they could still complete their mission.

Upon rendezvous that night, the men removed their coveralls. This revealed their ROK Army uniforms, complete with the correct unit insignia of the local ROK 26th Infantry Division. The team then formed up and prepared to march the last mile to the Blue House, the ROK presidential residence, posing as ROK Army soldiers returning from a counterguerrilla patrol.

The platoon marched smartly toward the Blue House, passing several National Police and ROK Army units en route. A scant 800 meters from the Blue House, a police contingent finally halted the platoon and began to ask questions that exceeded anything the raiders had rehearsed. The nervous North Koreans fumbled their replies. One suspicious policeman drew his pistol; a commando shot him. A melee then ensued in which two 124th men died. The rest of the North Koreans scattered and began racing for the DMZ.

ROK soldiers, police, and American troops cooperated in the massive manhunt that followed over the next few days. Several sharp encounters flared as the desperate North Koreans clawed their way toward home. Three more operatives were pursued and killed in the Seoul area. Subsequently, aroused I Corps (Group) units-to include both U.S. divisions-participated in successful sweeps that killed twenty-three and captured one of the North Koreans. Only two of the thirty-one northerners could not be accounted for-and they were presumed dead.

The liquidation of the Blue House assault team, however, came at a horrendous price. Three Americans died and three fell wounded in attempts to block the escaping infiltrators. ROK casualties totaled sixty-eight killed and sixty-six wounded-mainly army and police but also about two dozen hapless civilians. This cost hardly served as a ringing endorsement for all the security improvements developed and instituted throughout 1967.

Much had gone very wrong. The 124th cut right through the heart of the most developed segment of the DMZ barrier system. The embarrassing inattentiveness of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division said little for American military performance and strained U.S.-ROK relations. Indeed, the key event in the whole process revolved around a chance meeting with unarmed timbermen-random players not really part of the United Nations Command's anti-infiltration scheme. Fortunately for President Park, the loyal civilians notified the police, and the local authorities acted with alacrity. Had the KPA killed the woodcutters, the infiltrators might well have killed Park too. Even in the teeth of an alerted Seoul, the enemy nevertheless closed to within 800 meters of Park's residence, stopped more by luck and individual initiative than by a grand design.

Much had also gone right. The citizenry responded, the police foiled the raid, and a hasty but thorough amalgam of quick-reaction forces relentlessly pursued the North Koreans. The 124th Army Unit had gotten in, but they could not get back out-a tribute to the DMZ enhancements. In terms of anti-infiltration methodology, the delay and neutralization efforts had gone pretty well. Detection, however, still relied too much on the thin crust of regular forces along the DMZ. Most of the casualties occurred during attempts to track down the intruders. The allies were still finding too many of their prey only while being ambushed.

Nobody had much of a chance to reflect on lessons learned. U.S. and ROK soldiers were still tracking down the remnants of the Blue House raiding detachment when, as Bonesteel recalled, "the damned Pueblo occurred two days later and that really put the fat in the fire."

(Source: Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger)

USS Pueblo (AGER-2) is a Banner-class technical research ship (Navy intelligence) which was boarded and captured by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) on 23 January 1968 in what is known as the Pueblo incident or alternatively as the Pueblo crisis.

North Korea stated that she strayed into their territorial waters, but the United States maintains that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident. More recently, facts have come to light that indicate that USS Pueblo was captured by North Korea at the instigation of the Soviet Union, which was seeking a cryptographic machine onboard to match with a key provided to the Soviets by the spy John Anthony Walker.

USS Pueblo, still held by DPRK today, remains a commissioned vessel of the United States Navy. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has specified that it be used to promote anti-Americanism.

Initial operations

The ship was launched at the Kewaunee Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in Kewaunee, Wisconsin, on 16 April 1944 as United States Army cargo ship FS-344. She was transferred to the United States Navy in 1966 and was renamed USS Pueblo. Initially, she served as a light cargo ship, AKL-44, but shortly after resuming service was converted to an intelligence gathering ship, or what is colloquially known as a spy ship, and re-designated AGER-2 on 13 May 1967. AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) denoted a joint Naval and National Security Agency (NSA) program.

The USS Pueblo was an old commercial freighter that was converted in 1967 into a US Navy ship capable of gathering signal intelligence. Think of it as the US version of all the Russian fishing trawlers you hear about with antennas popping out all over the ship. After completing initial training on the US west coast in November 1967, the ship traveled to Japan in preparation for a future intelligence gathering mission. The USS Pueblo left the naval port at Sasebo, Japan on January 11, 1968 on it's first intelligence gathering mission. The mission was to gather intelligence on Russian ships traveling through the Tsushima Straits and intercept electronic transmissions from North Korea. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Activity and conflict near the DPRK

On January 5, 1968, Pueblo left for Sasebo, Japan. She left Sasebo on January 11 with specific orders to intercept and conduct surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the Tsushima Straits and to gather signal and electronic intelligence from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.

On January 21 a modified Soviet style sub chaser, SO-I class, passed within two miles (4 km) of the Pueblo. The next day, two DPRK fishing trawlers (Lenta Class) passed within 25 yards (23 m) of Pueblo. That day, a North Korean unit made an assassination attempt against South Korean leadership targets, but the crew of Pueblo was not informed.

The ship was under specific orders to not create an international incident and to stay out of North Korean territorial waters. However, an international incident had already occurred that didn't involve the USS Pueblo when 31 North Korean commandos infiltrated across the Korean Demilitarized Zone to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee. The commandos were intercepted just outside the grounds of the Korean presidents home and all but one of the commandos was killed in a furious gun battle with South Korean soldiers January 21, 1968. Tensions were running extremely high at the time that the USS Pueblo was drifting in international waters only 30 miles from the coast of North Korea. On January 22nd the Pueblo transmitted a situation report to Japan explaining that a North Korean sub chaser and two fishing trawlers had come near the Pueblo in the last two days. Despite the increased tensions and the fact that North Korean vessels were conducting reconnaissance of the Pueblo the US Navy leadership in Japan felt no need to inform the USS Pueblo of the assassination attempt and mounting tensions in the area or increase the ships security level. Throughout the mission the ships threat level was kept at minimum by the Navy. They did make sure to radio the latest NBA scores to the Pueblo though. As far as the crew of the USS Pueblo knew, it was business as usual on the fateful day of January 23, 1968. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

According to the American account, the following day, January 23, Pueblo was approached by a sub chaser and her nationality was challenged, Pueblo responded by raising the U.S. flag. The DPRK vessel then ordered her to stand down or be fired upon. Pueblo attempted to maneuver away, but was considerably slower than the sub chaser. Additionally, three torpedo boats appeared on the horizon and then joined in the chase and subsequent attack. The attackers were soon joined by two MiG-21 fighters. A fourth torpedo boat and a second sub chaser appeared on the horizon a short time later. The ammunition on Pueblo was stored below decks, and her machine guns were wrapped in cold-weather tarpaulins. The machine guns were unmanned, and no attempt was made to man them.

U.S. Naval authorities and the crew of the Pueblo insist that before the capture, Pueblo was miles outside North Korean territorial waters; the Koreans claim the vessel was well within the DPRK's territory. The mission statement allowed her to approach within a nautical mile (1.852 km) of that limit. The DPRK, however, claims a 50-nautical-mile (90 km) sea boundary even though international standards are 12 nautical miles (22 km).

The North Korean vessels attempted to board Pueblo, but she maneuvered to prevent this and a sub chaser opened fire with a 55 mm cannon. The smaller vessels fired machine guns into Pueblo, which then signaled compliance and began destroying sensitive material. The volume of material on board was so great it made it impossible to destroy all of it.

Just after lunch on the 23rd, three North Korean sub chasers were spotted approaching the Pueblo. The North Koreans signaled towards the Pueblo to identify themselves. The commander of the Pueblo, CPT Lloyd Bucher ordered his men to raise the American flag. After the flag was raised the North Koreans signaled that they were going to board the ship. CPT Bucher signaled back that the ship was in international waters. The North Koreans once again signaled that they were going to board the ship. At this time CPT Bucher ordered the crew to maneuver the ship away from the North Koreans. The North Koreans immediately tried to cut off the escape of the ship and opened fire on the Pueblo with their 57mm machine guns. Additionally two MIG-21s buzzed the Pueblo for added emphasis of how serious the North Koreans were. CPT Bucher ordered his crew to begin destroying all classified information and equipment and a distress call was radioed to Japan. Japan radio back that they acknowledged the distress call and that a rescue team would be mounted to assist them.

The North Koreans stopped firing and signaled towards the Pueblo to follow them. CPT Bucher thinking that a rescue team was enroute decided to comply, but only traveled at 1/3 speed in order to buy the ship more time for the rescue to come. However, no rescue was to come. It is important to remember that the United States was heavily involved in the Vietnam War at the time and the naval brass in Japan did not want to be the ones responsible for starting a second major war at the time that could have had disastrous consequences for the United States. They decided before they did anything they would have to get approval from the President of the United States. Before the US President even received word about what happened the USS Pueblo had already been captured.(Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Radio contact with Naval Security Group in Kamiseya, Japan had been ongoing. Seventh Fleet command was aware of Pueblo's situation. Help was promised but never arrived. More than likely, no one wanted to take responsibility for an attack on North Korean vessels attacking Pueblo. By the time President Lyndon Johnson was awakened, Pueblo had been captured and any rescue attempt would be futile.

Pueblo followed the North Korean vessels as ordered, but then stopped immediately outside North Korean waters. She was again fired upon, and an U.S. sailor, Fireman Apprentice Duane Hodges, was killed. She was boarded by men from a torpedo boat and a sub chaser. Crew members had their hands tied, were blindfolded, beaten, and prodded with bayonets.

While the naval brass were waiting for word from Washington the crew of the Pueblo continued to try and delay the North Koreans. However, the North Koreans again strafed the ship with machine gun fire and this time killed crew member Duane Hodges. CPT Bucher knew the charade was over and allowed the North Koreans to board the ship. The North Koreans quickly tied up and beat the crew and then drove the ship towards the port city of Wonsan. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Once Pueblo was in North Korean territorial waters, she was boarded again, this time by high-ranking North Korean officials.

Aftermath

Pueblo was taken into port at Wonsan and the crew was moved twice to POW camps, with some of the crew reporting upon release that they were starved and regularly tortured while in North Korean custody.

