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HOW IT WAS!

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KUNSAN AIRBASE

(1945-1952)

Cholla Province Korean War History (1950-1952)

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Invasion at Inchon

Pusan Perimeter Breakout, Inchon Invasion and Push North

But for all the subterfuge, it is now known that China's Mao Tse-Tung had warned North Korea's Kim Il-Sung that MacArthur would probably land at Inchon on September 15...but Kim Il-Sung disregarded this warning.

On September 15, 1950 the US 1st Marine Division, ROK marines and army troops led the "surprise" attack at Inchon. Despite this lack of secrecy, the landing met with little resistance and was resounding success with few casualties. As word of this spread to the North Korean forces, their forces completely shattered. On September 18, the U.N. broke out of the Pusan Perimeter. By September 23 the NKPA (Inmun Gun) was everywhere in full retreat. US, ROK, and UN forces launched counterattacks against the North Korean forces from the Pusan Perimeter in order to link with the UN forces at Seoul and Inchon.

The Allied Forces Press the Attack at Kunsan

Prior to the Invasion at Kunsan, the FEAF attacked targets in a 30-mile around Kunsan as part of the diversionary feint. However, after the Invasion at Inchon the NKPA went into full retreat. The 3rd Bomb Group with its B-26s and F-84 Thunderjet fighter-bombers attacked targets to block the retreat and trap the NKPA mechanized units. With most of the bridges destroyed, the NKPA finally abandoned there vehicles and heavy artillery and melted into the mountains to become guerrilla units.

In The Sea War in Korea (p108) talks of naval shellings in the Kunsan area at the end of September, "As the complexion of the war on the peninsula shifted from the defense to offense, from positional warfare to pursuit, UN naval forces kept the enemy under constant blockade, surveillance, and bombardment whenever possible. However, only a few of the ships were fortunate enough to have shooting assignments. Canada's Athabaskan and Australia's destroyer Bataan took potshots at enemy hideouts in the Kunsan area."

Trapped between the anvil of X Corps on the north and the hammer of the Eight Army smashing upward from the south, not more than 25,000 survivors of the Inmun Gun (KNPA) were able to retreat north of the 38th parallel.

Details of the Breakout in the Cholla Region

Pusan Breakout
The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin
by Donald Knox (p354)

The following is excerpted from South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu.

On the day he assumed command of operational IX Corps, 23 September, General Coulter in a meeting with General Walker at the 25th Division command post requested authority to change the division's axis of attack from southwest to west and northwest. He thought this would permit better co-ordination with the 2d Division to the north. Walker told Coulter he could alter the division boundaries within IX Corps so long as he did not change the corps boundaries.

The change chiefly concerned the 27th Regiment which now had to move from the 25th Division's south flank to its north flank. General Kean formed a special task force under Capt. Charles J. Torman, commanding officer of the 25th Reconnaissance Company, which moved through the 27th Infantry on the southern coastal road at Paedun-ni the evening of the 23d. The 27th Regiment then began its move from that place to the division's north flank at Chungam-ni. The 27th Infantry was to establish a bridgehead across the Nam River and attack through Uiryong to Chinju.

On 23 September the 2d Division (Indianhead Division) reduced the stubborn roadblocks the fleeing enemy had thrown up about the town of Ch'ogye. And then, on the 24 September, the 38th Infantry Regiment (Rock of the Marne Regiment) swept north, the 23rd Infantry Regiment circled south, and both regiments linked up beyond the old NKPA command post at Hyopch'on. As the 38th blocked escape from the north, the 23d fought its way into the city. The NKPA flushed out of the city were slaughtered. 300 corpses littered the road. On 25 September the 38th moved northwest to Koch'ang (70 miles south of Kunsan) chasing the retreating NKPA 2d Division. In a few hours it had broken through the thin defensive crust of the enemy 2d Division and was in the NKPA artillery areas, overrunning guns, vehicles, and heavy equipment. They had killed more than 200 enemy soldiers, captured 450 more. They amassed a total of 10 motorcycles, nearly 20 trucks, 9 mortars, 14 AT guns, 4 howitzers, and 300 tons of ammunition. At this point, General Ch'oe, commanding the enemy division ordered all his vehicles and artillery abandoned, and then melted into the hills to become guerillas.

