HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE OTHER UNITS (1951-1954) 76th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Battalion (AW) (SP) (Aug 51-Sept 53) 30th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Battalion (Sep 53-Sept 54)

POW Rememberance Award Snyper (NR)

POW/MIA Award POW Forum (NR)

The 76th AAA Arrives in Korea (Aug 50):

Another man was Jack R. Hayne, Capt, USA (Ret). Jack wrote, "I was a relatively new 2nd Lt. (Graduated the year before from the USMA, West Point, NY). As you realize, the battalion was at that time mostly black."

"We had 4 white (W) officers and 2 black (B) officers as follows: Btry Cmdr, Captain William J. Sandercock (W); Exec O, lst Lt. William Shugert (W); 1st Plt Ldr, 1st Lt. Lonnie Harrington (B); Asst Plt Ldr 2nd Lt. Bill Proctor (B); 2nd Plt Ldr, 2nd Lt. Jack Hayne (W); Asst Plt Ldr, 2nd Lt. George Armitage (W)."

"My platoon Sgt was Sgt Coy R. Morris and he was one of the best. 1st Sgt was MSgt Eddie Macklin and Motor Sgt was MSgt Curry. All top notch. One of my Section Leaders was Sgt Thesaloneus E. McLaine. Hope I spelt it correctly."

"I spent one year in the 76th. I joined the outfit in Japan after flying from Washington State to Elmdorf AFB in Alaska to the island of Shemya in the Aleutians. Four days after joining D Battery, 76th, we were on LST's on the way to Korea." He continued, "The entire battalion moved from Yokota AFB or Shoa-ma (this is a bit fuzzy) to Yokohama and boarded four LST's. It took several days to get to Pusan. After arrival, the orders came down from BN that D Btry was to move up to K2 Air base (Taegu AB) on the perimeter."

"You must realize that we had the Quad 50s and 40mm guns mounted on ancient half-tracks that dated back to the WWII invasion of Leyte and Mindanao. My job was to bring up the rear and make sure all the vehicles made it to K2 (Taegu). Needless to say, I came in 3 days later. Battalion and the remaining batteries stayed in Pusan or K-9. It will be soon seen that D Battery always led the way."

Taegu: September 1950: "Upon arrival at K2 (Taegu) we found M55's left behind by Detachment X of the 507th AAA Bn. The M55 consists of a Quad 50 turret mounted on a small trailer on doughnut size wheels. We were able to put them to good use. We did not experience any enemy infiltration during this time at K2. However, we did have to provide one section to protect 5th Airforce and 8th Army HQ in Taegu. While there the Hq was strafed by an aircraft and our guns shot up the tail section of the plane. It turned out to be one of our planes, an F82 Nightfighter, and it was all a mistake. I believe the pilot was taken off flight status."

"Between September 6 and 14 (1950) I provided two Quad 50 half-tracks to escort a Engineer convoy from Taegu to Pohang-dong on the East Coast. The convoy was ambushed around Kyongju and one half-track was hit with a North Korean (NK) shell between the cab and the gas tank and fortunately did not explode. We sustained one injury and lost one vehicle. The NK had broken through our thinly spread out line of infantry... elements of the 7th Cav and Item Company of the 21st Infantry Regiment. Item Company commanded by 1st Lt. Gib Gibson & 3rd Platoon by 2nd Lt. Harry Maihafer."

"The aircraft at K2 were WWII P-51 "Mustangs" and they were kept flying all day. The aircraft would fly from K9, Pusan AB, and strafe and napalm the ridges to the north of Taegu and K2. Then the planes would land at K2 to be refueled and rearmed. After that, the planes would take off and again strafe and bomb the ridges. This would go on for the entire day until close to sundown. After the last bomb run the aircraft would return to K9 Pusan for the night as it was considered too dangerous to remain at K2 for the night."