At Wonsan the 82 crew members of the Pueblo were taken off the ship and continued to receive brutal beatings from their guards as North Korean civilians cheered the capture of the Americans. The last time Americans had been at Wonsan was in 1950 when US Marines evacuated from the port after the Chinese military attacked the US military to aid their North Korean allies during the Korean War. The US Navy battleships had bombarded and destroyed the city before leaving. Wonsan was probably not the best location for an American to arrive in North Korea for the first time. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

This treatment was allegedly worsened when the North Koreans realized that crewmen were secretly giving them "the finger" in staged propaganda photos. (SITE NOTE: The group photos showed members of the crew with their middle fingers against their face in a pensive pose or with the middle finger across their wrist. That the North Koreans did not catch it prior to releasing the propaganda photos to the world is a wonder.)

Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Commanding Officer of the Pueblo, was tortured and put through a mock firing squad in an effort to make him confess. Eventually the Koreans threatened to execute his men in front of him, and Bucher relented. None of the Koreans knew English well enough to write the confession, so they had Bucher write it himself. They verified the meaning of his words, but failed to catch the pun when he said "We paean the North Korean state. We paean their great leader Kim Il Sung" ("We paean" sounds almost identical to "we pee on").

Following an apology, a written admission by the U.S. that Pueblo had been spying, and an assurance that the U.S. would not spy in the future, the North Korean government decided to release the 82 remaining crew members. On 23 December 1968 the crew was taken by buses to the DMZ border with South Korea and ordered to walk south across the "Bridge of No Return". Exactly 11 months after being taken prisoner, the Captain led the long line of crewmen, followed at the end by the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Ed Murphy, the last man across the bridge. The U.S. then verbally retracted the ransom admission, apology, and assurance. Meanwhile the North Koreans blanked out the paragraph above the signature which read: "and this hereby receipts for 82 crewmen and one dead body". Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Commanding Officer of the Pueblo and all the officers and crew appeared before a Navy Court of Inquiry. A court martial was recommended for the CO and the Officer in Charge of the Research Department, Lt Steve Harris. But the Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chafee, rejected the recommendation, stating, "They have suffered enough." Commander Bucher was never found guilty of any indiscretions and continued his Navy career until retirement.

There is some debate as to whether Commander Bucher acted within his orders. It was clearly stated in his orders that Bucher was not to spark an international incident. The Americans allege that North Korea attacked and boarded Pueblo in international waters — a clear act of war, whereas the DPRK has stated the Pueblo was in violation of the territorial limit. Historically, U.S. ships engaged in the collection of intelligence would often approach the very limits of territorial waters and sometimes cross over for brief periods of time. Such actions would often prompt the target country to mobilize parts of their military and thereby provide more intelligence for the U.S. ship to capture. The question is posed whether or not Bucher should have kept Pueblo in the area after the first encounter of a gunboat. Those familiar with the operations of the ship point out that such encounters were routine while on station, and it was expected that Bucher would remain on station in spite of such events. Further, Bucher was not informed of escalating tensions between North Korea and the South Korean-U.S. bloc in the days leading up to the capture of Pueblo. Bucher died in San Diego on January 28, 2004, partly as a result of complications from the injuries he suffered during his time as a prisoner of war in North Korea.

Pueblo is still held by North Korea. In October 1999, it was towed from Wonson on the east coast, around the Korean Peninsula, to Nampo on the west coast. This required moving the vessel through international waters. No attempt to recapture the Pueblo was made. This move was done just before the visit of U.S. presidential envoy James Kelly to the capital Pyongyang. The present location of Pueblo is in Pyongyang, as a reminder to tourists of the North Koreans' strength.

The Pueblo (AGER-2) was the third ship named after Pueblo, Colorado. It remains today a commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy. It is widely, but incorrectly, believed to be the first American ship to have been captured since the wars in Tripoli. On December 8, 1941, the river gunboat USS Wake (PR-3) was captured by Japanese forces while moored in Shanghai.

Tourist attraction

USS Pueblo is one of the primary tourist attractions in Pyongyang, North Korea, having attracted over 250,000 visitors since being moved to the Taedong River. The Pueblo is now anchored at the very spot where the General Sherman Incident is believed to have taken place in 1866. Often tourists are led through the ship by a guided tour. Participants will first enter the ship for a 15-minute video shown from a small TV set mounted in the ceiling, explaining how the North Koreans captured the ship, with contemporary film footage. All areas of the ship are shown, including the secret communications room full of encryption machines and radio equipment, still in a partly disassembled state after they were inspected by North Korean technicians. One highlight of the guided tour is a photo opportunity where visitors may have their pictures taken while holding the rear-mounted machine-gun.

Operation Red Fox
23 Jan 1968 - 05 Feb 1969

On 23 January 1968 North Korean patrol boats seized the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence-gathering vessel, in the international waters of the East Sea off Wonsan. One USS Pueblo crewmember was killed in the boarding and 82 were taken POW and held captive. The seizure, which took place a mere two days after a commando intrusion into Seoul, shocked the whole world, and there arose strong public demand in the United States for firm retaliatory action against North Korea. North Korea made the utmost use of the Pueblo incident in its crafty propaganda, believing that the United States, deeply involved in the Vietnam War then, would not be able to use the force of arms on the Korean Peninsula.


Crew of the USS Pueblo
(Click on photo to enlarge)

Between 26-31 January 1968 several 9th Air Force active units deployed to the Pacific in response to North Korea's seizure of USS Pueblo: the 4TFW sent 72 F-4Ds, the 354TFW sent 18 F-100s, and the 363TRW sent six RB-66s. In addition, several 9AF-gained ARC units were recalled to active duty: the 113TFW and 107th, 113th, 121st and 177TFGs. The 334th and 335th Fighter Squadrons, equipped with F-4 Phantom II fighters, rushed to Korea to support operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadrons returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968. F-106 fighters were briefly deployed to Osan AFB in Korea in March of 1968 to provide air defense during the Pueblo incident.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated at Yokota Air Base, Japan on 15 January 1968 . The mission was to provide air defense for the islands of Japan. Units assigned were the 34th, the 35th, and the 36th Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS); and the 556th and the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadrons. Aircraft assigned were the F-105 Thunderchief, the F-4C Phantom II, the EB-57 Canberra, and the C-130 Hercules. Between 23 Ocobert 1968 and 05 February 1969 all of the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing's F-4Cs were deployed to bases in South Korea to participate in the US response to North Korea's abduction of the USS Pueblo.

Six Air Force Reserve units were mobilized in the wake of the Pueblo Incident. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Colorado Air National Guard was ordered into active Federal service as a result of the Pueblo incident, along with three other F-100 tactical fighter squadrons: 136th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New York, 174th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Iowa, 188th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New Mexico. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron entered combat in Vietnam on 5 May 1968, two days after its arrival, and completed its 1,000th mission 51 days later. During the Air National Guard's eleven months of service in Vietnam, the four F-100 squadrons flew 24,124 combat sorties and accumulated 38,614 combat flying hours.

The 445th Military Airlift Wing was activated after the Pueblo was seized, on January 26, 1968. The activation of the 445th found many support personnel stationed at eight different stateside bases and aircrews flying more missions to Europe, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia. The Wing remained activated in support of the Pueblo incident for seventeen months until released from active military service on June 2, 1969. For superior performance and dedication during the Pueblo incident, the 445th Military Airlift Wing received its first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.



On 22 Mar 1968 the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployed to Osan AB from McChord AFB, WA. This marked the first time in history that Aerospace Defense Command F-106 fighter interceptors had flown to a critical overseas area, using in-flight refueling along with tactical air units.

318th FIS

318th FIS on Alert (1968) (USAF Photo)


318th FIS on Alert (1968) (USAF Photo)

318th FIS a/c 59-0059 on alert (Winter 67-68) (Don Ward)

The following is from Pueblo.org/v2f/association/guests0799.html>USS Pueblo Site: My name is Harry Larrabee Sr, TSgt, USAF (Ret) and I was stationed with the 6922 Security Wing (United States Air Force Security Service) at Clark Air Base. About 1.5 hours after the ship was taken over by the North Koreans another Air Force Sgt and myself boarded an Air Force C-124 with two I Vans (intercept vans with R390A recievers and PT-6 recorders) and two S-141 Shelters (something like a COMSEC Van equipped to monitor LF, HF, VHF and UHF) tool boxes over stuffed with parts to repair R-390s and PT-6s for Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea.

Upon our arrival sometime after midnight we set up the two S-141 shelters and the I Vans were set up the next day inside the compound on Hill 179 which housed the 6922 SW Det 2. For the next 60 days we upgraded the existing operations by rebuilding the receivers, recorders and TTY machines while some of the operations was moved to the I Vans. Each van was made up from 30(?) foot trailers which had both antenna and power inputs. While this was going on the other Sgt and I also pulled 24 a day stand-by on the S-141 shelters is ensure thier operation. (SITE NOTE: In Aug 2007, Nelson Carpenter wrote to make a correction. He stated the unit was Det 1, 6922nd Security Wing. The 6922nd SW was headquarted at Clark AB. The Detachment later evolved into Skivvy Nine.)

I do remember about 3 days after our arrival at Osan a North Korean Mig-21 flew from the DMZ to Osan Air Base and buzzed the base runway twice before heading back north. I myself was in one of the S-141 Shelters at the time talking with the operator at the time, this operator was listening to the Mig talking back to its base. We didn't realize at the time the aircraft was so close untill we could hear a jet that didn't sound like the F-105s that was stationed at Osan. When we exited the van this when we watched the Mig buzz the base. At this time neither the U S Forces; meaning Air Force, Army, or Navy; or the ROKs had anything that could defend against the Mig. If memory serves me correctly about three days latter the Air Force had 9 F-106 all weather fighter/intercepters assigned to the base.

We stayed with the 6922 Det 2 for 10 months supporting the mission for NSA and USAFSS. When I got on the operations floor for the first time I did notice a "X" off the East side of North Korea showing the position of the U S S Pueblo at the time of boarding, this "X" was 15 miles from the coast. Our total mission the whole time was to support "Electronic Intelligence" for NSA, USAFSS, USA, and the USN regarding the Pueblo and the North Korean activity at the time. Since it took so long for the crew members to be released I really don't know how much our intelligence effort helped.

While at Osan Air Base there was also a EC-121 that used to land there every so offten. This is the same EC-121 that was shot down in the Yellow Sea in April 1969, the same one that had holes in the tail section when it was flown into Osan while I was there. Unfortunately Viet Nam was in full gear so I don't really feel that the United States was in a good position to do anything with North Korea. In fact I also feel that had the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel I would be eating rice now and not the nice home cooked meals that I'm used too.