Task Force Blair and the Recapture of Kunsan

At Koch'ang the 38th captured a North Korean field hospital. They were advancing faster than the enemy could flee. Next they struck at Chonju, 72 miles away, on 28 September. The 2nd battalion leading, the 38th closed in on Chonju. There was a brief fight and 100 North Koreans were killed, and twice as many surrendered. However, at Chonju the 2d ID ran out of gas and had to wait for resupply. When Task Force Blair (3d Btn, 24th ID) under Maj Melvin R. Blair, arrived, he unhappily asked permission for units of the 24th ID (Taro Patch) to pass through the 38th's lines. After IX Corps rushed fuel forward, the 38th Infantry departed Chonju at 1530 on 29 September and proceeded to Nonsan and on to Kanggyong on the Kum River.

That evening Task Force Blair secured Iri. There, with the bridge across the river destroyed, Blair stopped for the night and Task Force Matthews (1st Btn, 24th ID) under the command of Capt Charles M. Matthews joined it. Kunsan, the port city on the Kum River estuary, fell to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, without opposition at 1300, 30 September.

Task Forces Mathews and Dolvin Recapture of Chinju, Hamyang and Namwon

On the morning of 24 September Task Force Torman attacked along the coastal road toward Chinju. North of Sach'on the task force engaged and dispersed about 200 enemy soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 104th Security Regiment. By evening it had seized the high ground at the road juncture three miles south of Chinju. The next morning the task force moved up to the Nam River bridge which crossed into Chinju. In doing so one of the tanks hit a mine and fragments from the explosion seriously wounded Captain Torman, who had to be evacuated.

Meanwhile, on the main inland road to Chinju the N.K. 6th Division delayed the 35th Infantry at the Chinju pass until the evening of 23 September, when enemy covering units withdrew. The next day the 35th Infantry consolidated its position at the pass. That night a patrol reported that enemy demolitions had rendered the highway bridge over the Nam at Chinju unusable.

On the strength of this information the 35th Regiment made plans to cross the Nam downstream from the bridge. Under cover of darkness at 0200, 25 September, the 2d Battalion crossed the river two and a half miles southeast of Chinju. It then attacked and seized Chinju, supported by tank fire from Task Force Torman across the river. About 300 enemy troops, using mortal and artillery fire, served as a delaying force in defending the town. The 3d and 1st Battalions crossed the river into Chinju in the afternoon, and that evening Task Force Torman crossed on an underwater sandbag ford that the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion built 200 yards east of the damaged highway bridge. Working all night, the engineers repaired the highway bridge so that vehicular traffic began crossing it at noon the next day, 26 September.

Sixteen air miles downstream from Chinju, near the blown bridges leading to Uiryong, engineer troops and more than 1,000 Korean refugees worked all day on the 25th constructing a sandbag ford across the Nam River. Enemy mortars fired sporadically on the workers until silenced by counterbattery fire of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion. Before dawn of the 26th the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, crossed the Nam. Once on the north bank, elements of the regiment attacked toward Uiryong, three miles to the northwest, and secured the town just before noon after overcoming an enemy force that defended it with small arms and mortar fire. The regiment pressed on to Chinju against negligible resistance on 28 September.

On 24 September Eighth Army had altered its earlier operational order and directed IX Corps to execute unlimited objective attacks to seize Chonju and Kanggyong. To carry out his part of the order, General Kean organized two main task forces with armored support centered about the 24th and 35th Infantry Regiments. The leading elements of these two task forces were known respectively as Task Force Matthews and Task Force Dolvin. Both forces were to start their drives from Chinju. Task Force Matthews, the left-hand column, was to proceed west toward Hadong and there turn northwest to Kurye, Namwon, Sunch'ang, Kumje, Iri, and Kunsan on the Kum River estuary. Taking off at the same time, Task Force Dolvin, the right-hand column, was to drive north out of Chinju toward Hamyang, there turn west to Namwon, and proceed northwest to Chonju, Iri, and Kanggyong on the Kum River.