"I found an apple orchard outside our perimeter and was able to purchase a laundry bag of delicious apples for our unit. Korea is noted for excellent apples. On my return to Korea in October 1998, I returned to K2 and was escorted around the base by Korean air force personnel. I looked for my CP and the location of our gun positions but nothing looked familiar. When I mentioned the apple orchard, the Korean staff Sergeant said that it was now part of the air base and we were standing in the middle of it."

"September 14th or 15th my interpreter, Kim Jung Ku, told me of the Inchon invasion and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter as heard on the Korean commercial radio station. Nothing official had come down through channels until much later. It didn't take too long before D Battery was told to move North to Kimpo AB, K-14 and Battalion moved up to K2."

After the Pusan Breakout the unit moved to Seoul. Jack Hayne later wrote, "I guess it was the end of September or the beginning of October (probably Oct.) we received orders to move north. We moved up through Kimchon, Okchon, Taejon, Chochi'won and Suwon to Kimpo AB, K-14. It was quite a trip with our old 1/2 tracks, trucks and jeeps groaning all the way. Going through Taejon we got to see a T-34 tank on the side of the road and painted on the side was "This tank knocked out by General Dean". The general was captured by the NK and was a POW.

By the way, the Taejon prison compound was littered with hundreds of bodies of male South Korean civilians executed by the retreating North Koreans to keep them from being inducted into the ROK Army."

Invasion of North Korea

Seoul: October 1950: "Upon arrival at K14 I was assigned to take my platoon into Seoul to set up the air defense of the Korean parliament, the Blue House (Pres. Syngman Rhee's quarters), 8th Army and 5th Air Force Headquarters. Some task for a platoon of four 40 mm guns and four sets of quad-50. Well, we headed for Seoul and found the only bridge across the Han River -- an Engineer pontoon bridge. North Korean bodies were floating in the river against the bridge and all the other bridges were destroyed."

"I setup two 40 mm guns and two 50's around the Parliament and Blue House and the same around Army and Air Force Hqs with my command post (CP) setup in the gatehouse of a school not far from the Hqs. Not long after arrival in this location Kim Jung Ku was able to locate a bathhouse we could use. What a pleasure it was to be able to steep in that very hot water. During our stay in Seoul I was able to make a phone call back to the states to talk to my wife. It took three days to get the call through but persistence on my part made it possible. (Radar could always do it for the Colonel in Mash)."

"There were very few buildings over 2 stories high. The Parliament, telephone central, Seoul University and Hospital were exceptions. There were few if any retail stores. I guess I should mention that driving through the Korean countryside was something a nose would never forget since human waste was used as a fertilizer and the smell was deadly. It took some getting used to, but we got used to it. On my trip back to Korea with my son in 1998, I asked Rhee Young Chan about the absence of the odor and he answered, 'Oh, sir, now we use chemical fertilizers.'"

"As the commander of the only AAA outfit in Seoul, I became the Air Defense Commander of the city and as such had to report to 8th Army for the General's staff meetings. Picture this -- a lonely 2nd Lieutenant with a room full of field grade officers -- Lt. Colonels, bird colonels and generals. Needless to say, I kept my reports short and sweet, not wanting to put them all to sleep. Anyway, the air defense situation was quiet and "Bed Check Charlie" wasn't making any runs on the city at this time."

"While in Seoul I picked up a houseboy around 17 years old to help around the CP. Kim Jung Ku was officially my interpreter. It turned out that the houseboy came from middle to upper class family and my assistant platoon leader, Lt George Armitage and I were invited to his home for dinner. I can't remember the houseboy's name so let's call him Park. Park's mother apologized for not inviting us earlier but they had to cook meat from a tuberculin-tested cow. She explained that the chicken being served was from their own back yard and that they had taken great care preparing the rice and eggs having used boiled water in all their preparations."

"This was my first opportunity to eat Korean food and it was exceptionally good. Sake was served warm and everyone 'Dohzohed' each other and the proper response was 'Doh maree gato go zi eemas' in Japanese. I guess now it would be 'Komapsumniddah' Park and his younger brother played the violin and his sister did Korean dances. The family sang and we had an enjoyable evening sitting on the floor etc. Then it was time to leave and when I stood up I found out the effect of the Saki. Wow!!! My head was swimming."