Fred Estill of Houston, TX wrote in Mar 2007, "I was assigned to Osan AB from November 68 until Feb 69. I arrived at Osan AB 4 days prior to the capture of the Pueblo by the North Koreans. I'd noticed quite a few new troops were being assigned (USAF) to Osan prior to my departure to Korea. I thought I had it made since I wasn't being sent to VietNam. Shortly after my arrival I was assigned as a General's Aide (I believe his name was Gen. Moon). We worked 16 hr shifts 7 days a weeks for the longest during the Pueblo crisis. Reservists were activated and all we heard from them after their arrival was "We'll be here for 60 days at the most. What a vacation!" Well they ended up staying in Korea for many months afterwards until the Pueblo crisis "cooled". When it rained the floors of the hqtrs building flooded so much they had to put sand bags at the entrances to offices in the building to keep the water level down. We walked in 3 inches of water while working in our offices. Heat was by kerosene heaters and we often "froze" at night since they would be empty by 3AM each morning. I'll always remember Osan...."

The following is from Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger:

The air power arrived under the operation code-named Combat Fox. Spurred by Lieutenant General Seth J. McKee of Fifth Air Force, several air units arrived in Korea before 1 February 1968. Along with forces from Okinawa, these included the three, potent F-4D Phantom II squadrons of Colonel Charles E. ("Chuck") Yeager's 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. Yeager's "suitcase air force" flew in from North Carolina within seventy-two hours of notification, a truly remarkable performance. Altogether, almost 200 combat aircraft deployed.

At sea, the Seventh Fleet marshaled some thirty-five major surface combatants. Six aircraft carriers led the procession of naval might that comprised Operation Formation Star. Navy air furnished another 400 or so frontline combat jets.

The buildup looked impressive, but appearances could be deceiving. Bonesteel had asked for this show of strength, but he did not really command it. Narrowly defined command relationships strictly limited these contingency forces to a deterrent role. Thanks to his personal influence, Bonesteel received some help from the Fifth Air Force in prosecuting the Second Korean Conflict; the Seventh Fleet did not cooperate at all.

The Fifth Air Force's Advance Echelon took charge of the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) contribution. Senior USAF officers made it clear that these air units "[were] neither assigned nor attached to the command of General Bonesteel as Commander, US Forces Korea." In the event of an overt invasion, the Fifth Air Farce (sic) would come under UN authority. But until then, it responded to distant U.S. Pacific Air Forces and through them to U.S. Pacific Command.

Fortunately, Generals McKee and Bonesteel worked out practical arrangements to make use of the new air units in the ongoing low-intensity conflict. Combat Fox aircraft aided the ROKs in sea-approach coverage and provided strip-alert quick-reaction flights. Both American infantry divisions received and exercised new forward air controller teams and procedures, although no actual air strikes occurred. Squadrons and wings rotated to Korea at regular intervals, allowing some training for them from the commitment. Once the imminent danger subsided, the USAF component gradually pared back to its precrisis strength. In all, Combat Fox lasted sixteen months.

The U.S. Navy went its own way, with the Seventh Fleet anxious to reduce the task groups and speed ships to Vietnamese waters. None of the warships responded to General Bonesteel in any capacity, although he would gain some air sorties in the event of a major war. For Seventh Fleet, the Korean circuit mainly constituted a waste of time. According to one participating admiral, these activities "usually involved some rather innocuous air operations for a couple of days, using one of our aircraft carriers." By summer, the Seventh Fleet had moved on.

Although not fully orchestrated for maximum support of General Bonesteel's UNC, the contingency buildup worked. This tremendous show of force brought in ten times the amount of aircraft normally operated by the 314th Air Division. The 600 or so USAF and U.S. Navy (USN) jets completely negated the only real conventional edge the DPRK possessed their air arm. Any northern blitzkrieg would have to proceed under American-dominated skies. North Korea did not try anything. Even unconventional operations dwindled in the face of the U.S. air and sea armadas.

Thus, the contingency deployments did their job and guaranteed some breathing space for the Americans and South Koreans to settle their disputes. Apprised of the ROK intransigence and war fever, President Johnson wisely deferred to General Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter and sent an envoy immediately. Cyrus R. Vance arrived in Seoul on 10 February.

Vance possessed topflight credentials. A former secretary of the Army and deputy secretary of defense, Vance had spoken for Johnson and the United States in several delicate situations: Panama in January 1965; the Dominican Republic (that same year); in Detroit during the riots of June 1967; and on strife-torn Cyprus that autumn. He would speak softly enough to the Koreans, but his words would be blunt.

As usual, Vance traveled light. Only John E. Walsh, ambassador to Kuwait, and translator Daniel A. O'Donoghue accompanied the troubleshooter. Bonesteel and Porter met the trio at the airport, and they took off immediately for the secure confines of U.S. Eighth Army headquarters. Walsh experienced a frigid flight in a bubble-topped, little OH-23 while perched unceremoniously on Bonesteel's lap. With the Blue House raiders just run to ground, even the commanding general could not afford to borrow one of the few enclosed UH-1 Hueys. The cold flight said a lot about the resource situation in United Nations Command. Bonesteel might have done it intentionally, to make a point.

Vance wanted to meet immediately with President Park, but ROK Blue House staffers rebuffed his request with uncharacteristic rudeness. The officials told Vance that Park was meeting with his military planners and not to be disturbed. Unable to arrange a meeting, and looking ahead to a banquet that evening sponsored by the ROK Army, Vance and his men huddled with Bonesteel and Porter. The fivesome went over some hundred discrete issues, ensuring a unified front. Vance would do all the talking for the next few days.

At the ROK Army dinner that night, the Americans stuck to light conversation and banal, obvious toasts. Their excited counterparts talked with conviction about the mighty things to come as the allies avenged the Blue House and Pueblo incidents. The southerners seemed to think that Vance's arrival presaged the great march north. One boozy ROK general cornered Ambassador Walsh and confided in him: "We're blood brothers.... When you are hurt, we are hurt.", If Vance and his partners had any doubts about ROK belligerence, the banquet demonstrated just how wild things had gotten in Seoul.

When Vance met Park the next day, the South Korean president proved quite obstinate. But Vance did not compromise. Johnson's spokesman laid out his position frankly. First, there would be no wider war in Koreaperiod; the U.S. already had its hands full in Vietnam. Any ROK military action against the north would be cleared with General Bonesteel, and he was not empowered to allow South Korean cross-border reprisals without President Johnson's approval. Vance made it clear that he could foresee no circumstances-short of a full-scale North Korean invasion-that could garner such approval.

Second, with a military attack ruled out, the United States would negotiate as necessary in order to gain freedom for the Pueblo sailors. Vance reminded Park that America had a tradition of talking with groups and states it did not recognize, including such thorns as the Barbary pirates, the Filipino insurgents, and Pancho Villa. This matter was between the United States and North Korea.

Finally, Vance offered some sweetener with the bitter gruel. He promised Park $100 million in immediate military aid, to include F-4 series Phantom fighter jets for the ROK Air Force; additional assistance would follow. To get this equipment, Park had to vow not to go north.

For four days, Park equivocated. But he really had no choice. Without the United States, South Korea could never hope to defeat the DPRK at any acceptable cost. The ROK leader finally consented to reign in his generals. Vance left, his mission accomplished. Presidents Johnson and Park met in Honolulu in April to seal the deal. So the great crisis abated. A midintensity war had been averted. The low-intensity war, however, remained to be won. (Source: Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger)

Operation Combat Fox (USAF Involvement):

• Fifth Air Force Advance Echelon to Osan AB (from Fuchu AS. Japan)
• 4th Tactical Fighter Wing to Kunsan AB (72 F-4Ds from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina)
• 18th Tactical Fighter Wing I-) to Osan AB, Kwangju ROKAFB (36 F-105Ds from Kadena AS, Okinawa)
  • 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron (-) to Osan AB (12 F-105Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)
  • 334th Tactical Fighter Squadron to Kwangju ROKAFB (24 F-105-Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)
• 64th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Kimpo AB (24 F-102As from Naha AB, Okinawa)
• 82d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Suwon ROKAFB (24 F-102As from Naha AS, Okinawa)
• 318th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Osan AB (24 F-106As from McChord AFB, Washington)

Eleven months after the seizure North Korea repatriated 82 Pueblo crewmen and one set of remains to the United States through P'anmunjom on 23 Dec 1968. Upon signature of the US admitting to espionage in the coastal waters of the Sea of Japan, the 82 POWs were freed. Upon their return on 28 December 1968, the crew was treated poorly by the public and the military and only in 1990 did they receive the POW ribbons to which they were entitled. The ship remains in Wonson Harbor, North Korea.

USS Pueblo (AGER2): War Trophy in Wonson Harbor
(Click on photo to enlarge)

The following is a guestbook entry from USS Pueblo Veterans Association by Edward A. Lewis of Salem, New Hampshire. He was assigned to the 6314th Support Wing at Osan in Jan 1968. He stated:

"...I'm glad the memory of the Pueblo and your heroic sacrifices is being kept alive. I was a US Air Force officer stationed at Osan Air Base at the time of the capture, having arrived there in November, 1967 (I was on the way home on the day you were released). In January, 1968, I was a First Lieutenant and Personnel Officer assigned to the 6314th Support Wing, 14th Air Division. For the next six months, I headed up the Personnel Readiness Center, which handled all the Air Force TDY staffing in-country.

A couple of weeks ago, while exploring Pueblo related websites, I came across a 1999 e-mail from Stu Russell in which he asks for any knowledge of the US Air Force blocking the runways to prevent ROKAF from taking off. Here are some thoughts if you are still interested in that subject: ROKAF was charged with air defense in Korea, so it may have been thought appropriate for them to do something. Of course, they were still plenty upset at the North Koreans for the Blue House incident a few days before.

I was very friendly with a number of air controllers and feel I would have heard about us blocking the runways, but I know I definitely did not hear of any such thing happening. Nor, conversely, was there ever any word of them scrambling from any air base. Our thinking (among my friends) was that if the ROKAF had scrambled, they surely would have blown the North Koreans out of the water. Our basis for that was about a month before, a NK gunboat was harassing a ROK fishing boat (may have been spying, nothing really said, who knows) up near Cheju-do. ROKAF scrambled and did blow them out of the water.

