Long load times. Graphics intensive page due to loading of photos. Please be patient... Information on this page dealing with the 38th Fighter Group falls into the "best guess" category. Because of the ROKAF's stringent rules dealing with the release of information on their units, any unit information is "classified." Therefore all information is drawn from sources outside the ROKAF chain.
 
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 THE ROKAF IN THE 1990S AND INTO THE NEW MILLENIUM: Currently, the 38th Fighter Group -- flying F-5Es of the 11th Fighter Squadron -- are stationed at Kunsan. The biggest change between the first unit in 1953 and now is that the ROKAF are no longer trainees. The ROKAF has become a potent force as a deterent to North Korean aggression. Unfortunately, any information about a ROKAF unit is considered classified. Therefore, any official specifics on their current military operations cannot be released by the ROKAF. Any comments about ROKAF capabilities made in this section are pure speculation. In the 1990s, the Miracle of the Han arrived in the Kunsan area in full force. The plans developed in the late 1980s were put into effect for the three national industrial complex construction projects -- Kunsan, Kunjang (Kunsan/Janghang) and the Agro-industrial Complex (in Seongsan/Seosu/Okku). The benefit to the base were the improved infrastructure that comes from such massive improvements. For example, in 1989 the telephone lines were considered too "dirty" to support computer lines, but by 1995 just about every child over 10 had a computer hooked up to the internet. Because of the growth of the Industrial complexes, the roads have been expanded and transportation has been improved. Because all the new workers moving into the area, new housing has exploded. High rise apartments continue to be erected as Kunsan City continues its expansion. The tangible and intangible benefits of these programs have been phenomenal in its impact on the residents of this area. Because of these projects, Kunsan Air Base in the near future will be landlocked. (Refer to the Map of the Kunjang Tidal Reclamation Project.) Currently the base has an over-water landing pattern, but soon the tidal flats adjoining the base will be reclaimed. The Saengmun Project will create the largest dike in the world by 2014 and reclaim all the lands behind it. At some unspecified time in the future, Kunsan Air Base will be incorporated into a new international airport that is still in the design phases. Initially the airport was to be to the east of Kunsan AB near Shimpo Bay but now plans seem to indicate that they will extend the Kunsan Airport into the tidal reclamation area. 38th Fighter Group: The 38th Fighter Group (ROKAF) (and its 111th Fighter Squadron) is manned by dedicated group of professionals. Because of the ROKAF manning system, many of the career ROKAF personnel at Kunsan have been stationed there for ten to fifteen years. The pilots and senior NCOs are highly trained and disciplined. Many of the ROKAF Warrant Officers/NCOs have received advanced training in the U.S. and can speak English moderately well. However, the lower ranks (under the compulsory military service) are basically short-term enlistees just putting in their time. Though the 38th FG (ROKAF) performs its own maintenance on assigned aircraft, it still periodically needs USAF assistance for more sophisticated repair tasks or jobs requiring high-technology equipment. Most of its maintenance would be considered "on-aircraft" without any "back shops." The ROKAF maintenance system is based on a Korean War system called "REMCO" (Rear Echelon Maintenance Combined Operations). Under this system, the forward operating units perform maintenance on the aircraft to keep them flying, but any major repairs or major scheduled maintenance is performed in a rear echelon facility. Chinhae Air Base (near Pusan) handles all the major inspections and depot repairs. This depot is also the maintenance center for the Korean commercial airlines as well. The main ROKAF logistics base for the ROKAF remains at Taegu AB. Many of the component parts for the aircraft are repaired at this base. If you note the locations on the map, you will see that these Chinhae and Taegu are in the southern part of Korea, while most active-component bases are in the north.
The main ROKAF area has remained next to the taxiway with a parking apron fronting the taxiway. The 38th Fighter Group headquarters are in this area. The maintenance hangar is located next to the parking apron and can accommodate two F-5Es. Along the wings is space for maintenance shops. To the side of the maintenance hangar, hardened arches were erected for each aircraft in the 1980s. The designs are similar to the hardened arches used by the USAF...and were probably built using the same local contractors with the same specifications. The main road leading to the south end of base (and across "Taxiway Charlie") divides the maintenance area from the administrative areas. The headquarters buildings are across the street from the maintenance area. (Note: The old