"Well, George and I left late at night and that was a problem since 8th Army had set a curfew with no exceptions -- officers or enlisted. So here were two shavetails sneaking through back alleys to the CP. While traipsing through one alley I heard a challenge in Korean and what sounded like someone loading a round into the chamber of a rifle. George shouted 'Meegook sah rahm needah.' On hearing that, I slammed him to the ground, shielded his body with mine and said, 'You damn fool! Why did you say we are gooks??' "

"George's response was, 'For G-d's sake, Jack, get off me. Meegook is Korean for American.' It seems that when George was attending Princeton University, his girlfriend was Korean and he learned some of the language." (NOTE: "Megook saram" means American people. "Hangook saram" means Korean people. Some people say that this is where the derogatory term "gook" originated from.)

"After a few weeks in Seoul I met a professor of English at the University and he was also a businessman with a jewelry shop. Professor Lee had an excellent command of English. I asked him if he could sell me an emerald and indicated that it should be about twice the size of my thumbnail. Lee didn't have one that size but would check with his sources and let me know as soon as it arrives. The next day I received orders from the Battery Commander (BC) to prepare to move out. We were to move North to P'yong-yang, the NK capital. The emerald would have to wait. Now it was time to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea -- we would be on enemy soil and stretching our supply lines. That's when cigarettes became scarce and mail call did not occur often."

North Korea: November 1950: The unit took part in the drive into North Korea with the 8th Army. It first moved to Pyongyang then Sinanju on west coast, and finally pushing north to near the Yalu River. Jack Hayne wrote in the Korean War Project (KWP) about the early days of the 76th AAA AW Bn (SP). He wrote, "I was a platoon leader in D Btry from August 50 to Mar 51 when I became Btry Cmdr of Hq Btry for a couple of months until Capt. Wilbur Rawlins took over. D Btry had led the way for the Bn from the time we landed in Pusan and moved up to Taegu on the perimeter. From there we moved to Seoul, then Pyongyang (NK capital) and further north to Sinanju (K-29) airbase. Our next objective was K-30 at Sinuiju by the Yalu River but the Chinese put a crimp in that journey. I did reconnoiter to a few miles of K-30 when I noticed there wasn't any garbage such as candy wrappers, cigarette butts or tin cans littering the country side. That was enough to tell me that I was in advance of our infantry. So I told my driver and Kim that we had better "bug on out". A few days later the Chinese chased us out of the area." He mentions his loyal Korean friends - Kim Jung Ku and Rhee Young Chan. (Go to A TRIP BACK TO KOREA for a recount of Jack Hayne's trip to Korea where he is reunited with his old Korean friends.)

However, the Chinese entered the fray with Mao Tse-Tung's counteroffensive on November 25th. Three Volunteer armies -- equivalent to nine U.S. divisions -- suddenly attacked the western front. Caught in a trap, the 8th Army withdrew South in what was termed a "mobile defense" strategy . The 76th was among the last elements in the columns protecting the rear. Ed Moyaghn of the 90th Bomb Squadron said, "I remember asking how fast their halftracks would go & got this answer " the Army say 40 MPH but when we were bugging out from up north we got 60MPH & our 40mm cranked down over the back firing like the 50s" don't know if that was true but that's what I was told." Everything was chaotic as the Chinese pushed the 8th Army out of North Korea. This is a great story, but unfortunately it is not true. Though there are documented stories of Quad-50s firing point-blank into oncoming Chinese until they were unuseable during the Chosin battle, the 76th AAA was not one of those units. Jack Hayne loved this tale and actually had second-thoughts of correcting the material as this tale is what legends are made of.

However, for the sake of historical accuracy, we have included Jack's comments. "I read Ed's quote about the withdrawal from the north after the Chinese entered the war Nov. 25, 1950. They were in action as early as October. In his quote the person he spoke to said that their half-tracks did "60 mph & our 40 mm cranked down over the back firing like the 50s". Sounds good but not likely. My jeep, my driver PFC Lee, Kim and I were the last vehicle of D Battery, 76th AAA out of Sinanju, K-29. Not a shot was fired. Believe me... not a shot was fired. As for doing 60 MPH... have you ever witnessed a convoy going at that speed?"