The USAF was responsible for all offensive air operations. In January, there were about a half dozen aircraft each at Osan and Kunsan. They were TDY from Japan and were "specially configured." It would have taken too long for them to be reconfigured in time to aid the Pueblo. (SITE NOTE: The "half dozen aircraft" at Kunsan and Osan on nuclear alert cannot be verified. He is referring to the aircraft of the Det 1, 347th TFW of Osan with nuclear weapons and the Det 1, 475th TFW at Kunsan. His numbers would indicate 3 aircraft -- 2 "hot" and one spare. However, the SIOP info from Nautilus.org for the time stated four "hot" with two spares.) As it was, they were downloaded and uploaded several times over the next day or so until other aircraft could be flown in from Japan.

Also, I recall it did not take too long (seems now like only a day or two, but I could be wrong on that point) for a carrier to be nearby. (SITE NOTE: The USS Enterprise took one day to reach the area, but reports state that when it did arrive, there were what appeared to be 75 ships stretching across the horizon. All Navy personnel thought they were going to war. However, after three days of steaming up and down the North Korean coast, they were told to withdraw.)

Here is the most interesting and telling part. Between 1:00 and 1:30 local time, I was meeting with the Deputy Director of Operations, Lt Col (later Col) Paul Taylor, in his office. At about 1:15, the Director of Operation, Col Fishell (as I recall) came into the office and said, "Paul, I understand there's a Navy ship in trouble off the coast." Col Taylor responded, "We've heard that, too, and have been in touch with the Navy. They say thay can handle it." Those were the exact words (or 99%), especially that last sentence.

In view of all that happened immediately subsequent, I will never forget them. A very short discussion, less than five minutes, took place in which they agreed we (USAF Korea) would do nothing, nor was there any indication of anything being done or to be done by ROKAF. These were the two officers who would have been the most involved with any USAF action to be taken and would have also been the most knowledgeable of any ROKAF action. I was in Col Taylor's office for another ten minutes or so after that. Again, it's been 34 years, but that conversation is one I will never forget. ..."

The following is a short chronology of the Pueblo incident:

The 12th TFS from the 18th TFW at Kadena immediately deploys to Osan AB on 23 Jan. The 475th TFW is hastily formed of the 67th TFS (from Kadena); 356th TFS (from Myrtle Beach); and 558th TFS (changed to 391st TFS) were immediately sent to Kunsan to hold down the fort until the 4th TFW from Seymour Johnson, NC arrived. From January to February 1968, the 51st dispatched 12 F-102s to Suwon AB, South Korea.

The 4th TFW arrived with its THREE squadrons (334th; 335th and 336th TFS) at Kunsan AB on 31 Jan 1968 -- though the 336th TFS is only shown at Kwangju ROKAFB from Jun-Jul 68). 18th Tactical Fighter Wing F-105s was split between Osan AB and Kwangju ROKAFB.

The 15th TRS from Kadena with its RF-4Cs deploy to Osan AB from 26 Jan-12 Feb 1968. UNC announces loss of a USAF RF-4C photo reconnaissance plane over Taegu on 10 Feb. Operating from Itazuke AB, Japan with a detachment operated at Osan AB, South Korea, 13 Feb-c. 25 Jul 1968.

On 14 Feb, a USAF F-4D out of Kunsan AB crashed near the village of Yongan-myon, Ilssan-gun, Chollabukto killing three villagers and injuring another. The pilot and nav ejected safely.

On 22 Mar, the deployment to Osan AB of the 314th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, 325th Fighter Interceptor Wing from Air Defense Command (ADC) first time the F-106 flown to critical areas outside the continental US using inflight refueling. Rotated stateside in June. (NOTE: The 325th Wing source states: "From 9 February to 1 July 1968, the 325th Fighter Interceptor Wing (ADC) kept a large detachment of F-106A aircraft at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea to provide air defense." (On July 1, 1968, the Air Force inactivated the 325th FIW.))

The "paper wing" of the 354th TFW was formed to provide the cover wing for the ANG units that were deployed to Kunsan to replace the 4th TFW in July. The 354th TFW consisted of the 127th TFS: 5 Jul 1968-10 Jun 1969. (Kansas ANG: F-100); 166th TFS: 5 Jul 1968-10 Jun 1969. (Ohio ANG: F-100);

(NOTE: The 8th US Army Chronology 1 July 1968-31 December 1968 on 1 August has a confusing notation. It stated, on 3 Aug, "The 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, headquartered in Kadena AFB, Okinawa, arrives in Korea to replace the 334th Tactical Fighter Squadron which rotated to CONUS. The 300-pilot 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron flies F-105 Thunderchiefs." The 334th and 335th TFS of the 4th TFW of Seymour Johnson AFB, VA was scheduled to return on Jul 1968. However, the 12th TFS from Kadena does not have 300 "pilots." Most likely they meant "300-man squadron." AFHRA shows the 12th TFS deployed to Osan AB, South Korea, 23 Jan–13 Jun 1968 for the Pueblo Crisis.)

On 17 Dec, the 71st FIS (ADC) with F-106 aircraft from Malstrom AFB, Montana arrive at Osan AB replacing the 48th FIS (ADC) returning to Langley AFB, VA. The 71st FIS from Malmstrom AFB, MT deployed at Osan AB, South Korea from about 22 Dec 1968 – about 9 Jun 1969. (We are uncertain about the location of these interceptors as some records indicate that the Interceptors were at Suwon during the Pueblo Crisis.)

18th Tactical Fighter Wing
Kadena AB, Okinawa

12th TFS

The following is from Tango Way relating Bill Bayless' experiences during the Pueblo Incident while deployed to Osan. He was an Engine Mechanic of the 18th TFW at Kadena and was part of the contingent that immediately deployed with their F-105s to Osan AB on 23 Jan. He stated, "We lived in barracks on the alert pad. The nuclear weapons bunker was across the street. The barracks consisted of four bays with a central shower and latrine. We put ninety-six men in a barracks designed for thirty-two. I set my alarm for 0300 so that I might have some hot water for a shower." In this, he is talking of staying in the Diamond area of the base where the nuclear alerts were staged. But he was lucky, the advance elements of the 4th TFW had to put up their own twelve-man tents without any prior experience -- in the middle of winter. The folks at Kunsan who came up from Cam Rahn Bay had only light jungle fatigues and no thermal underwear. Bill was lucky -- he had a shower.

Barracks

Bill continued, "... Osan was a mess. Most of the vehicles on the base were not operating. Vehicle parts and supplies had been shipped to Vietnam to support the war effort and the Osan vehicle fleet had deteriorated. It took a few days to get everything we needed from Kadena." This was the standard situation in Korea, but at least at Osan they were at the head of the supply chain so things were better than Kunsan where the 4th TFW showed up. Because Osan was close to the DMZ, it was felt that staging of the aircraft further south was recommended. Try to imagine the three squadrons of the 4th TFW along with a squadron from Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam, additional WB-57 aircraft, C-130s hauling in cargo, F-105s from Kadena and Osan seemed to have it a lot easier. In the end, the overcrowding at Kunsan was solved by sending the nuclear alert Det 1, 475th to Taegu and one of the 4th's squadrons to Kwangju.

Airfield from Hill 170 near End-of-runway

He went on, "... An SR-71 was launched from Kadena to look for the Pueblo and was over the area in about 15 minutes. There was a problem with weather and I don't know if the mission was successful." From the recalling of the events, it was not the lack of information about the events that caused the problem, but the "political" solution that evolved -- versus the military one. If the US went after the Pueblo full force, it would be starting another "war" while the US was deeply involved in Vietnam. It could NOT support two wars. Though as distasteful as it may seem, the decision was logical. However, years later as the USS Pueblo sits in Wonsan Harbor as a "war prize" of North Korea, one wonders if the decision was a right one. However, in the end, many in the US military lost faith in the military creed to never leave anyone behind -- as the US "deserted" the crew of the USS Pueblo in North Korea and attempted to peacefully negotiate their release. Thirty years later, the after-effects of the US decision to NOT react are still being felt.

The high-level behind-the-scenes discussion of 11 Feb 1968 is related in Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger:

When Vance met Park the next day, the South Korean president proved quite obstinate. But Vance did not compromise. Johnson's spokesman laid out his position frankly. First, there would be no wider war in Koreaperiod; the U.S. already had its hands full in Vietnam. Any ROK military action against the north would be cleared with General Bonesteel, and he was not empowered to allow South Korean cross-border reprisals without President Johnson's approval. Vance made it clear that he could foresee no circumstances-short of a full-scale North Korean invasion-that could garner such approval.

Second, with a military attack ruled out, the United States would negotiate as necessary in order to gain freedom for the Pueblo sailors. Vance reminded Park that America had a tradition of talking with groups and states it did not recognize, including such thorns as the Barbary pirates, the Filipino insurgents, and Pancho Villa. This matter was between the United States and North Korea.

Finally, Vance offered some sweetener with the bitter gruel. He promised Park $100 million in immediate military aid, to include F-4 series Phantom fighter jets for the ROK Air Force; additional assistance would follow. To get this equipment, Park had to vow not to go north.

For four days, Park equivocated. But he really had no choice. Without the United States, South Korea could never hope to defeat the DPRK at any acceptable cost. The ROK leader finally consented to reign in his generals. Vance left, his mission accomplished. Presidents Johnson and Park met in Honolulu in April to seal the deal. So the great crisis abated. A midintensity war had been averted. The low-intensity war, however, remained to be won.

Ginko Tree on Hill 180 (now part of Golf Course Landmark)

January 23, 1968

The broken generator was mounted on the front PTO case of the J-79 engine, which put me down the intake of the RF-4C most of the morning.

I came out for air after about an hour and could sense that something was going on. The tempo of the flight line was different. Aircraft were being refueled, people were moving a little faster, and C-130's were landing at Kadena. I dismissed my reaction and went back to work. About thirty minutes passed, and someone yelled down the intake, "Bayless, come on out, you need to go home and pack." Ok, this was a mobility exercise, part of a game we played. I had been through this many times. You go home, pack your duffle bag, report to your assigned area, and wait for the all clear. I went home and packed, told my spouse that I would probably be home for dinner, and reported back to the flight line. An hour later I was on a C-130 bound for South Korea.

Earlier that day, the USS Pueblo was at work 13 miles from the coast of North Korea when four North Korean patrol boats surrounded the craft. The Pueblo's skipper, Comdr. Lloyd Bucher, protested that the ship was in international waters, beyond the 12- mile limit. The Pueblo, armed with two machine guns, offered no resistance to the North Korean crewmen as they scrambled aboard the Pueblo. Bucher ordered secret documents burned and equipment destroyed. The North Koreans opened fire and three US crewmen were wounded and one, Duane Hodges, from Creswell, Oregon, was killed by a 57mm shell. Ten bags of highly sensitive documents were seized by the North Koreans, along with most of the ships highly classified equipment.