northeast-southwest runway used in 1953 is now called "Taxiway Charlie" or "642" and leads into the Whiskey Arch area sheltering the F-16s of the 8th Fighter Wing.) Some buildings sit on built-up areas. As this area has a low water-table -- possibly as low as 20 feet -- it is a fair assumption that the ROKAF has a hardened underground control center located in this area. Most likely their Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) serves a dual purpose as a MOC and a War Operations Center (WOC). However, one wonders how much integration goes on between the ROKAF and USAF as the 8th Fighter Wing has a separate WOC under their wing headquarters. Again as a guess, there is probably very little direct interaction between the units in their war-time scenarios. It is very common to see the 8th FW personnel in full chemical warfare gear during their exercises, while the ROKAF personnel are riding their bicycles in normal uniform. At best, there is probably telecon coordination when the 8th FW performs some exercise scenario in the ROKAF area. However, there has been published reports in early 2000 of the ROKAF exercising with the USAF on perimeter defense exercises in future exercises. The ROKAF now owns the eight hardened bunkers at the south end of the runway. These were used for USAF nuclear alerts between 1968-1974 but turned over to the ROKAF in the 1980s. This area is commonly called the "Tree" area. Beside these bunkers are buildings used by the ROKAF. Throughout the base, the other ROKAF units are located near their USAF counterparts. The ROKAF Security Police are located near the main gate. The ROKAF Dispensary is located near the USAF hospital. The ROKAF are involved in the Tower operations, GCA and weather operations of the base.  ROKAF Weather Service Housing: The Officer and Senior NCO reside on the north end of the base. The housing units are clustered in a small area at the base of Wolfpack Park adjacent to the USAF BOQ area. The cinderblock ROKAF Officer's Club; single unit houses for senior officers; and the two-story BOQ are located on a quiet cul-de-sac. Behind it are the multi-story Officer and NCO family units. The training area with its open playing field is across the street with its open training field. The training area, motor pool; POL dump; and security police areas are still located behind the two-story concrete training building. The ROKAF dispensary is located next to the USAF Hospital. A new chapel was erected on the opposite side of the hill (in the old location of the USAF civilian personnel offices) the mid-1990s.  Click on photo to enlarge The only remaining examples of the BOQ houses transferred to the ROKAF in 1958 exist next to the training field closest to the USAF BOQ area. These two houses have had the hondol chimneys removed, but the slat construction of the original 63d Infantry Division structures can still be seen. There was a small ROKAF chapel located next to these buildings in the 1980s, but it is now vacant as the new ROKAF Chapel has been recently built on Gunsmoke Hill.  View from Wolfpack Park after a snowstorm. Click on photo to enlarge The enlisted barracks are located in the ROKAF Ramp area. The two-story structure that looks like a modified church was newly constructed in the mid-1990s. Prior to that, the enlisted ranks resided in the old Nissen quonset huts that had been around since the mid-1960s. The old units were heated by deisel fuel space heaters. These ROKAF enlisted barracks stood out in stark contrast to the newer multi-story USAF enlisted dormitories next door...and many a USAF airman would be reminded of this fact when complaining of their cramped quarters.  Click on photo to enlarge Social Responsibilities: The ROKAF assists the local community with various tasks when requested by local officials. For example, it is common for the ROKAF to be committed to rice field planting and other farmer assistance projects during the rice planting season. Farmers are always impacted by the lack of manpower in planting and harvesting their crops. The assistance of the ROKAF troops is a welcome addition.  In addition, during any local emergency, the ROKAF (along with other military units) would be rushed to the disaster sites for immediate aid and recovery efforts. Primarily the units are used for manual labor tasks such as cleanup or erecting shelters for civilians displaced by the natural disasters. Specialized units would handle rescue or other needs.  