Retreat to Seoul: December 1950: By December 13th, the bulk of the Eight Army had withdrawn south of the 38th parallel. Strangely there was no pursuit by the Chinese which confused the demoralized forces. They set up a defensive position on the Imjin River, some thirty miles north of Seoul. But it was simply a lull in the battle. The Chinese were simply regrouping for another attack on 1 Jan with 230,000 volunteers and 70,000 North Koreans. On 3 Jan the 8th Army under Gen Ridgeway initiated a "retrograde movement" (withdrawal) from Seoul. Luckily, the Chinese decided not to pursue the attack, rather opting to pull back and rest for two months for the March spring offensive.

During the Second through Sixth Chinese Offensives, the battles raged between Pyongtaek and Seoul in the west; and Kangnung, South Korea and Kangsong, North Korea in the west. The front was in a constant state of flux.

Main Line of Resistance Stabilizes: May 1951: It soon became evident to the Chinese that they were not going to be able to win the quick victory they had initially anticipated. But by the same token, the U.S. had decided early on that they were willing to settle for a stalemate -- containing the war to Korea -- with a negotiated peace settlement. By May 51, the battleline had settled along the 38th parallel.

Elements of the 76th AAA Battalion Split:

Elements of 76th AAA Btn Stationed on Cho-do (K-54): In addition, some 76th AAA Btn batteries appear to have been dispersed to outlying islands as well. Richard Lamar wrote in the KWP, that in the 1952-1953 time frame "I was a Sgt in communications..and remember that we were on an island in support of the Air Force." He later wrote in an email, "The battery I was assigned to was on an island in the bay of the North Korean Capital...Pyongyang." This was the island of Cho-do (K-54) which was close to the west coast of the North Korean mainland near the mouth of the Chinampo River in North Korea. It supported the operations of the 6004th AISS. Because of its location 50 miles north of the 38th parallel, those stationed on this island received special combat pay. The Ground Control Intercept (GCI) squadron was tasked with vectoring bomber aircraft to targets within North Korea on their night-time missions or fighter aircraft to intercepts with enemy aircraft. "I know that in the winter all the water was frozen. Our mission was to protect the Air Force radar site. We had a beach landing strip which was used by Air Force planes which were in distress. Also many pilots bailed out over our island. The Air Force did have a rescue helicopter unit on the island -- H-19 helicopters." Earlier in the war, there were Sikorsky H-5A helicopters here. If a B-29 was crippled and had to ditch, it would immediately attempt to head to Cho-do...usually with enemy aircraft not far behind trying to pick off these crippled aircraft before they reached Cho-do. Cho-do was also a frequent target of the "Bedcheck Charlie" heckler -- a Popov Po-2 biplane -- especially in the later days of the war. Dropping hand-held bombs, it unsuccessfully tried to disable the GCI operations.

By October 1951, General Ridgeway stated that the war "could be construed as a military stalemate. It all depends on how you look at it." While both sides haggled over the truce agreement, there were 60,000 UNC battle casualties -- of which 22,000 were American. U.N. forces continued fighting for worthless real estate such as Heartbreak Ridge. Finally, the truce talks moved to Panmunjom, but the war dragged on. It was now a war of attrition and trench warfare. On November 26, 1951 they drew the military line of demarcation at the 38th parallel. A relative calm had fallen on the battlefield...and no new offensives were planned to gain territory in North Korea.

Although the Communists had been forced to concede on the 38th parallel, their clever delaying tactics had given them time to construct a fairly impregnable defense line across Korea making it difficult for UN forces to keep exerting effective military pressure on the ground. The war had become a matter of trench warfare along the DMZ.