Three blown bridges west of Chinju delayed the departure of Task Force Matthews (formerly Task Force Torman) until 1000, 27 September. Capt. Charles M. Matthews, commanding officer of A Company, 79th Tank Battalion, replaced Torman in command of the latter's task force after Torman had been wounded and evacuated. He led the advance out of Chinju with the 25th Reconnaissance Company and A Company, 79th Tank Battalion. The 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, followed Task Force Matthews, and the rest of the regiment came behind it. Matthews reached Hadong at 1730.

In a sense, the advance of Task Force Matthews (25th Rcn Co; A Co. 79th Tk Bn; a platoon of B Co, 67th Engr C Bn; an air TAC Party; and the medical section of the 27th Inf Regt.) became a chase to rescue a group of U.S. prisoners that the North Koreans moved just ahead of the pursuers. Korean civilians and bypassed enemy soldiers kept telling of them being four hours ahead, two hours ahead-but always ahead. At Hadong the column learned that some of the prisoners were only thirty minutes ahead. From Hadong, in bright moonlight, the attack turned northwest toward Kurye. About ten miles above Hadong at the little village of Komdu the advanced elements of the task force liberated eleven American prisoners. They had belonged to the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment. Most of them were unable to walk and some had open wounds.

(NOTE: There were three separate task forces in this movement: (1) TF Matthews which formed the point; (2) TF Blair, named after Maj Melvin R. Blair, CO 3d Bn, 24th Inf, which followed close behind Matthews; and (3) TF Corley, named for Col John T. Corley, CO 24th Inf Regt, which included the rest of the RCT, following TF Blair. See 24th Inf WD, 26-30 Sep 50: 3d Bn, 24th Inf Unit Rpt, 26-30 Sep 50.)

Just short of Namwon about noon the next day, 28 September, several vehicles at the head of the task force became stuck in the river crossing below the town after Sgt. Raymond N. Reifers in the lead tank of the 25th Reconnaissance Company had crossed ahead of them. While the rest of the column halted behind the stuck vehicles Reifers continued on into Namwon.

Entering the town, Reifers found it full of enemy soldiers. Apparently the North Koreans' attention had been centered on two F-84 jet planes that could be seen sweeping in wide circles, rocketing and strafing the town, and they were unaware that pursuing ground elements were so close. Surprised by the sudden appearance of the American tank, the North Koreans in wild disorder jumped over fences, scurried across roof tops, and dashed madly up and down the streets.

Reifers said later that the scene would have appeared ludicrous if his own plight had not been so precarious. Suddenly he heard American voices calling out, "Don't shoot! Americans! GI's here!" A second later a gateway leading into a large courtyard burst open and the prisoners-shouting, laughing, and crying-poured out into the street.

Back at the head of the stuck column, 1st Lt. Robert K. Sawyer over his tank radio heard Reifer's voice calling out, "Somebody get up here! I'm all alone in this town! It is full of enemy soldiers and there are American prisoners here." Some of the tanks and vehicles now pushed ahead across the stream. When Sawyer's tank turned into the main street he saw ahead of him, gathered about vehicles, "a large group of bearded, haggard Americans. Most were bare-footed and in tatters, and all were obviously half starved. We had caught up with the American prisoners," he said, "there were eighty-six of them."

(NOTE: Most of the official Army records erroneously give credit to TF Dolvin for liberating these prisoners. However, notes of participants leave no doubt that TF Matthews effected the liberation. TF Dolvin did not reach the outskirts of Namwon until midafternoon, about 1515, nearly three hours after TF Matthews had entered the town.)

Task Forces Matthews and Blair cleared Namwon of enemy soldiers. In midafternoon Task Force Dolvin arrived there from the east. Task Force Matthews remained overnight in Namwon, but Task Force Blair continued on toward Chongup, which was secured at noon the next day, 29 September. That evening Blair's force secured Iri. There, with the bridge across the river destroyed, Blair stopped for the night and Task Force Matthews joined it. Kunsan, the port city on the Kum River estuary, fell to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, without opposition at 1300, 30 September.