Off Base Conflicts: Off-base conflicts disrupt the lives of both the USAF and the ROKAF. Though most protests are aimed at the USAF, the ROKAF as the host is deeply involved. In 1989, a big change came about when then Korean President Roh Tae-Woo declared that Kunsan Air Base would become a civilian airport. During 1992, a 1970 agreement was revised permitting the use of Kunsan Air Base by Korean carriers and increasing their flight frequency. (Note: There was a previous Seoul-Kunsan airline route that ran from August 1970-March 1974. The route was stopped supposedly due to the cost of oil, but notice that March 1974 was when the 8th TFW arrived to take over the base.) The USFK said that such arrangements, which permit regular commercial airlines' access to U.S. Air Force bases outside U.S. territory, exist only in Kunsan and in Misawa, Japan. However, as soon as the aircraft traffic picked up, the USAF increased the landing fees due to the increased costs in repair/maintenance of the runways and added demands on USAF personnel/equipment to handle this traffic. Immediately there were howls of protest from the Koreans. These protests are over claims of "illegal" land use by the USAF -- rather than the landing fees. To an outside observer, this seems strange as the ROKAF is the host, but the stones are being hurled at the USAF. However, this protest is by-and-large considered mainly an on-going nuisance. (Go to the Cholla Province activist information site at http://inp.or.kr for more information. It contains information on the The Civilian Movement for Regaining Our Land in Kunsan U.S. Military Base.) Since the 1970s, Kunsan Air Base has been a focal point of student protests ranging from accusations of support the Kwangju Massacre to Illegally retaining the landowners land. These protests have brought the two occupants of Kunsan Air Base closer together in attempting to diffuse local tensions. An interesting point about these protests is that they are usually held at the Main Gate of Kunsan -- viewed as the USAF gate. There have been few protests at the North Gate -- or ROKAF Gate. Unfortunately, the anti-American tensions is again on the rise in the year 2000. The rhetoric appears to be the same as the simplistic 1980s student view that if the Americans were gone, the Koreas would be reunited. Kim Dae-jung has come out and pointedly stated that the Americans will not be leaving...but the protests continue to grow. THE ROKAF IN EVENT OF WAR: Offensive Strategy The "AirLand Battle" strategy developed in the mid-1970s called for early, quick, deep strikes into enemy territory, again with the likely use of nuclear weapons, especially against hardened underground facilities (of which there are many in North Korea). In other words, the strategy itself implies "rollback" rather than simple containment of a North Korean invasion. Into the 1980s, the idea was to use nuclear weapons within the first hour of battle (H+1). The North Koreans -- knowing that the Americans had nuclear battlefield weapons -- moved 80 percent of their forces to the front on the DMZ. The North Korean idea was to strike quickly to penetrate into Korea and mingle with the ROK forces and civilians...thereby rendering the nuclear weapons ineffective. In the 1990s, the U.S. army changed its mind after the use of "smart bombs" or "cruise missiles" in Desert Storm proved that they could reliably reach their targets. High-yield conventional weapons are more useful than nuclear warheads with their messy and uncontrollable effects. The nuclear weapons were removed from Korea in 1991. In a paper about Operations Plan 5027 (CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027), it stated, "The primary objective of North Korea's military strategy is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean control within 30 days of beginning hostilities. A secondary objective is the defense of North Korea. To accomplish these objectives, North Korea envisions fighting a two-front war. The first front, consisting of conventional forces, is tasked with breaking through defending forces along the DMZ, destroying defending CFC forces, and advancing rapidly down the entire peninsula. This operation will be coordinated closely with the opening of a second front consisting of SOF units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in CFC's rear." (NOTE: "SOF" means "Special Operation Forces" or highly-trained commandoes.) "The DPRK offensive against the ROK will consist of three phases. The objective of the first phase will be to breach the defenses along the DMZ and destroy the forward deployed forces. The objective of the second phase will be to isolate Seoul and consolidate gains. The objective of the third phase will be to pursue and destroy remaining forces and occupy the remainder of the peninsula."  "As the attack against the forward defenses along the DMZ begins, DPRK forces will probably initiate SCUD and FROG missile attacks with high explosives, smoke, and possible nonpersistent chemical warheads against airfields, lines of communications, C2 and logistics facilities. Additionally, the DPRK attacks will be supported by the opening of a "second front" in rear areas by teams of SOF units. These soldiers, some dressed in ROK army uniforms and carrying ROK weapons and equipment, will infiltrate into the south by air, sea, and through tunnels under the DMZ to attack CFC airfields, C3, and other key targets." Kunsan ROKAF's Role in Event of War: With the elimination of the nuclear element from the equation (tactical nuclear artillery and airborne weapons), it leaves only three guesses for the type of mission the F-5Es from Kunsan would be assigned. In the initial phases of battle, the F-5Es from Kunsan would be committed to air intercepts