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This page is graphically intense with long load times due to photos. However, the photos and narratives by the men who served at Osan Air Base makes the wait well worthwhile. The opinions expressed are those of the author and in no way represents any official statement of Osan AB or the USAF. 
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Acknowledgement: Thanks to Lt Kim Nu-ri, Executive Officer, 37th Tactical Intelligence Group for the unclassified information on his unit. Thanks to Lt Choi Jae-hong, Chief of Operations, AFOC Support Wing and Lt Han Ju-yop (Justin), Translator AFOC Support Wing for their help in providing information on the AFOC Support and Services Wing and ADA Platoon. 
1970s View of Osan AB (USAF Photo) ROKAF AT OSAN ABHISTORY OF ROKAF AT OSAN AB:IN WORK...ROKAF (Republic of Korea Air Force) THIS IS A WORK IN-PROGRESS AND FACTS ARE BEING ADDED/DELETED DURING THIS PROCESS. THIS IS NOT A COMPLETED HISTORY.ORIGINAL ROKAF AIRCRAFT: Original Aircraft: Though Osan AB never had an assigned aircraft wing, the ROKAF was always attached to the 5AF and 7AF headquarters as operational planners for the ROKAF at F-51s at Gangnung and later the F-86s at Sachon and Kunsan. The original aircraft of the South Korean Air Force were discarded aircraft that were left behind by the Japanese after the war. Charles Euripides of Charlotte, North Carolina wrote, "I have collected photographs of the following Japanese aircraft in service in Korea, 1945-1950: 1. Ki-55 "Ida" (NKAF, overall gray); 2. Ki-54 "Hickory" (NKAF, overall green); 3. Ki-86 "Cypress" (SKAF, overall silver); 4. Rufe (float only); 5. Ki-9 Spruce (overall green, South Korean markings." Charles' observations of the Japanese aircraft in use by the SKAF is corroborated by the website Japanese Aircraft in Foreign Markings. It says, "South Korea: By force of circumstance, this "new" nation had to develop an air force from scratch at the end of the war. Initially, they operated Tachikawa Ki-9 "Spruce" machines, that appear to be in red - lime trainer colours. Markings consisted of a large Korean red / blue roundel, outlined in white, carried at least on the fuselage and upper wings. A broad white fuselage band was carried in front of the tail section." At Kunsan Air Base, when the 63rd Infantry Division, 3rd Battalion came to Kunsan, the Captain Robert Grenig reported seeing a "Zero" abandoned on the base. This aircraft was slowly stripped of any usable parts by the Koreans (with the knowledge of the Americans) until it was nothing but a skeleton. The Japanese had simply laid down their arms at the end of the war and walked away. (NOTE: The "Zero" was most likely a Ki-55 "Ida" as the "Zero" was a naval aircraft and Kunsan Aerodrome was an Army Advanced Training Base.) The Ki-55 "Ida" was a single-engined dual seat Army Type 99 Advanced Trainer and Ki-54 "Hickory" was a dual-engine Army Type 1 Advanced Trainer/Transport. Both of these aircraft may have been used at Kunsan by the 12th or 23rd Advanced Air Training Units who operated in the area. The 19th Air Training Unit was also in the area and may have used the Ki-86A "Cypress"; Ki-9 "Spruce"; and Ki-17 "Cedar" aircraft. These were Army single-engined two-seat biplane primary trainers.       Later Charles wrote of a photo of Kimpo c.1945. He said, "The photo shows a number of Ki-84's, Ki-55's, Ki-54's, Ki-79b's and a few P-38's and one C-47. Another photo shows a number of Ki-46's, a Fokker Super Universal, and the same aircraft listed above." Thus Kimpo appears to have been the "collection point" of the Japanese aircraft after the war. Charles also mentioned that the Japanese aircraft left in North Korea were taken to Russia by the Russians after they drove down to the 38th Parallel. He said, "I sent a number of vivid, color photos of Japanese aircraft in North Korean markings to No Kum-Sok, the North Korean pilot who defected in September, 1953 to Kimpo. Even after reviewing the photos, he wrote me and said that the Russians took all Japanese aircraft back to Russia following WWII and that the Koreans had no Japanese aircraft." According to an article in Code One Magazine celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean Air Force, the history of the ROKAF predates the official 1949 formation date. It states, "...Korea can trace its aviation heritage back to 1922 when An Chang-nam became the first Korean pilot to fly in his country's air space. Military aviation started about the same time. Korean expatriates desiring to support the independence movement in their homeland went through flight training at aviation schools in other countries. Korea's first six military pilots received their training in Curtiss JN-4s in 1920 at the Redwood flight school in northern California."  J-1 Jenny (From Code One Magazine)  Old ROKAF (From Kimsoft) It continued, "Choi Yong-duk, who later played a leading role in establishing ROKAF, set up an organization called the Air Force Foundation Committee in 1943 to train Korean pilots in China to fight in the independence war against Japan. When World War II ended, thousands of other Koreans involved in the independence war returned home. Yong-duk and several others set up several private organizations that promoted aviation. Yong-duk, Lee Young-Moo, and Chung Jin-Il integrated these organizations in August 1946 to form the Korean Aviation Establishment Committee. As relations between the north and south became more confrontational in the late 1940s, the committee began negotiations with US forces in Korea to establish an aviation unit under the control of the ministry of national defense. The unit, equipped with L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft, was activated in May 1948. An air force academy was established at Kimpo Air Base eight months later." "As the communist forces of North Korea strengthened their airpower with Soviet equipment and as US forces withdrew from the peninsula in June 1949, South Korea asked for more military aid, including fighter aircraft. The United States denied the request to avoid increasing tensions in the region. Republic of Korea President Lee Seung-Man went about finding other avenues for procuring military hardware to respond to the North Korean military build up. A nationwide donation campaign called "National Flag" collected money for aircraft. The funds raised were used to buy ten T-6 trainers. The aircraft were rolled out in ceremonies at Yoido Air Base in May 1950 and named "National Foundation Aircraft" to commemorate the public's part in providing them for the country's defense. The timing could not have been more portentous — the war began less than six weeks later." By mid-1950 the ROKAF had some T-6 Texan trainers and L-4 Piper liaison aircraft -- though the reports of the numbers of these aircraft vary from 20 to 60. These were all World War II surplus aircraft -- and all trainers. According to The United States Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p17), "The ROKAF's 16 planes (8 L-4's, 5 L-5's, and 3 T-6's) were located at Kimpo and Seoul airfields, and it had detachments at Suwon, Taegu, Kwang-ju, Kunsan and Cheju-do." The ROKAF was not up to the task for the war ahead. EARLY DAYS OF KOREAN WAR: The original 1,900 man ROKAF was decimated in the first days of the war. A few of the survivors became the fighter pilots who would later form the nucleus of the ROKAF 51st Provisional Squadron under Major Hess. According to Air War Over Korea by Robert Jackson (p13) states, "...one critical deficiency in the South Korean defences became apparent when two North Korean Yak-9 fighters appeared over Kimpo and Seoul Airfields and circled leisurely for several minutes at low altitude before flying away northwards. The South Korean had nothing capable of intercepting the the enemy aircraft; in June 1950, the Republic of Korea Air Force consisted of 60 aircraft, all trainers; 8 L-4s; 5 L-5s and 3 T-6 Texans. These were based on Kimpo and Seoul Airfields."  (NOTE: All Japanese aircraft (i.e., Tachikawa Ki-9 "Spruce") have been "officially" erased from ROKAF history.) (From ROKAF 50th Year History) The following is excerpted from 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996). It stated, "The NKAF was "opposed" by the ROKAF, by the middle of 1950 it had in its inventory eight Piper L-4 liaison aircraft and three T-6 Texan trainers. A southern pilot defected to the North in another Piper in May 1949. All remaining aircraft were destroyed on the ground during the first days of the war. The ROKAF was caught at the early stage of its formation; in fact Kimpo was the only air base it had available and none of the five airfields that were under speedy construction was ready by the start of the hostilities. One flight school was founded in Jan.1949 and it had insufficient time to train enough cadres." "The overall strength of the ROKAF on 2 June 1950 was 1,899 officers and men, including at least 100 pilots, and all this force during the opening days of the war was killed, scattered or taken prisoner. Thus when it became necessary to commit to combat some South Korean aircraft, at least for outward show, "Project Bout One", planned before the outbreak of war, was put into effect: ten re-activated F-51D Mustang fighters of USAF with ROKAF markings. The pilots were Americans under Maj. D. Hess, ground crews were also American. In operations during the summer and autumn of 1950 these planes saw much combat, demonstrating that the "...South Korean Air Force, wing by wing with UN aviation, defends the sky of the Motherland". The Americans had no choice in this matter because there were not enough native South Korean pilots." According to Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component Commander by Peter C. Hunt, "The ROKAF was virtually nonexistent when the war erupted--it had less than twenty trainer and liaison aircraft, none of which were suitable for combat. Shortly thereafter, the USAF transferred ten F-51Ds to the ROKAF, accompanied by flight and ground crew instructors. As the RAAF transitioned from the F-51D to the Meteor, they gradually turned over their extra Mustangs to the ROKAF as well." "Any real disagreements about airpower between the US and the ROKAF occurred before the war. In its effort to establish an air force, the Korean government was supported by General Claire Chennault, who recommended a 100-plane force (including 25 F-51s) for the Republic. The US initially eschewed any commitments of this nature for two main reasons. First, the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) was not prepared for such an undertaking because they had limited resources. Second, the weak ROK economy could not support the cost of an air arm. When the Korean government in October 1949 established the ROKAF despite US resistance, the KMAG gradually formed an air advisory group." When the tensions with North Korea increased before the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee requested F-51 Mustangs that the U.S. were scrapping in favor of the F-80 Shooting Stars. In Air War over Korea (p13) it states that, "The pitifully inadequate state of the ROK Air Force was a direct result of United States policy; following repeated pleas by President Syngman Rhee, Major-General Claire L. Chennault had drawn up a plan for a South Korean Air Arm consisting of 99 aircraft, including 25 F-51 Mustang fighter-bombers, but this had been rejected by General MacArthur, who believed that the build-up of such a force would serve to increase the tension that already existed between North and South Korea and would lend weight to the Communists' claim that the United States was deliberately seeking to promote an arms race in the area." The transfers were reluctantly approved and started to the ROKAF in 1949. However, after the invasion of Korea a new problem popped up. The jet fighters in Japan could not operate from the undeveloped airstrips in Korea. The F-51s were hastily pressed into service by the Americans during the initial days of the war...leaving the Koreans with nothing. After the initial shock in June 1950, the F-51s were handed over to Major Hess' "Bout One". According to South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (p17), "The South Korean Air Force in June 1950 consisted of a single flight group of 12 liaison-type aircraft and 10 advance trainers (AT6). Maj. Dean E. Hess, KMAG adviser to the South Korean Air Force, had a a few (approximately 10) old F-51 (Mustang) planes under his control but no South Korean pilots had yet qualified to fly combat missions. These planes were given to the ROK Air Force on 26 June 1950." It states in Air War Over Korea (p25), that there was a plan to deploy a proportion of the F-51s recalled from the Air National Guard on the South Korean airfields as soon as possible after their arrival in the Far East. However, it continued, "Before the deployment could take place, however, steps would have to be taken to remedy the deplorable condition of the South Korean airfield still held by the Allies. In July 1950 the only airfield suitable for operations even by piston-engined combat aircraft was Taegu, and even that had little to offer; the runway was a bumpy pilot's nightmare of packed earth and gravel, and amenities consisted of a few ramshackle buildings. Since June 30th Taegu -- known also under the military designation of K-2 -- had been the home of the ten worn-out Mustangs supplied to the Republic of Korea on the request of President Rhee. This unit, manned by a mixed bunch of South Korean and American pilots under the command of Major Dean Hess, was in action almost continually during the early days of July, although in effectiveness was hampered by the fact that many of the South Korean pilots lacked sufficient experience to handle the F-51 and also by the lack of a suitable tactical air control system. Nevertheless, because of its location the Mustang squadron was the only Allied unit capable of ranging along the whole length of the front and of patrolling the battle area for between two and three hours at a stretch. It was comforting for the commanders of the hard-pressed 24th Division and ROK forces to know that a flight of Mustangs could be overhead within minutes of a request for help being sent out." This first battle-weary unit of the ROKAF was absorbed by the Mustang-equipped ROKAF 51st Provisional Fighter Squadron at Taegu. It flew its first ground attack mission on July 15th.  (Courtesy Ken Creasy) According to Major Hess in his autobiography Battle Hymn (pp75-76), "At Itazuke my excitement increased. The instructions called for command of a new project, a classified organization with the nebulous title "Bout I." I was to take ten American pilots, four ground officers, and a hundred enlisted men to Korea, where we would train a number of South Korean pilots in the F-51 (Mustang). Some of these Korean were veteran flyers who, ironically had flown for Japan in World War II -- an indication of how during their forty-five-year occupation of Korea the Japanese had attempted to absorb these people. But now their country was independent once more after forty years of subjection, and these Koreans were waiting to be taught how to fight for their freedom with our modern weapons." He continued (p76), "I was told it was to be a training mission only. We would be located on a field near the town of Taegu and thus be the only friendly air power in Korea. But we Americans were to stay out of combat. The men we were to instruct would become the nucleus of what might prove to be a valuable addition to the United Nations forces. They in turn would teach more of their compatriots to fly the F-51s." Later Major Hess would get a "reinterpretation" that would allow he and his pilots to lead the combat missions. Major Hess stated that many of the original Korean pilots had previous flying experience with Japanese aircraft during World War II. Because of this one pilot with a few confirmed American kills under his belt felt that the Americans had nothing that they could teach him. Unfortunately, he was used to a much more maneuverable Japanese aircraft and was not accustomed to the F-51s flight characteristics. On an attack on a tank, his angle of attack was too steep and he plowed into the ground. These and other problems frustrated Hess' originally. Language barriers were probably the greatest obstacle to his training program. However, after the arrival of the 6002nd Fighter Bomber Squadron from the Philippines flying F-51s, the ROKAF 51st Provisional Squadron was absorbed into the unit. The ROKAF aircraft ceased to exist. However, Maj. Hess made an impassioned plea to General Timberlake to maintain the unit and was given permission. Most of the American pilots voluntarily chose to remain with the 6002 FBS and only Maj. Hess, Lt. Mike Bellowin and about thirty enlisted volunteered to remain with the ROKAF. The fledgling ROKAF unit under Maj. Hess moved to K-4 (Sachon) near Pusan to continue flying and then on to K-10 (Chinhae) in July. By this time, there were only six F-51s. The unit remained small with three American pilots and only eight of the original ten ROKAF pilots. After the recapture of Seoul, the unit moved to K-24 (Youngdungpo) on Sep 27, 1950. It followed the drive north and was at K-24 (Pyongyang) between Oct 28 - Dec 6, 1950. It arrived at K-5 (Taejon) on Dec 6. The training cadre was sent on to Cheju Island (K-40). It departed Taejon and moved back to K-16 (Youngdongpo). 