Eastward of and generally parallel to the course of Task Force Matthews and the 24th Infantry, Task Force Dolvin and the 35th Infantry moved around the eastern and northern sides of the all but impenetrable Chiri-san area, just as the 24th Infantry had passed around its southern and western sides. This almost trackless waste of 750 square miles of 6,000 to 7,000-foot-high forested mountains forms a rough rectangle northwest of Chinju about thirty by twenty-five miles in dimension, with Chinju, Hadong, Namwon, and Hamyang at its four corners. This inaccessible area had long been a hideout for Communist agents and guerrillas in South Korea. Now, as the North Korean forces retreated from southwest Korea, many enemy stragglers and some organized units with as many as 200 to 400 men went into the Chiri Mountain fastness. There they planned to carry on guerrilla activities.

Lt. Col. Welborn G. Dolvin, commanding officer of the 88th Tank Battalion, led Task Force Dolvin out of Chinju at 0600, 26 September, on the road northwest toward Hamyang, the retreat route taken by the main body of the N.K. 6th Division. The tank-infantry task force included as its main elements A and B Companies, 89th Medium Tank Battalion, and B and C Companies, 35th Infantry. It had two teams, A and B, each formed of an infantry company and a tank company. The infantry rode the rear decks of the tanks. The tank company commanders commanded the teams.

(NOTE: TF Dolvin also included the 1st Plat, A Co, 65th Engr C Bn; 2d Plat, Hv Mort Co, 35th Regt; Medical Det, 89th Med Tk Bn; and TF trains.)

Three miles out of Chinju the lead M26 tank struck a mine. While the column waited, engineers removed eleven more from the road. Half a mile farther on, a second tank was damaged in another mine field. Still farther along the road a third mine field, covered by an enemy platoon, stopped the column again. After the task force dispersed the enemy soldiers and cleared the road of mines, it found 6 antitank guns, 9 vehicles, and an estimated 7 truckloads of ammunition in the vicinity abandoned by the enemy. At dusk, the enemy blew a bridge three miles north of Hajon-ni just half an hour before the task force reached it. During the night the task force constructed a bypass.

The next morning, 27 September, a mine explosion damaged and stopped the lead tank. Enemy mortar and small arms fire from the ridges near the road struck the advanced tank-infantry team. Tank fire cleared the left side of the road, but an infantry attack on the right failed. The column halted, and radioed for an air strike. Sixteen F-51 fighter-bombers came in strafing and striking the enemy-held high ground with napalm, fragmentation bombs, and rockets. General Kean, who had come forward, watched the strike and then ordered the task force to press the attack and break through the enemy positions. The task force broke through on the road, bypassing an estimated 600 enemy soldiers. Another blown bridge halted the column for the night while engineers constructed a bypass.

Continuing its advance at first light on the 28th, Task Force Dolvin an hour before noon met elements of the 23d Infantry, U.S. 2d Division, advancing from the east, at the road junction just east of Hamyang. There it halted three hours while engineers and 280 Korean laborers constructed a bypass around another blown bridge. Ever since leaving Chinju, Task Force Dolvin had encountered mine fields and blown bridges, the principal delaying efforts of the retreating N.K. 6th Division.

When it was approaching Hamyang the task force received a liaison plane report that enemy forces were preparing to blow a bridge in the town. On Colonel Dolvin's orders the lead tanks sped ahead, machine-gunned enemy troops who were placing demolition charges, and seized the bridge intact. This success upset the enemy's delaying plans. The rest of the afternoon the task force dashed ahead at a speed of twenty miles an hour. It caught up with numerous enemy groups, killing some of the soldiers, capturing others, and dispersing the rest. At midafternoon Task Force Dolvin entered Namwon to find that Task Force Matthews and elements of the 24th Infantry were already there.

Refueling in Namwon, Task Force Dolvin just after midnight continued northward and in the morning reached Chonju, already occupied by elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment, and continued on through Iri to the Kum River. The next day at 1500, 30 September, its mission accomplished, Task Force Dolvin was dissolved. It had captured or destroyed 16 antitank guns, 19 vehicles, 65 tons of ammunition, 250 mines, captured 750 enemy soldiers, and killed an estimated 350 more. It lost 3 tanks disabled by mines and 1 officer and 45 enlisted men were wounded in action.

In crossing southwest Korea from Chinju to the Kum River, Task Force Matthews had traveled 220 miles and Task Force Dolvin, 138 miles. In the wake of Task Force Dolvin the 27th Regiment moved north from Chinju to Hamyang and Namwon on 29 September and maintained security on the supply road. This same day, 29 September, ROK marines captured Yosu on the south coast.