to maintain air superiority. Though much of the North Korean air assets are obsolete, it will throw everything it has in one massive thrust to implement a breakthrough. Remember that the North Korean strategy is NOT based on maintaining air superiority, but rather ground superiority. After the initial thrust North Korea's Air Force and navies are expected to retreat into defensive roles. As the F-5E combat radius with max fuel and 2 Sidewinder missiles is 656 miles, it will probably be involved in a over-lapping sector defense with a 300-mile radius. At home station, the major concern would be perimeter defense as there will be increased concerns of North Korean Special Operation Forces penetrating the base. If no SCUDs had penetrated the Patriot missile air defenses, the aircraft would recover at home station. If the base has been hit by a chemical SCUD attack, the aircraft may recover at secondary locations -- including highways. After air superiority has been established, the role of the F-5Es may switch to Close Air Support (CAS) for the ROK units along the DMZ. However, as its combat radius is only 195 miles (with a 5200-pound ordnance load, max fuel, and two Sidewinders), it would have to be forward deployed to another base. Most likely it would be held in reserve in case of a breakthrough. If there was a breakthrough, the role may change to Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) to attack any tanks or moving armored columns. (NOTE: North Korean strategy is to win WITHOUT the benefit of air superiority. The Korean People's Army (KPA) is structured and deployed on the primacy of the offense of its ground forces in what would be primarily a ground war. Its strategy and tactics are built on the key concepts of combined-arms offensive operations, battlefield mobility, flexibility, and the integration of conventional and unconventional warfare. Mass, mobility, and firepower (combined with speed) are the three reinforcing elements. The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of allied defenses either before South Korea can fully mobilize its national power or before significant reinforcement from the United States can arrive and be deployed. The North Korean navy might attempt to insert amphibious-trained special operations forces on each coast or to secure the northern islands or support operations against the Kimp'o Peninsula. In addition, Scud and FROG missiles would be used during the assault to disrupt rear areas and C3I. After this, the North Korean Navy and Air Force will assume a defensive role.) Kunsan AB Strategic Defense: There has been a push in recent years to integrate the ROKAF operations into the USAF base defense plans. This push was brought about primarily by the worldwide reductions in US military manning. At the end of the runway on a hill known as "Big Coyote," the ROKAF maintained a Vulcan cannon as part of the Air Base Defense. In turn, the USAF provides stinger missile teams as an aircraft defense. The perimeter defense roles and other integrated functions will be exercised in local exercises. In the 1980s, the threat of an attack from North Korea remained ever present. The Scuds B and C have ranges of 210 miles and 310 miles, respectively and the capability for carrying chemical warheads. As a result, the possibility of chemical attacks were real, but in another sense Kunsan did think of them much as the did not have the range to touch Kunsan. Kunsan felt safe from Scud attack. Then in 1995, news of the deployment of the Rodong-1 intermediate range ballistic missile was released. Kunsan, which was previously outside of the effective range for the Scuds B/C, was now within the striking range of the Rodong-1 (No Dong 1) missiles. To offset concerns over possible missile attacks, Patriot missiles were deployed to Korea. Army Patriot Missile units of the 6th CAV 143rd ADA (Air Defense Artillery) were deployed to Kunsan and became responsible for the base's air defense against potential missile attacks from North Korea. (See Kunsan AB: 1994 The Patriot missiles performance has been widely criticized in the U.S. by military experts outside the DOD. A Russian article reiterates this concern. 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996), Mir Aviatsiyi (Aviation World) magazine, #14 (1997/2) issue, Authors: Vladislav Morozov, Sergey Uskov (Ufa, Russia), Translated by Aviapress (C) 1998, www.aviapress.com) states, "One shouldn't forget about "surface-to-surface" missiles of different types in the possession of the KPDR, many of them manufactured in North Korean factories. It was North Korean "Scuds" used by Saddam Hussein that the Americans and Israelis were frightened of during the Gulf War. Americans managed to shoot down only 10 percent of the "Scuds" launched with their brand-new "Patriot" missile system despite the fact that such launches were rare events." "We can imagine in how much trouble the US Air Defence system would have if the North Koreans ever did launch a massive air strike. It would make no difference whether the Americans were able to shoot down half of attacking obsolete North Koreans