 ROKAF Training (From Code One Magazine) The following was excerpted from Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component Commander. "After the war began, the US initiated a special project called "Bout One" to assist the development of the ROKAF. Bout One provided the ROKAF with ten F-51s, spare parts, and US instructors for aircrew and maintenance personnel. Even after General MacArthur announced that the decision to establish Bout One was final, Lieutenant General Earle Partridge, the 5th Air Force (5AF) commander, harbored doubts about the project because of inadequate ROKAF logistics and "entirely incompetent [Korean] F-51 pilots." "Led by USAF Major Dean E. Hess, Bout One's airpower objectives largely reflected the desires of US commanders, on whom the unit depended for guidance and leadership. Hess had unique insight into ROK political objectives as well as ROKAF airpower goals, since he had close personal relationships with President Rhee and General Kim Chung Yul, the ROKAF Chief of Staff. The South Korean pilots wanted to serve their country in any way possible--when the US considered dissolving Bout One, the South Korean crews volunteered to join the army so they could continue to fight. In fact, a major airpower objective throughout the Korean War was to support the outnumbered UN ground troops through close air support (CAS). In this mission, Korean cultural beliefs occasionally undermined the capability of airpower to achieve its objectives effectively. The ROK Army was sometimes reluctant to call for CAS, fearing the perception of weakness and a corresponding loss of face." "With about two dozen aircraft, mainly Canadian-built, North American T-6 trainers and L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft, the ROKAF organization had virtually no combat capability. In the early days of the war, Korean pilots used the liaison aircraft to drop small homemade bombs that they kept on their laps. The allocation of ten F-51s for Major Hess's Bout One project eventually grew to twenty fighters by the end of 1951. This expansion was closely monitored by USAF leaders who wanted to control the post-war ROKAF capability without signaling a US commitment for long-term support." "Operationally, Bout One diverted much-needed USAF aircraft and pilots to the ROKAF during a critical phase of the war. USAF plans to dissolve the project were shelved when President Truman specifically authorized the initial F-51 transfer. Additionally, because most of the Korean pilots could not speak English, CAS was not feasible due to communications problems. At 5AF, the political significance of Bout One forced commanders to attend to the smallest matters personally. General Partridge was distracted by the need to oversee specific details about pilots and missions when the ROKAF and USAF flew together."  (From Mig Alley Skin Central) "Practically speaking, the ROKAF had to integrate into the US command structure because they depended on Major Hess's instructions from the USAF. American instructor pilots normally led mixed flights of US-ROKAF crews, and ROKAF pilots simply followed the leader. The language barrier essentially precluded the ROKAF from leading flights, because the JOC and the American instructors spoke only English." "Commanders should question the assumption that language differences do not affect airmen, since English is the common language of aviation. American, British and Australian crews spoke English as their primary language, and the Afrikaaners in the SAAF spoke fluent English as well. Although the ROKAF contribution to the war was small, the inability of their pilots to speak English created significant operational hurdles that were never fully solved over the three years of war."  ROKAF Training (From Code One Magazine) But this problem of language was not only South Korean. The following is excerpted from 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996). It states, "By the middle of 1953 the NKAF had not been rebuilt as a true fighting force. The brunt of air combat over Korea was borne by Russian and Chinese pilots. As can be concluded from recollections of Soviet participants of the war, North Korean pilots were few and far between and, because they couldn't speak Russian or Chinese, they were hard to teach. According to some recollections (not without expletives) the Koreans were simply avoiding combat under the pretext of 'preservation of national cadres'." As the Korean War stabilized, the ROKAF increased its aircraft numbers with transfers from the USAF which now was transitioning back to F-80, F-84 and F-86s. The ROKAF units moved to Kangnung to be closer to the front lines which now had stabilized along the 38th Parallel. As other RAAF-associated units transitioned to the Glouster Meteor their F-51 aircraft was transferred to the ROKAF. For example, 2Squadron (SAAF) records indicate that many of the South African Air Force (SAAF) F-51Ds were transferred to the ROKAF in 1953-1954 as well. Starting in 1955, F-86F being discarded by the USAF were transferred to the ROKAF to replace the F-51s.  ROKAF F-51 (From Code One Magazine) According to an article in Code One Magazine celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean Air Force, "In the first days of the war, ROKAF pilots made heroic but vain attempts to turn back North Korean forces by dropping hand grenades on enemy tanks from their liaison aircraft. The day after the initial invasion, ten ROKAF pilots were rushed to Itasuke Air Base in Japan to receive conversion training for the F-51 Mustang. They returned to Taegu Air Base in South Korea less than two weeks later to take part in the war. ROKAF operations were soon moved to Jinhae Air Base near Pusan as ROKAF pilots supported the Naktong River defense line around that city after the initial retreat." It continued, "ROKAF forces became more proficient as the war progressed. In October 1951, ROKAF F-51 pilots conducted their first independent air operations against enemy supply lines. South Korean pilots later distinguished themselves by destroying the Sung-Ho-Ri iron bridge after many unsuccessful attempts by US bombers in January 1952. Other memorable operations include the Pyung-Yang bombing operation in August 1952 and a series of highly effective close air support missions in March 1953."  ROKAF F-51 (From Code One Magazine) It added, "From its first mission in July 1950 to the armistice in July 1953, ROKAF F-51 pilots completed about 8,500 combat missions. Thirty-nine out of a total of 115 ROKAF combat pilots flew 100 combat missions or more. Seventeen ROKAF pilots lost their lives during the war. The service grew from a meager force of twenty-two liaison aircraft and 1,100 troops at the beginning of the war to 118 aircraft and about 11,500 troops at war's end." PROBLEMS DEALING WITH TRAINING A TECHNICAL WORKFORCE AFTER THE KOREAN WAR: 1950s: The 6146th Air Force Advisory Group (ROKAF) was formed to train the ROKAF. Originally organized as the 6146th Air Base Unit in July 1950, the organization elevated to group-level in August 1952; redesignated to 6146th Air Advisory Group (ROKAF) at that time, and finally redesignated to 6146th Air Force Advisory Group (ROKAF) in July 1953. The organization's primary mission was to train pilots and ground crews for the Republic of Korea's Air Force (ROKAF), but it also flew armed reconnaissance close air support missions. The group maintained its own aircraft and kept operational the airstrip at which it was based, which was often nearer the front lines than any other USAF unit. For part of 1951, a unit detachment trained Korean personnel on the island of Cheju (Cheju Do). At Sachon it trained ROKAF personnel in the operation and maintenance of L-4, L-5, L-16, T-6, and F-51 aircraft. When the group moved to Taegu in early 1953, it left a detachment at Sachon to continue that training. Once trained at Sachon, the Korean pilots deployed to Kangnung near the 38th parallel, where another of the group's detachments had been based since the end of 1951. That detachment earned a Distinguished Unit Citation for the period December 1952 through April 1953 for flying hundreds of close support and interdiction strikes with a wing of the Republic of Korea Air Force. Under the guidance of 6146th Air Force Advisory Group pilots, Koreans flew F-51s from Kangnung to bomb, rocket, and strafe enemy troop concentrations, vehicles, supply dumps, and fuel storage sites. (Source: Korean War Project.) The problems associated with training a technical workforce were immense. Up to the Post-World War II period, the Japanese had reserved all technical positions for the Japanese -- with Koreans filling the lower menial positions. When the Japanese went home, they took with all the managerial level or highly-skilled workers. If a Korean was trained by the Japanese, he was painted with a broad brush of "collaborator" and persecuted. In a nut shell, the common Korean was basically only suited for menial labor. Though there were semi-skilled labor to varying degrees, the highly-skilled technicians were nil and professionals such as engineers were at a premium. After the war, the ROKAF started from scratch building their workforce under the guidance of the US military. Prior to the F-86, the ROKAF conducted their F-51 flight training out of Kangnung with the 10th FBW (ROKAF). However, in 1955 the USAF started the first transfers of the F-86 to the ROKAF. This entailed training the ROKAF on a completely different technology to bring them into the jet age. "An Open Letter to my Buddy" by a retired USAF MSgt states, "I went back for a second tour in 1956. I was stationed at K-13 Suwon as an advisor to the Republic of Korea Air Force. (ROKAF) We were teaching the Koreans how to fly and maintain the F-86." Prior to the F-86, the Koreans were noted as "band-aid mechanics." Basically, they were miracle workers who could temporarily fix things with bubble gum and bailing wire. However, jet engines were not tolerant of these old-fashioned techniques. Suwon became the training base for the F-86 to train the ROKAF personnel.  (From ROKAF 50th Year History) 1960s: By the 1960s, the ROKAF was expanding as more and more trained technicians filled their ranks. Training was still primarily through US assistance -- but only a little training was done at Osan with the primary ROKAF-USAF training being done at Suwon. Pilots and senior technicians attended military schools within the United States. Under the military aid programs, military hardware was transferred to Korea at no cost using the slight-of-hand tricks of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and US military "aid" dollars to purchase the FMS materials. As US units transitioned to the F-100 Supersabres, the F-86 Sabre jets were sent to the ROKAF. The ROKAF organizational structure in the 1960s was understandably a carbon copy US organizations. The ROKAF was heavily reliant on US aid. However, there has been a dramatic change in the form of training provided to the ROKAF over the years. Years ago the USAF would train the ROKAF on the system and then transfer the system to the ROKAF. However, now systems are purchased "off-the-shelf" and contractors provide support/training. For example, let's consider the development of Air Traffic Control within the ROKAF. In 1952, the Taegu Air Control Center (ACC) was established in Taegu by USAF/MATCOM. However, by 1958, the ROKAF was sufficiently trained to take over the enroute control of aircraft. In 1968, the High-Control Service was established at Mt Palgong by USAF to provide radar service for flights at or above FL240. In 1973, the ROKAF took over High-Control Service. In 1986 a new computer-based enroute radar control system was installed at Taegu airbase by ROKAF. Thus one can see that the pattern in the past was that the USAF first established a system; the ROKAF was trained via OJT to maintain the system; and then the system was transferred to the ROKAF. This system of "training and transfer" was used in all areas. However, after the "Miracle of the Han River" came about, Korea has gone about developing her own electronic systems in cooperation with foreign companies. Throughout the history of the ROKAF, American personnel would serve as transition trainers and advisors for new aircraft received. Most often these "trainer-advisors" would be USAF personnel from bases in Korea who would be sent to various ROKAF bases requesting assistance. A History of the Korean People, Tradition and Transformation by Andrew C. Nahm (p505) states, "Following the signing of the armistice agreement in July 1953, south Korea strengthened its military, aiming at the construction of a self-reliant defense posture. Various new academies of the military branches and a war college were established, and after the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States on October 1, 1953 more U.S. military aid was received and troops became better trained and equipped. While training better qualified officers at military schools in Korea, the government sent a large number of officers to receive advanced training at U.S. military institutions." It continued, "Although South Korea's military strength increased during and after the Korean War, it was not until after the emergence of the Third Republic in 1963 that the national defense posture was noticeably improved. The government adopted several important measures to strengthen national defense, increased the number of divisions and units in the armed forces, and improved the training programs." 1970s: Military expenditures grew steadily after 1963, particularly after 1972, due to the shift in U.S. Asian policy and international situation. To be more specific -- Vietnam blossomed after 1963. Lyndon Johnson escalated the Vietnam war in 1965 and 1966. The U.S. needed its troops...and international support as well. In order to get Korean involvement, the U.S. threatened to pullout portions of its troops from Korea if Korea did not contribute its troops. However, if Korea did acquiesce, the U.S. agreed to provide additional military assistance in the form of U.S. military aid dollars. Korea's involvement was blackmail, but the Korea really didn't have much choice, but to join the Vietnam effort. Korea sent its troops off to war. Part of this "deal" was that the US was going to remove the 7th ID and promised to upgrade the ROK military with new equipment and armaments. The 7th ID was removed in 1977. Though Park Chung-hee had volunteered troops before and sent a Korean MASH unit in 1964, 50,000 Korean soldiers were fighting in Vietnam after 1965 under the new agreement. By the time the ROK forces withdrew in 1973, as many as 300,000 Koreans had served there. Korea transferred most of its F-5A to Vietnam and in return had them replaced with F-4E aircraft. However, after Vietnam fell, the U.S. needed Korea to maintain its image as the protector of democracy. With all the excess stockpiles of Vietnam materials, much of it ended up in equipping the South Korea forces. The first "Team Spirit" was born in the late 1970s and continued till the 1990s. But another trend was happening in the U.S. There was a strong push in America to reduce the size of the military after Vietnam. (This was shown by President Carter's plan in 1979 to reduce the American forces by 6,000 troops -- though it was discarded later.) With this new reality, it was essential to beef up the South Korean forces.  (From ROKAF 50th Year History) By these actions, the Korean military hardware was being upgraded by the U.S. Korea secured an increasing amount of military loans from the U.S. "Military assistance from the United States was a key factory in Korean military development. Between 1953 and 1961, the United States provided $1.6 billion; between 1962 and 1969, $2.5 billion; and between 1970 and 1976, $2.8 billion in grants and loans." South Korea spent an enormous amount of money for the military in its military modernization program. It purchased $2.1 billion worth of arms from the United States between 1975 and 1979. South Korea was the 4th largest buyer of U.S. military hardware. Most of this spending was simply "slight-of-hand" tricks of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)...U.S. giving loans that were later "forgiven" after Korea had bought U.S. arms. By 1990, Korea's military expenditures had reached $9.18 billion and was increasing rapidly as Korea set out on its path to be militarily independent from the U.S. military. However, a key point of this modernization that should not be overlooked is that technology was being transferred along with this upgrade in military hardware. In 1969, the manufacturing of small arms, tanks, and guided missiles and rockets began, and Korean-made guided missiles, tanks and high-powered rockets were tested successfully in September 1978. The people trained in the military took this training in military technology and converted it to the civilian markets. The miracle of the Han was underway.   (From AFTHS) 1980s - 1990s: By the mid-1980s, Korea had transitioned from low-tech industries (shoes, clothing) into mid-tech industries (petrochemicals, steel, automobiles), but it wanted to enter into high-tech areas (electronics, aircraft manufacturing). However, it did not have the technology. The only way to obtain this technology quickly with minimal risk was through partnerships. Thus was born the KFX (Korean Fighter Program) which gave birth to the KF-16. This was an aircraft "co-produced" in Korea in hopes of gaining the technology to "co-develop" at a later date its own aircraft (similar to the JSF Japanese Fighter Program). (NOTE: In "co-produce" Korea uses another company's designs and manufactures it in Korea, but in "co-develop" Korea participates in the design phases of the aircraft as well as production.) The Korean KTX-2 Advanced Trainer/Fighter is a step along this path. It is plain to see that Korea has already mapped out a long-range plan to be self-sufficient in design, development and production in its own aircraft systems. The key item for the Koreans is "technology transfer." In the development of the KTX-2, David Ash, Lockheed Martin's program director for the KTX-2, said in July 99, "The supersonic KTX-2 will have the maneuverability, endurance and systems to prepare future pilots to fly advanced, front-line fighters like the F-16, F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In addition, the team of engineers from Lockheed Martin and Samsung Aerospace are working together to make sure the design experience that comes from producing the world's most advanced fighter programs is transferred to the Korean industry." Korea aims to develop its own high-tech aircraft manufacturing capability.  (From ROKAF 50th Year History Background History of Nation in 1960s: The country of Korea was in turmoil in the 1960s. The corruption within the Syngman Rhee government was rampant. In 1958 legislation was passed that abolished election for local officials. Politically important local posts were filled with Rhee's Liberal Party members; Chiefs of police were replaced with Rhee supporters; and a National Security Law was passed that virtually killed any chance for democratization of politics. The end result was riots and student demonstrations that erupted throughout the country. It culminated in the April 19th Student Uprising. This toppled the Rhee government. Rhee resigned from office in April 1961 and left for exile in Hawaii. This was the end of the corrupt and oppressive First Republic. However, the Second Republic was short-lived. On May 16, 1961, a group of military officers carried out a coup and established a military junta. A small group of young officers commanding 3600 men toppled a government that had authority over an army of 600,000. The reason was that President Yun had sided with the junta and persuaded the U.S. Eighth Army and the commanders of various South Korean army units not to interfere with the new rulers. President Yun stayed on for ten months after the military junta took over power thereby legitimizing it. The revolutionary junta suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, forbade all political activities, imposed press censorship, and banned student demonstrations. Major General Park Chung-Hee consolidated his power and retired from the military to become President of the Third Republic (1963-1972). In May 1965, President Park visited the US at President Johnson's invitation, and soon after an agreement between South Korea and the US was reached regarding the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam. There was a great outcry and vehement opposition from a large number of National Assemblymen, students, and intellectual and political leaders in Korea. However, the die was cast and several thousand Korean troops left for Vietnam. Korea had been blackmailed into agreeing to this. If it had refused, some American troops with their modern weaponry would have been withdrawn for duty in Vietnam. But if Korea agreed, the U.S. promised to increase the monetary grants and loans to Korea. Park Chung-Hee's regime has been colored as an "iron-fisted dictatorship", but his supporters claim the country needed a strong-willed leader with a vision at the time. Perhaps they were right as the "Miracle of the Han River" can be directly attributed to him. However, by the 1970s there were others who felt quite the opposite about his continued iron-fisted rule. Popular politicians such as Kim Jung-pil, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung openly criticized the regime. Later they would be arrested for their views. In August 1965, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), an administrative agreement concerning the status of US troops in Korea, was signed thus resolving many thorny problems which had existed ever since the arrival of the American troops. Parties agreed to permit other privileges and rights, including relief from taxes, customs, immigration requirements, and sharing of payment for claims. However, the basic premise of the SOFA deals with percentage share. If you pay more for the support of the American troops, you get a lot more in concessions. The Koreans paid little to nothing in 1965 and the SOFA was heavily weighted towards the Americans' advantage. It was not until 1992 that the SOFA was renegotiated and Korea increased its share to $220 million. But in the early 1960s, the U.S. still spent $500 million a year to support the ROK and as such, the ROK had no negotiating power. Then on January 21, 1968, the North Koreans dispatched Commandoes to the South to assassinate Park Chung-Hee, but failed. Two days later the North Koreans captured the USS Pueblo on the high seas east of the North Korean port of Wonson. The situation became worse when the North Koreans shot down a U.S. EC121 reconnaissance plane, which due to a navigational error flew over North Korea on April 15, 1969. Korea was on the brink of war. The USAF deployed successive units to Kunsan with some elements at Osan AB. After the Pueblo Incident, the nuclear tasking was moved back to Osan.  (Click on image to enlarge) F-86F SABRES According to the Baugher site, "The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) received its first Sabres when five F-86Fs were turned over to ROK pilots on June 20, 1955. Korea received 85 ex-USAF F-86F-25 and -30 fighters between June 1955 and June 1956. These replaced the F-51D Mustang fighters used previously, equipping units of the RoKAFs 10th Wing. In 1958, 27 more F-86Fs and ten RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft were delivered. Many of the ROKAF ex-USAF Sabres were retrofitted with the "F-40" wing with extended tips and slats. Many were modified to carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. These ROKAF Sabres were replaced by Northrop F-5s beginning in 1965. At least three F-86Fs survived until 1987." Beginning in November of 1960, the Republic of Korea got sufficient numbers of F-86Ds to equip two interceptor wings.