The 2d Division Pushes West

Opposite the old Naktong Bulge area, the N.K. 9th, 4th, and 2d Divisions retreated westward. At Sinban-ni the 4th Division turned toward Hyopch'on. The 9th withdrew on Hyopch'on, and the 2d, after passing through Ch'ogye, continued on to the same place. Apparently the 9th Division, in the lead, had passed through Hyopch'on before elements of the U.S. 2d Division closed in on the place.

On 23 September the 38th Infantry of the U.S. 2d Division had hard fighting in the hills around Ch'ogye before overcoming enemy delaying forces. The next day the 23d Infantry from the southeast and the 38th Infantry from the northeast closed on Hyopch'on in a double envelopment movement. Elements of the 38th Infantry established a roadblock on the north-south Chinju-Kumch'on road running northeast out of Hyopch'on and cut off an estimated two enemy battalions still in the town. During the day the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, entered Hyopch'on after a rapid advance of eight miles from the southeast. As the North Koreans fled Hyopch'on in the afternoon, 38th Infantry fire killed an estimated 300 of them at the regiment's roadblock northeast of the town. Two flights of F-51 fighter planes caught the rest in the open and continued their destruction. The surviving remnant fled in utter disorder for the hills. The country around Hyopch'on was alive with hard-pressed, fleeing North Koreans on 24 September, and the Air Force, flying fifty-three sorties in the area, wrought havoc among them. That night elements of the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, entered Hyopch'on from the north.

At daylight on the 25th, the 38th Infantry started northwest from Hyopch'on for Koch'ang. The road soon became impassable for vehicles and the men had to detruck and press forward on foot.

In retreating ahead of the 38th Infantry on 25 September the N.K. 2d Division, according to prisoners, abandoned all its remaining vehicles and heavy equipment between Hyopch'on and Koch'ang. This apparently was true, for in its advance from Hyopch'on to Koch'ang the 38th Infantry captured 17 trucks, 10 motorcycles, 14 antitank guns, 4 artillery pieces, 9 mortars, more than 300 tons of ammunition, and 450 enemy soldiers, and killed an estimated 260 more. Division remnants, numbering no more than 2,500 men, together with their commander, Maj. Gen. Choe Hyon, who was ill, scattered into the mountains.

Up ahead of the ground troops, the Air Force in the late afternoon bombed, napalmed, rocketed, and strafed Koch'ang, leaving it virtually destroyed. After advancing approximately thirty miles during the day, the 38th Infantry stopped at 2030 that night only a few miles from the town.

Elements of the 38th Infantry entered Koch'ang at 0830 the next morning, 26 September, capturing there a North Korean field hospital containing forty-five enemy wounded. Prisoners disclosed that elements of the N.K. 2d, 4th, 8th, and 10th Divisions were to have assembled at Koch'ang, but the swift advance of the U.S. 2d Division had frustrated the plan.

The 23d Infantry was supposed to parallel the 38th Infantry on a road to the south, in the pursuit to Koch'ang, but aerial and road reconnaissance disclosed that this road was either impassable or did not exist. General Keiser then directed Colonel Freeman to take a road to the north of the 38th Infantry. Mounted on organic transportation, the regiment, less its 1st Battalion, started at 1600 on the 25th and made a night advance to Koch'ang, fighting three skirmishes and rebuilding four small bridges on the way. It arrived at Koch'ang soon after the 38th Infantry, in daylight on 26 September.

That evening the 23d Infantry continued the advance to Anui, fourteen miles away, which it reached at 1930 without enemy opposition. Except for the small town itself, the area was a maze of flooded paddies. The regimental vehicles could find no place to move off the roads except into the village streets where they were dispersed as well as possible. At least one enemy group remained in the vicinity of Anui. At 0400 the next morning, 27 September, a heavy enemy artillery and mortar barrage struck in the town. The second round hit the 3d Battalion command post, killing the battalion executive officer, the S-2, the assistant S-3, the motor officer, the artillery liaison officer, and an antiaircraft officer. Lt. Col. R. G. Sherrard, the battalion commander, was severely wounded; also wounded were twenty-five enlisted men of the Regimental and Headquarters Companies.