There was no help available to the Pueblo, once the attack was under way. Yokota Air Base had three aircraft on alert at Osan Air Base, South Korea, but two were out of commission and waiting for parts and the other was armed nuclear. All the F-105s on alert at Kadena were armed with nuclear weapons. I don't know why the navy didn't respond.

As we arrived at Osan Air Base, the 83 crewmen from the Pueblo were being processed into prison at Wonsan. The 18th TFW commander ordered the deployment of all of Kadena's F-105s to Osan, Korea. Twelve aircraft were launched by sundown. As ground crews arrived at Osan, they went to work to arm each Thud (F-105) with 16 500 lb., armor piercing, bombs. The next morning they were ready, with orders to sink the Pueblo. Orders to launch never arrived from 5th Air Force, but our aircraft and people remained on alert until after the release of the Pueblo crew.

The base exchanged sold out of almost everything within a couple of days. It was two or three weeks before new stocks of essentials like soap, shampoo, deodorant, razor blades, and shaving cream started to arrive. A few of these items were available from local establishments in the town of Osan. When we arrived from Kadena, we were ill equipped for the cold weather. It took a while to get cold weather clothing, so we made due with field jackets without liners.

We worked twelve hour shifts, as I remember, and I choose to work mostly at night. That left the day free to roam about and photograph the village of Osan and the surrounding area. Osan was a poor town, with little to support it other than the base. I think a rather high percentage of the people in town engaged in occupations of dubious repute. In the history of Korea there must have been an influx of Christian missionaries, because the biggest and best buildings in town were the abundant Christian churches of various denominations.

A TRIP ON A BROKEN AIRPLANE

After six weeks, at Osan, I boarded a C-130 from, Naha Air Base, for the trip back to Okinawa. The aircraft crew chief told some of us, before leaving, that they were having problems controlling the prop speed on one of the engines. Even though it was loaded with a J-75 engine on an installation dolly (about 10,000 lbs.) and sixteen or seventeen troops with all of their tools and baggage, the pilot and crew felt it was safe if one of the engines had to be shut down.

A young lieutenant sat beside me and introduced himself as one of the base chaplains. His father was ill and he was headed home on emergency leave. He had never flown in a military aircraft before. When we were airborne the pilot feathered the prop and shut down the problem engine. About 20 minutes out of Osan another engine started to lose oil pressure. The pilot declared an emergency and fire trucks and ambulances met us as we landed at Kunsan Air Base. (That didn't set well the the young chaplain.) There were, including me, several jet engine mechanics on the plane and none of us had ever turned a wrench on a C-130. Transit Alert mechanics replaced the oil pressure transmitter and we were on our way.

We reached a cruising altitude of about 30,000.feet and everyone was starting to relax, although the prop speed problem had not been cured. Well into the flight, somewhere over the East China Sea, there was a loud "BANG" and the C-130 immediately went into a dive. My chaplain companion had a white knuckle grip on his own thighs and his eyes were closed. When the plane reached an altitude of about 10,000 feet, the pilot leveled the airplane and discontinued the dive. I had been through high altitude chamber training and recognized this as a rapid decompression and the pilot's actions were "by the book". The crew chief made everyone aware that the J-75 engine and all baggage and equipment might need to be dumped, but that didn't happen. We cruised into Naha at 10,000 feet and landed without incident. Everyone was happy to be on solid ground, but none more grateful than the young chaplain.

LT. TOM UTTS

Our maintenance officer, Lt. Tom Utts, wrote a novel, Korea Blue, loosely based on his experiences in Korea. Tom currently resides in California. He has a great sense of humor and had an interesting Air Force Career. Take some time to visit his websites: ZCAPS LAIR and CLARK AIR BASE SCRAPBOOK

F-105s at Osan AB (Jan 1968) (Tom Utts)


(L) F-105s at Osan AB (R) 12th TFS Ops Bldg (Jan 1968) (Tom Utts)

---

Life at Osan and Songtan With the heightened tension, the base set about constructing bomb shelters with sand bags. We are uncertain of organization but the AFCS indicates "Air Force Communications Service" who were permanent party -- not TDY personnel. Believe these personnel lived in Jamesway barracks at the base of Hill 180 and worked near the perimeter in what used to be the Ground Power Section for the AFSS on Antenna Hill.)

Michael Tobin of West Chester, PA wrote, "Osan1968TurtleStele: My pre Pueblo Incident barracks was the 1st one at the top of the hill. This turtle statue was right out front. About the time these were being taken I was developing a full blown case of Mono, which sidelined me for a long time. The black and whites were all taken the winter of 67/68.

"Looks like your other photographers spent less time partying and pissing OB than my ilk. I was AFCS 30730 (Tech Controller) for the 2146th. Our shift rotation of 2 swings 2 mids 2 days 2 days off was a zombifying shift that did not provide one with something called a life. I had to drink beer incessintly just to sleep. I was king of the beer fund for most of my tour.


(L) Sandbaggers Sandbagging it (R) Michael Tobin taking break (1968) (Michael Tobin)

Michael continued about the sandbagging detail, "... just a little bit out of the hospital around March it looks like. I was on reduced duty at the time and was only a supervisor. One of the sandbaggers was another tech controller, Airman Rucker. I have another PIC of him in my collection. The red hats are for the AFCS, which you had right on Air Force Communications Service.

On the picture of himself, he wrote, "I was a little tired in this PIC must have worn myself out putting the pens and pencils into my pocket. The Pens & Pencils was sort of a "thing" with us "Water Walkers", also known as Tech Controllers. The trick was getting your cigarettes and pens to fit into the same pocket. I think it was the Water Walkers whom invented the stripe pocket.


(L) The Bucket MW Army (?) -- Korean War era barracks with snow on ground (R) Inside of Jamesway Barracks of permanent party personnel. (1968) (Michael Tobin)

On the "Bucket" site, "I am pretty sure that this was the "Bucket", an ARMY Microwave Tower for send and recieve of all DOD communications were handled there. The ARMY guys there had an AKAI Reel To Reel tape player with 10" reels in their barracks that was manned 24/7. They had a couple pair of wires leading from the AKAI owners locker to the comm center where it was patched into the radio equipment. They played all the stuff that was too hot for AFKN. Our comm center had a feed that we would patch into when the the stuffed shirts would leave for their yobo's." (SITE NOTE: The "Bucket Site" is still located atop Hill 170.)

On the barracks shot, he wrote, "Mine Again! Looks to me like a refrigerator, a table and a space heater. There was probably beer and sodas in the fridge. I got a real story on this subject. We had to rough-it after they stole the Pueblo, cause we had to double up our beds. The houseboy got an overnight raise,m and I guess some of the others were laid off. Their wasn't a real need for housboys in the ANG tent city."


(L) The Turtle Stele appears to be near the perimeter fence -- not the location it was in 1976 near present commissary. (1968) (Michael Tobin) (NOTE: See Korean History: Chosun Period for Turtle Stele info.) (R) Main Gate to left (1968) (Jack Berry) (NOTE: Namsan Village Road was not built until the 1980s.)


Kyongbu Railway looking north (1968) (Michael Tobin) (NOTE: The children are returning from school as indicated by their school bags.)

Off-base, the Chicol-ville area remained a rather bleak area of wooden buildings that lined the Shinjang Mall Road. The photos below were taken during the winter months with its snow and freezing temperatures. (NOTE: Following photos sent to us were identified only as "Vee." Michael Tobin in 2006 stated these black and white are his photos.)

Kid in snow (1968) (Michael Tobin)	Uncertain of Location but buildings of type near MSR (1968) (Michael Tobin)
Pony carts: Appears to be sewer pipe storage. Pipes had wood "X" inside to keep from breaking. (1968) (Michael Tobin) (NOTE: Pony delivery carts operated by North Korean refugees from Milwal road area.)	Chicol-ni from over the perimeter fence (1968) (Michael Tobin)
Appears to be looking down road to Main Gate with Hill 170 to right. (1968) (Michael Tobin)	Mokchon Railway Crossing looking north (1968) (Michael Tobin) (Note: Car crossing track appears to be taxi.)

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82nd FIS F-102s deploy to Suwon Twenty five F-102 aircraft of the 82nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron were deployed to Suwon AB, Korea in support of Operation Combat Fox (Pueblo Incident). On 18 Feb 1968, the first of the 82nd FIS aircraft returned to Naha AB, Okinawa. On 18 Feb 1960, the 82nd FIS F-102s returned to Naha.(Source: 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology (30 Nov 1940-31 Dec 1980)) (NOTE: On 1 Feb 1968 the 51st FIW Chief of Maintenance indicated that some of the 82nd FIS equipment was off loaded at Osan by mistake from four C-141 aircraft. On 2 Feb a C-130 daily shuttle flight was instituted between Kadena AB and Osan AB. On 2 Feb the 82nd FIS deployment was completed to Suwon. 82nd FIS started flying on 5 Feb. On 8 Feb, two F-102s on loan to Clark AB arrived at Suwon bringing the total to 27 F-102s. On 14 Feb orders were received to place all O/R aircraft on 15 minute alert or higher alert during daylight hours. Accordingly, aircraft were pre-flighted and pilots set up in the cockpits. On 17 Feb 5th AF ordered the 318th FIS to deploy 18 F-106s to Osan AB, Korea and directed the 82nd FIS to return to Naha AB.)

Det 1, 51st FIW remained at Suwon with 12 aircraft. On 17 Aug the number of F-102s assigned at Det 1, 82nd FIS was reduced from 12 to 9. On 25 Sep the first accident involving an 82nd FIS aircraft in over two years occurred near Suwon AB when an aircraft overstressed its G-limits. The aircraft was a total loss. However, the crew was uninjured. On 15-30 Oct four additional F-102 aircraft were deployed ot Suwon AB in support of a JCS-directed increased readiness posture.