F-86F 51-13180 preserved at Seoul War Museum (MAP); F-86F (ex-RoKAF?) displayed at Osan AB.; Unidentified F-86F being assembled for display at Inchon war museum Aug99 (R. Royce Raven) From: Duncan's Sabre Site 1970s: After peace overtures from the North, President Park announced his willingness to open gradual contacts with North Korea. However, he did not know that the North had secretly started building infiltration tunnels under the DMZ in 1970. In 1971, Korean ground troops assumed responsibility for the defense of the 156-mile DMZ with a partial withdrawal of American forces with the removal of the 7th Infantry Division. Park Chung-hee, angered over the removal of the 7th ID, and only appeased by the promise to upgrade his military with direct aid. In 1971 President Park declared a national emergency after narrowly defeating Kim Dae-Jung for the presidency (51%). Because of Kim Dae-jung's attacks on the Park regime, he became a marked man of the KCIA. Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History (p358) refers to the "Yushin" constitution this way. The 1972 constitution was written "removing all limits on his tenure in office and giving him powers to appoint and dismiss the cabinet and even the prime minister, to designate one-third of the National Assembly..., to suspend or destroy civil liberties, and to issue decrees for whatever powers the Yushin framers forgot to include." In 1972, President Park imposed martial law and was elected to a six-year term under a new constitution. Basically, with the "Yushin" system, Park could remain President as long as he wished with being bothered by elections. Military expenditures grew steadily after 1972 due to the shift in U.S. Asian policy and the international situation. Most of this increase was due to the grants and loans promised by the President Johnson if the ROK Army would join the alliance in Vietnam in 1965. In 1973, U.S.-Korea relations became strained in connection with the kidnapping from Japan of Kim Dae-jung, who would later become Presidents of Korea. He claimed that the government of Park was "highly militaristic" and it had been turned into a "police state" during his Presidential campaign in 1971. In 1973, he was kidnapped from Japan; underwent torture; and faced imminent death at the hands of the Korean CIA. It was the US intercession that saved his life. Park became indignant with U.S. interference in the internal affairs of South Korea -- Washington reduced its military aid to Seoul in the early 1970s as a warning against the authoritarian rule and human right abuses of the Park regime. He sought self-sufficiency through defense budgeting -- U.S. grant aid was terminated in 1976 -- and US-supported indigenous arms production. Despite a covert nuclear weapons program and the illegal conversion of the Honest John missile, the US never abandoned the alliance with the ROK. Because of the growing discontent against his policies in 1974, Park imposed an emergency decree forbidding criticism of the "Yushin" constitution. With the power of the National Security Act, the KCIA enforced this decree through intimidation and torture. World-wide attention was being focused on Korea with outraged cries against the human rights violations. In 1974, a North Korean sympathizer from Japan, in an attempt on the life of President Park Chung-hee at a public gathering, shot and killed Mrs. Park. There was growing criticism of the Americans against human rights violations by the Korean government. In 1975, Jimmy Carter in running for President told the Washington Post that he saw no reason for American troops to be stationed in South Korea and that, if elected, he would pull them out along with the nuclear weapons stationed there. In the 1992 publication, Kim Young-Sam and the The New Korea (p99) it states, "Carter apparently wanted to removed the "trip-wire" U.S. force to avoid any possibility of an American entanglement in a future land war in Asia. But Carter also appeared to be motivated by his and his advisers' deep antagonism to the authoritarian government in South Korea and its violations of human rights. It appears that they were also heavily influenced by the so-called Koreagate scandal of 1971 involving a lobbyist for South Korea, Tong-sun Park, with ties to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency." Koreagate involved the dispersal of between $500,000 to $1 million annually in cash gifts and campaign contributions. President Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw the ground troops of the US from South Korea caused grave concerns for the national security. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of the superiority of the North Korean forces, but did recommend a scaling down of the American forces. The impact of these decisions at the local level was that USAF base officials took a "wait-and-see" attitude before approving monies for improvements to the base. In 1976, two American army officers were brutally hacked to death in an unprovoked attack by 30 axe-wielding North Korean Communist security guards in the joint security area of the truce conference installation at Panmunjon. The ROKAF along with the U.S. forces went on full alert. A massive buildup was immediately undertaken with carrier fleets and AWACS aircraft deployed to Korea. Though the tensions died down, whenever you have so many armed forces confronting each other there is always the chance that someone may pull the trigger and World War III will start. Any face-off is dangerous. However, the event did strengthen the case of the opponents to Jimmy Carter's withdrawal plans. In 1976, the U.S. Senate in a 77-to-15 vote refused to endorse Carter's withdrawal scheme. Politically, the scheme was dead, but Carter needed a face-saving exit. In early 1977, the third in a series of tunnels secretly dug under the DMZ was discovered. In February 1979, Carter on the basis of a reappraisal of North Korea's military strength, said no further withdrawals would take place until the end of his administration. The reappraisal was a face-saving device which permitted the reversal of policy. Following President Carter's Korea visit in June 1979, the thorny issue of troop withdrawals was solved and the plan was withdrawn. However, a 1979 Gallup poll showed the American people's support for South Korea was at its lowest point ever. The assassination of Park Chung-Hee by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency on October 26, 1979 shook the nation. Martial Law was enacted and the Fourth Republic came to an end. Again the ROKAF was on full alert. On the night of December 12, 1979, Major General Chun Doo-hwan ousted General Chong Sung-hwa as Army Chief of Staff. A History of the Korean People, Tradition and Transformation (p465) states, "This incident raised a serious issue between the commander of the U.S. forces in Korea and General Chun because of his mobilization of troops without the authorization of the commander of the U.S.-Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC) which was established on November 1978, with the commander of the U.S. Eight Army as commander of the combined forces. Therefore any troop movement of Korean troops without the approval of the commander of the combined forces was regarded as illegal. However, the United States, recognizing the particular situation in Korea, raised no serious objection." (NOTE: The effects of this U.S. decision to say -- and do -- nothing is still being felt today as the Korean student activists use it as "proof" that the U.S. "supported" Chun Doo-hwan in his actions. It is not known what actions were taken by the Kunsan ROKAF to support this action by Chun Doo-hwan, but it is assumed that the unit was confined to barracks and on full alert. However, the Commanding General of the First Army guarding Seoul ordered his troops to remain "neutral." Most likely similar orders were issued to the ROKAF. Kunsan would have been too far away from any of the coup activities going on to be considered a player.) On May 9, 1979 Kim Yong-sam and Kim Dae-jung urged the government to cancel martial law and suspend its plans to revise the constitution. Government response was vague and student protests erupted and spread nationwide. Facing a possible collapse of law and order, the government extended its limited martial law to nationwide one on May 18. Kim Yong-sam, Kim Jong-pil and Kim Dae-jung were arrested. In Kwangju the news of the arrest of Kim Dae-jung infuriated the residents. They occupied buildings and broke into armories to get arms. On May 22, paratroopers stormed Kwangju and subjugated the rebellion, but the insurrection resulted in the death of several hundreds (though Kwangju residents claim it is in the thousands). Westerners call it the "Kwangju Riots" or "Kwangju Uprising", but Koreans call it the "Kwangju Massacre". Kim Dae-jung was indicted by the Chun regime for inciting the riots and given the death sentence...but it was later commuted to life in prison. (NOTE: Again anti-American protestors assign some degree of blame and guilt upon U.S. military and government authorities for the bloody crackdown in Kwangju. South Korean army units were technically under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) were pulled from their positions near the DMZ to participate in quelling the Kwangju uprising. Radicals accuse the U.S. of approving or at least acquiescing to their deployment to Kwangju. However, on the opposite side of the coin, some vocal American politicians have used this same case as demonstrating the untrustworthiness of Koreans in living up to treaty agreements.) Though Kwangju is 120km from Kunsan, it is unlikely that there was any involvement from the Kunsan ROKAF to support the suppression effort. It was strictly a ROK Army operation. Again, the ROKAF would have probably been confined to barracks and on full alert. (NOTE: This uprising would be the centerpiece of investigations by the National Assembly in 1987 under Roh Tae-woo and then reopened under the Kim Young-sam presidency. In the latter, Chun Doo-hwan and Ro Tae-woo were arrested in 1995 and tried in 1996 on bribery and sedition charges. Though the charges for "treason" were dropped, the two former Presidents were sent to prison for corruption. In 1995 President Kim Young-sam said this was a major step towards "righting the wrongs of history", but he would soon find his own troubles with corruption when his second son, Kim Hyon-chol, was sent to prison for receiving bribes in 1997.) In 1980, General Chun Doo-hwan was "inaugurated" as president as all four political parties were disbanded. In 1981, he would be "reelected" by the electoral college as the only candidate. ROKAF TRANSITION TO F-4D/E: In 1972, the RoKAF received 18 F-4Ds drawn from the USAF's 3rd TFW based at Kunsan AB. (Go to 3rd Bomb Wing for more information.) Initially these aircraft were "on loan" from the USAF.    Click on photo to enlarge From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. According to Service with the Republic of Korea Air Force, "In 1968, the Republic of Korea, having gotten rather nervous about border clashes with North Korea, ordered an initial batch of 18 F-4Ds. This order was filled using aircraft drawn from from existing USAF stocks rather than by new construction. The transfer program was assigned the code name Peace Spectator. The first four F-4Ds arrived in Korea in August of 1969. They were supplied to the 110th TFS of the 11th FW based at Taegu." "In 1972, the RoKAF received 18 more F-4Ds drawn from the USAF's locally-based 3rd TFW. These planes were supplied in return for the Korean government agreeing to transfer 36 Northrop F-5A/Bs to South Vietnam under the Enhance Plus program. Though we do not show any F-4Ds at Kunsan, there is one source that stated that Kunsan had a detachment of the 110th TFS, 11th FW from Taegu stationed there. Possibly this detachment existed only temporarily during the transfer. The F-4Ds were supplied to the 157st TFS of the 11th FW. These planes were officially only on loan to Korea, but the transfer was eventually made permanent. A few USAF F-4Ds were used by the RoKAF on short-term loan during the 1970s, but six were permanently supplied to the RoKAF in 1982 to make up for attrition, and a further 24 were delivered between December 1987 and April 1988. This last batch were equipped with Pave Spike laser designators. This final batch enabled the ROKAF to bring its two F-4D squadrons back to full strength and to equip a third. Ultimately, at least 70 ex-USAF F-4Ds were transferred to South Korea, the last being delivered in 1988."   ROKAF F-4Ds From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge "The RoKAF ordered 37 new-build F-4Es from McDonnell, receiving the first examples in 1978. The last of these planes, 78-0744, was the the 5068th and last Phantom to be built in the USA. These 37 planes were delivered under Operation Peace Pheasant II. They went to the 152nd and 153re TFS of the 17th TFW based at Chongju." "Subsequently, Korea has received an unspecified number of ex-USAF F-4Es. The US offered 24 surplus F-4Es in 1988 and 30 in 1989, but probably only the latter batch was actually delivered. It is uncertain exactly how many ex-USAF F-4Es are currently flying in Korea. Some Korean F-4Es are equipped to carry the AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack laser designator pod. When the USAF's Korea-based 460th TRG disbanded in late 1990, 12 of their RF-4Cs were turned over to the RoKAF, along with a quantity of AN/ALQ-131 jamming pods. These were given to the 131st TRS of the 39th TRG based at Suwon." In the late-1970s the transfers of F-4Ds were being handled as the USAF transitioned to F-15s and Kunsan did support the ROKAF at Taegu with maintenance trainers. According to Bruce Ebert, then a crew chief with the 8th TFW from 1978-1980, "I do remember that some of our F-4s went to Taegu right around the time Kadena got F-15s. ... at that same time we gave/sold/transferred (or however that stuff works) some of our planes to the Koreans. But for whatever reason, some of the maint guys from Kunsan used to go to Taegu as maint trainers/advisors for the Koreans."  ROKAF F-4E 80387  ROKAF F-4E 80407  ROKAF F-4E 80744 F-5A/B FREEDOM FIGHTER: Starting in 1972, as a favor to the U.S., Korea transferred 36 F-5As and all its RF-5As to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. To make up the difference, the US government agreed to supply Korea with F-4 Phantoms and later-model F-5Es. It would make sense to hold onto the F-86s until the F-5Es that were promised by the US arrived and then swap them out.  ROKAF F-5A 38399 From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge Fightertown says, "The Republic of Korea Air Force (Hankook Kong Goon) was one of the largest operators of the Freedom Fighter, receiving 88 F-5As, 30 F-5Bs, and 8 RF-5As. The first F-5s arrived in Korea in early April of 1965. 16 F-5As and four F-5Bs re-equipped the 105th Fighter Squadron of the 10th Fighter Wing based at Suwon, which achieved operational status on September 1, replacing F-86F Sabres. Another 14 F-5As were delivered to the 102nd FS, also based at Suwon."  ROKAF F-5B 21276 From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge "The RF-5As equipped a single squadron, and this unit continued to fly the RF-5A some time after the F-5A/F-5B had been replaced by the F-5E/F." "During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the F-5A and F-5B were replaced in front-line service with the RoKAF by later-model F-5Es and Fs. By the end of the 1980s, all of the F-5A and F-5B Freedom Fighters were out of RoKAF service. " "The RoKAF had originally planned to acquire the RF-4E for reconnaissance purposes, but this plan was abandoned and several F-5As were converted to RF-5A reconnaissance configuration with camera noses. These RF-5As were withdrawn from use in 1990 following the arrival of a second batch of RF-4Cs. This marked the last of Korea's early-model F-5s." 1980s: In 1985 President Chun Doo-hwan freed Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and other political prisoners from a ban on political activity. In 1987 amidst growing cries of protest Chun Doo-hwan decided to step down and selected his choice for a successor as Roh Tae-woo, a former general. The National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment for direct election of the president. A significant change for the military was that it pledged to be "non-political". In other words, military personnel would be free to vote without coercion. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung failed to agree on a united opposition candidate and faced Roh Tae-woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party. 26 million voters went to the polls to elect Roh Tae-woo as a minority candidate against a badly divided opposition. Regardless, over 98 percent of the voters turned out to vote for the first civilian President since Syngman Rhee. The election was internationally monitored. (NOTE: Kim Young-sam would later claim that his Presidency was the first civilian government since Roh Tae-woo was from a military background.) On November 28, 1987 KAL 828 enroute to Seoul from the Persian Gulf was bombed by North Korean terrorists killing 115 people. One of the terrorists, Kim Hyun-hee, in her 1995 autobiography Tears of My Soul talked about her orders: "By destroying the plane we intend to increase the sense of chaos and ultimately to prevent the Olympic Games from taking place in Seoul. Other nations will not want to risk their athletes for fear that either their planes will be destroyed or that once in Seoul their athletes will not be safe from terrorist attacks. (NOTE: Kim Hyun-hee was extradited to Seoul, tried and sentenced to death. Her sentence was commuted and she was released.) In 1988, the official histories read "the Summer Olympics were held in Seoul without incident after the Republic of Korea refused to host them jointly in Pyongyang". In truth, the Seoul Olympic committee offered the ping-pong venue and another minor sport to Pyongyang realizing full well that North Korea would refuse. Pyongyang -- along with Cuba -- boycotted the Olympics and issued some very ominous threats that cast a cloud over the events. However, with the KAL 828 incident still fresh in their minds, some of the ROKAF units along with some 51st TFW aircraft were put on full-alert -- just in case. Luckily nothing occurred to interrupt the Olympic spirit. In 1988, the New York Times reported the possibility that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. This would foreshadow the events of the 1990s where North Korea would push the Korea again to the brink of war. In the latter part of the 1980s, student activism peaked. At Osan AB, the front gate was closed regularly by students protesting the Kwangju Massacre and assigning blame to the U.S. warmongers. In addition the students blamed the U.S. for the separation of the two Koreas. These types of demonstrations were widely publicized around the world. For example, in 1988, the U.S. Information Service facility in Kwangju was repeatedly attacked by student activists. The agency was closed. At Osan Air Base, the Main Gate was often closed as student activists would show up with megaphones to make their statement. These demonstrations were more vocal than damaging. The area outside of Osan Air Base was starting to show the effects of the "Miracle of the Han" as some of the economic expansion started to appear in Kunsan. Planning work was being done to expand Pyeongtaek Harbor and there was an expansion as new companies moved into the city area to get away from the high costs of operating in Seoul. The opening of the Kyongbu highway through the Osan City toll gate provided easy transportation to Seoul. In the farm areas, most of the farm roads were being converted concrete roads. The bottleneck within Songtan was freed up by the construction of the Route 1 directly through Burak mountain by draining the old "Paradise Lake" and filling in the low-lying swampy areas. The first of the highrise apartments were built in 1980s along the reclaimed land along Route 1 to Pyeongtaek. Along with these high-rises many of the Songtan schools were expanded. This would mark the beginning of a building boom in the Songtan City. In the last half of the 1980s, the initial planning stages was underway for three national industrial complex construction projects -- Kunsan, Kunjang (Kunsan/Janghang) and the Agro-industrial Complex (in Seongsan/Seosu/Okku). No one could have envisioned how fast things in Kunsan would change after the ball was set in motion. The biggest change that affected the relationships between ROKAF and USAF was the change in the Americans perception of the average Korean. Two things had happened since the 1960s-1970s when Americans looked on Koreans as inferiors. First, the "third wave" of Korean immigration had taken place in the 1970s. These Korean emigrants were educated Koreans who bypassed the immigration quotas. By the 1980s, they had entered America's mainstream and no longer perceived as "THEM" foreigners (as differentiated from "US" Americans). Secondly, in the 1980s, there was a growth in Korea in the disposable incomes of workers. Though the government attempted to restrain the skyrocketing wages, they continued to grow in the form of expanded annual bonuses. In the blink of an eye, Korea had developed a middle class. It is important to point out that the amount of money one earns does not really determine if one is middle-class or not. If someone "thinks" that he is of the middle class, he "IS" middle class. Middle-class status is a state of mind. Once a person perceives himself as middle-class, he also assumes the values and goals of that class. He takes on the perceived characteristics of that class -- apartment, car, children in better schools, etc. Suddenly, Americans saw Koreans in a different light. They saw them no longer as inferiors as they had in the 1960s-1970s, but rather as equals. It is difficult to respect someone you consider inferior -- even one who considers you his friend. But it is easy to respect someone who you consider your equal -- even an enemy. The ROKAF and USAF in the 1980s saw each other as equals. F-5E TIGER II: At this point in time, we are uncertain exactly when the F-5Es arrived at Kunsan. We know that they were not at Kunsan in 1978, but they were present in 1987. As it would not be logical for the F-5A/B to be at Kunsan, we are assuming that Kunsan was equipped with the Korean-built F-5Es produced between 1982-1986. (NOTE: We speculate that the 111th FIS departed Kunsan when the F-86Fs left and was assigned to the 10th Fighter Wing at Suwon to transition to the F-5Es. When the construction of new bunkers to house the F-5Es was complete, the 111th moved back to its old home at Kunsan sometime between 1982-1986.) Kalani O'Sullivan remembers seeing three F-86s at Taegu in 1987 on a staff visit to the 11th TFW. Fightertown says, "The Republic of Korea Air Force (Hankook Kong Goon) is a major operator of the F-5, and flies all versions of the F-5 with the exception of the RF-5E." "The ROKAF received its first early-model F-5 Freedom Fighters in 1965, and operated a large number of F-5Aa, F-5Bs, and RF-5As. As a favor to the United States, in 1972, Korea transferred 36 F-5As and all its RF-5As to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. To make up the difference, the US government agreed to supply Korea with F-4 Phantoms and later-model F-5Es. The first F-5Es entered Korean service in 1974, when 19 ex-Vietnamese Air Force aircraft were delivered. This laid the foundation for the acquisition of 126 new-build F-5Es and 20 F-5Fs. The first F-5Es were allocated to the 1st Fighter Wing (115th, 122nd, and 123rd Tactical Fighter Squadrons) based at Kwang Ju air base." "In 1980, South Korea signed an initial license production agreement for the manufacture of 48 F-5Es and 20 F-5Fs plus their engines. The Hanjin Corporation, utilizing some facilities owned by Korean Air Lines, assembled the last 68 of the 233 F-5E/Fs delivered to the ROKAF between 1974 and 1986. The General Electric J85 engines were assembled by Samsung (today known as Samsung Aerospace Industries). Work on the project began in 1981, and the first Korean built F-5 (an F-5F) flew for the first time on September 9, 1982. The Korean-built aircraft had all been delivered by 1986." Fightertown continued, "These F-5E/Fs replaced the previous force of F-5A/Bs, although some of these are retained for training. In ROKAF service, the F-5 is known as the Chegoong-ho (Skymaster). The South Korean government is very tight about security, and very little reliable information is available about serial numbers and unit allocations. However, it is believed that the F-5E equips the 115th, 122nd, and 123rd TFS of the 1st Fighter Wing based at Kwangju, the 102nd ,103rd, and 111th TFS of the 10th Fighter Wing based at Suwon, and the 201st and 203rd TFS of the 5th Fighter Wing (base unspecified). The Operational Conversion Unit for the 1st Fighter Wing retains some F-5A/Bs for training." (CORRECTION NOTE: The 111th TFS is part of the 38th Fighter Group at Kunsan Air Base.)
(From Juchan Kim's Homepage)  ROKAF F-5E 61650  ROKAF F-5F 10594 From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge ROKAF Transitions to New Aircraft According to International Air Force Directory; 1999-2000, South Korea's economic crisis is snapping at the heels of its ambitious defence plans, particularly its indigenous KTX-2 advanced trainer/light fighter being designed by Samsung Aerospace in concert with Lockhead Martin. The New ROKAFSince 1990, Korea has been pressing forward on its own after it experienced an initial shock when the U.S. announced that it wanted to downsize their forces by 25 percent under the Nunn-Warner initiative and Korea wanted to know why their "big brother" had changed so. The Koreans did not want the US forces to be downsized but was only able to retain them in Korea by a sizeable increase in their share of the support of these troops.This is when Korea looked at itself for the first time with new eyes as it entered the global marketplaces. It was one of the four dragons of Asia and it for the first time saw that it would have to stand on its own instead of being reliant totally on the U.S. for military hardware. At this point, it let contracts to its lagging shipyards to build its destroyers, LSTs, mine sweepers and submarines. It expanded its manufacture its own main battle tanks under license with the key item being technology transfer so that Korea could be self-sufficient in parts. It started on the building of the KF-16s as kits in order to gain experience in aircraft manufacturing and also gain much needed technology transfer. It opened research avenues into the design, procurement and manufacture of next generation helicopters and fighters. This was an aggressive program to upgrade its military forces hardware as well as gain the technology to build homegrown units to free itself from the U.S. stranglehold. Whether one likes it or not, Korea was pumping out destroyers, submarines, main battle tanks, fighter planes. However, by 2006, it was apparent that the ROK plans were to hit some major obstacles. The first was that the birth rate for Korea had dropped to 1.2 -- meaning that there were not enough births to sustain a viable society. As a result, the ROK forces were projected to be reduced in size. To make up for the manning decrease, the ROK military planned to upgrade their forces with high-tech weaponry. Here it met its second stumbling block -- money. The future of a shrinking population size would reduce the tax base, while the ROK was increasing expenditures for social programs and aid to the North. As such, there were projections for funding shortfalls that most certainly would hit the military first. In 2006, the orders for next-generation armaments were reduced in size. For example, the F-15K which was first anticipated to be a 200 aircraft order was reduced in 2005 to 40 aircraft with 20 more ordered (but not funded) in 2006. As to its reliance on its "big brother" -- that term has not been heard in the Korean press or on the mouth of any Korean for the past ten years. The U.S. was /never again be referred to as Korea's big brother. Korea no longer saw itself as subservient to the U.S. forces -- but rather as its equal ... and in most cases on their home turf, proved to be superior. By 2006, the majority of Koreans wanted the U.S. to leave Korea -- but qualified it with, "not just yet." This was because of the North Korean nuclear crisis was unsettled and the Roh Moo-hyun administration's rapproachement efforts had proved mixed results -- and some said "no returns." It still needed the U.S. Intelligence, high tech armaments and follow-on forces to balance the military equation. However, this did not mean that they liked the U.S. presence -- and some activists viewed the Americans as "occupiers." In 2006, after years of anti-Americanism, thwarted efforts to provide a unified front against North Korea, frustrations with the Roh Moo-hyun administration over US global positioning strategy (regional role in Northeast Asia), the US announced that it would no longer be a "providing patron" to the ROK military, but rather reshape the alliance so that it would become a "supporting partner." By June 2006, the message had become clear that the US-ROK alliance was in serious trouble. In June 2006, Gen Burwell B. Bell, USFK Commander, stated that the ROK needed thorough research and preparation for a new command structure if it is to take back wartime operational control of its forces from the US. Gen. Bell called for research into how land, sea and air forces should be composed in peace and war. In essence, the wheels were set in motion by the US to relieve themselves of CFC control, but the ROK was NOT prepared to accept the functions back. Most military analysts would agree with Gen Bell. Next Generation ROKAF AircraftKF-16C/D Falcon The operations for the fabrication of the KF-16 was set up in Sochon in 1990. The ROK initially attempted to negotiate technology transfer as a precondition for the contract, but the Samsung built the F-16C/Ds under license for the ROKAF with an order for 160 aircraft produced by 2000. An order for an additional 20 was signed to keep the production lines busy until the KTX-2 entered full production and bolstered the air force's inventory, while limiting the effects from delays to the F-X program.The reliability of P&W's engines has been questioned since 1997, which saw two separate crashes of KF-16s in August and September. In late February, another P&W-powered KF-16 fighter crashed when its engine caught fire after taking off from an air base. Dismissing reports that it recommended GE's engine for the F-15K based on price and reliability, Boeing said that it had no preference for a specific engine maker. The F-16s/KF-16s are in service with the 20 Tactical Fighter Wing - Sosan AB (120 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN); 123 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN)) and the 19 Tactical Fighter Wing - Chungwong AB (161 TFS (F-16C/D Block 32); 162 TFS (F-16C/D Block 32); 155 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN); 159 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN)) KT-1 Woongbee Basic Trainer KT-1 Basic Trainer The KT-1 basic trainer ("Woongbee') was acclaimed as Korea's first independently- developed aircraft at its unveiling in Nov 2000. The decision in 1988 to pursue technological research to expand the local aircraft manufacturing base and came after 10 years of intensive development. It was Korea's first aircraft designed entirely by computer. The ROKAF will take 85 KT-1s to replace T-41Ds and T-37s. (See KT-1 for more information) An armed version and its derivative as a light attack aircraft are under development and testing. This armed version can carry external fuel tanks, conventional weapons and is equipped with a mission computer, INS/GPS, Head-Up Display(HUD) and Multi-Function Display. 