Air Defense Policy for Anti-aircraft Artillery:

The U.S. Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p430) states, "On August 1950 Generals Vandenberg and Collins formally agreed that an Air Force air-defense commander would exercise operational control over antiaircraft artillery "insofar as engagement and disengagement of fire is concerned." In the Far East antiaircraft artillery battalions deployed to Korea were assigned to the Eighth Army, but Far East Command operations instructions vested the air-defense commander with "operational control" over all separate (nondivisional) antiaircraft artillery units." The 76th AAA at K-8 was considered a "nondivisional" unit. This means that the unit fell under the command of the 3rd Wing Commander as an FEAF asset.

Arrival at Kunsan Air Base: June 1951

Initially there was no AAA protection for the base due to the limited amounts of AAA units at the start of the war. The 76th AAA did not arrive until the 3rd Bomb Wing was set to start operations. Thus elements of the 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion (SCARWAF) assumed the duty. Bruce B. Satra of Vernal, Utah was a former SSgt with H&S Co, 808th EAB wrote, "This was several months into our efforts there--we had four half tracks as I remember, one had a single barrel 40 mm AA gun, the others had quad mounts of .50 cal Brownings in what must have been a modified aircraft turret, it had no plexiglas dome but otherwise was as in an airplane with the 4 .50's air cooled--big problem. Our half tracks couldn't make 150-200 mph down hill and that's what the guns needed to cool the barrels. We were told to hold it to three round bursts, not easy unless you're really skilled. We burned out a few barrels early on."

"The truck had a Briggs and Stratton engine mounted behind the turret, driving a hydraulic pump that operated the turret's rotation and elevation mechanism to train the guns, worked really nicely. I could start the little engine usually within two pulls cold--very unusual in those days."

"We had men on rotation doing duty on the half tracks for air defense and it cut into our work schedules as these would be grader operators, truck drivers, heavy equipment operators etc., so finally they sent in a colored AA outfit, I never learned their strength whether company, battalion or what, nor their unit designation."

"We didn't mix with them at all, I think the feeling of distaste was mutual. They would show up at the Red Cross tent where we could buy coffee and doughnuts ( at stateside prices and made with donated flour etc--I saw the boxes) and freeze us out. I would have cheerfully shot one or more of them given the chance---seriously---we were kind of on edge by then. I was brought up to not be prejudiced in regard to race, etc. but in trying circumstances it's surprising what you'll do." (SITE NOTE: There was a lot of tension within the 76th AAA and reports of open defiance of orders at times. President Truman had signed the integration order for the military in 1949, but the Army was very slow to implement the order. The negro troops within the Army felt deep resentment -- and after a negro infantry unit deserted their positions on the frontlines, the Army did not trust the negro units -- nor the negro leadership of these units. Many of the 76th AAA NCOs were negro, though the officers were white. As a result of the distrust of negros in command, the Army "integrated" by promoting relatively young WHITE NCOs and replacing the black NCOs. After "integration", there appeared to no further racial problems. To this day, the Army's discriminatory practices of judging negros as only suitable for low-level jobs such as laundry and food services, AAA units or infantry foot-soldiers is used as an example of institutionalized discrimination. The USAF on the other hand did not have this problem and integrated their units starting in 1949 -- but the USAF also set higher standards for enlistment thus negros entering the USAF were college-graduate officers and individuals with high school diplomas.)

In June 1951, elements of the 76th AAA were assigned to Kunsan AB (K-8) to protect the runway and aircraft of the 3rd Bomb Wing.

One of the most unlikely sources of information of the 76th AAA in the early days came from "Mike" Lee, the long-time Kunsan AB Hobby Shop Supervisor. His story begins in Kaesong, North Korea where he was orphaned during the allied push north where remembered the bombs falling everywhere. He was adopted by the GIs at Kaesong, but when the Chinese entered the fray in Dec 1950, he fell back with them to Kimpo Airport. He remembered the sounds of bombs landing very close by as the Chinese closed in on Seoul. The 6467th "Comm Squadron" rescued him and evacuated him to Taegu. He remembered helping fix their radios. When the Chinese were pushed back out of Seoul he moved with the unit to Pyongtaek. There he was sent to an orphanage but soon "attached" himself to the 76th AAA Battery B. The unit moved south to K-8 and he came along. The section he was with in Battery B was positioned on the south end of the base near the present C-pad.