At least passing notice should be taken of another event on 27 September. The last organized unit of the North Korean forces east of the Naktong River, elements of the N.K. 10th Division, withdrew from notorious Hill 409 near Hyongp'ung and crossed to the west side of the river before daylight. Patrols of the 9th Infantry Regiment entered Hyongp'ung in the afternoon, and two companies of the 2d Battalion occupied Hill 409 without opposition. On 28 September the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, crossed the Naktong to join the 2d Division after the newly arrived 65th Regimental Combat Team of the U.S. 3d Division relieved it on Hill 409.

At 0400, 28 September, Colonel Peploe started the 38th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion leading, from Koch'ang in a motorized advance toward Chonju, an important town in the west coastal plain seventy-three miles away across the mountains. The 25th Division also was approaching Chonju through Namwon. Meeting only light and scattered resistance, the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, entered Chonju at 1315, having covered the seventy-three miles in nine and a half hours. At Chonju the battalion had to overcome about 300 enemy soldiers of the 102d and 104th Security Regiments, killing about 100 of them and taking 170 prisoners.

There the 38th Infantry ran out of fuel for its vehicles. Fortunately, a 2d Division liaison plane flew over the town and the pilot learned the situation. He reported it to the 2d Division and IX Corps which rushed gasoline forward. At 1530 on 29 September, after refueling, the 3d Battalion departed Chonju for Nonsan and continued to Kanggyong on the Kum River, arriving there without incident at 0300 the morning of 30 September.

The IX Corps had only two and a half truck companies with which to transport supplies to the 25th and 2d Divisions in their long penetrations, and the distance of front-line units from the railhead increased hourly. When the 2d Division reached Nonsan on the 29th the supply line ran back more than 200 road miles, much of it over mountainous terrain and often on one-way roads, to the railhead at Miryang. The average time for one trip was forty-eight hours. In one 105-hour period, Quartermaster truck drivers supporting the 2d Division got only about thirteen hours' sleep.

At the end of September the 2d Division was scattered from the Kum River southward, with the 38th Infantry in the Chonju-Kanggyong area, the 23d Infantry in the Anui area, and the 9th Infantry in the Koryong-Samga area.

Seoul was recaptured on September 26, 1950. On October 7 the U.N. Forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The U.N. sanctioned defeat of North Korea with the aim of reunification of the country.

Fifth Air Force Takes Control of Kunsan Air Base

Fifth Air Force took over Kunsan Air Base in October 1950 and began work on the runway. Before the Air Force could assign a flying unit to Kunsan, Army engineering units had to prepare the base's facilities. The Army's 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion (EAB) started construction of a NE-SW 5,000 foot runway using quarried rock from the hills outside the base. The 808th EAB was a SCARWAF unit (Special Category Army With Air Force). The original NNE-SSW sod 2,800 ft Japanese runway was not used. However, the ground had to be filled and drained before any construction could be done.

The 27th Airfield Installation Squadron arrived to set up the barracks and put the base infrastructure into operation. Luckily most of the work done by the 63d Infantry Division, 3rd Battalion done in the Occupation years was still intact. The BOQ structures were retained, though most of the main base quonset huts were torn down. The base roads layout was retained.

The slow process of filling the runway area with rock and draining started. From the start, the 808th was handicapped by inexperienced personnel, faulty equipment and soil conditions that were not normally suitable for airfield construction. (Go to 808th/809th/841st Engineering Aviation Battalion for the detailed information of these units and the problems they faced.)

The Push North and the Chinese Lay their Trap

The UN forces including three ROK divisions pursued the fleeing North Korean forces. But unknown to the UN forces, the Chinese 40th, 39th and 42d armies under Commander-in-Chief Peng had marched under the cover of darkness into North Korea on 19 October. They were getting into position for their initial assault. In all there were four armies, three artillery divisions and one antiaircraft regiment. This was the first contingent of thirty-nine divisions that Chairman Mao promised to send to North Korea. The goal of the Chinese in Korea was to assist North Korea in the "reasonable settlement of its problem by wiping out the U.S. troops and then seek a peaceful settlement." They went undetected by American fliers and MacArthur was convinced there was no threat of Chinese intervention. This is what he told President Truman in his meeting with him on October 15 at Wake Island.