The KT-1 basic trainers are equipped with 950 hp turbo-prop engines with a max airspeed of 648 kph and range of 1,700 kilometers. The aircraft was designed for basic use of the ROKAF measures 10.3 meters in length, 10.6 meters in width and 3.7 meters in height.
Golden Eagle KTX-2 Advanced Trainer/Fighter
"The concept for the KTX-2 was developed through joint studies by engineers in
Korea and at Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, home of The Fighter
Enterprise, under guidance of the Republic of Korea Air Force." - Excerpt from
The Korean KTX-2 Advanced Trainer/Fighter.
In Jan 2004, Jane's Security News Briefs reported, "The Republic of Korea (RoK) Defense Procurement Agency has placed a production contract for 25 T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic advanced jet trainers with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI)." In Feb 2004, GE Korea, the South Korean division of General Electric Co., said that the U.S. company signed a US$80 million deal with a South Korean jet manufacturer to co-produce jet engines. The deal calls for GE Aircraft Engines and Samsung Techwin Co. to produce 27 units of the F404-GE-102 engine for South Korea's T-50 advanced jet fighters. In July 2004, the T-50 was undergoing spin recovery tests to determine the limits of recovering from an out of control spin situation. One of the four test aircraft has been fitted with a spin recovery chute. By 2006, the ROK was attempting to market the T-50 on the international market in competition for sales in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. F-X Program with Boeing F-15K Selected amid Controversy: In recent years, Korea has started to ween itself away from American support. It has completed its KF-16 program run at Sochon -- though it has an extension for 20 more KF-16s to be built -- and is now looking towards the next generation fighter. The F-4 fleet is aging rapidly and the F-4D/E aircraft of the 11th TFW and 17th TFW must be replaced starting in 2004-2005. At the start, the FX envisioned a buy of 120 aircraft, but it was cut down to 40 aircraft. There were initially four foreign bidders vying for South Korea's 4.2 trillion-won ($3.23 billion) program to buy 40 fighters between 2005-2009, code-named the "F-X project." The initial competitors were Boeing's F-15, Russia's Su-35, French Dassault's Rafale and the European consortium Eurofighter's Typhoon. Boeing had the edge initially, though the European consortium offered some very lucrative incentives including technology transfers. In January 2002, a surprise twist occurred when the Koreans signed a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) opening the way to possible assembling of Su-35s in Korea. Payments supposedly will partially offset by the defaulted $3.2 billion loan that Korea foolishly made to the Soviets in hopes of opening doors for its businesses.
Boeing F-15K
Boeing's F-15 and France's Rafale were the two strongest contenders. The U.S.
continued to speak of "interoperability" between the Koreans and U.S. forces as
the primary reason for choosing the U.S. F-15s -- not to mention that if the
bid didn't come through, Boeing's St. Louis plant for F-15s will close down.
"Identified only as a military officer, he accused the ministry of pressuring F-X evaluators to give favor to Boeing, saying that the ministry's sudden change of the evaluation rating standard is designed to set the scene for Boeing's winning the project. In February, the ministry ordered its F-X evaluation agencies to use the 60-100 band in terms of evaluation instead of 0 to 100, prompting speculation that it would give advantage to Boeing, which does not offer core technology items. Meanwhile, the 424-page document, drawn up by the Air Force, shows that the Rafale of French Dassault has scored the highest in every category of evaluation test, beating its competitor, the F-15K of Boeing Co. The classified document is one of two photocopies of the original, and insiders might have leaked it to the press with a purpose, sources said. The Air Force's evaluation rated Boeing's F-15K ``excellent'' in only two categories, such as reliability and support combat capability, according to the document. Boeing allegedly met only 30 percent of core technology requirements."
The whistleblower was later identified as ROKAF Lt. Col. Cho Joo-hyung who was
part of the initial evaluation team. He has been accused of bribery to the
amount of $8,400 (11 million won) for offering advice to one of Dassault's
Korean contract offices. Later, another Col. was arrested for leaking
information to the Dassault contractor, Comet. (NOTE: In Feb 2004, the ROK's highest court upheld the conviction of Cho Joo-hyung for bribery and leaking classified information in connection with the military's next-generation fighter procurement project in 2002. The Supreme Court sentenced Cho Joo-hyung, 51, to 18 months in jail with a three-year stay of the prison term.)
On 8 Aug, Yonhap News reported, "S. Korea Downplays Report on F-15's Loss to Su-30 in Mock Battle" "The Air Force downplayed Saturday a report by the Financial Times that South Korea's future top fighter, the U.S.-made F-15 Eagle, was defeated by Russia's Su-30 Flanker in a mock battle. Russia's Su-30 was one of four contenders in the FX program which had many questions of transparency." This is not news. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, "Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time" [May 24, 2002]. The article stated, The Russian-built Sukhoi Su-30MK, the high-performance fighter being exported to India and China, consistently beat the F-15C in classified simulations, say U.S. Air Force and aerospace industry officials. In certain circumstances, the Su-30 can use its maneuverability, enhanced by thrust-vectoring nozzles, and speed to fool the F-15's radar, fire two missiles and escape before the U.S. fighter can adequately respond. This is according to Air Force officials who have seen the results of extensive studies of multi-aircraft engagements conducted in a complex of 360-deg. simulation domes at Boeing's St. Louis facilities.According to AWST the much talked about defeat of F-15's vs the Su-30's flown by India had a few tidbits that were not mentioned before. The pentagon claims that the Alaska based 15's did not have the new long rage active electronically scanned array radars on them. These would have proven to be a sig. advantage and would have allowed the AMRAAMS to be fired off first. According to NewsMax.com, "New Chinese Jets Superior, Eagle Loses to Flanker" Charles R. Smith (May 26, 2004) China is about to receive 24 advanced Sukhoi Su-30MK2 Flanker fighters from Russia. The new fighter jets are reported to be the naval versions of the Sukhoi Su-30MKK fighter. The new Chinese fighters are reportedly equipped with enhanced anti-ship strike capabilities including the Kh-31 Krypton supersonic anti-ship missile. China has already purchased 78 Su-27SK/UBK fighters and 76 Su-30MKK fighters from Russia, and is building 200 more Flanker jets under license from Sukhoi. The PLA Naval Air Corps will deploy the latest batch of Su-30MK2 fighters. The disturbing news from Beijing adds to recent bad news for the U.S. Air Force. According to an unreleased U.S.A.F. report, the F-15 Eagle - the most advanced U.S. fighter in service - is inferior to the latest versions of the Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker. The report covers a series of air-combat training engagements earlier this year between Indian air force Su-30MKs and F-15Cs from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The U.S. F-15s were equipped with the U.S. latest long-range, high-definition radar systems. During the air combat exercises the Su-30MKs and F-15 pilots were seeing each other at the same time with their radars, but the Indian pilots were getting off the simulated first shot with their AA-10 Alamo missiles and often winning the long-range engagements. Flanker Beats Eagle According to a Richard Fisher, a defense analyst and noted expert on the Chinese military, the Chinese Flanker fighters can beat the U.S. top jet fighters including the F-15 Eagle. "Since 1992 the Pentagon has known that in a close-in dogfight the Su-27 would smear the F-15. That year Russian Sukhois came to Langley AFB and showed us their stuff. What we appear to be learning from the recent exercise with India is that Russian radar, weapons and more importantly, tactics, have all reached a level in which the F-15 is on the verge of being outclassed in the long-range engagement as well," stated Fisher. According to a recent report by Fisher for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the Chinese Flanker fighters are a real threat to Taiwan and the U.S. Fisher's report raised early alarm bells about the Chinese purchase of large number of the more advanced Flanker - the Su-30 multi-role strike fighter. "With the purchase of the Sukhoi Su-30MKK (Mnogafunctunali Kommercial Kitayski-Multifunctional Commercial for China) the PLAAF demonstrated that it had made a clear doctrinal commitment to acquiring multi-role attack fighters capable of "joint" warfighting. The Su-30MKK is the first PLAAF attack fighter capable of delivering precision-guided munitions in all weather conditions, and to use modern air-to-air weapons like the self-guiding Vympel R-77 (AA-12 ADDER) AAM," noted Fisher's report. "This upgrade program has the potential to rapidly increase the number of multi-role fighters in the PLAAF, conceivably adding up to 78 Su-27SK/UBKs and 200+ J-11s to the 100+ Su-30MKK/MKK2 multi role fighters. The prospect of the later was formidable enough. But the near-term prospect of nearly 400 Sukhoi fighters with ability to launch active-guided R-77s and anti-ship missiles like the Kh-31A on a single mission creates great pressure for a U.S. defensive response. Such a force poses a serious challenge to Taiwan's ability to maintain control over its own airspace as well as complicating U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy plans to come to Taiwan's defense if needed," states Fisher's report. New Chinese Missile Superior to U.S. Worse still is the fact that China is now developing an air-to-air missile considered to be superior to the U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM missile. The self-guided AMRAAM is the main long-range armament for all U.S. fighter jets. The new Chinese Project 129 or PL-12 missile is a Sino-Russian collaboration drawn from the Russian AA-12 Adder and equipped with an indigenous Chinese high-power rocket motor. Unlike the Russian AA-12, the PL-12 will have better performance than early models of the U.S. AMRAAM missile. The PL-12 reportedly has a maximum head-on engagement range of 50 miles and a maximum speed of four times the speed of sound. The PL-12 is now in the final stages of development, with test firings against target drones scheduled for this year. Pakistan is seen as the first export customer for the PL-12. The PL-12 has alarmed U.S. defense sources who now consider it as the primary radar-guided air-to-air missile threat against American and allied aircraft. The new PL-12 missile, once married to the advanced Su-30 Flanker jets in the PLAAF, can dominate the skies over Taiwan and eventually Asia. The U.S. F-15 Eagle, first flown in the mid-1970s, is rapidly becoming vulnerable to these fifth generation weapons. Supposedly the U.S. Air Force answer to the new threat is the F-22 Raptor. The new stealth jet fighter is capable of dealing with both the Su-30 and the PL-12 missile because of its superior speed, agility, and its ability to hide from conventional radars such as those on the Su-30. The U.S.A.F. wants to buy up to 400 of the advanced stealth fighters over the next decade. Unfortunately, Congress led by Senator Kerry cut the funding for the F-22 severely. "The U.S. needed the F/A-22 in the Pacific theater five years ago, so that by today it would be reasonably integrated into our total forces. America will need far more than the 277 F/A-22s our leaders our currently willing to buy, and they are long overdue in the force. They are indeed expensive, but their cost is puny compared to the price America will pay if it either has to fight a war on the Taiwan Strait, or should it even lose that war," concluded Richard Fisher defense analyst. But what about Korea? When compared to the survivability of the single engine F-16 in the mountainous Korean environment, anything was better than that. The F-15 has a chance to get back to base with one engine -- the F-16 none. When looking at its main adversary, the F-15 is head-and-shoulders above the competition. If the ROK should go to war with China -- well, we are in WWIII and nukes are going to be flying anyway so who cares?
ROK Aircraft Programs: According to the Korea Update: Annex B: Aircraft :
South Korea has the AIM-120, AGM-130, AGM-142 & AGM-88 either ordered or in service.
Keith Rowe's "ROK Air Force Order of Battle"HQ, ROKAF
[possibly 10 x Nike-Hercules sites including:Inchon, Daechon, Hwangsang (w. of Chonju 8220-5 unit), Mt. Chunsang (near Pusan); possibly 24 x I-HAWK sites including: Haeundae (near Pusan). There are four ADA bases around Seoul including Mt. Unyon, Uijongbu (probably I-HAWK), the Nike-Hercules site at Inchon, plus one additional site in Kyonggi Province] 60 x towed 20mm Vulcan are part of the airbases defense forces Air Force Logistics Command
Hardened Shelters: there are 641 x hardened aircraft shelters in ROK for ROKAF, USAF and U.S. reinforcing a/c TOTAL AIRCRAFT:
2000 White Paper, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea "South Korea", Aerospace Encyclopedia of World Air Forces, David Willis, ed., Aerospace Publishing, Ltd., London, 1999 "Korean Air Force with F-16", Lieven Dewitte and Stefan Vanhastel, eds., copyright @ 1997 by Dewitte and Vanhastel http://studwww.rug.ac.bc/~svhastel "Republic of Korea Air Force/Republic of Korea Armed Forces/Brian Taehyun Kim's Website" http://www.csun.edu/~btk29323/airfor.htm "Area III,Services & Facilities, Pyongtaek and Vicinity, 19th TSC" http://www-19tsc.korea.army.mil/05%20Installaions/Area%20III/050300.htm "ROKAF 91st Base Construction Group" Korea Post, Society of American Military Engineers, July - 2000, Volume 3, issue no. 7 "South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft", Korea Herald, 20 Nov 1997 "Air Force to lease 30 U.S.-made jets for training", Korea Herald, 2 April 1999 "Air Defense System Vulnerable Due to Nike Missles", Korea Times, 27 July 2000 ""Seoul to buy Lockheed Martin radars", Korea Herald, 23 Nov 2000 ""Test shows S.K.'s aging missles fail to fire warheads", Korea Herald, 20 Dec 2001 "Korea buys 2 military cargo planes from Indonesia", Korea Herald, 21 Dec 2001 "Report on missle incapability misleading: Air Force", Korea Herald, 21 Dec 2001 "Camp Echo Hill: How It Was [1961-1976] http://nikekimje.tripod.com/Howitwasnike2.html "Harpy Attack UAV/Dan Allmacher/Asian Defense/Yahoo Groups http://groups.yahoo.com/group/AsianDefense/message/25 Correspondence with Dan Allmacher, 25 June 2003 "News about Infantry/How to Make War/StrategyPage.com/9 Oct 2002" "South Korea/International Air Force Directory 1999" http://mylima.com/airforce/s2.htm#SOUKOR 1950s: DEVELOPMENT OF OSAN AB AND SONGTANThough most people do not talk about it, the ROK Army had strict orders to execute any Koreans who entered any designated "security areas" that were off-limits to Koreans. Summary executions during the war were not unknown by the ROK Army. A rail spur was constructed in 1952 to bring the heavy construction equipment into the base by rail from the Kyongbu Rail line. Where the Bravo Gate is now located was the Bomb Dump hill. The rail spur entered between Hill 170 and Bomb Dump Hill with Namsan Village along the perimeter. Railway guards were normally assigned to the ROK Army. The railroad spur entered the base at this area and the munitions were off-loaded and stored in the earthen bunkers dug into the hillside. The bunkers were on both sides of the hill. At this time, there were still people living in villages within the base and no real perimeter had been established. However, these villagers were not considered a threat -- and some of the 839th Engineering Aviation Battalion (EAB) Special Category With Air Force (SCARWAF) were reported to have lived with some of the families while the construction was going on. At this time, the massive influx of North Korean refugees had not taken place and the shanty-town on Chicol-ni had not been erected. On base, the 839th was situated somewhere near the present BX and Movie Theater. The 841st were up along the base of Hill 170 in the present barracks area between the present Alabama and Texas Streets. In the photo, notice that the area ends with a hill and the road to the main gate curves around this hill. (NOTE: The present day Songtan Blvd did NOT exist over the hill. There was a road that between the 839th EAB area and Chokbong Village that was still on base in 1952. This road extended up the hill where the 18th FBW BOQ quarters were built and enlisted barracks lower down the slope.) Though the work on the road from the main gate to the MSR-1 (Shinjang Mall Road) began earlier, old photos indicate the bulk of the construction took place in Jan 1952. In the photo below, there were houses that sprang up along the road. The construction and repair of the MSR-1 was not the responsibility of the 839th EAB, 840th EAB and later the 841st EAB. Supposedly this was handled by an Army Combat Engineering crew from Suwon. 18th FBW Arrives (Dec 1952) On 26 Dec 1952, the 315th AD airlifted the 18th FBW headquarters from Chinhae to Osan-ni AB and its attached No. 2 Squadron SAAF from Hoengsong Airfield to Osan-ni, the largest airlift of an USAF unit up to this time. (Source: AFHRA.) The base was not fully completed when the 18th occupied it during the latter months of the war. According to an article by Warren Thompson, "The shoulders to the runway, taxiways, and parking areas had not been stabilized nor graded flush with the concrete. The drop at the edge of the concrete ranged from 3 to 12 inches in some spots," recalls Maj. Flamm "Dee" Harper, the 18th group operations officer during that period. "A young pilot landing on a wet, slick runway with a heavy load [when his bombs had failed to release] faced a real challenge. If he got in trouble and a wheel left the hard surface of the runway, he washed out the aircraft." Once the runway was built, the ROK Army continued to provide outer perimeter defense, but the US did not trust these ROK troops. Once the massive influx of North Korean refugees and others seeking work on Osan AB took place, the growth of the black market and "slicky boy" (thieves who would steal anything on base that was not nailed down) increased. In fact, due to the frequency of thefts by the "slicky boys", the general opinion was that the ROK Army guards were operating in collusion with these "slicky boys." At this time, Chicol-ni had not been built as yet. A small bar row with prostitutes sprang up in in Namsan-tau. Robert Spiwak who was in a compound on Hill 170 above Namsan-ni stated in June 2005, "I still remember the medics chasing the girls around the village to give them shots of penicillin." There was another prostitution village on the west side of base called Makum-ni. It was frequented mostly by members of the 338th AAA AW Batteries on the top of Hill 180. Ron Freedman a 2d Lt with the anti-aircraft unit on Hill 170 stated, "There was a village called Makum-ni down the bottom of the hill on the west side. It was filled with prostitutes, and we had a terrible time keeping the GI's out of it. Our CO told us that we had the highest VD rate in all of Korea. And of course the stench from the use of night soil was overpowering. The place was so backwards it was unbelievable. No roads, no electricity, no water, and the main road through Osan-ni was just dirt. The villagers paid their taxes by keeping the road somewhat repaired. We had a garbage truck that came to our outfit every few days. Its tires were held on by bolts and the mound of garbage was covered by 8 or 10 men sitting on top of it eating the stuff."There was no perimeter fence in the early stages of the base, the base was literally wide-open. The off-base areas was not off-limits in 1952 and American soldiers could visit the Makum-ni area at will. After the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing arrived, the off-base areas were placed off-limits because of the soaring VD rates -- but supposedly because of the threat of North Korean sympathizers. However, this not deter individuals from leaving the base. Later a barbed wire fence was erected around the perimeter, but soldiers and airmen simply would crawl through the widely spaced strands. The 18th Wing did not place its nearby village of Osan "on-limits" until May 1953; it did so only after all base personnel and "probable contacts" were administered antibiotics as prophylaxis. MSR and Chicol Village There had been existing buildings along the MSR-1 when the 839th EAB arrived to construct the base. However, these were usually stands that advertised "ice cold beer" for the GI traffic on the MSR-1 leading to Pyeongtaek and Taegu in one direction, and to Suwon and Seoul in the other. Swiftly Chicol-ri (or Chicol Village) grew in size. It was nothing more than shanties, but the work on the base attracted more and more refugees to the area. (Remember that Korea was still an agrarian society and these North Korean refugees had no land and there was little chance that they would succeed if they stayed in the refugee camps.) By 1953, the rice fields along the Shinjang Mall Road were being filled in. There were two springs that allowed the water for the people in the area. One was down near Hobak Road and the other was near the present location of the Young Chon Hotel. The shacks that were built squeezed together with dirt alleys between the shanties. The tops of some of the shanties were built with scrap lumber salvaged from the scraps of the base, but the majority of the houses were roofed with flattened ammo cans and over this was tar paper (also stolen from base) tacked down by strips of wood. After the Korean War settled into a stalemate, the Allies sued for peace. President Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man 1875-1965) threw up many stumbling blocks to the peace process. Rhee refused to sign any peace treaty stating he would carry on the fight alone. As negotiations neared completion, Rhee released all the North Korean POWs who stated they were pro-South without the approval of the US military as head of the UN. In the end, Rhee was "bought off" with the promise of a mutual defense treaty so as to not disrupt the Armistice negotiations any further. North Korea, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and a US general representing the UN signed the Armistice -- with the ROK refusing to sign. After the Armistice in July 1953, the perimeter defense protection by the ROK Army was eliminated -- though the ROK Army troops were still dispursed to camps that were within five miles of the base. Some of these camps exist today. For example, one Army small camp is within three miles of the Hill 180 Gate and was used as an US Army radio relay antenna farm during the Korean War, but became an ROK Army ammo storage area after the war. Another camp is located approximately three miles to the west in Godeok-myeon. This is the pattern followed by the ROK Army throughout the peninsula. After the Armistice The South Korean government was not happy with the truce. Remember that South Korea never signed the Armistice. After the Armistice in 1953, the first ROKAF personnel were assigned to conduct On-the-Job-Training (OJT) with the USAF units. The ROKAF elements at Osan AB were undergoing intensive