Though many names came and went over the course of the war, he remembers the following names of some men from the B-Battery because they saved his life. The names are: Sgt Boseman (Tennessee); Sgt Sutton (Indiana); Sgt Carroway (Texas); and Lt. Coolridge. He got sick and was sent to the International Orphanage downtown -- that still exists today -- and there he came in contact with Dr. McGurry of Miami, Florida. The doctor wanted to adopt him legally, but problems at home prevented it. Mike's story goes on, but the bottom line is that A devout Christian he praises God for his salvation but thanks the GIs for his survival.

Aircrews report that the unit was already in-place at Kunsan when their aircraft arrived in June 1951.

3rd Bomb Wing Aircraft Arrive: August 1951: By August 1951, the construction had progressed far enough that the 3rd Bomb Wing was assigned to the base from Iwakuni, Japan. On August 22, 1951 the 3rd Bombardment Wing finally moved to the base as Kunsan's first assigned aircraft wing. However, when the first aircraft of the 3rd Bomb Wing touched down at Kunsan in August 1951, elements of the 76th AAA) Btn were already in place. It is assumed that they were assigned to the base in July 1951 when the 3rd Bomb Wing received its movement orders.

Ed Moyaghn recalls that the 76th AAA halftracks were just down from where they parked their aircraft temporarily on the old Japanese sod airstrip. Ed remembered that the 76th was a "colored" anti-aircraft unit with white officers at the time. The unit consisted of Self Propelled (SP) "Quad-50s" (four 50 cal. machine guns on a half-track) and Automatic Weapons (AW) 40mm cannons. Ed wrote "...about Aug 51 we left Iwakuni, flew a mission & landed at K-8 [ my first time ] our parking area [ 90th ] was on the far side of the runway on the old Japanese runway [ grass/mud ] dark. Right next to the parking area was a Army halftrack with Quad 50s, that was my first contact with the 76th. We were assigned parking & maint. out there for two or three mos. until the PSP for us was done, so we got to know some of the guys."

VMF(N)-513 and 474th FBW Arrives: April-July 1952: In April 1952, the 3rd Bomb Wing was joined by a squadron of Marine nightfighers (F4U-5Ns and F7F-3Ns), the VMF(N)-513 "Flying Nightmares" who flew night missions alongside the 3rd BW. The airfield started to become congested. Then in July 1952, the 474th Fighter Bomber Wing arrived with its F-84s and flew primarily daylight missions. After this round-the-clock operations were flown from the base. The flightline area where the 76th AAA was primarily situated became that much more congested -- and more dangerous.

Overall Air-Defense Plan: June 1952: In June 1952 General Clark approved an automatic-weapons battalion at Kunsan as part of an overall air-defense plan for Kimpo, Suwon, Pusan, Inchon and Kunsan. As of June 1952 there were only four gun battalions and four automatic-weapons battalions in Korea for Air Defense.

The antiaircraft emplacements were primarily along the length of east-west runway in built-up earthen emplacements. The bulk of the AAA emplacements were interspersed near to the aircraft parking areas. The bulk of the positions were in the large open areas between the taxiway and the main runway. The other batteries were on the perimeter of the base. (Go to the Korean War Reference Page and refer to the handdrawn 1952 maps of Kunsan AB for details)

Bobby White wrote in an email, "The positions were around the perimeter of the base. Our position was a Quad 50 and there was a 40 MM position 150-200 yards from us and the rest were a ways from us." He wrote in the Korean War Project, "I was in 2nd platoon Btry D 76th AAA Aw Bn (SP) at K-8 Kunsan Air Base from July 1952 to the middle of January 1953. I was Squad leader of position Dog 222. This was a Quad 50 Cal machine gun mounted on a half-track. The names of the people in this squad were Farrill, Makela, Climpson, Cuevas and White. The best I remember our position was at the southern end of the runway, and to the west a few yards just inside the fence by the Yellow Sea." This would place this unit south of the Marine MGCIS-1 who were also on the shoreline and behind the 8th Bomb Squadron B-26 parking area. In the winter this would have been a very miserable position as the sea spray would freeze on one's clothes and wind chill factors would easily have the men operating in below-zero temperatures.