On 18 Mar 1971 the 82nd FIS Forward Operating Location at Suwon was relieved of its operational commitment in Korea. On 27 Feb 1971, the last F-102 of the 82nd FIS departed for Okinawa. (Source: 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology (30 Nov 1940-31 Dec 1980))

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318th FIS F-106s deploy to Osan AB Replacing the 82nd FIS F-102s at Suwon, the 318th FIS F-106s departed Naha AB on 18 Feb 1968. A total of 487 PAX and 719,582 lbs of cargo were received. 21 C-141 aircraft were used to make the move. On 20 Feb the last C-130 departed Naha for Osan with 318th FIS PAX and equipment. A total of 23 C-130s were used to move 238 PAX and 436,000 lbs of cargo for the 318th FIS. (Source: 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology (30 Nov 1940-31 Dec 1980))

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T-33s Assigned to Osan Two T-33s were transferred from the 51st FIW to Osan AB in Oct 1969. (Source: 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology (30 Nov 1940-31 Dec 1980))

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Bob Hope Show (Dec 1968) After the tensions had died down a bit after the Pueblo Incident and units were packing up to go home, the Bob Hope Show came to Osan in December 1968. This dedicated group of troopers came overseas every Christmas with Bob Hope. Because of this Bob Hope is held as an icon whose shows dating back to WWII made him a timeless legend. On this trip, he was accompanied by Ann Margaret -- who after years is still a favorite in the eyes of those who served in Vietnam as well. She became the anti-thesis to "Hanoi Jane" (Jane Fonda) who caused a lot of heartburn to GIs by calling them "baby-killers" and openly supported the Viet Cong. Ann Margaret, on the other hand, neither supported nor condemned the Vietnam War, but only supported the "boys." For this, Vietnam-era vets remember her fondly to this day. Of course, every show had the leggy girls -- to remind all of the girls back home and always had a beauty pageant winner -- who was Miss World, Penelope Plummer from Australia for this show.

Crowd waiting for the show (1968) (Neil Mishalov)	Crowd waiting for the show(1968) (Neil Mishalov)
Bob Hope with his golf putter (1968) (Neil Mishalov)	Penelope Plummer dazzling the crowd (1968) (Neil Mishalov)

(Source: Photo by Neil Mishalov at www.mishalov.com.)

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Bob Hope with Penelope Plummer, Miss World of Australia (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)	Bob Hope with Penelope Plummer, Miss World of Australia (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)
Bob Hope and Ann Margaret (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)	Ann Margaret and member of audience (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)

Appreciative audience (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)

(Source: Photo by Craig Garner at Stars and Stripes.)

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557th CESHR Red Horse (1968-1969) Osan, Kunsan, Taegu, Kwangju, Suwon and Kimpo. The 557th Red Horse Squadron assisted in the build up of US Air Forces in South Korea as a result of North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo. Responsible for the construction of many projects throughout Korea such as the "Wonder Arches" (Hardened Aircraft Shelters) and expanding aircraft parking ramp areas. The 557th Red Horse Squadron relocated to Eglin AFB, Florida in 1969. The projects started were handed over to Korean contractors to complete.

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Assault in Wongon-myeon, Songu-ri According to the Pyeongtaek History, on 28 Mar 1968, an American Arpel (?) assaulted Mr. Kim Tong-shik cutting his tongue. Outcome of this incident unknown but it would have fallen under the newly implemented SOFA. However, unless a serious crime case involving murder/rape, the ROK police jurisdiction usually waived after an investigation. (Source: Pyeongtaek City History CD, "Pyeongtaek Si Sa.")

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Project Black Spot: Alleged Secret Project to Halt Infiltration Between 19 August 1968 - 23 October 1968, there was a secret program called "Project Black Spot" to use NC-123K and AC-123K to attempt to stop the infiltration into the South by the North. They became operational in 1968 and flew 28 operational missions over the two month period in the South Korean Sea, trying to stop infiltration from North into South Korea by sea. Unfortunately, no bad guys were caught. The Black Spot folks supposedly shared some of the facilities of the 314th Air Division Recon. According to Richard J. Latshaw, "They went out on a bunch of night missions but never found anything to speak of. About the same time, we were checking out a new TI ir system and flew one mission over the water. Scared the you know what out of what was probably an NK boat. At least, he took off in a Northerly direction as fast as he could go. Unfortunately, we didn't have anything to drop on him. (the NK boats used to join in with the fishing fleet and then run ashore to drop off or pick up agents)."

During this time, the North still did not have semi-submersibles nor the small submarines. (Source: Skunk Works.) (See Spies, Infiltrators and Espionage for further historical information on the infiltrators and spy networks in South Korea.)

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1969

(L) Jwadong Methodist Church with Pastor Rev Chang Jun-hong (1969) (Jwadong Methodist Church Photo)

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Songbuk Elementary School (1969) (Songbuk Elementary School)

On 22 Nov 1969, Taegwang Chongup High School was officially opened as a spin-off of the Taegwang Middle School on the same location. The title of the high school would be changed on 16 Dec 1972 to Taegwang High School due to a change in regulations.

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LIfe at Osan AB Gregory Terlecki of Alexandria, VA wrote in Nov 2005, "I was the Law Enforcement Desk Sergeant for the 6314th SP Sqdn, C Flight, from about June 1969 - Feb 1970. I did pull security before that and can still vividly remember walking perimeter behind those F-106s & the F-4s." (SITE NOTE: The F-106s Delta Darts were from the 71st FIS, of Malstrom AFB, MT were for air defense and the F-4Cs came from Det 1 347th TFW at Osan AB that came into existence in 1968 stood nuclear alerts on one month rotations.)


6314th Security Police Squadron

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Bucket Site The following is from a story "My Two Tours of Duty in South Korea-Jan'69-Oct'70" by "Ric" Emil Obrey '06 U.S. Army STRATCOM LL/Bn-S. The following is his tour at the Bucket Site located on Osan AB on Hill 170 overlooking Namsan-tau just off-base.

Finally I found out where I was to be assigned. A site on Osan Air Base called Bucket Site. It was the largest site in the company and called Bucket Control Site. I was going there by way of K-6 Pyongteck but not on the train this time. I would have to go in a truck convoy which turned out to be the worst trip in my life and do not want to talk about it much now. I will say that I nearly froze to death riding in the back of a duce and a half truck. I also lost most of my personal gear and uniforms which were in another supply truck. That was a hard way to learn about Korea's infamous “Slicky Boys” but I did and I know that I was not the only one either.

The base at K-6 was called Camp Humphries and was the largest installation I had been on since arriving in country about a week ago. It was a helicopter base and had CH-47 Chinooks stationed there as well as other small aircraft. Larger planes and jets used Osan AB about 15mi North of Pyongteck. Most of Co”C” was stationed at K-6 because there was a Dial Exchange, switchboard, phone and line detachment, microwave and a VHF radio sites. I believe the XO was in charge of this section of our Signal Company while the CO at Taejon over saw the isolated sites and entire radio system operation. I did not like it there at Camp Humphries because it was too military and sterile for me. All the barracks were in a row, the streets had names, the Mess Hall was large and like at boot camp and there were officers all over the place. That meant saluting and proper uniform dress all the time.

It took a long time for me to thaw out after that truck ride but the following morning a jeep from Bucket Site arrived to pick me up and take me back to Osan AB. The driver was a guy from Tennessee named Jim Hinkle. The ride was a lot more comfortable than the day before in the back of a truck and Jim assured me that being assigned to a radio relay site was a great job. The signalers on site were friendly and although it was on an air base the site was locked and off limits even to the AP's on base. It was a sanctuary with a bite because base communications went through the site switchboard. Therefore no unit and no one were beyond our control. He would remain one of my close friends while I was in Korea and later we would even take R&R to Expo'70 in Japan together. I sure would like to hear from him someday and hope his life has been good and filled with happiness.


"Ric" Emil Obrey as Newbee Greenbean on site (1969) (Emil Obrey)

Bucket Control Site was small in area but had a large number of communications pass through it. Its nickname was “The Tower of Babble”. There were only about 4 or 5 main buildings with the Radio Operations and tower on a level about 20 ft above the others. There was a Mess Hall / NCO Barracks / Day Room Building & 2 Quonset EM Barracks. I became familiar with a variety of off-time activities found on most radio sites including shooting pool and playing ping pong with was Korea's national past time. Other favorite activities included playing various card games, reading, writing letters, watching AFKN on TV or listening to music. Since the site was on an air base we had to go to the movies down at the theater but then there were many things to do like shopping and crafts too. One favorite way to pass time was to spend it at the NCO or Airman's Clubs drinking, eating and enjoying other activities that were available.

The Radio Operations was divided into a large main building containing all the stacks of radio equipment and a smaller Control Room containing switchboards and circuit mainframe.


Bucket Site Operations and Tower (1969) (Emil Obrey)


Bucket Site mess hall, day room, barracks (1969) (Emil Obrey)


Road up to Bucket Site (1969) (Emil Obrey)

After getting trained as a microwave radio repairman now I was going to operate a switchboard that I had never seen before. I was glad the Army didn't decide to make me a cook because I would have ended up poisoning everyone. Anyhow, I did learn to operate and use the switchboard efficiently & I was able to “send and receive tones” which were used to align circuits for resistance. I even got to enjoy the work and learned many useful skills that made me a better all around technician. Depending on the work shift there were 3-5 operators on duty but there could be as many as 7 including a ROK Air Force tech. He would provide translation for us when needed but also worked on some ROK circuits that also went thought Bucket Site. It was difficult at first to understand an English speaking Korean soldier on the radio or phone but with time it became a normal conversation.

Sometime the atmosphere in the Control Room was boring and quiet and we spent time listening in on various circuits which was not permitted, or “rang up” a friend on another site to B.S. with and pass the time. We had phone line circuits that went to Hawaii and the U.S. too but we could not use them to phone home or we would get in “deep kemp-she”. Other times working at the switchboard required an operator to have 3 or more hands in order to accomplish the many tasks going on at one time. The room had 5 or 6 switchboards, teletype machines and radio's and when busy was a buss with voices and personnel working at each position.

I have always enjoyed airplanes so I also sent time on Bucket Site just watching the various air craft take off and land at Osan AB. There was a mixture of old airplanes like the C-47 and F-86 used by the ROK Air Force and the newer U.S. planes like the F-4 Phantom, C-130, C-141 and other aircraft of the era.


Osan AB runway from Bucket Site (1969) (Emil Obrey)


Osan AB east side of base from Bucket Site (1969) (Emil Obrey)


Osan AB base area and runway (1969) (Emil Obrey)

Outside the base main gate was as entirely different world called “The Vill”. It wasn't like being on base, in the States, at home or any place I had ever been before and I also had to learn its culture and protocols. The town was crowded, dusty, load, busy and full of small simple businesses getting day to day matters done. Also included were plain looking store fronts that opened into large Disco's Bars or other types of music and dance establishments. There were lights, loud music and girls everywhere. Of course there were usually enough G.I's to go around so the ladies did not have to drink alone.