OJT with various Air Force units, including the Airfield Installation Operations (AIO) -- forerunner of Civil Engineering --and Air Police Squadrons, learning various Western techniques in installations and security. The 6314th Air Police Squadron of Osan in the mid-1960s handled the security of the Diamond area nuclear alerts and Matador missile security. These would NOT be areas suitable for ROKAF trainees. However, assistance as KATUSAs assigned as translators for the Air Police Squadron assigned to check point control and interfaces with the ROK would certainly be areas open to them. They also worked with the 1973rd AACS receiving instruction in the Ground Control Approach System (GCA) and air traffic control. To promote the learning rate of the Koreans, English classes were started on base on a voluntary basis. However, the major training was conducted by the 6146th Air Force Assistance Group (ROKAF) which was headquartered at Osan AB, but had detachments throughout Korea. (SITE NOTE: The unit started out as the 6146th Air Base Unit in 1951 and was changed to the 6146th AF Assistance Group in 1952. This unit was the primary source of transferring technology and upgrading the skills of the airmen to a modern Air Force. The Korean military, though eager to learn, were still technologically behind the US and had to learn the basic rudiments from scratch. This posed a problem that had to be overcome by intensive in-classroom instruction geared to the Koreans. Language -- reading and speaking English -- were the biggest obstacles in instructing the Koreans as all the manuals and materials were in English.) Fifth Air Force advanced headquarters moved to Osan from Seoul in February 1954 and remained until September 1955. The war was over and the wing was leaving Korea for Kadena, Okinawa where it where it would convert to the F-100. The 67th FBS departed Osan AB for Kadena, Okinawa on 30 Oct 1954. The 18th TFW colors left Osan AB for Kadena AB, Okinawa on 1 Nov 1954. During 1954 and 1955, the 58th Fighter Bomber Wing moved to Osan from Taegu. In 1954, the ROKAF presence was moved to Osan AB -- as an interface with the 5th AF and 58th FBW. However, Osan AB was not a well-known location for the ROKAF as yet. The term "Osan Air Base" was not only confusing to Americans, it was also confusing to Koreans as well. A story related by Mr. Chong Kyu-sok told of how as a ROKAF airman he was ordered to Osan AB in 1958. He boarded a train and got off at Osan-ni. Arriving late at night, he asked where the base was. They pointed to the bright lights in the distance where search lights were lighting the sky. Not realizing the distance, he started walking and soon realized that it was not as near as the lights seemed to indicate. This experience was not only himself, but with most ROKAF personnel ordered to report to Osan-ni Air Base. Instead of getting off the train at the nearby Seojong-ni Train Station (1km down the road), most got off the train at the Osan-ni Train Station (8km away). (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O'Sullivan and Mr. Chong Kyu-sok, 21 July 2005.) The hills inside the base bore the scars of the quarry work done to build the runway both on Hill 180 in what is now the Commissary and Osan American high school and on a dirt fill quarry on Hill 170. Outside the base, the hills were denuded and bare with a few clusters of acacia and scrub pines near Jinwi and Seojong-ni. Only a few trees, like the Ginko tree now on the Golf Course, remained in the area. Supposedly a fifth Korean village (most likely "Eunheng Jengui" as indicated on the marker at the Ginko Tree on the Golf Course) was relocated in 1953 to enlarge the compound area for the location of Headquarters, 5th Air Force, which maintained an advanced headquarters until the arrival of the 314th Air Division in 1955. The base still had not fallen into a state of utter disrepair that would follow after the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing left in 1954. But soon after the Wing left, the fences were stolen and anything that wasn't nailed (or bolted down) disappeared. Osan Air Base became a dismal location in the 1950s -- but it was luckily higher up the food chain than other bases getting first pick of the scraps that were sent from Japan who got all the "first dibs" on anything worthwhile. After 1955, the base slowly deteriorated to the point that even toilet paper was a luxury item. The 839th EAB started to pack things up at K-55 as the unit was scheduled for deactivation in 1955. The 417th Engineering Aviation Brigade at Taegu (K-2) was shutting down as well. The last elements of the 841st had departed Osan (K-55) for Kunsan (K-8) in early 1954 to replace the 808th EAB which was moving to Okinawa. The 839th EAB remained a strange mix of USAF and Army personnel involved in heavy construction. After the infrastructure at K-55 was in place, the 839th became "maintainers" of the base with the personnel "honchoing" gangs of around 12 Korean nationals on various assigned projects. Unlike other bases where an Airfield Installation Squadron (AIS) assigned to the Wing was formed, Osan retained the EAB to fulfill this function. The EAB equipment was supposedly turned over to the ROK prior to departing the country. Because the 839th had assumed the Airfield Installation Operations (AIO) duties, there was no base civil engineering function. The equipment the EAB was leaving behind was heavy equipment was turned over to the base instead of the ROKAF. Throughout the EAB's stay in Korea, many Koreans were working side-by-side with the units starting off as unskilled laborers and then progressing up to equipment operators. These would have been the initial Civil Engineering unit on the base using Korean nationals as the civilian backbone of the operations. (SITE NOTE: Though we cannot say for sure, there is a possibility that ROK Army or ROKAF personnel were used in supporting the ROK facilities on Hill 180. There were areas where civilians were living on base in what is now the ROKAF area.) However, though the 18th FBW mouthed words such as "cooperation" and "allies" these would only have been politically correct phrases, the truth was that the USAF "owned" Osan in a real sense. There was no Status of Forces Agreement and only the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 to guide the U.S. forces. (See Mutual Defense Treaty to view the document.) Because of the difficulties with Syngman Rhee encountered during the war, this document had to be approved by the U.S. Congress. The treaty "morally commits" both nations to come to the other's defense in case of attack, although it does not -- as in NATO -- require an automatic response by the U.S. President. Korea was too weak to defend itself and needed the U.S. It was more than willing to make concessions. Remember that 100 percent of the ROK government budget in the 1950s was from U.S. aid funds alone. James Wade in his book One Man's Korea, 1967, (pp105-107), it states that American soldiers in the mid-1950s complained about "sensitivity" manuals that say Koreans were "proud and dignified." "All the people we've seen so far have been filthy beggars, or farmers living in huts worse than animals. They're not even civilized, let alone dignified or proud." This provides some insight into how the Americans military in Korea felt towards the Korean people at the time. Remember also that at that end of the Korean War, the threat of another invasion from the North was real. The area surrounding Osan AB had become filled with North Korean refugees or Koreans seeking work. In post-war Korea, employment was hard to find and simply surviving was a chore. The Chicol village was nothing more than shanties, where the roofs were made from flattened ammo cans with tar paper stretched over it to keep the water out. Some even lived under cardboard structures from materials scavenged from the base refuse. Milwal area became filled first and then the population spread west to Pokchong. At the same time, the Koreans were uncertain of their future as the threat of another invasion always hung over their heads. These people would have feared any invasion from the North because if captured and it was found they were employed by the base or consorted with Americans, there would be mass executions as "collaborators." To these refugees -- and to millions of Koreans at the end of the war, an invasion was a real possibility. Off-base There were many accusations by the local populace aimed at Osan AB that the US military personnel who committed crimes off-base literally got away with murder. There was some truth to this accusation as prior to the SOFA all murders of Korean nationals by US soldiers was tried by military court martials -- much to the outrage of the local citizenry. In some cases, the offenders were simply shipped out of country -- and the cases swept under the carpet. The ROK police were also noted for being corrupt leading to the Korean populace not trusting the police for justice. (NOTE: There was no SOFA in Korea until 1965 and the US military assumed jurisdiction over its personnel for ALL crimes committed off-base.) In 1958, the first fire station was built in Songtan up on the hill of Milwal dong -- on the righthand side as one went up the hill. There was a fire watch tower at the station as the shanty town construction made fires a real problem as it could spread easily from the wood houses. The normal Korean house were built with mud wattle bricks, but the poverty of the area meant the structures were basically scavenged wood and tar paper. The fire department on base was also tasked to assist on major fires off-base. As many of the married ROKAF personnel lived off-base, fires were a constant danger for their families. According to Chong Kyu-sok, who arrived at Osan AB in 1958, the ROKAF enlisted force was used to fight major blazes to prevent the fires from spreading. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O'Sullivan and Mr. Chong Kyu-sok, 21 July 2005.) The road outside the Main Gate led to the MSR-1 (Main Supply Route-1) and the buildings were built of the shoddiest of construction. The business center was located along the MSR with the Songbuk Farmers market in the area along with the bus terminal (where the Kookmin Bank is now) and the Jaeil Movie Theater (where the Woori Bank is now). The Chicol Village grew with businesses along the road side and shanties along the base to the rice paddies. The Jungang Market was established in the same location as it is now as an assemblage of open market stalls set against the buildings. Most of the business were small tailor shops and shoe shops with many drug (yak) stores and small grocery stores. The rest were bars that were along the Shinjang Mall road starting with a large dance hall just outside the Main Gate. 314th Air Division (USAF) (1955) After the Korean War, the 314th AD was assigned to Osan Ni (later, Osan) AB, Korea from 15 Mar 1955 until 7 November 1978 when it moved to Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. It remained at Yongsan till 1 April 1979 when it returned to Osan AB. It remained at Osan until 8 Sep 1986 when it was inactivated. Under the Air Division, the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing at Osan was assigned from 1 Mar 1955-31 Jan 1957. The 58th Fighter-Bomber Wing replaced the 18th FBW at Osan and was attached 15 Mar 1955-31 Dec 1956 and it was assigned from 1 Jan 1957-1 Jul 1958 when it was inactivated. The 58th was redesignated as the 58th Tactical Missile Group with Matador missiles at Osan and assigned from 24 Apr 1959-25 Mar 1962 when it was inactivated. The 310 Fighter-Bomber Squadron was attached from 1-15 Jul 1958 though not operational because it was to be converted into the 310th Tactical Missile Squadron under the 58th Tactical Missile Group at Osan. The 6146th Air Force Advisory (Republic of Korea Air Force) (later, 6146 Flying Training; 6146 Air Force Advisory) was assigned from 15 Mar-24 Sep 1955 and then from 18 Sep 1956-1 Apr 1971. The 6156th Flying Training Squadron (Transfer to ROKAF) was assigned from 15 Mar-14 Sep 1955. (Source: AFHRA: 314AD.) As the highest peacetime USAF element under the USFK, the head of the 314th AD became the commander of the Air component of the USFK -- which would include the ROKAF which at the time was funded by the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Armed Forces Assistance Korea (AFAK). As such the 314th AD addressed equipment procurement (F-86D/F), supply (including spare parts and POL), repair facilities, and pay increases -- and as an adjunct dealing with reenlistments, the morale problems within the fledgling ROKAF. ROKAF officers were assigned to the 314th AD as interfaces to the ROKAF. (Source: 1965 CINCPAC History.) ROK Army Anti-aircraft batteries at Osan (1955) During the Korean War, the US Army 338th AAA AW Batteries provided anti-aircraft protection for the USAF units. Atop Hill 180, the 40mm Bofors were situated. This is where the open sports field in the ROKAF area is located at the highest point on the hill. Along the runway, Quad-50s were situated along its length. After the Armistice, the US Army turned over these weapons to the ROK in 1955 when the 338th AAA AW was returned stateside for deactivation. The locations of the batteries remained in the same locations for the time being. In the mid-1960s, HQ 4th Bn , 44th Arty redesignated 2/44 Pyongtaek was located at Camp Humphreys (K-6). In 1963, the command posts (AADCP) were located at Osan AFB and Camp Humphreys (K-6). The Nike-Hercules missiles handled high-altitude defense with air-burst capability to knock out incoming bombers at great distances. Once the US Army Nike-Hercules batteries were set up with Camp Humphreys (K-6) as the headquarters in the late 1960s, the 40mm Bofors at Osan were reassigned to other ROK Army units in Korea. (NOTE: The Nike batteries throughout Korea were turned over to the ROK Army in 1977-78 and HAWK batteries in 1982.) In addition, the ROK was switching to a missile defense system. One ROK Nike battalion and two ROK HAWK battalions were authorized for the ROK Army low-level anti-aircraft defense of Taegu and Kwangju air fields in 1965. These were funded under the US Military Assistance Program (MAP). (Source: 1965 CINCPAC History.) This would presage the transfer of the US Army NIKE and HAWK assets in the late 1970s and early 1980s. After the Korean War, the ROK Army presence on-base disappeared from Osan AB except for the anti-aircraft elements. However, after the 18th FBW left, there was no active wing on the base and most of the high-altitude anti-aircraft weaponry would have been shifted to Suwon Air Base (K-13) as the ROKAF had an active base there. In 2006, all that remains of the long abandoned Quad-50 and 40mm Bofor sites that spread out parallel with the runway during the Korean War are circular indentations along the perimetter road on the north side of the runway. The Quad-50s that remained were to provide low-level airfield protection for the runway. However, as the operational units were at Suwon, the numbers of Quad-50s at Osan were limited to positions at the end of runway. Though there was no active wing on the base, the 8th FBW set up a nuclear alert commitment on the base in the Diamond area. Thus there was a requirement for anti-aircraft defense of the runway. In truth, against modern jet aircraft, the Quad-50 can only hope to put up a screen of fire and hope the jet will fly through it... it is ineffective as a modern anti-aircraft weapon. In the 1960s, the 20mm Vulcan cannons were turned over to the ROK to upgrade their defense capabilities. These Vulcan cannons were situated in their current locations at the ends of runway. The Quad-50s were removed and used for close-in perimeter defense. (NOTE: Remember that in the 1970s, the Quad-50s were used with great effectiveness mounted on convoy trucks in Vietnam and was a devastating weapon for hamlet defense.) Supposedly the Quad-50s were turned over to the ROKAF ADA Platoon in the 1980s. (Source: Lt Choi Jae-hong, Chief of Operations, AFOC Support Wg) However, the ROK Army ADA functions were not officially turned over to the ROKAF until 1991. (SEE AFOC Support Wing ADA Battery for continuation.) 6146th AFAG (ROKAF) (1955) Training was provided to the ROKAF by the 6146th Air Force Assistance Group (AFAG) of Osan AB starting in 1955. The 6146th Air Force Advisory (Republic of Korea Air Force) (later, 6146 Flying Training; 6146 Air Force Advisory) was assigned to the 314th AD from 15 Mar-24 Sep 1955 and then from 18 Sep 1956-1 Apr 1971. The 6156th Flying Training Squadron (Transfer to ROKAF) was assigned to the 314th AD from 15 Mar-14 Sep 1955. (Source: AFHRA: 314AD.) The ROKAF already had the basic elements of its Air Force with its L-4, L-5, L-16, T-6, and F-51 aircraft. In 1955, the ROKAF received its first F-86s transferred from the US as the US military transitioned into "century" aircraft starting with the F-100s. The majority of aircraft transfers occurred in 1959 as the overseas units transitioned to the newer aircraft. A History of the Korean People, Tradition and Transformation by Andrew C. Nahm (p505) states, "Following the signing of the armistice agreement in July 1953, south Korea strengthened its military, aiming at the construction of a self-reliant defense posture. Various new academies of the military branches and a war college were established, and after the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States on October 1, 1953 more U.S. military aid was received and troops became better trained and equipped. While training better qualified officers at military schools in Korea, the government sent a large number of officers to receive advanced training at U.S. military institutions." At this time, the ROKAF was still being trained to take over many functions of surveillance and air traffic control. The surveillance units were trained by the 6146th Air Force Assistance Group to handle radar intercepts (GCI) and air traffic control over ROK air space. After the first crews were certified, the installations were turned over enmasse -- equipment, furniture and buildings -- to the ROKAF. This same training was given to the Ground Control Approach (GCA) radar operators to handle air traffic control for the bases as well as training of Air traffic controllers for the ROKAF base towers. Throughout Korea in 1954, ROKAF troops were temporarily assigned to Radio Relay sites for OJT with the US forces. It is assumed that the WASHINGTON site on Hill 170 had ROKAF troops for training as well. However, such contacts were not documented under the 5th Comm Group histories and most likely handled under the 6146th AFAG programs. By 1965. the ROK capabilities had progressed to the stage that the ROK was given Microwave capabilities to serve the ROK Army, increase communication channels and provide service to the civilian community. It was funded the Military Assistance Program ($7 million) and AID ($6 million). (Source: 1965 CINCPAC History.) Steve Weatherly wrote on the Korean War Project in Dec 2005 : "6146 AFAG staff assigned to Seoul lived at Camp Coiner adjacent to Youngsan Post. Our two barracks were on the high point of Camp Coiner and overlooked the 304th Signal (US Army) that occupied most of the camp. The unit motor pool was also at Camp Coiner. Accompanied personnel lived in family housing on Youngsan. We worked at ROKAF HQ on the south side of the Han River and made the round trip twice a day, to and from Camp Coiner by bus. AFAG also had detachments throughout Korea. I worked with many ROKAF and AFAG personnel at the 8 ROKAF radar sites, HQ ROKAF, the ROKAF 30th AC&W Wing at Osan AB, the technical school at Taejon, and the depot at Taegu AB. My office also supported the Blue Fortune and Peace Fortune communications system. During my assignment, ROKAF received the F4 Phantom fighter bomber aircraft and US bred guard dogs, and an EC-121 was shot down over the East Korea Sea (aka Sea of Japan). In my area of responsibility there were many firsts. Radar evaluations of the ROKAF radars were conducted by the USAF. The radomes at the ROKAF radar sites were painted a haze grey instead of white during US contractor depot level maintenance. ROKAF personnel completed their first, on-site depot level radar maintenance assignment to their Cheju-do radar site. Arrangements were also made to make FPS-18 gap filler radar systems available to the ROKAF AC&W system from the US. Many potential locations for these radars were visited, evaluated, and a installation and implementation plan was developed. My tour was busy, rewarding, and went by very quickly. Korea was a great assignment. Later back in the US at Air training Command, I was able to visit with many of my ROKAF friends when they attended technical schools at Keesler AFB, MS."For the USAF in Korea, the top of the food chain was the 314th AD at Osan AB. The reason is that the ROK did NOT have a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) -- even though Japan and Germany as conquered nations had them in place. (SITE NOTE: It would not be until August 1965 when the ROK had a SOFA. Many questions can be raised as to why a nation that was declared "free" at the end of WWII would not have such an agreement. USFK historians have attempted to state that there were difficulties in writing the Japanese SOFA, but these excuses are to cover over the basic fact that the Chinese had developed nuclear capabilities in 1958 and President Eisenhower had approved the "forward positioning" of nuclear weapons to counter the threat. The Japanese people would not allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil -- and the highly publicized nature of the "Hiroshima Maidens" (disfigured women from the nuclear blast brought to the US for reconstructive surgery) made it political suicide to retain the weapons there. In a nutshell, without a SOFA the US could do as they pleased in Korea -- treating the country as their own fiefdom as long as they provided the bankrupt South Korean government with financial backing to stay alive.) In 1965, the Commander of the 314th Air Division assumed the additional duty of Chief of the Air Force Advisory Group in Korea. (Source: 1965 CINCPAC History.) What this indicates that the training of the ROKAF forces had progressed to a state that they now were intimately intertwined with the Military Assistance Program (MAP), Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) and Agency for International Development (AID) programs requiring high-level involvement. Remember that the US was using the ROK for troops to Vietnam and these aid packages were predicated on the ROK troops remaining in Vietnam -- thus the administration of these programs were intertwined also with national policy. Nuclear Alerts at Osan AB (1958) The UN confirmed arrival in South Korea of American 280mm atomic cannon and Honest John nuclear rocket launchers on 28 Jan 1958. Preparations were started for the housing of Matador missiles at Osan AB. By 1958, the U.N. Truce Inspectors had left. After this time, the nuclear alerts were started in Osan by the 8th TFW -- as there were no inspectors to report the apparent violation of Article 12 of the Armistice agreement on the introduction of new weapons systems to the peninsula. In these matters, the ROK government had no say in the actions -- and simply "rubber-stamped" the actions as it relied on the US for almost 100 percent of its finances through loans, foreign aid and grants. The US military aid to South Korea from 1950-1959 amounted to $1.292 billion. On 8 Feb 1961, the US and the ROK concluded agreements with respect to US economic, technical, and related assistance to Korea. These agreements (which supersede the 1948 aid agreement, the 1952 economic coordination agreement, and the 1953 reconstruction and financial stabilization agreement) provide for a special mission to Korea to discharge the responsibilities of the US stipulated therein. (The agreements were to be entered into force on 28 Feb 1961.) (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p109, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA) In 1958, the nuclear commitment moved to Osan AB with the F-100s of the 8th FBW from Yokota, Japan. The ROKAF was not consulted on the appearance of this unit at Kunsan. The operations were controlled directly out of Japan. Though Osan AB was much more "civilized" than Kunsan AB, it had no real alert facilities until August 1958. Operation "Big Nickel" [would] redeploy 20 F-100 aircraft and 90 personnel from K-8 to K-55. (Source: Baugher site: B-57:) (SITE NOTE: This was the move of the 8th TFW from Kunsan (K-8) to Osan (K-55) in 1958. USAF Memories: Dick Seeley stated, "Later in the year we moved our detachment operations to Osan AB, Korea and we took on a more serious mission." Later the 8th TFW would move their alert operations to Kadena, but in 1960 would move the alert back to Osan AB after the alert facilities were built.)" The "more serious mission" was standing nuclear alerts with their F-100s. (See Nuclear Tasking for details on the nuclear issues and deployments to Korea of nuclear weapons.) 