Three Chinese Armies -- the equivalent of nine U.S. divisions -- moved into position slowly by night. On October 21 Pyongyang fell to UN forces. On the October 21 the orders were given for the Chinese troops to destroy the ROK 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions that were advancing north. By October 25, two of the armies were in position to attack. The plan was to lure the enemy UN and ROK troops into mountain areas, then encircle them and wipe them out.

MacArthur still in ignorant of the Chinese presence in North Korea, issued a statement in Tokyo that "the war is definitely coming to an end shortly." But contact had been made by ROK 1st Division near Unsan and captured a Chinese prisoner who revealed that vast numbers of Chinese had crossed the Yalu and were heading south. This was radioed to headquarters. In addition, a spy group headed by Navy Lieutenant Eugene Clark ranged far to the north and had picked up conclusive evidence of thousands of Chinese heading south. However, MacArthur still refused to take the Chinese seriously despite the intelligence.

The race to the Yalu continued despite the warnings. On October 24 The Eight Army crossed the strategic Chungchon River and one division, the ROK 6th Division had reached the Yalu River on the Manchurian border. MacArthur rejoiced and authorized the use of "any and all ground forces to secure all of North Korea."

The Chinese Spring the Trap

On October 26, the X Corps landed at Wonsan on the east coast.

On November 2 Peng sprang the trap to wipe out the U.S. 2nd Division. By November 5 MacArthur, without consulting Washington (but later approved by Truman), gave the orders to bomb the Korean end of the Yalu River bridges. He now realized that the Chinese intervention was serious, for the Chinese had driven Eighth Army back across the Chungchon River. Suddenly the Chinese disengaged as Walker had succeeded in withdrawing the bulk of his troops safely across the Chungchon River. But Mao was satisfied with the First Chinese Campaign. The Chinese had annihilated 15,000 of the ROK & UN forces and foiled MacArthur's plan to occupy all of Korea by Thanksgiving. But then suddenly the Chinese withdrew back across the Yalu on November 7. By suddenly withdrawing, Mao guessed that MacArthur, assuming he had beaten the Chinese, would push his troops farther north.

MacArthur fell for the trap. Between November 10-24, X Corps advanced toward the Yalu River in the east, while the Eight Army closed in on the west. On November 24, MacArthur issued orders for a "final offensive" to launch an all-out attack to secure all of North Korea. Following MacArthur's orders, UN forces continued forward being drawn into the area. MacArthur felt the mountainous backbone of North Korea made it impossible for the Chinese to use the area for military operations. He knew little of his new enemy. The Chinese simply waited to spring the trap, then on November 25 the slaughter began. Three Volunteer armies suddenly attacked the western front of Eighth Army along the Ch'ongch'on River. The ROK II Corps was in disarray after both its divisions collapsed. The road to retreat was jammed.

At the Chosin Reservoir, the Marines and the 7th Division were unaware of the debacle going on in the western flank and prepared for their attack. Little did the Marines know that eight Chinese Volunteer divisions had been lying in wait for them on the west side of the Chosin Reservoir. On the east side of the Chosin Reservoir, the Chinese 80th Division approached the 7th ID without being observed. On November 27 the Chinese struck the 1st Marine and 7th ID at Changjin Reservoir in the east. The rest is history. The debacle, the misery, the heroism, the fighting and the frozen retreat.

Mysteriously, General Almond of X Corps remained oblivious to the true situation and wanted to continue the attack. General Walton Walker of the Eighth Army did not share this view and ordered a general withdrawal of the Eighth Army -- in order to save his men. By November 28 MacArthur woke up to reality and authorized Walker to fall back to Pyongyang and there to go on the defensive, while X Corps was to withdraw to the Hungnam-Wonsan area. He cabled the Pentagon: "We face an entirely new war." Mao's troops on both the eastern and western fronts had caused a sensational turn of events smashing MacArthur's dreams of taking all of Korea -- with his forces in full retreat.