Jim Hinkle on Bucket Site on dayoff (1969) (Emil Obrey)

The thought did not occur to my when I first arrived at Bucket Site that this assignment may only be temporary. After about 3 months of on the job training working on site I was informed that I was going to be transferred to Richmond Site. It was an isolated radio relay site above the city of Taejon near our company HQ at Stonestown Compound. Richmond was a large main site and one along a series of “Backbone” sites from Pusan to the D.M.Z. in the North. My friend Jim Hinkle encouraged me by saying I would enjoy the experience and we would be able to talk on-line and visit. So the guys gave me a party and we said our farewells. A driver took me to the small rural train station at Osan-ni and I went off to my next assignment and duty station at Richmond Site.

Bucket Site from MSR on east end of runway (1969) (Emil Obrey)


Bucket Site view of site from Osan AB (1969) (Emil Obrey)


Osan AB Main Area and PX along Broadway Ave. (1969) (Emil Obrey)

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First Man on the Moon Rivets Korea to TVs On 21 July 1969, the first men walked on the moon. In Korea, everyone is glued to the TV to watch the events on TV as it unfolds. President Nixon proclaims a National Day of Participation so everyone watches as Apollo 11 makes history. Remember that at that time, the TV were not household fixtures but located mostly in coffee shops and other business shops. The TVs were cheap black and white models for the most part.

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EC-121 Shot Down On Monday, April 14, 1969 at 5:00 PM EST (1544Z), a Navy EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft (PR-21/BuNo 135749) of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) with a crew of 31, including nine Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) and Marine linguists, took off from Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan on a routine Beggar Shadow SIGINT collection mission over the Sea of Japan. The EC-121M had been directed to proceed to a point off the Musu Peninsula, where the aircraft was to orbit for several hours along a 120-mile long "track," then land at Osan Air Base in South Korea. The aircraft commander had been ordered not to come any closer than 50 nautical miles to the North Korean coastline. This particular route had been flown by VQ-1 EC-121Ms for two years without incident, and the mission had been graded as being "minimal risk." More than 190 similar missions had been previously flow by Navy and Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea's east coast during the first three months of 1969, all without incident. Six hours after takeoff, the crew of the EC-121M transmitted a routine radio-teletype activity report at 11:00 PM EST, then disappeared off USAF radar screens at 11:50 PM EST, 90 miles southeast of the North Korean port of Chongjin.

The EC-121M mission had been monitored from the ground by Air Force radar sites in Japan and South Korea, as well as by the USAFSS 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata, Japan and Detachment 1, 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base, Korea (USA-31), which followed the flight by intercepting North Korean air defense radar tracking transmissions. Air Force radars and USAFSS COMINT intercept operators in Korea had detected two NKAF MiGs flying towards the unarmed EC-121 prior the plane's disappearance. In addition, the intercept operators at the USAFSS listening post at Osan, South Korea, who were copying North Korean voice and morse air defense radio traffic, tracked the flight path of the EC-121 aircraft as well as the intercept course of the North Korean fighters. The NAVSECGRU listening post at Kamiseya in Japan was also intercepting Russian PVO radar tracking of the EC-121M mission, giving NSA two sources of information as to the flight path of the aircraft.

The USAFSS listening post at Osan attempted to warn the aircraft's commander by transmitting a mission abort signal at 11:46 PM EST. But the MiGs caught up with the slow flying aircraft as it turned for home 90 miles southeast of the North Korean port city of Chongjin, and the MiGs shot the EC-121 down at 11:47 PM EST. All 31 crewmembers were killed, including nine NAVSECGRU cryptologists. The bodies of only two of the crew were ever recovered. The USAFSS listening post at Osan (SIGAD USA-31) issued a CRITIC message on the incident at 5:44 AM GMT on April 15, 1969.

President Nixon order an immediate halt of all aerial reconnaissance missions in the Sea of Japan, but rescinded his order three days later, this time ordering that all peripheral reconnaissance missions off North Korea be accompanied by fighter escorts.

According to one source, an NSA review of COMINT intercepts of North Korean Air Force ground-to-air radio traffic from the USAFSS listening post at Osan showed that the shootdown had resulted from a command and control error between the North Korean ground controller and the fighter pilot. Other NSA intercepts showed that the Soviets were shocked by the North Korean action, so much so that Russian warships were sent to the crash site to help American ships search for survivors.

President Nixon's revelation that NSA had successfully monitored both the North Korean and Russian air defense tracking nets caused both nations to immediately change all of their radio frequencies, operating procedures and crypto systems in use at the time. It took NSA's cryptologists months to get back to the point where they were prior to Nixon's press conference. (Source: KoreanWar.com.)

Hal Flynt of Knoxville, TN, then an F-4 pilot, wrote in the guestbook in Aug 2007 that he remembered, "The EC21 Incident in 1969 and the many hours of MIG cover following that. Taking pictures of the EC21 parts on the fantail of a Russian Destroyer while being escorted by MIG 21’s." It was a tense time.

The following is from Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger:

The North Koreans did respond to UN diplomacy-but not in the conference room and not along the DMZ. This time, Kim I1-sung's air commanders committed a calculated act of terror aimed to reopen the seams in the U.S.-ROK alliance. On 15 April, just after the northern premier's fiftyseventh birthday, two Korean People's Air Force MiG interceptors shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121M Constellation ninety-five miles off the east coast of the DPRK. The Communist fighter pilots issued no warning to the unarmed, four-engine turboprop, which lumbered along gathering electronic signals under a long-standing project code-named Beggar Shadow. Thirty-one Americans died in the one-sided encounter.

The specter of the Pueblo seemed to be resurrected. This time, the evidence clearly showed a premeditated act by the north. There was little likelihood that some local commander had gotten bold given Kim's massive crackdown against his officer corps. Dare the United States and/or its Republic of Korean allies hit back?

President Nixon thought so. "We were being tested, and therefore force must be met with force," assumed the new U.S. leader. His national security adviser Henry Kissinger agreed. The president convened most of his National Security Council and weighed his options. Two USN carrier battle groups headed out into the Sea of Japan-just in case.32 Kissinger, noticeably excited to be facing his "first major crisis," prepared a slate of possible responses. These included a protest at Panmunjom, armed escort of future reconnaissance flights, seizure of North Korean vessels on the high seas, mining of Wonsan harbor, shore bombardment by air or ship gunnery, and retaliatory air strikes against the KPAF fighter airstrips. The president and his national security adviser agreed that only two options really seemed possible: a reprisal air strike or an aerial escort linked to a diplomatic complaint at the truce table. Both men favored the air attack.

But Nixon and Kissinger found themselves alone in their enthusiasm to bomb North Korea. Secretary of State William Rogers feared a public backlash from another military action in addition to the immensely unpopu lar Vietnam War. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird warned that Congress would conduct its own retaliation, scuttling Nixon's other projects early in his administration. Laird also made the usual strategic argument: Korea was an economy-of-force theater, and anything used there diverted from the main effort in Vietnam. For his part, CIA chief, Richard Helms, also agreed that an air strike risked escalation and promised nothing but momentary gratification in the Oval Office. All urged the president to limit his response to armed escorts and a note at Panmunjom.

The key men on the scene in Korea also warned against an air strike. Ambassador Porter recommended a mild response, for fear of encouraging radical elements in Pyongyang (or Seoul, for that matter). General Bonesteel also "didn't consider it wise" to react strongly, reported the JCS chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler. The general and ambassador cited intelligence sources, confirmed by CIA Director Helms, that indicated that the EC-121M downing was just another "isolated provocation," perhaps hoping to draw a UNC overreaction to suit some arcane internal needs in Pyongyang. So far, the ROKs had not stirred. Would they remain quiet if UN Navy fighter-bombers struck North Korea?

Dismayed by the lack of support for their aggressive ideas, Nixon and Kissinger relented. On 18 April, the president announced that armed escorts would accompany future U.S. reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of North Korea. He also told the UN representative to the Military Armistice Commission to deliver what Nixon called "a very weak protest" to the DPRK general at Panmunjom.

In his mind, Nixon reserved the bombing option, but as the days passed, it became less and less likely. "I still agreed," wrote Nixon later, "that we had to act boldly. I just wasn't convinced that this was the time to do it." Like Johnson after the capture of the Pueblo, the president worried about launching aircraft and then finding himself at war in Korea. "As long as we were involved in Vietnam," concluded Nixon, "we simply did not have the resources or public support for another war in another place."

The same factors that militated against a massive response to the taking of the Pueblo still restrained U.S. decision makers. Taking the long view came easier this time. The infiltration situation had improved greatly, the ROKs faced no special crisis, and the poor naval fliers were dead-not hostages. Thus, the Americans reacted to the loss of the EC-121M in three ways: the note at Panmunjom, armed escorts, and a naval show of force off the North Korean coast.

The "nonconfrontational" statement was accepted without comment by the KPA representative. The American delegation also withdrew until August to reinforce its protest. The DPRK gave no indication of how it interpreted this missive, but it certainly must have calmed any invasion hysteria. Attacks on Americans tailed off drastically over the next few weeks.

The armed escorts proved easier to order than implement. Panicky Pentagon officials suspended all U.S. reconnaissance flights worldwide on 15 April, pending a decision on armed escorts. It took until 8 May to scrape up enough escort fighters to restart the missions. Given the heavy air commitment to Vietnam-to include the recent commencement of secret bombings in Cambodia-this should have surprised few. Nixon, however, raged against the "postponements, excuses, and delays." He might have been even more annoyed had he learned that Beggar Shadow flights had always received fighter escorts through the end of 1968 when requirements in Southeast Asia and the presumed easing situation in Korea encouraged a shift of these assets. Once escorted flights resumed, no further reconnaissance aircraft were attacked. The KPAF declined to test the U.S. aviators.

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F-106 Delta Darts Alert (1969) Replacing the 82nd FIS F-102s at Suwon, the 318th FIS F-106s of McChord AFB departed Naha AB on 18 Feb 1968 for Osan AB. A total of 487 PAX and 719,582 lbs of cargo were received. 21 C-141 aircraft were used to make the move. On 20 Feb the last C-130 departed Naha for Osan with 318th FIS PAX and equipment. A total of 23 C-130s were used to move 238 PAX and 436,000 lbs of cargo for the 318th FIS. (Source: 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology (30 Nov 1940-31 Dec 1980))

The alerts for the F-106s continued into 1969. The following photos by Frank Dutcher, 71st FIS, Malstrom, MT during alerts at Osan in 1969 are from F-106 Delta Dart: 71st FIS

F-106s from the 95th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, 21st Air Division (later 20th Air Division) of Dover AFB, Delaware deployed at Osan AB from 15 Nov. 1969 - 1 May 1970. Attached to Fifth Air Force ADVON, 15 Nov. 1969 - 1 May 1970.