As most antiaircraft positions were located between the runway and taxiway, the soldiers had to cross the PSP taxiway to get to their mess/billeting area. According to Jack Kio, a Marine with the VMF(N)-513, one of the men from the 76th AAA was hit by a Marine F7F Tigercat as the individual attempted to cross the taxiway. Operations at night were extremely hazardous for ground personnel as Marines did such strange things as removing their landing lights to reduce aircraft weight to get an edge in combat -- and they didn't use the lights on takeoff to preserve their night vision. But to anyone on the ground in darkness, it would be hard to judge distances to a moving aircraft.

Air Raid Drills: Early 1952: In the early days of the war, the Communists periodically tested the air-defense systems with low-level, moonlight-flying Po-2 hecklers (Bed Check Charlie). In 1952, numerous vets at Kunsan commented on the air raid drills and the "colorful fireworks displays" when Bed Check Charlie paid visits. Shooting down one of these planes was next to impossible though some of the Marine VMF(N)-513 had some successes shooting some down. Later on the threat from the PO2 at Kunsan virtually disappeared as the aircraft concentrated on closer targets such as Kimpo Airfield or Cho-do island.

Jim Heath of the 809th EAB remarked, "We also dug slit trenchs in back of the tents that were used during the air raids when Bed Check Charlie disturbed our sleep. We were not to far from the runway." Slit trenches were everywhere and were used whenever there was an air-raid drill.

Initially there was a great fear that the Chinese would attack from the air. However, this type of attack never did materialize though numerous drills were conducted at Kunsan in case of this eventuality. The sounding of different 40-mm automatic weapon bursts were supposed to be used as signals of the type of an impending air raid or attack. There was a pre-designated signal system using the firing off of shells at specific intervals and numbers to indicate what type of attack was expected. In conjunction with the air raid warnings, the 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion (EAB - SCARWAF) was tasked with beefing up the perimeter ground defense in the event of an attack. Air raid drills at night provided a memorable aerial fireworks display.

John W. Colburn of the 76th AAA (1952-1953) commented, "The "air raid drills" referred to actually "barrage fire" missions where all the 40mm guns were elevated to 200 mils (11.25 degrees) and the quad .50s were elevated to 300 mils (16.9 degrees). Each weapon revetment had 16 numbered stakes around it, and the weapons were pointed over the designated stake at the same azimuth. The stakes may be seen in the picture of the quad .50 at the beginning of the history."

John continued, "At the command to fire, each 40mm gun would fire 40 rounds of high-explosive tracer ammunition at the automatic rate of 120 rounds per minute and the quad .50s would fire 200 rounds with each of the four guns as a single burst. With a theoretical 32 weapons firing tracer ammunition and the 40mm rounds bursting at about 5000 yards, it made quite a show. In theory, the weapons were pointed at the approaching hostile aircraft, which would fly into the mass of metal thrown in front of it. During the period I was with the 76th, we never fired a shot at a hostile aircraft."

Distasteful FEAF Bugout Plan: Early 1952: In early 1952, there appears to have been some friction between the USAF and other services over the distasteful FEAF (Far East Air Force) policy to make the Marines and Army "the last man out" in case of a "bugout" -- a withdrawal in the event of the base was about to be overrun. During early 1952, the fear was that the Chinese could possibly overrun the peninsula. Contingency plans were drawn up for the Marine and Army ground units to fall back to Taegu/Pusan, while Air Force units would evacuate all its forces by air to Japan.