58th FBW Deactivated and Redesignated as 58th TMG (1959) After the 18th FBW left for Okinawa in 1957, it was briefly replaced by the 58th FBW but it was soon deactivated. The 58th was redesignated as the 58th Tactical Missile Group with Matador missiles at Osan and assigned in 1959. However, it was inactivated in 1962. As was mentioned before, the base was treated as an American preserve. The nuclear weapons were not allowed in Japan so they simply shipped them to Korea to stand alert. Later the Matador Missiles -- nuclear capable -- were shipped to Osan even though they were already being phased out of the USAF inventory. Overthrow of Syngman Rhee (1959) The corruption of the Syngman Rhee administration with Rhee becoming more and more isolated from the public. At this point, the Rhee administration was almost 100 percent supported from US military aid and grants. His despotic rule was backed up by the first elements of what would become the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) which engaged in torture and kidnapping under the guise of seeking communists. The final straw was when Rhee's party attempted to rig the elections by placing his candidates in positions of power. There were many protests outside the Main Gate with Koreans shouting "Yankee Go Home" -- and surprisingly to many Americans, the faces of many in the crowd were recognized by Americans as Korean workers employed on base. Finally in 1960, the Syngman Rhee regime was overthrown by student revolts over his despotic rule and the corruption was rampant. A popular uprising occured -- initiated by students and later joined by the public in general. The country was about to decend into anarchy and the US offered Rhee safe passage out of the country. He was sent into exile in Hawaii in 1960. 1960s: ROKAF AT OSAN ABA History of the Korean People, Tradition and Transformation by Andrew C. Nahm (p505) states, "Although South Korea's military strength increased during and after the Korean War, it was not until after the emergence of the Third Republic in 1963 that the national defense posture was noticeably improved. The government adopted several important measures to strengthen national defense, increased the number of divisions and units in the armed forces, and improved the training programs." The US military presence was still a major source of income in the Songtan area in the 1960s. Osan AB was the prime employer and the "camptown" was geared specifically for the base personnel. Seventy percent of the population of Songtan lived within 10 km of the Main Gate. Osan AB was a "company town" supported by the incomes from workers on base and those in the camptown (ki'ichiwon) of Chicol Village. It is sad to note that during this period, the government actively promoted the sex trade as a source of foreign exchange. Three was direct government involvement in the promotion of the camptown system by declaring the Songtan area as a "special tourism zone." In this way the bars would obtain special tax advantages in the sale of beer -- with prostitution used to attract the GI customers. It would be a decade before the programs that Park Chung-hee started would see fruition in the Miracle of the Han. (SITE NOTE: The ROKAF personnel were prevented from entering the bars as it was strictly for US personnel only. Though some did enter the bars as guests, they were the exception. Later the bars outside of the gate became a "whites only" area, while the bars up in the Jwa-dong area developed as "black only" bars. In truth, though the prices were minimal for Americans, the average ROKAF enlisted man at the time could not afford to go to the bar rows as the Americans did.) After Park Chung-hee took power, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiations started in 1963 primarily to deal with the growing public demand for the control of crimes committed by American soldiers. It was an administrative agreement concerning the status of US troops in Korea to resolve many thorny problems which had existed ever since the arrival of the American troops. Parties agreed to permit other privileges and rights, including relief from taxes, customs, immigration requirements, and sharing of payment for claims. However, the basic premise of the SOFA deals with percentage share. It was signed in August 1965. However, it was an agreement whereby the ROK did not have to pay for their share of the national defense. (SITE NOTE: It would not be until 1991 when the SOFA was renegotiated -- again centering around the ROK demand for more control over the prosecution of USFK offenders for major crimes. However, in exchange for changes to SOFA over criminal jurisdiction over USFK soldiers, the ROK was forced to accept a formula for increased defense costs share for supporting US forces in Korea that created a furor after so many years of not paying for their defense share. However, by that time the ROK was a G-12 nation and able to afford the costs.) The US did recognize that the land belonged to the ROK, but the land was granted to the US "rent free" in exchange for the US defense commitment. Though the land belonged to the ROK government under the administration of the Ministry of Defense, the ROK had simply turned the base over to the US Forces Korea (USFK) to do with as it saw fit. Though the SOFA formalized this agreement over the use of the lands, the fact of life was that the ROKAF did NOT control Osan AB. The USAF treated the base as "theirs". Base host-tenant agreements were written with the USAF as the "host" while ROKAF units were the "tenants." The USAF retained the use of the main base and western sections of the base -- the entire runway and "diamond" (A-D) areas, while the ROKAF was given a small south-east corner of the base. Though it may be politically incorrect to speak of these matters in the reference to the ROK-US alliance, the truth was that the ROK was dependent upon the US for the support of its military and local economy -- and kowtowed to the US on most matters. The ROK continued to waive jurisdiction over capital crimes committed off-base up until the SOFA was signed in Aug 1965. It is significant that it was only after 1965 that the 8th Army Histories published the outcomes of trials of American personnel in Korean courts where Korea exercised its jurisdiction over the cases under the SOFA. (SITE NOTE: However, it was very suspicious that the punishments meted out for capital crimes were very light because the courts took into consideration the close US-ROK relationship in defending Korea. In effect, the punishment for murder were lightened by the political relationships between the US and Korea.) A portion of the unused land on the eastern portions of Hill 180 was returned to ROKAF control. This was just inside the Main Gate up to the sump area created by the Korean War quarry work (which is now the Commissary). The ROKAF Security Police who acted as gate guards and ROK Army who controlled the anti-aircraft weapons were billeted. The living conditions in the ROKAF area was primitive using quonset huts previously used by Americans during the Korean War. ROKAF married personnel were housed off-base. At the top of the hill areas (near the Milwal-dong perimeter) on-base workers were allowed to live in structures abandoned by the Korean War US Army anti-aircraft units. Sets of houses were set aside for the women who worked on-base at the very top of Hill 180 in what is now a ROKAF sports field. Military expenditures grew steadily after 1963, particularly after 1972, due to the shift in U.S. Asian policy and international situation. To be more specific -- Vietnam blossomed after 1963. Lyndon Johnson escalated the Vietnam war in 1965 and 1966. The U.S. needed its troops...and international support as well. In order to get Korean involvement, the U.S. threatened to pullout portions of its troops from Korea if Korea did not contribute its troops. However, if Korea did acquiesce, the U.S. agreed to provide additional military assistance in the form of U.S. military aid dollars. Korea's involvement was blackmail, but the Korea really didn't have much choice, but to join the Vietnam effort. Korea sent its troops off to war. Though Park Chung-hee had volunteered troops before and sent a Korean MASH unit in 1964, 50,000 Korean soldiers were fighting in Vietnam after 1965 under the new agreement. By the time the ROK forces withdrew in 1973, as many as 300,000 Koreans had served there. Korea transferred most of its F-5A to Vietnam and in return had them replaced with F-4E aircraft. As a trickle down effect of the military upgrade programs, the ROKAF at Osan AB saw upgrades to their living conditions as well as efforts to incorporate the ROKAF into the war-planning operations of the 5th AF as the air component commander of the combined forces. ROKAF intelligence sources were also added to as detachments of the 6006th Air Intelligence Squadron (ROKAF) -- first developed as a ROK CIA-type special-operations unit during the Korean War. As the ROK military was being integrated into the US war-planning, it was ROKAF started to become a mirror-image of the USAF command structure. The reasons were simple that the ROKAF was still dependent upon the US military for training, logistics support of their F-51 and F-86D/F aircraft. The OJT programs started after the Korean War started to pay off as ROKAF units started to become stand alone forces. The F-86D/F units were stationed in Sachon and Chongwon, but the Ground Control Intercept (GCI) and Ground Control Approach (GCA) were strictly Korean. However, these units were dependent upon the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for spare parts and upon the US for training overseas of its personnel. For example, during this period, many ROKAF fighter pilots were trained in Japan by the USAF at Misawa. At Osan AB, a two-story structure was built for the ROKAF Combat Air Command (CAC) -- the predecessor of the Air Force Operations Command -- next to the golf course. However, there was growing dissent within the US defense community over opinions of the ROK troop strength levels required to defend South Korea. While one study recommended a "substantial reduction" in South Korean forces in ROK, CINCPAC argued that the ROK military was already five divisions short of the necessary strength to repel an attack (Source: 1965 CINCPAC History, pp 81-82.) Off-base Economy Though the ROK made strides after the Korean War to improve its economy, it still was struggling to kick start the stagnant economy. The ROK was no longer fully dependent upon the US for its financial existence -- and the economy had grown to the point that the US recommended the curtailment of financial grants to the ROK to be replaced by long-term loans in the early 1960s. However, the economy was still primarily agrarian-based. The ROK exported its cheap labor to foreign countries to obtain foreign exchange. Domestically, the building construction industry was active in changing the face of Seoul with high-rise apartment buildings. From this expertise, the construction industries were able to win international contracts using the cheap Korean labor and ultimately became the major bread winner for obtaining much needed foreign capital. Korean workers became a common fixture in construction projects in Libya, Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East. However, the economy needed monies to jump start the stagnant domestic economy. Park Chung-hee made some unpopular decisions to obtain much needed capital to finance Korea's industries. The first was the signing of the Japan-ROK Normalization treaty. The Japanese promised millions in grants and loans to the ROK. The second was the ROK agreed to send troops to Vietnam. The US promised in return massive aid packages to upgrade the ROK military and civilian infrastructure programs. In 1965, the continued military aid and equipment upgrade programs were predicated upon the continued use of the ROK troops in Vietnam. (Source: 1965 CINCPAC History.) Nuclear Alert Commitment shifted to 41st AD (1967) The ROK was NOT involved in this commitment as it was a "permanent" TDY unit from Japan. According to Thunderchiefs over Fuji, in May 1963, the 8th TFW started conversion to the new Republic F-105 Thunderchief, and by June 1964 had moved all wing ops to Yokota AB after the closure of Itazuke AB. It flew the F-105 until 1964 when it departed Itazuke. The as-designed mission of the F-105 Thunderchiefs was nuclear retaliation against the Cold War Soviet Block. Since all nuclear weapons were banned in post-World War II Japan, the wing's Thunderchiefs periodically rotated to Osan AB, Korea, to perform "Victor Alert" duty (15-minute scramble). The alert crews at Osan AB continued to live in a thirty-two man barracks on the alert pad with latrine and shower facilities. The barracks consisted of four bays with a central shower and latrine. The nuclear weapons bunker was across the street. On 10 July 1964, the 8th TFW began a relocation to George AFB, California, without personnel or resources. At Yokota, the 34th, 35th, and 80th TFS and their THUDs were reassigned to the 41st Air Division. The 6641st was a transition wing for holding the F-105 squadrons prior to their being transferred to the 347th TFW as F-4C squadrons. The 35th and 36th TFS converted to F-4Cs in 1967, but the 80th was still flying F-105s when it was assigned to the 347th TFW. It converted to F-4Cs in 1968. The alerts were still being conducted from the Diamond area with the alert aircraft inside the hangars and "hot cocked." The alert facility was air-conditioned and relatively comfortable with 32-man barracks for the TDY maintenance troops of the "Detachment." During the initial response to the Pueblo incident at Osan AB, the TDY nuclear alert crew with their F-4cs were uploading and downloading weapons to provide for both conventional and nuclear strikes. They seemed to be reconfiguring their aircraft to fill multiple taskings while they awaited for the 4th TFW to arrive from Seymour Johnson. Reports were that there was a great confusion as to what role they would play in the Pueblo incident. Remember that their primary nuclear targets were in China -- not the North. However, a conventional tasking would be very different. In the end, an F-106 unit was deployed to Osan AB in Mar 1968 to relieve the fighters of any conventional role. 30th AC&W Wing (ROKAF) (1965) The ROKAF 30th Aircraft Control & Warning (AC&W) Wing at Osan AB was formed in the mid-1960s. Its mission was to prove radar intercepts (GCI) and handle air traffic in the Korean air space. It was to also provide radar surveillance of the North and provide early warning in case of an air attack -- as well as coordinate any actions with the USFK air component through the 5th AF at Osan AB. Arrangements were made to make FPS-18 gap filler radar systems available to the ROKAF AC&W system from the US. (SITE NOTE: This became the 30th Air Defense Wing [command and control for 20+ air defense and air control radars] Osan AB Deteriorates in Cold War Period The base quickly returned to a backwater, rundown, neglected podunk of a base that the rest of the U.S. Air Force had forgotten about. The 6314th ABG handled the base operations, but in truth the 314th Air Division were the true "owners" of the base as no SOFA agreement existed until August 1965. In fact, there was no base newspaper, only the 314th AD newsletter that was distributed Korea wide. The 6314th ABG Commander, however, was functionally over USAF installations in Korea -- but answered directly to the 314th AD commander. After the War, the US Army anti-aircraft artillery turned over their equipment in place and departed Korea. The ROK Army assumed these batteries that were made up of 40mm Bofors (high-altitude anti-aircraft) and Quad-50 (four 50 caliber machine guns in tandem as low-level anti-aircraft). These were situated on the highest point of Hill 180 (now a sports field for the ROKAF next to the perimeter of Milwal-dong). These ROKAF and ROK Army personnel were housed in quonset huts in the present area of the Main Gate. Some of these 1950s structures still exist in the ROKAF area, but no longer used for housing the troops. The area near the Main Gate that had been cleared for a helicopter pad became a baseball field in the 1960s. The USAF provided all base security at the time for Osan AB ... and it was a pathetic situation. The base perimeter was basically indefensible -- ten miles of perimeter with one USAF guard per mile. The ROKAF was given a small portion of the perimeter to defend around its areas. In most places there was no fence as it was stolen by the Koreans. "Slicky boys" (thieves) would regularly raid the base for anything that wasn't nailed down. GIs report that on the way to work they would see the "slicky boys" carting off spare fuel tanks over the fence -- and soon would hear hammering as the "slicky boys" made short work of stripping the tanks off-base. However, before one condemns the Korean populace for the black market conditions, one should consider what John Caldwell wrote in his 1953 book, And Still the Rice Grows Green. He wrote, "And there is a significant relationship between the degree of dishonesty and the number of Americans stationed in an area ... the magnitude of the black market operations varies in direct proportion with the American military population." For Americans to condemn the Koreans for the black market conditions is to smite themselves in the face -- as the Americans are just as much to blame -- if not more so as the "sellers" of the goods. Pueblo Incident and Osan AB (1968-1969) Things remained static at Osan AB until the Pueblo Incident. Though not well-publicized, the ROK and the US were NOT on the same page. After the Blue House raid in Jan 1968, followed a few days later by the capture of the USS Pueblo, the ROK was ready to go to war. In the "Blue House Raid," 31 highly trained North Koreans infiltrated through the US sector of the DMZ on a mission to assassinate the South Korean president, Park Chung Hee. This team fought its way to within a few blocks of the Blue House before being stopped by ROK troops and police. In the fighting that followed and the subsequent attempt by the raiders to flee to North Korean 28 of the communists were killed, one was captured and two others were presumed to have escaped. The North Korean captured in the raid said the US Embassy was also a target of the commando force.Emboldened by all the promises of the past, the ROK felt that their "brothers in arms" would aid them in settling the score with the North. However, this was not to be. The buildup in Korea was simply a matter of "flying the flag." Even the US troops were unaware of this high-level decision by President Johnson. The fate of the USS Pueblo crew had already been sealed before the first deployed aircraft had hit the tarmac of Korea at Kunsan AB -- and later Osan AB. At Osan AB, the TDY nuclear alert crew with their F-4cs were uploading and downloading weapons to provide for both conventional and nuclear strikes. Reports were that there was a great confusion as to what role they would play in the Pueblo incident. Remember that their primary nuclear targets were in China -- not the North. However, a conventional tasking would be very different. In the end, an F-106 unit was deployed to Osan AB in Mar 1968 to relieve the fighters of any conventional role. But as it turned out, the ROK and US were not on the same page. The US did NOT want to open another front with Vietnam going on. On the other hand, Park Chung-hee who had survived the assassination attempt by North Korean Commandoes just prior to the Pueblo Incident was ready to go to war -- with the assistance of the US. The ROK generals started full-scale operations to take the fight north. The ROK was preparing for war. Swiftly, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with Park to head this off, but the South Korean president proved quite obstinate. But Vance did not compromise. Johnson's spokesman laid out his position frankly. First, there would be no wider war in Korea period; the U.S. already had its hands full in Vietnam. Any ROK military action against the north would be cleared with General Bonesteel, and he was not empowered to allow South Korean cross-border reprisals without President Johnson's approval. Vance made it clear that he could foresee no circumstances-short of a full-scale North Korean invasion-that could garner such approval.Between 26-31 January 1968 several 9th Air Force active units deployed to the Pacific in response to North Korea's seizure of USS Pueblo: the 4TFW sent 72 F-4Ds, the 354TFW sent 18 F-100s, and the 363TRW sent six RB-66s. In addition, several 9AF-gained ARC units were recalled to active duty: the 113TFW and 107th, 113th, 121st and 177TFGs. The 334th and 335th Fighter Squadrons, equipped with F-4 Phantom II fighters, rushed to Korea to support operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadrons returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968. F-106 fighters were briefly deployed to Osan AFB in Korea in March of 1968 to provide air defense during the Pueblo incident. After the initial hysterical response, the US went into a stalemate instead of escalating to a war-footing. The following is from Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger: The buildup looked impressive, but appearances could be deceiving. Bonesteel had asked for this show of strength, but he did not really command it. Narrowly defined command relationships strictly limited these contingency forces to a deterrent role. Thanks to his personal influence, Bonesteel received some help from the Fifth Air Force in prosecuting the Second Korean Conflict; the Seventh Fleet did not cooperate at all.Even with the shootdown of a Navy EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft (PR-21/BuNo 135749) of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) with a crew of 31 on April 14, 1969 by North Korean fighters, the US was undetered from its stance to not go to war. Eleven months after the seizure North Korea repatriated 82 Pueblo crewmen and one set of remains to the United States through P'anmunjom on 23 Dec 1968. Upon signature of the US admitting to espionage in the coastal waters of the Sea of Japan, the 82 POWs were freed. Upon their return on 28 December 1968, the crew was treated poorly by the public and the military and only in 1990 did they receive the POW ribbons to which they were entitled. The ship remains in Wonson Harbor, North