planes that are really ready for scrap yard. The other half of the NKAF at that time would still be able to reach American artillery positions, command posts, communication lines and shower them with old-fashioned, but nonetheless exploding, bombs or strafe with "ancient" unguided rockets and cannon fire." With the words of the above still ringing in one's ears, it is no wonder the US forces stepped up their chemical warfare training. Some missiles WILL get through. Some planes WILL get through. The North Koreans have simply an overwhelming superiority in numbers -- even if it is obsolete junk. Differences between USAF and ROKAF Perspectives on War Preparations:The USAF personnel intensified their chemical warfare training in 1994. However, the casual observers have noted that the ROKAF did NOT train in the same way. Though they exercise, they do not seem stress the chemical environment threat in the same manner as the Americans. A casual observer may say that the differences in their training emphasis is because of costs. Chem-warfare suits and gear are very expensive. However, we believe, it is more a matter of perspective. First, the USAF forces train for war...THE ROKAF IS AT WAR. To be more specific, the Republic of Korea NEVER signed the Armistice agreement in 1953. The US (Gen. Mark Clark for the UN Command), North Korea and China did. The South Korean viewpoint is that technically a state of war still exists between the two countries...though it did agree to a cease-fire. As a result, the outlook of how to pursue the conflict is different. Though one may argue that the ROKAF are technically under the UN Command in case of war, the reality is that Korea has its own agenda. There are numerous instances in recent years where the Republic of Korea has pursued its own goals (pursuant to its national or personal interests) rather follow the wishes of the U.S. commander. The reminders are still fresh of when Chun Doo-hwan removed the troops to effect his coup in 1979 or when he used the ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) troops to suppress the Kwangju Uprising in 1980. The CFC was established as an integrated command to develop mutual balanced security cooperation between the United States and South Korean forces. From South Korea, A Country Study, by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1981 states (p284) "The United States expressed great displeasure during the December 1979 military coup when then Major General Chun, without authorization of the CFC Commander, moved combat troops from their positions north of Seoul into the capital. Chun's act and the response by Washington indicated perhaps how seriously both sides viewed the combined command. One justification seen by the United States for continuing to exercise operational control over South Korean forces was the possibility of tempering responses to North Korean provocations, as it had done after the 1976 tree-cutting incident in the DMZ involving the ax-murders of two United States officers. The CFC appeared to be one way to improve South Korean command abilities while satisfying both Washington's desire to retain ultimate control and Seoul's desire to ensure the maintenance of a United States presence." Though there is a lot of talk of the U.S. and Koreans fighting "shoulder-to-shoulder," the bottom line is that the U.S. does NOT wish South Korea to have an aggressive war-fighting capability. It only wishes it to have a defensive capability. In a confrontation (such as the Pueblo incident), the U.S. has consistently backed-off as it does NOT want a war. On the other hand, the Korean forces in a confrontation are not afraid to resort to arms -- as it did in a recent 1999 naval clash between North and South Korean forces. This aim to have an offensive capability for Korea has always been espoused starting from the earliest days of the Syngman Rhee regime. However, Korea didn't have much choice in the past as the U.S. was its primary arms supplier and financial supporter. But this is going to change. Korea realizes that it is at a disadvantage with its neighbors in any territorial dispute -- and all of its borders with Japan, China and North Korea are in dispute. It realizes that its KF-16 can remain over Tok-do Island -- a key territorial fishing area disputed by the Japanese -- for only 10-15 minutes and its "coastal" navy could not compete with the Japanese in a territorial dispute. The Korean Navy joined in the RimPac 2000 activities as a precursor to its goal to become a "blue-water navy" and continues to launch their own submarines. Korea is undergoing the building of its own next-generation fighter aircraft. These are precursor clues that Korea will pursue their own independent goals -- no longer following U.S. demands. The U.S. will come to its defense...not because Korea asks for its aid, but because it is now in America's geoeconomic interests to do so.  