At Kunsan, the plan called for the Marines (VMF(N)-513 ground support personnel) and Army units (808th EAB (SCARWAF) and 76th AAA ) to fight a delaying action until all USAF personnel had departed for Japan. After the USAF were safe, the remaining Marine/Army troops would fight their way out on foot. Needless to say, this policy did not sit well with the Marines and Army personnel. The Marines (with their own air resources) formulated their own contingency plans. However, the Army (without their own air assets) had no choice but to simply pass this distasteful policy on to their troops.

Remember that the 76th AAA was a "nondivisional" asset and fell under the FEAF directives. Luckily the bugout policy never had to be tested. As the threat from the Communist Chinese stalemated into a trench-warfare battle on the Main Line of Resistance (MLR), Kunsan no longer felt threatened and this "bugout" policy was soon shelved.

Integration in the Colored Units:

Though the 76th AAA Bn had distinguished itself in battle, all "colored" units were lumped together with the disgraced "colored" 24th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). In The Battle of the Pusan Perimeter by B.L.Kortegaard it stated, "The NK simply crushed 24id's 34th Regiment, overwhelming them with numbers, better equipment, and better fighting ability. When this became generally known, the fighting spirit of other US units was sometimes hard to find. The most serious example was 25id's unreliable all-Black 24th Infantry Regiment. 24th Infantry coined the term "Bug Out" and illustrated it, as around Sangju where 24th units abandoned their machine guns and mortars without being attacked. Exposing the flanks of adjacent regiments without warning offered the enemy access around our front lines, endangering all Eighth Army. At Muchon-ni, 3/24 ran so far and so fast their battalion commander needed a full day to find them again (4 miles to the rear at Haman). When our disciplined, competent 27th Infantry re-captured positions fled by 2/24, they found the battalion's abandoned crew-served weapons still in place." (NOTE: Pfc William Thompson of 3/24 Heavy Weapons manned his machine gun alone until he was killed -- although his whole battalion had fled. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.)

After the 24th RCT incident, the Army moved swiftly to replace black NCOs with white ones in the "colored" units. The Army unfairly branded all "colored" units as unfit with a broad sweep of the brush. Many colored units who fought bravely in the Korean War were unfairly maligned and to this day, the fight has raged on to clear these units' war records. (NOTE: See Army: Racism played role in all-black unit's failure and The Last Black Combat Unit Of The US Army Fights Alongside The Last Black 24th Infantry Regiment for further details of this struggle.)

Remember that during the Korean War period, there was still racial prejudice within the military establishment. Though President Truman had signed an executive order in Oct 1946 to desegregate the armed forces, it was did not become an actuality for ALL services until President Kennedy took office. For example, only a few years before during the Occupation years from 1945-1948, Camp Hillenmeyer (later K-8) was a segregated Army base with the blacks serving as cooks and laundrymen who lived separately from the whites. In 1950, America was still immersed in segregation. For the Army, segregation ended in 1951.

Studies of the times indicates that there was an institutional mindset in the Army in dealing with "colored" draftees during the Korean War. Many felt the "colored" troops were fit only for low-skill specialties such as cooks or anti-aircraft batteries. This mindset reached to the highest levels of military leadership.

While blacks had served in every American war, they had not fought along side of whites with any great frequency. At the start of the Korean War, even the Marines were reluctant to incorporate blacks into their fighting units. However, by the end of the war Marines were integrated and non-discriminatory -- each man was just a Marine.

As to the USAF at Kunsan AB, the "colored" troops were fully integrated into the Air Force units (both as officers and enlisted). However, the blacks kept a very low profile. They were a minute percentage of the total base population. However, the senior NCOs were sensitive to the racial issues and would ask enlisted whites if they would mind being trained by a black before being placed under them. The majority of whites didn't care -- as long as the black was competent in his field. As far as we know there were no complaints about the quality of work or performance of duty by any black airman.

Initial Integration of the 76th AAA: August 1952

Bobby White wrote, "I was among the first group of whites to integrate the unit the last of July or first of Aug. 1952. My First Sgt. was colored and all the officers that I saw were white. I was the first white in my squad of six and when I left we were all white except one. The 40 MM position was still all colored. I don't know how the rest of the positions were." Bobby continued, "I didn't hear of any problems while I was there."

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