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Three Airmen killed in 347th TFW F-4C Aircraft Fire The incident occurred on 29 Apr 1969. At this time, the 36th TFS was part of the 347 TFW and deployed to the Osan FOL, Det 1, 347th TFW. Lauren Milligan of Vermont wrote Mar 2007, "My brother,John "Ricky" Milligan was in the 36th TFS at Osan in April 1969. He was a crew chief, and a plane, and hanger caught fire, exploded? and he was killed along with two other airmen."

Later Dave Revezzo of Jacksonville, FL wrote in June 2007, "I made several TDY trips to Osan from the 80th TFS (347 TFW) at Yokota during 1969 to 1971. I was the crew chief of the F4C that exploded in the hanger in 1969. I lost two very good friends that day. The third airman's name sounds familar, but I don't remember him. I arrived that day from Yokota to start my 30 day rotation. The plane exploded about an hour after I arrived. Those two friends were scheduled to return to Yokota the next day. One going back to the states to marry. I also was there and on the nuclear alert regarding the Pueblo incident.Yes, it was the real thing."

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Anti-government Protests over Constitutional Amendment In June-July 1969, 3,800 students from five Seoul universities clashed with police over the amendment to the Constitution that would allow Park Chung-hee to run for the Presidency for a third six-year term. Clashes lasted for eleven straight days.

In Sept 1969, clashes between rock-hurling students and police flared up again over the constitutional issue.

On 18 Oct the national referendum showed that two-thirds favor the third term amendment with 11.1 million voting. President Park had said he would step down if the referendum didn't pass. However, with the approval he could run for a third term in 1971.

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SOFA Punishment Under the SOFA, the Ministry of Justice exercised jurisdiction on 51 cases -- 11 military and 40 civilian. Of this number, 34 are awaiting trial, two on appeal and 15 completed. There were no acquittals and the general level of punishment was "reasonable" according to the 8th Army.

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ROK Upgrade under Military Assistance Program On 29 Aug, six F-4Ds arrive, the first of 18 to be given to the ROK under the $100 million 1968 Military Assistance Program (MAP). On 23 Sep President Park Chung-hee activates first ROKAF F-4D squadron at Taegu. The last of the 18 F-4Ds were delivered in Sep to the ROKAF.

In December a number of U-10B aircraft arrive under the MAP. The single-engine prop aircraft equipped with communications, search light and loudspeakers intended for counter-intelligence work.

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ROK Developments President Park Chung-hee on 29 Sep 1969 opens the Osan-Chon leg of the 270-mile Seoul-Pusan Expressway. This highway, which will form the backbone of a nationwide mass transit network and improve military supply lines, was scheduled to be completed by mid-1970.

The RO annouced a devaluation of its currency as the open market exchange rate jumps from 290 to 305 won to one US dollar.

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Miracle of the Han During the 1960's, South Korea made great economic progress. Seoul, the showpiece of this success, became known as the "Miracle on the Han River." Through its five year plans, the government set out to make Korea into a modern industrial nation. New industry sprang up around Seoul, causing the population to soar to 10.6 million. Rapid growth forced the government to develop plans to ease crowding in Seoul. It chose an area south of the Han River, where relatively few people lived, to build new housing. Soon huge, high-rise apartments pierced the skyline in other outlying areas. Rice growing fields south of the city disappeared to be filled by apartment complexes. The city absorbed these new residential areas into its orbit.

The new housing was unlike traditional Korean homes, which were wide, one-story structures with rows of rooms linked by courtyards and porches. Instead, residents of modern Seoul lived in vast apartment complexes surrounded by playgrounds, department stores, and sports facilities. The old-style homes disappeared from the city landscape. (Source: Korean Society.)

Unfortunately, the "Miracle of the Han" would take a few more years to extend outside of Seoul. Many people in the Cholla Provinces felt neglected by the prosperity of Seoul while their economies remained at the subsistence levels. The term "regionalism" was coined to reflect the feelings of the Cholla provinces of what was referred to the favoritism showed to the the Seoul-Taegu-Pusan connections.

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Infiltrators, Spies and Hijacking In 1969 there were 367 NK infiltrators attempted to infiltrate on 153 separate occasions. This was a dramatic decrease from the 1,142 attempted infiltrations in 1968, but that seaborne infiltrations tripled. Of the 367 infiltrators, 79 were captured and 93 were killed.

On 11 Dec a KAL turboprop YS-11 hijacked enroute from Kangnung to Seoul and diverted to NK airport near Wonsan with 51 passengers. The International Red Cross asked to intervene. This was the second hijacking of a commercial airliner after the C-47 that was hijacked in Feb 1958. Large scale anti-communist protests in ROK over the hijacking were held.

The government took a hardline with Communists after the assassination attempt on the Blue House in 1968. In July 1969, Lee Kun-su, a high-ranking communist who defected through Panmunjon made the headlines in Mar 1967, was hanged in Seoul Prison. He was condemned on 10 May for spying for the North while posing as a defector. Also in July Kim Chong-tae, a leader of a NK spy network called the Unification Revolution Party, was hanged in Seoul Prison. He was sentenced to death in Jan 1969 for espionage activities against the South since Mar 1964. The ROK CIA announced in Sep that they arrested two NK agents and 10 accomplices who attempted to reorganize the Unification Revolution Party that was neutralized in 1968. In Aug 1969 the Supreme Court upholds the convictions of two leaders in the Imja island espionage ring arrested in July 1968 and sentences them to death.

The ROK Security Command and KCIA were active in searching out spy rings -- but it appears that many of these rings had existed in Korea for many years before being found. On 19 Aug the ROK Army announced the arrest of six agents belonging to two separate espionage groups which had infiltrated into the south coast and were to spy on military facilities in Pusan, Seoul and Taegu. In Oct the KNP announced the arrest of 10 people in a spy ring in three cities in North Cholla Province after the leader of the group surrendered. The ROK Security Command announced the arrest of nine suspected NK espionage agents in two Kunsan based spy rings. In Oct two NK agents and 17 collaborators were arrested in Seoul after a gun battle that wounded two KCIA agents. In Oct the KNP arrested two subversive agents in Yongdongpo who had infiltrated the ROK on 8 Jul to stir up unrest. In Oct the KNP and KCIA announced the arrest of four spies and three suspected spies in two separate roundups in Seoul and Taegu. On 19 Nov the ROK Army Security Command announced the arrest of a five-man spy ring in Yongdong-po set up by a NK agent in 1961.

The North suspended large scale penetration attempts and instead started infiltrating the South with small teams. The ROK drew up plans to increase the KNP to a strength of 15,000 men to cope with the infiltration problems. (NOTE: It was not until 1970 that the paramilitary Combat Police (later called Riot Police) was proposed.) On 21 Jul infiltrators were repulsed by 2d ID troops on the DMZ. On 12 Aug the ROK Army Security Command announce the arrest of three agents residing is Sochon, South Chunchong Province (22km from Kunsan). Two agents captured attempting to exfiltrate near Munsan. On 24 Aug large firefight on DMZ leaves one infiltrator and three ROK soldiers dead. On 14 Sep three infiltrators killed and one captured on eastern sector of DMZ at a road block. In the firefight that ensued, one ROK army killed and four wounded. In Oct a NK agent and supporter captured attempting to exfiltrate across the Imjin River. In Oct two infiltrators killed and one repelled in central sector of DMZ. On 13 Oct one infiltrator killed in central sector. Two agents who appeared in the I Corps area on 12 Oct are killed by ROK Marines when they attempt to cross the Imjin River on 17 Oct.

Seaborne infiltration were on the increase in 1968. On 12 Jul an infiltrator was captured near Kimpo after infiltrating by sea on 8 Jul. In June, a band of 16 guerillas infiltrated by boat near Pusan. 13 were killed, but 3 escaped. On 25 Jul the three NK agents were tracked down on Taehuksan island near Mokpo and killed. On 25 Jul, three infiltrators and two ROK soldiers killed on the southern half of the DMZ. In Aug Seoul police capture two agents who had landed on the southern coast. On 8 Aug KNP announced the capture of a NK espionage agent in Pusan who was to forment trouble amongst unions and students. He had been infiltrated by highspeed spy boat. On 12 Aug a high-speed NK boat attacks a fishing vessel off the southern islands in Cholla Province killing two men and wounding three others before escaping. On 20 Sep four infiltrators killed and speedboat captured on west coast. On 22 Sep a NK agent is captured by ROK Marines on east coast near Yongil.

On 24 Sep ROK Destroyer Pusan-ham had a running gun battle with a 50-ton spy boat off the southwest coast of South Korea near Imja Island. The spy boat attempted to evade capture by dodging in and out of the fishing boats. In the fire-fight that ensued, six ROK crewmen were seriously injured. Because inclement weather was closing in, it was decided to sink the 50-ton spyboat. Approximately 15 crewmen aboard perished.

On 13 Oct a ROK destroyer Chungmu-ham sank a 75-ton spy boat carrying about 20 agents after a running gun battle off the SW coast.

On 25 July, 45 NK guards attacked UNC guards with fists and clubs. No serious injuries involved.

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DMZ Ambush Ambush along DMZ Four soldiers traveling along the DMZ in a one-and-a half ton truck marked with a white flag and "DMZ Police" were attacked with small arms and grenades by North Korean intruders in a planned ambush. U.S. Army responding to the shooting spotted the four intruders heading north to the DMZ.

The four soldiers from the 7th ID were identified as SSgt James R. Grissinger; SP4 Charles E. Taylor; SP4 Jack L. Morris; and PFC W.E. Grimes. Each were shot through the head by their attackers.

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Nixon Doctrine On July 24, 1969, President Richard Nixon, en route to Guam, told reporters that the United States would seek to reduce its military involvement in Asia and encourage the "Asianization" of conflicts on that continent. Originally called the "Guam Doctrine" and better known as the "Nixon Doctrine," this change of foreign policy was a result of U.S. public pressures to get out of Vietnam, the war's drain on the U.S. economy, the new president's intention to uphold his campaign promise to "withdraw honorably" from Southeast Asia, and the new administration's aspiration to meet the geopolitical challenges and opportunities generated by the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s. Throughout the early 1970s, the Nixon administration developed its strategy for a new relationship with Asian nations, based on the maintenance of U.S. security commitments to and increased burden-sharing by its Asian allies. Simply put, the Nixon Doctrine stated: "We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations' affairs."

This Doctrine would ultimately lead to the removal of the 7th ID from Korea in 1971...and the coining of the term "Vietnamization."

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