Korea. Protests at Outside Osan AB (1969) In June-July 1969, 3,800 students from five Seoul universities clashed with police over the amendment to the Constitution that would allow Park Chung-hee to run for the Presidency for a third six-year term. Clashes lasted for eleven straight days spreading throughout the country. Local student supporters of the anti-constitution amendment issue staged protests in front of the Main Gate -- but reports indicate they were without the violence associated with the Seoul protests. During any protests at Osan AB, the ROKAF personnel were locked down on base. Whatever the personal opinion of the ROKAF officer-enlisted personnel, they remained silent as the Park Chung-hee regime exerted absolute power over the military. In Sept 1969, clashes between rock-hurling students and police flared up again over the constitutional issue. On 18 Oct a national referendum was held that showed that two-thirds favor the third term amendment with 11.1 million voting. President Park had said he would step down if the referendum didn't pass. However, with the approval he could run for a third term in 1971. Off-base Songtan-myeon (district) was raised to the status of Songtan-eup (town), Pyeongtaek-gun (county) by Law No. 1117 (Promulgated on November 21, 1962) This meant that a rural area of Kyonggi-do (Province) but was elevated to a main town. It was at this point, that Chicol Village ceased to exist and the name "Songtan" officially replaced it. There was only one main road to the base at the time. This road ran from the Main Gate through the Shinjang Mall area to the Mokchon railroad crossing and then intersected with the MSR-1 near the express bus depot. The Hill 180 gate connected to the Main Gate area through a small winding dirt road and down the ridge line to Seojong-ni. The "business" district along the MSR-1 expanded with the express bus depot there as well as the Jaeil Theater. The Songbuk Farmers' Market area was expanding outward and the rice fields were being filled in to make room for more construction. There was also increased construction in the Jwa-dong area up on the hill for the lower income work force. The North Korean refugee population remained concentrated in the Milwal-dong area and the low houses expanded outward into Seomi-ri and Jokbong. In 1964, Songtan became a "special tourism district" -- or camptown (ki'chichon) -- whereby the ROK could placate the US military about "protecting" the GIs. The camptown system specifically identified areas for GIs and foreign tourists (government contractors). As such the USFK had some control over these bars and could exert pressure through off-limits sanctions. In addition, the USFK "turned a blind eye" to the prostitution aspects of camptowns and initiated town patrols to "protect" the GIs in the bar rows. Basically the USFK forces did as they pleased in these camptowns. Prosecution of American servicement for major offenses against Korean nationals started after the SOFA was implemented in 1967. Under the SOFA in 1969, the Ministry of Justice exercised jurisdiction on 51 cases -- 11 military and 40 civilian. Of this number, 34 are awaiting trial, two on appeal and 15 completed. There were no acquittals and the general level of punishment was "reasonable" according to the 8th Army. By the late 1960s, the housing off-base had significantly improved. New housing aimed for Osan AB American troops were being built in the Mokchon area and spreading out into the Namsan-tau area. Children of the professional ROKAF personnel (senior enlisted-officers) attended either the Songbuk or Songshin Elementary schools, and the Taegkwang Middle School. However, most children in upper education were sent to Seoul or Suwon to live with relatives and finish their schooling if it could be afforded. On 21 July 1969, the first men walked on the moon. In Korea, everyone is glued to the TV to watch the events on TV as it unfolds. President Nixon proclaims a National Day of Participation so everyone watches as Apollo 11 makes history. Remember that at that time, the TV were not household fixtures but located mostly in coffee shops and other business shops. The TVs were cheap black and white models for the most part. 1970s:USFK Troop Reductions and Turnover DMZ to ROK (1970) On 15 Oct 1970, USFK authorities announced that more than half of the US servicemen involved in the 20,00-man cutback had already left Korea. The spokesman said US military strength in the ROK was at 52,000, down 12,000 from the full strength of 64,000. It was not revealed how soon the remaining 8,000 men will be withdrawn to complete the cutback.On 6 Jul 1970 the US officially notified the ROK of its reduction plans and meetings set up to discuss time tables and military aid to upgrade the ROK forces. The cost of maintaining the present level of Sec of Defense Laird stated that the pull-out would be complete by mid-1971, but a significant presence would remain. The ROK accepted the US "concept" of a pullout and negotiations began. US military aid to the ROK in 1970 was about $140 million. Park Chung-hee stated that he and 19 members of his cabinet would resign if the 20,000 troops were pulled out. In July 1970 Vice President Spiro Agnew announced the US plan to station a wing of F-4s in the ROK as part of the upgrade of the ROK defense capabilities. This would lead to the creation of the 3rd TFW at Kunsan. In August the DoD announced that the troop reduction was based on the baseline of 63,000 troops authorized, but that the ROK was 10,000 understrength at that moment. Thus the actual numbers would be less than 20,000. The USFK stated that most of the reductions would be accomplished through attrition as the tour is only 13-months. Sec of State Rogers told Congress that the $150 million in modernization funding for the ROK would enable the ROK to take over the responsibility for the 18 mile stretch of the DMZ currently covered by the 7th ID. He indicated the overall five-year plan for the modernization of the ROK military would cost $750 million. In Dec, the Congress approved the $150 million package and the ROK indicated that it would use the funds to purchase F-5E aircraft along with speedboats, signal equipment and tanks as part of the modernization process. The US also announced that it was reducing its 39,000 force in Japan by 12,000. In addition, it was withdrawing 5,000 from the 50,000 in Okinawa. As part of the cutback, the 475th will be moved to Kunsan AB by 30 Jun 1971 and redesignated the 3rd TFW. The EC-121 Warning Star operating at Itazuke would be moved to Kwangju AB. In 1971, Korean ground troops assumed responsibility for the defense of the 156-mile DMZ with a partial withdrawal of American forces. However, this was bought with a U.S. promise for increased contributions to upgrading the Korean military hardware and financial assistance. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "In 1970, a decision was made to reduce US forces in Korea in view of the capability of the ROK armed forces to take over the primary burden of ground defense of their country and in conjunction with a US-funded, five-year modernization package for the ROK armed forces. In March 1971, the 2nd Infantry Division pulled back from the DMZ and turned over its area of responsibility to a ROK Army division. By late March, the only area of the DMZ still guarded by U.S. troops was a 1,000-meter wide sector in the vicinity of Panmunjom, site of the meetings between the UNC and the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers components of the Military Armistice Commission. The planned reduction in Eighth Army was completed on schedule as the command's authorized strength was reduced by over 18,000 by the end of June 1971." On 3 Jan, Richard Nixon told the DoD to "postpone indefinitely" the reduction of forces beyond the 20,000 men reduction by 30 June 1971. The DoD stated no such plans need to be delayed. President Park Chung-hee announced at the same time in Jan his intention to reduce the ROK commitment in Vietnam of the 50,000 men there -- though not immediately. Park called for a "self-reliant defense" based upon lessons from the past. US-ROK issue joint agreement for the modernization of the ROK military and arrangements for the reduction of US forces in Korea. In July $150 million in surplus equipment given to ROK. In fact in 1971, the ROK received assurances that equipment transferred to the troops in Vietnam would remain with the units. This was all part of the scheme that became known as the Nixon Doctrine whereby countries would be responsible for their own defense. 51st ABW Takes Over Osan AB The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was inactivated on 31 May 1971. It was redesignated the 51st Air Base Wing on 20 Oct 1971 and relocated from Naha Air Base, Okinawa, to Osan November 1, 1971 where it took over support responsibilities for Osan AB under the 314th Air Division. (SITE NOTE: It would be redesignated the 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) on 30 Sep 1974 and later the 51st Tactical Fighter Wing on 1 Jul 1982. It would become the 51st Wing on 7 Feb 1992 and then the 51st Fighter Wing on 1 Oct 1993.)  Map of Osan AB Flightline (NOTE: The Diamond A-D where the nuclear alerts were pulled ("A" Matadors/"B" F-4Cs/"C" F-105s/"D" F-100s).) The 36th TFS converted from the F-4D to the F-4E on 1 Jun 1974 prior to it becoming a part of the 51st Composite Wing. (SPECULATION) The move to equip the 36th TFS with F-4Es that were scheduled for replacement in frontline forces within the next few years by the F-15 (1975) and F-16 (1979) may have been influenced by the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) campaign to get the ROK to buy the F-4E. The Republic of Korea Air Force ordered 37 F-4Es from McDonnell, receiving the first examples in 1978. The US offered 24 surplus F-4Es in 1988 and 30 in 1989, but probably only the latter batch was actually delivered. Some Korean F-4Es are equipped to carry the AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack laser designator pod. (Source: Baugher Site: F-16.) The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) flying the OV-10A Broncos was transferred from the 314th Air Division at Osan AB on 30 Sept 1974 and assigned to the 51st Composite Wing at Osan AB when the Wing assumed control of the base. (Source: AFHRA: 19th WS.) ROKAF and USAF Relationships at Osan AB There were problems over Park Chung-hee's iron-fisted rule and human rights violations. This led to a movement to remove the U.S. forces from Korea in the late 1970s under the Jimmy Carter administration. By 1971, the U.S. had transferred jurisdiction of an 18.5-mile sector of the DMZ from the 2nd Infantry Division to the 1st Republic of Korea Army Division. A month later, the 7th ID - around 18,000 troops - was pulled out of South Korea after 24 years of service. This pullout left a very bitter taste in Park Chung-hee's mouth and he threatened to resign over the issue. However, he was placated by the offer of programs to upgrade the ROK military with equipment, funding and training. This strain affected the improvements to the base as well. All programs funding were placed on a "freeze." The net effect to Osan AB was that the base took a "wait-and-see" attitude towards making any significant improvements to the base. The USAF and ROKAF relationship remained cool. The Americans off-base remained isolated in their havens of the Songtan bar row area and the Foreigners Apartments constructed for the Osan military families down on Burak-san Road. During the 1970s, the primary flight operations were at the F-86D bases of Kunsan and Sachon so professional interfaces with the US forces at Osan AB were limited to the few individuals involved in the Korean Theater Air Control System (KTACS) under the ROKAF Combat Air Command (CAC). These personnel would interface with the 314th AD in controlling the operations at the central command post. Each position had a US and Korean counterpart. Very few joint leisure activities were fostered between the ROKAF and US at Osan AB. Because of the U.S. and Korea's strained relationship in the early 1970s, close ties between the ROKAF and USAF was not actively fostered. During the 1970s, however, there appeared to be many Americans married to Koreans who attended Christian services off-base and intermingled with the Korean populace -- many of whom were ROKAF. (NOTE: During the 1980s, the attendance of Americans at off-base services in Songtan dwindled except in those services of the Baptist or evangelical faiths.) Within the ROKAF area, the training area consisted of a two-story concrete building of the standard Korean design for school or government buildings. The design is one of a central hallway on the front with doorways leading to various rooms. In front of the building was an open sports field. (This area is now the open field near the ROKAF Air Defense Artillery Command HQ. Near the training building was the motorpool, Security Police and POL dump. It appears that there was a cinder-block Officers Club and a two-story BOQ in the late-1970s. The enlisted men lived in Nissen quonset huts -- leftover from the Korean War -- in the ROKAF/ROK Army area near the Main Gate. (Some of these still remain in 2006 deserted and unused identified by their low numbers in the 100s.) Most ROKAF NCO/Officer families resided off-base.  View from the 6th Tee with ROKAF area in rear (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger) Anti-aircraft Artillery The ROKAF was also slowly converting over from its "feudal" equipment. The antique ROKAF quad-50 antiaircraft guns used in WWII were finally replaced with the towed M61 20mm Vulcan cannon. However, for some time both the Vulcan and the Quad-50 were used to guard the ROKAF flightline. Later on, the Vulcan cannon would be moved to end of runway positions. (SEE AFOC Support Wing: ADA Battery for technical info on Quad-50 and Vulcan cannon.) Though the six-barreled vulcan gun was extremely reliable, it was originally fed by linked ammo whose links that tended bend or shatter and jam the gun at high rates of fire. This led to a linkless feed system in later models. However, the high-altitude 40mm Bofors were removed with the Nike-Zeus ADA batteries at Camp Humphreys took over the mission. Off-base Offbase, Chicol Village -- more commonly known in the 1970s as Songtan by Americans -- remained basically as it was in the 1960s until the end of the 1970s. The economy in the area remained primarily dependent on the base -- either in the bar row areas or because of the employment provide. In the 1970s, over 70 percent of Songtan-myeon lived within 10 km of the base Main Gate. In other words, Songtan was a "company town" with the USAF being the "company." In the 1970s, the Namsan Road had not been built. The "Romance Club" and "Sam's" was in a two-story structure was immediately to the left as one exited the main gate. The Main Gate was a small guard shack manned by both US and ROKAF Security Police. Racial Tensions: Black vs. White Racial tension between blacks and whites became a problem -- as it was throughout America and the military worldwide. On Martin Luther King's birthday, 300 soldiers marched peacefully in Camp Stanley -- but the point was that the blacks felt that they were being denied promotion and equal treatment. Racial incidents increased. In June a riot in Itaewon left 13 injured and area was placed off-limits. Camp Humphreys had a race riot in April. On 13 Apr 1971 after three days of racial incidents in Anjong-ni village outside of Camp Humphreys end as the village was temporarily put off limits. Several US soldiers were arrested on charges of arson and larceny. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p148, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA)Park Chung-hee's 5-year plans had not taken root as yet. President Park initiated the Saemaul Undong (New Village) to increase farm income. Rapid progress in urban areas was made during the period between 1962-1971 under Park Chung-hee's Five Year Development Plan. However, rural areas lagged far behind the industrial progress that was being made in the cities. As a result, Park Chung-hee designed and implemented the New Community Movement, or Saemail Undong in 1971. 35,000 village units were involved. Under the Saemaul Undong campaign, most of the 35,000 participating villages launched projects to straighten and widen the roads so that moderate traffic could be more easily accommodated. (A Handbook of Korea, 1999 p 414) As the areas surrounding Osan AB was primarily agricultural, the successful impacts of the Saemaul Undong were readily apparent. Slowly, the "Miracle of the Han" was affecting the populace in a "trickle-down" fashion. Though the economy of the Songtan area remained relatively poor, the improvements could be seen in the extensive use of fire brick and concrete in the construction of buildings. Unfortunately, most of the young people still gravitated to the major cities to work for companies offering higher wages. This left only their parents behind. For parents who could afford it, the children were sent to Seoul for education as the area was considered "backwards." The Park regime did start to address the disparity between the major cities and the rural areas, but this dealt primarily with birth control or agrarian issues. It was not until the end of the 1970s that some substantive changes started to appear in Songtan. In Aug 1972 Osan AB was hit by torrential rains caused by nearing typhoons which resulted in heavy flooding. Evacuation plans were nearly put into effect. For their efforts in supporting the 314th Air Division, the 36th was awarded the ROK Presidential Unit Citation for assistance to the Korean people during the storm. (Source: 36th Fiends History.) Photos of the typhoon generated flood showed the waters of the Jinwi River had backed up to the point that the water was running over Route 1 with the railroad tracks completely covered. On 17 Oct 1972, Park Chung-hee suspended the constitution and declared martial law throughout the country. The National Assembly is dissolved and political opposition eliminated. US declared dismay, but military continued normal duties. On 27 Oct, Park presented a 126-article Constitution for a national referendum within a month. It dissolved the National Assembly and provided for the election of the President every six years by a 2, 395 person National Conference for Unification. It consolidated his powers as President. 91.5 percent of the voters approved the new constitution in a high voter turnout. (SITE NOTE: The impact to Osan AB personnel was due to the curfew that was imposed. The curfew was 12pm which made it hard for late night merchants to operate. If found on the streets, the police would arrest the offender.) When the Base Commander voiced his concerns personally to Park Chung-hee during a visit to Songtan and Osan AB, Park was very receptive to the ideas of upgrading the area. The major complaint was that there was only one road into the base (Main Gate-Shinjang Mall Road-Mokchon Crossing-MSR-1) which created congestion and could impact on national defense in time of war. Park Chung-hee gave the okay to expand the area in 1976. (NOTE: Remember that Park Chung-hee was receiving monetary support from the US to upgrade the military and much of this money was being siphoned into improving the infrastructure. The 7th ID was removed from the DMZ.) Once Park Chung-hee gave his approval, the Shinjang Road overpass (over the Kyongbu Railway) was built and the Mokchon Crossing was closed. The Milwal Road was expanded and the road cut to the Main Gate. Roads were straightened from Milwal Road to the Hill 180 gate.) Once the new roads were in place, massive renovations of the Shinjang Mall area took place -- upgrading buildings and constructing new ones. The housing was extended out toward Mokchon Road -- and new housing was expanding in the Namsan-tau area. Some of the benefits of the "Miracle of the Han" was that most of the housing sprouted TV antennas as they were able to pickup the 7am-10pm TV broadcasts from Seoul. Though primitive by most modern standards, for most of the US military in Korea, Songtan was like living in luxury. With the increased USAF traffic brought about by the Vietnam War, the shops outside the base started to prosper as more customers came to Songtan seeking bargains on suits, leather coats and other items. However, there was a lot of friction over the "Miracle of the Han" in other areas of the country. In Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History (p326) it states, "An industrial belt extended north and west from Pusan, linking the free-export zones in Masan and Changwon with new industries in cities like Taegu and Ulsan. Little towns like Kumi and ports erased in the Korean War like P'ohang were transformed overnight into industrial cities because they were near Park's birthplace (next to Kumi) or were hometowns of one of his close associates (P'ohang). Tile roofs and television antennas sprouted on homes all over the Kyongsangs, while in southwest Cholla peasants living in thatched-roof huts continued their backbreaking agrarian toil at near-subsistence levels, or sent children off to Seoul in search of a job in a tearoom or massage parlor." The point is that the "Miracle of the Han" did not include the Cholla area. The "Miracle of the Han" applied to the "T-K" (Taegu-Kyongsang) group. There was growing criticism of the Americans against human rights violations by the Korean government. In 1975, Jimmy Carter in running for President told the Washington Post that he saw no reason for American troops to be stationed in South Korea and that, if elected, he would pull them out along with the nuclear weapons stationed there. In the 1992 publication, Kim Young-Sam and the The New Korea (p99) it states, "Carter apparently wanted to removed the "trip-wire" U.S. force to avoid any possibility of an American entanglement in a future land war in Asia. But Carter also appeared to be motivated by his and his advisers' deep antagonism to the authoritarian government in South Korea and its violations of human rights. President Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw the ground troops of the US from South Korea caused grave concerns for the national security. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of the superiority of the North Korean forces, but did recommend a scaling down of the American forces. The impact of these decisions at the local level was that USAF base officials took a "wait-and-see" attitude before approving monies for improvements to the base. As the ROKAF were residents of on the base using USAF water and sewage facilities, there were inconveniences as the quality of the infrastructure deteriorated. For the base as a whole, this "wait-and-see" attitude set any improvements back five years as base officials simply sat on their hands. The "improvements" to the base were done by the 54th CES/Det 1 (Red Horse). However, the Civil Engineering did very little to upgrade the base infrastructure because they were hamstrung by lack of funding. 