The Communist Chinese intervention with 260,000 "volunteers" on November 27, 1950 failed to push far enough south to put Kunsan in jeopardy. The construction continued on the base. On December 22, General Walker was killed in a jeep accident and replaced by General Matt Ridgeway. On December 24, X Corps sails from Hungnam. North Korea is evacuated.

On December 31, 230,000 Chinese volunteers and 70,000 North Koreans launched the Third Chinese Campaign as a surprise attack. This flow of battle centered around the 38th Parallel and Seoul during the Third Chinese Campaign (January 1951) and Fourth Chinese Campaign (April 1951). On February 1, the U.N. voted to end the Korean conflict by "peaceful means." Though the Chinese and North Koreans recaptured Seoul on January 4, 1951, the UN forces retook Seoul on March 18, 1951.

MacArthur Replaced

In April 1951, the friction between General MacArthur and President Truman reached a head and he was "fired" (relieved of duty) -- without being given the opportunity to resign. He was replaced by Lt. General Matt Ridgeway. At this time, the U.S. policy was that if the U.S. forces were forced to fall back to Taejon again, they would be evacuated to Japan. In other words, the official U.S. policy was to hold Korea, but NOT at all costs.

In May 1951, the Chinese launched the Fifth Chinese Campaign in which the Chinese suffered a major defeat with 17,000 dead and 10,000 captured. With the Chinese no longer capable of mounting another major offensive, Mao ordered his troops to turn the war into one of sheer endurance. The Chinese were used to guerrilla warfare and were not used to tunnels and trench warfare. In addition, the Chinese could only afford to pay for 10 percent of the costs, with the remaining 90 percent being provided by the Soviets. However, what worried Mao was that Stalin would not specify "how much" was owed.

On May 31, 1951, the negotiations began -- shakily at first because of the insistence on it being held at Kaesong in North Korean territory. General Ridgeway told the JCS he would refuse to attend at Kaesong -- even if directed. However, finally it was agreed to hold it at Panmunjon. The truce talks began on July 10, 1951...and the war dragged on...and on...and on.

The 3rd Bombardment Wing Moves to Kunsan Air Base

Fifth Air Force had taken over Kunsan Air Base in October 1950 and started plans for constructing the runway. The first Air Force unit assigned to the Kunsan Air Base was the 27th Air Installation Squadron (AIS) which arrived on 1 April 1951 and started to construct the additional billeting to house the new wing's personnel. The 808th EAB also arrived from Okinawa in April 1951.Arthur Aseltine of the 808th EAB, Company A, remembered that the field was filled with stacks of plywood for the construction of these billets. (Go to 808th/809th/841st Engineering Aviation Battalion.) Aviation engineer units available to the Far East Air Forces in July had been badly understrength and deficient in technical training. In addition, the soil conditions required round-the-clock quarry operations to provide rock fill for runway and drainage to remove the water. This slowed the construction airfield. Together with the ground reverses in the war, fighter planes were prevented from deployment to Kunsan.

By August, construction had progressed to the point that the Air Force assigned the 3rd Bombardment Wing to Kunsan. The 3rd BW moved to the base on August 22, 1951, as Kunsan's first assigned aircraft wing. The 3rd Airfield Installation Operations (AIO) replaced the 27th AIS. The work to extend the runway to 9000 ft continued and the 809th EAB arrived in November 1951 to assist in the task. (Refer to the Table of Contents at How It Was (1951-1954) for a listing of all the units at Kunsan AB.)

From that time on, the round-the-clock flying continued from Kunsan with the 3rd Bomb Group flying B-26B/Cs flying night air-interdiction missions -- along with the VMF(N)-513 Marine Night Fighters flying F7Fs and F-4Us ; and the 474th Fighter-Bomber Group flying F-84s primarily for daylight strafing and ground support. Later in April 1953, the 49th FBG would replace the 474th FBG at Kunsan AB.


The population of Kunsan City soon swelled with refugees who were displaced from their homes in the northern areas of Korea. Fleeing first the North Koreans and then the Chinese, these people settled down in the Kunsan area until the conflict ended. By 1952, Kunsan's original population of about 40,000 had swelled to 100,000 people...mostly refugees. In fact to this day, many families in Kunsan have roots to North Korea from which they fled and could not return after the war.



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