ROKAF F-16Cs over Dokdo -- disputed territorial island that has become a national symbol. Second, it deals with how South Koreans view the North Korean threat of biological and chemical weapons. Most Koreans feel deeply that the North Koreans would never use these types of weapons of mass destruction (chemical/biological) against fellow Koreans. If a Korean unit prepares to stay alive in a chemical environment, it accepts the fact that all Korean civilians around them (without the proper gear) will die. This thought is unacceptable. To use such a weapon against one's brother (as Koreans view each other) would reduce the user to being an animal and a sub-human monster. It is an abhorrent thought. This is not to say that the Korean military doesn't believe that chemical weapons will be used. In fact, they agree that it will be used in the initial phases against American bases. The Koreans have also had many well-publicized decontamination exercises with their American counterparts. But one still gets a lot of mixed signals. It is sort of like the people practicing a task, but not really believing that they will ever use it. Most U.S. military experts feel that the North Koreans will use non-persistent chemical weapons as a FIRST weapon of choice to disorient and disrupt allied defenses. However, persistent chemical weapons may be used against airbases. (NOTE: "Persistence" has more to do with how long the agent is effective rather than its lethal potential (incapacitating versus blood agents). Thus a major port like Pusan would have to practice decontaminating the port facilities as the agents would persist. However, a battle field corridor would want non-persistent agents that would dissipate quickly allowing the North's forces to pass through.) In a paper about Operations Plan 5027 (CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027) under "Special Weapons Doctrine" it stated, DPRK chemical weapons would compliment conventional military power. In a surprise attack, DPRK forces are expected to use chemical weapons to demoralize defending forces, reduce their effectiveness, and deny use of mobilization centers, storage areas, and military bases without physically destroying facilities and equipment. Non-persistent chemical agents could be used to break through defensive lines or to hinder a CFC counterattack. Persistent chemical agents could be used against fixed targets in rear areas, including command and control elements, major LOCs, logistic depots, airbases, and ports." What this means is that PERSISTENT chemicals may be the weapon of choice against Kunsan AB. However, one gets mixed signals from casual observations of the ROKAF at Kunsan. It appears that the ROKAF does not exercise with the same intensity as the USAF in dealing with the chemical threat. One gets the impression that the ROKAF doesn't seem to view the chemical threat in the same manner as the US Forces. Much like the biological threat of anthrax. The U.S. forces in Korea must mandatorily receive anthrax shots, but the ROKAF receives none. If the anthrax threat is so real, shouldn't both forces receive the shots? One questions why the two allied forces -- facing the same threat -- are doing things so differently. We do not have the answers. The paper about OPlan 5027 continued, "It is likely that chemical weapons would be used early in the conflict, rather than held in strategic reserve. Virtually every stage of US military operations would be made more complicated by the requirement to operate after the use of chemical weapons, beginning with deploying through vulnerable ports and staging facilities. Far from being weapons of last resort, chemical weapons may be a weapon of first resort." This is a major concern to the U.S. as it can easily lead to the opening up Pandora's box. Threats of biological/nuclear agents against U.S. bases in Japan would force a reaction by Japan...or even worse a nuclear response by the U.S. Third -- and most important point -- is that most Americans don't understand is that they are planning their offensive strategies in another person's homeland. The American forces are keyed in on the OPlan 5027 "Destruction Phase" with a goal of terminating the North Korea regime, rather than simply forcing the North Korean forces back across the Truce Line. This "destruction phase" of operations would include the US invasion of North Korea, the destruction of the Korean Peoples Army and the North Korean government in Pyongyang. US troops would occupy North Korea and "Washington and Seoul" will then abolish North Korea as a state and "reorganize" it under South Korean control. That's all fine to say, but what if there's not much left of South Korea to "reorganize" North Korea under? A few years back US analysts predicted that in case of a new war Pyongyang would be defeated, but only "after a bloodbath that would destroy the whole peninsula". Would the U.S. plot the same strategies to "Take it to the North" if the conflict centered in Minnesota, USA against Canada? Probably not. The key point that Americans don't realize when they talk of confronting North Korea is that any battle will pitch Korean against Korean on Korean homelands. The Americans may lose some lives, but the Koreans will lose their homeland.
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