1980sThe ROK Army presence at Osan AB disappeared after the Vulcan and Quad-50 anti-aircraft weapons were turned over to the ROKAF in the 1980s.The conditions for the ROKAF officers and enlisted personnel on base improved. They were a direct reflection of the improvements in the Korean economy and the dramatic growth of its GNP. It also reflects the military's concern that there was full-employment on the economy for highly-skilled technicians -- especially aircraft mechanics. Companies such as KAL and Samsung with its KFP (Korean Fighter Plane) program was expanding their operations. Concerns for retention of the mid-level NCOs were a primary concern as these skilled-individuals could easily find a much more lucrative future as a civilian outside the military. Though the pay for the lower ranks did not improve as they were conscriptees, the upper ranking NCOs and officers saw increases in pay and benefits to encourage retention in the military. The training area, motor pool and security police areas remained in the same area. Though there was improvements, the enlisted folks continued to bunk in the Nissen huts in the ROKAF area. A small ROKAF chapel was built in the ROKAF area. The motorpool and security police remained in the same areas. In 1980, General Chun Doo-hwan was "inaugurated" as president as all four political parties were disbanded. In 1981, he would be "reelected" by the electoral college as the only candidate. He continued the government patronage of the chaebols by granting them low-interest loans. One significant change that would affect Osan in general was in 1982. The government lifted the 31-year old midnight-to-4 AM curfew. Though the USAF maintained its curfew policies in the American town bar row, the Korean populace in general was now free to be out after midnight. In 1988, the official histories read "the Summer Olympics were held in Seoul without incident after the Republic of Korea refused to host them jointly in Pyongyang". In truth, the Seoul Olympic committee offered the ping-pong venue and another minor sport to Pyongyang realizing full well that North Korea would refuse. Pyongyang -- along with Cuba -- boycotted the Olympics and issued some very ominous threats that cast a cloud over the events. However, with the KAL 828 incident still fresh in their minds, some of the ROKAF units along with some 51st TFW aircraft were put on full-alert -- just in case. Luckily nothing occurred to interrupt the Olympic spirit. ROKAF Combat Air Command (CAC) In the 1980s, the Combat Air Command, the predecessor of the AFOC, was headquartered at Osan, and had nine flight wings and one training wing. It controlled aircraft that included twenty-two Sqs of ground attack fighters/interceptors, twenty-three counterinsurgency aircraft in one Sq, twenty reconnaissance aircraft in one Sq, and fifteen search-and-rescue helicopters in one Sq. All of these aircraft were produced in the United States, with the exception of sixty-eight Northrop F-5E/Fs that were coproduced with Korean Air. As of 1990 the 294 Northrop F-5s and 36 General Dynamics F16C /Ds were the primary ground attack aircraft. Approximately 130 McDonnell Douglas F-4s were deployed as of 1990 for air defense but were equally useful in ground attack. All three types of aircraft were capable of being used in either role, depending on their armament. (Source: Global Security.org.) The CAC interfaced with its counterpart the 7th AF under the Combined Forces Command (CFC). 37th Tactical Intelligence Group (TIG)The 37th Tactical Intelligence Group (TIG) arrived at Osan AB in 1986 and worked with its USFK counterpart the 6th Tactical Intelligence Group (6 TIG), which was reactivated at Osan Air Base in 1981. The 607th AIS, 6 TIG (USAF) worked with the 37th TIG (ROKAF) to bring together intelligence collection, analysis, targeting, production, and dissemination assets assigned to the of 7th Air Force and the Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS).. (Source: Wikipedia: 607th AIS.) (SITE NOTE: KTACS is also known as Korean Theater Air Control System.) 607th Air Support Operations Group [607th ASOG] The 607th ASOG's mission is to provide the Seventh Air Force and Air Component Commander (and in wartime, the ROKAF AF Operations Command) with an unbeatable theater air control system, execute unmatched command and control, weather, and radar support over technologically advanced communications connectivity, and apply air power to meet the CINC's objectives through control of air assets in support of theater forces. After reactivation in 1980 at Osan AB, the group's primary focus has been supporting the Korean Theater Air Control System. In February 1992, the group acquired the Korean peninsula weather mission, which it still holds today, and the Korea-wide intelligence mission, which it held until 15 December 1994. Today, the 607th Air Support Operations Group has units throughout Korea, at Osan Air Base, Yongsan Army Garrison, Camps Humphreys, Red Cloud, Stanley, Casey, Walker, Page and Stanton Army Installations, including the Third Republic of Korea Air Liason Office (TROKA-ALO) . 7th Air Force (7AF), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and Combined Air Component Command (CACC) On September 1986, the Air Force activated 7 AF again to assume the duties of maintaining the fragile armistice on the Korean peninsula that the 314 Air Division was responsible for. Since then, 7 AF, as the US Air Force component to the US and ROK Combined Forces Command's Air Component Command, has been an integral part of deterring aggression from North Korea against the ROK. The 5th Reconnaissance Squadron U-2s fly on daily missions for the past two decades. Using data-link capabilities in near real-time, the 5th RS provides fresh images to the 607th Air Intelligence Squadron for dissemination to policy-makers and combat troops. The commander, Seventh Air Force, is dual-hatted as commander, Combined Air Component Command (CACC). Since 1986, 7 AF, as the US Air Force component to the US and ROK Combined Forces Command's Air Component Command, has been an integral part of deterring aggression from North Korea against the ROK. Air Component Command (ACC) -- part of the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command (CFC) -- is the air component of CFC. CFC exercises Combined Delegated Authority over Korean forces responsible for the defense of the Republic of Korea. Should the policy of deterrence fail, CFC would direct combat operations to defeat an enemy attack. These CFC forces are organized into ground, air, naval components and two Major Subordinate Commands, marine and when activated, a special operations command. ACC is responsible for planning and executing the Integrated Tasking Order (ITO). 1990s:Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Command The Nike-Hercules batteries were transferred to the ROK Army from the US Army in 1978. The last Hawk batteries were transferred to the ROK Army from the US Army in 1982. The functional control of the Nike-Hercules batteries (Inchon, Daechon, and Pusan) and three Hawk squadrons were transferred to the ROKAF from the ROK Army in 1991. At that time the Command was organized with four ADA Wings. The decaying Nike-Hercules units were to be shutdown in the early 2000s and replaced by used PAC-2 Patriots from Germany, but the ROK was still attempting to haggle over the price -- while stating that it was the Germans who were holding up the purchase.30th Air Defense Wing The wing evolved from the 30th Airborne Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadron as it grew to provide command and control for over 20 air defense and air control radars. The Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC) is located at Osan AB. The ROKAF building a backup MCRC at Taegu AB. Under the 30th ADW was the Control and Reporting Centers (CRC) at Taegu AB. The CRC of Chungchong Province included the 309 Air Control and Warning Squadron. 93rd Base Construction Group Detachment (Osan) Headquartered at Chungwan AB, this is the USAF REDHORSE equivalent. There is detachment at all major ROKAF bases including Osan. 2000s:43rd ADA and 35th ADA Patriots The 1st Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery has Patriot batteries at Osan AB, Kunsan AB and Suwon AB. Since 1994, 48 fire units of Patriot missiles have been deployed at Suwon, Osan and Kunsan airbases in South Korea. Suwon Air Base is a Republic of Korea Air Base, on which is housed the 1st Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery. The unit's mission is to defend against air attack. The 1st Battalion (PATRIOT), 43rd Air Defense Artillery is a six firing battery, Echelon Above Corps PATRIOT Missile Battalion with a Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and a direct support maintenance company. A battery is composed of eight launchers of PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles, each having 4 and 16 interceptors, respectively. 1-43 ADA assumed it's mission in the Republic of Korea in October 1994.The USFK brought in an additional Patriot batteries in 2004. These batteries were all upgraded to PAC-3s in Sept 2005 and provides the ROKAF some breathing-room. The 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade became fully operational on the Korean peninsula by the end of 2004. The Army deployed the brigade, which had been stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, to South Korea. Its new headquarters at Osan Air Base, 48 miles south of Korea's Demilitarized Zone. The Army Patriot missile brigade deploying from the United States to South Korea began moving into its newly built headquarters in October 2004. The brigade marked completing its deployment to South Korea with a formal ceremony sometime in December 2004. By then, the brigade numbered about 1,200 soldiers and maintain eight firing batteries at four air bases: Osan, Suwon, Kunsan and Kwangju.. Hardened Theater Air Control Center The Hardened Theater Air Control Center at Osan AB is the largest Combined Air Operations Center in the world. The "Hardened" in the HTACC's designation derives from the 10-foot-thick walls, hence the nickname "Cheyenne Mountain of South Korea." The Hardened Theater Air Control Center's Defense Red Switch Network provided superior multi-level, self-authenticating, flexible, secure communications, which enhanced leadership's command and control effectiveness. This acts as the nerve center for air operations during war-time which affects both the AF Operations Command (AFOC) (ROKAF) and 7th AF units (USAF) operating jointly under the Combined Forces Command of the USFK.  ROKAF Area of Osan AB (Google Earth) (Jun 2006) Air Force Operations Command (ROKAF) Osan Air Base is also home to the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) Operations Command (AFOC). The ROKAF occupies an additional significant area within Osan AB, and recently expanded into land that had originally been purchased to accommodate the relocation of forces from Yongsan Army Garrison. When that move was cancelled, the ROKAF acquired the land. The new AFOC headquarters is located in the expansion area. (Source: RAO: Osan History.) (SITE NOTE: The MOU for the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison to Osan was signed in 1990. The land was procured to facilitate the move. However, by the year 2000, ten years had passed and the land was unused. Under ROK law land that is procured for use but lays fallow reverts to the municipality. Thus Pyeongtaek City sued for the return of the land. At that point, the decision was made to build hastily construct the AFOC building along with the construction of Pokchang Road leading to the AFOC gate in order to retain the land under the Ministry of Defense.) The Air Force Operations Command was formerly the "Combat Air Command" (CAC) that was headquartered at Osan. The old CAC at Osan was located in a small, two-story building and the move to the AFOC building in 2003 was a welcome move to spacious quarters. As one enters the doors, one is greeted by a ROKAF sentry who reminds one that the building is for official business only. ![](Pics/030921-afoc-hqJackTerwiel.jpg") AFOC (2002) (Jack Terwiel)  AFOC (2002) (Jack Terwiel)   AFOC Gate Static Displays: F-4D and F-5E (Mar 2006) (Kalani O'Sullivan)   AFOC Gate Static Displays: F-86, T-33, UH-1 and Nike-Zeus (Mar 2006) (Kalani O'Sullivan) The AFOC has nine tactical fighter wings and one training wing. In addition, the Air Defense Artillery Command (ADA), Air Traffic Center (ATC) come under the Operations Command. AFOC controls twenty-two squadrons of ground attack fighters/interceptors, twenty-three counterinsurgency aircraft in one squadron, twenty reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron, and fifteen search-and-rescue helicopters in one squadron. All of these aircraft were produced in the United States, with the exception of sixty-eight Northrop F-5E/Fs that were coproduced with Korean Air. (Source: 2000 Report to Congress Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula, September 12, 2000.) In 1990 the 294 Northrop F-5s and 36 General Dynamics F16C /Ds were the primary ground attack aircraft. Approximately 130 McDonnell Douglas F-4s were deployed as of 1990 for air defense but were equally useful in ground attack. All three types of aircraft were capable of being used in either role, depending on their armament. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.) Under the F-X, next generation fighter program, the ROKAF will be adding the F-15K to its inventory and has received the first aircraft in Sep 2005. In the future, the ROK is also attempting to add indigenous Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAV) to its inventory as a reconnaissance tool. In addition, the USFK will be transferring day/night search and rescue missions to the ROKAF in 2006. It announced that it was going to order 40 more aircraft in 2006. The aircraft possessed as of 2004 was: Air Force Operations Command -Osan AB 37th Tactical Intelligence Group The ROKAF's 37th Tactical Intelligence Group (TIG) supports the AFOC with air intelligence garnered through the shared information sources. The unit arrived on Osan AB in 1986. Their general mission is the gathering of air intelligence that is shared between the ROKAF and USFK. The unit brings together intelligence collection, analysis, targeting, production, and dissemination assets of the AFOC. The unit received the Security Intelligence Force Award for both 2004 and 2005. In 1996, 1999 and 2000, the unit received national security awards for intelligence evaluations. (Source: Lt. Nu-ri Kim, 37th TIG Executive Officer.) The 37th TIG intelligence mission is classified, thus there are very little specifics on the unit's mission that is releasable to the public. However, we can infer that its intelligence sources are mainly from the USAF 303rd Intelligence Squadron and its operational sister squadron the 607th Air Intelligence Squadron -- along with real-time data culled from the U-2 missions originating from Osan AB. The 37th TIG in support of the AFOC is the counterpart of the USAF's 607th Air Intelligence Squadron in support of 7th AF. "Today the 607 AIS, working with its republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) counterpart, the 37th Tactical Intelligence Group, represent a key element in the U.S. commitment to the growth of combined USAF/ROKAF Intelligence capabilities. It is our combined responsibility to ensure our Intelligence products are timely, thorough, and accurate, for our enemy is one who takes his war fighting capabilities very seriously and is ever seeking the opportunity to put them to the test. We accept the challenge of the mission, carry it proudly into the future, and always stand ready and willing to continually meet the challenges faced by seventh air force and the air component command." The 607th Air Intelligence Squadron is comprised of six flights of approximately 180 officer and enlisted personnel. US military personnel who work "shoulder to shoulder with the ROK military." (Source: Wikipedia.) The shared intelligence comes from tenant reconnaissance/intelligence units, such as the 5th Reconnaissance Squadron flying U-2s on daily missions that can last 11 or 12 hours. Using data-link capabilities in near real-time, the 5th RS provides fresh images to the 607th Air Intelligence Squadron for dissemination to policy-makers and combat troops. Another USAF intelligence source at Osan AB involved with the U-2 reconaissance data is the Skivvy-Nine, the 303rd Intelligence Squadron, which is part of the old USAF Security Service (USAFSS) filled with linguists monitoring both Korea and China. The unit was designated a Group in 1981 and remained as such until 1993 when it was designated the 303rd IS, under the 692nd Intelligence Group, the 67th Intelligence Wing, and the Air Intelligence Agency. (Source: FAS.org.)  Lt Kim Nu-ri in front of 37th TIG Building (Jun 2006) (Kalani O'Sullivan) According to recurring news reports, the major problem with the CFC and ROK is that the US controls most of the intelligence -- which at times the USFK is reluctant to share with its ROK counterparts in peacetime. The reason is that the ROK pulled out of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 1992 and controls its forces in peacetime. Only during wartime would the ROK forces fall under the CFC control. However this poses a dilemma in that the sharing of sensitive USAF intelligence to a ROK component that is NOT part of the CFC. Though the working relationships at the lower levels appear to be cordial, in recent years there has been some strain in the sharing of intelligence information between the allies. The U-2 flights by the 5th Reconnaissance Squadron at Osan AB, satellite surveillance provided by the Space Command Squadron at Osan AB are the primary intelligence sources. The ROK launched its first military satellite (joint-use) in 2006, but its main "spy" satellite is still in work in cooperation with Israel with a launch with a Russian rocket in 2007. Until then, the ROK is at the mercy of American satellite intelligence data. "When I was a director of TACC (Theatre of Air Control Center) at OSAN Air Base, which was operated by both the ROK Air Force Operation Command and the US 7th Air Force Command, one of my primary responsibilities along with my US counter partner included 24-hour observation and reaction against all enemy activities displayed on LSD (Large Scale Display).The AFOC coordinates its wartime actions with the 7th AF commander in his roles as the Combined Air Component commander and Area Air Defense commander. The 7th AF AOC is an inplace command and control center for all aerospace operations within the Korean theater. Communications support includes providing infrastructure and data systems for disseminating the daily integrated tasking order; radio and data circuits for managing the Common Tactical Picture; Global Command and Control System administration for managing the Common Operational Picture; Defense Red Switch Network maintenance for secure voice capabilities; tactical switch maintenance for secure data and voice connectivity; and secure video teleconferencing systems strategic warplanning for U.S. and Korean leaders. (Source: AFCA May 2001 by Capt Sean Keene) In 7th AF AOC, the USAF refers to the "ITO" (Integrated Tasking Order) as the "ITS" ("integrated tasking suggestion"). It is a list of assets with missions assigned against the best targets intelligence collectors can produce that meet the CINC's guidance. The 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) operations branch links the intelligence, the attack asset and the CINC's guidance together for timely attack. The 3rd BCD at Osan is the only combined BCD in the Army (ROK-US under the CFC). (Source: GlobalSecurity.org: 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) - Korea and Global Security.org: BCD Mission) ROKAF Air Defense Artillery Command The ROKAF Air Defense Artillery Command is directly under the AFOC and its headquarters is located on Osan AB on Hill 180. In 1990, the ROK Army transferred the operations of the Hawk and Nike-Zeus missiles to the ROKAF -- transferred to them from the departing US Air Defense forces -- and formed the ROKAF Air Defense Artillery Command (ADAC). In Jul 1991 the ROK Army ADA infantries formally transferred the ADA responsibility to the ROKAF. (Source: ROKAF.) There is little information at this time except that there are three brigades under the ROKAF ADAC (with the 2d ADA Brigade identified and two unspecified). Each brigade consists of one Nike-Zeus and two I-Hawk units under each brigade. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org) The I-Hawk System provides low to medium level air defence as part of the national air defence. With a maximum effective range of 40 km, the I-Hawk can defend against targets manouevering up to 8 Gs, has a Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP) of 0.85 and is effective against noise jamming and deceptive counter-measures. (Source: I-Hawk.)  I-Hawk  Nike Hercules in Korea (1968) Supposedly the ROK is attempting to procure used PAC-2 Patriot missiles from Germany to support its air defense -- but the ROK keeps trying to buy cheap and renegotiate the price. In July 2005, South Korea announced that it intended to buy Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against North Korea. South Korea hoped to phase out its aging arsenal of Nike surface-to-air missiles beginning in 2006, replacing them with new Patriots purchased from either the U.S., or second-hand ones from Germany. In 2000, Seoul came close to buying 48 Patriots from the U.S., but ultimately cancelled the purchase over negotiated costs and ROK demands for technology transfer. The ROK negotiated for the purchase of the used PAC-2 missiles from Germany but claim the process is being held up because of the lack of German legislative approval. The delay of the SAM-X project, which was initiated in 2000, has been the source of concerns, creating a big hole in the country's air defense system. (Source: Korea Times andMissile Threat.) However, the ROK's seriousness in procuring the PAC-2 is in question as long as the US supports Korea's defense with PAC-3 Patriots at Kunsan, Kwangju and Osan-Suwon. The Seoul government, in seeking greater independence from the U.S. government, has been reluctant to introduce the new PAC-3, out of concern that it could provoke anti-American sentiment in the country. Progressive civic groups argue the introduction of PAC-3 missiles would, in fact, mean the inclusion in the U.S.-led global missile defense network, which they claim could spark an arms race and raise tension in the region. (SITE NOTE: Six Patriot batteries have been stationed in South Korea’s major bases since 1994. Two Patriot brigades were added, bringing the total batteries of Patriots in South Korea to eight. The two batteries were added at Gwangju Air Base and Osan. Five hundred troops from the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade were stationed in Osan. Each Patriot battery has six to eight launchers; each launcher can hold four PAC-2 missiles or 16 PAC-3 missiles.) AFOC Support and Services Wing The AFOC Support and Services Wing (AFOC S&S) -- more commonly known simply as the AFOC Support Wing -- contains the miscellaneous elements required to support the AFOC. The Support element is comparable to the USAF Mission Support Squadron (MSS) while the Services element contains the Air Defense platoons handling the Quad-50 machine guns and Vulcan cannons used for low-level air defense of Osan AB. Included in the Support Wing is the ROKAF security police unit which works with the USAF for base security. In addition there are the motorpool, mess hall and supply functions.  Lt Choi Jae-hong, Chief of Operations, AFOC Support Wg, Osan AB (Jun 2006) (Kalani O'Sullivan) Air Defense Artillery Battery The mission of the ADA Battery under the AFOC Support Wing is to provide short-range low-level anti-aircraft defenses for Osan AB. The PAC-3 missiles of the USAF 38th ADA of Osan AB provide the long-range air defense coverage. The ADA function consists of four platoons. The 1st and 2nd platoons provide Vulcan coverage at the end-or-runway to cover runway approaches. The 3rd and 4th platoons provide Quad-50 protection from positions on the hills near the Main Gate. (Source: Lt Choi Jae-hong, Chief of Operations, AFOC Support Wing and Lt Han Ju-yop, Translator AFOC Support Wing)
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