HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE (1945-1952) Cholla Province Korean War History (1950-1952) Page 5 of 6

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The North Korean Offensive in the Cholla Province

The following is drawn from South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter XIII (pp210-234). "The N.K. 6th, farthest to the west of the enemy divisions, had a special mission. After the fall of Seoul, it followed the N.K. 3d and 4th Divisions across the Han as far as Ch'onan. There the N.K. Army issued new orders to it, and pursuant to them on 11 July it turned west off the main highway toward the west coast. For the next two weeks the division passed from the view of Eighth Army intelligence. Various intelligence summaries carried it as location unknown, or placed it vaguely in the northwest above the Kum River.

"Actually, the 6th Division was moving rapidly south over the western coastal road net. Its shadow before long would turn into a pall of gloom and impending disaster over the entire U.N. plan to defend southern Korea. Its maneuver was one of the most successful of either Army in the Korean War. It compelled the redisposition of Eighth Army at the end of July and caused Tokyo and Washington to alter their plans for the conduct of the war.

In History of United States Naval Operations: Korea: Chapter 5, The Pohang Landingby James A. Field, Jr., it states, "Admiral Doyle had brought his ships into Sasebo on 3 July only to find that his prospective passengers had already departed. Next day, on orders from Admiral Joy, he flew back to Tokyo with members of his staff to work on a plan for the landing of two regimental combat teams of the 1st Cavalry Division on the west coast of Korea. For this operation CincFE’s preferred objective was Inchon, seizure of which would give access to the Seoul transportation complex and would cut the enemy’s main supply route; alternatively, it was proposed to land the cavalrymen at Kunsan, at the mouth of the river Kum, whence they could strike inland toward Taejon and the enemy’s right flank. The concept of a landing at Inchon was certainly strategically appealing, and was the germ of the operation which in September would put the enemy to ignominious flight. Its proposal in early July was evidence of early confidence in the efficacy of American intervention. But a few short days sufficiently demonstrated the visionary aspects of the idea, and even Kunsan, a much more modest alternative, was soon seen to be an impossibility. Almost at once the problem came to be not one of throwing the 1st Cavalry Division against the enemy’s flank, but of getting this force into Korea while there remained some Korean territory to get into."

NOTE: There are allegations of indiscriminate bombings by the US B-29 bombers, but its strange that people would be setting up the open market while the rest of the country is fleeing the NKPA and heading south. Also the people waving is very funny as I wonder how many people a B-29 would see from its altitude. The following is extracted from an article at Kimsoft "Rethinking The Nogun-ri Massacre on the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Korean War" by Sung Yong Park. It stated in part: "On July 11, 1950, two U.S. aircraft bombed the Iri Train Station and the Iri market area in Iksan town.[vi] Since this day was a big marketing day, (in Korea, the big market opens every five days) Iksan town was crowded with local villagers who wanted to buy and sell their products there. That day an especially big cattle market also opened near the electric substation. An assemblyman had come to the local movie theater to speak to students of the Namsung Middle School and the Iri Girls Middle School. When the people saw U.S. airplanes, B-29 bombers with the American flag mark, flying over them, they welcomed them with the waving of hands and Korean flags to show that they were civilians.

After the planes circled for a while, bombs began to fall and detonated around the train station. After 15 minutes, a second bombing occurred around the station and electric substation. On the next day, July 12, many villigers came to help with the casualties and to find out whether their family members were alive or dead. However, the U.S. airplanes returned and bombed again around the station, and even the nearby villages. Witnesses estimated the number of victims to be several hundred. Among just the Railroad employees in Iri station were 54 deaths and more than 300 people wounded.[vii]

This occurred in a non-combat zone, since the NKPA did not come there until another 7 days had passed. On Aug. 3, 1950, three divisions of the U.S. Army, retreating to the east bank of the Naktong River, blew up two of its bridges (Waegwan and Tuksong-dong) in an effort to deny their use by the enemy. [viii] ...

[vi] Min (People) December, 1999, pp. 92.
[vii] Ibid. p93. Original source is the History of 100 Years in Korean Railroad published in 1999.
[viii] Min, November, 1999, pp. 88-93.
[viii] Min, November, 1999, pp. 88-93.

The 6th Korean People's Division had swept to the southwest from Taejon toward Iri and Kunsan. They easily rolled over the remanents of the ROK 7th Infantry Division and proceeded south. The invading North Koreans captured Kunsan Aerodrome on 13 July 1950 according to official records. However, ROK Marine military orders shows that the ROK Marines arrived on 16 July and fought for four days in the Kunsan-Iri area. (The Marines were dispatched by Marine Corps Operation Order 41, Cheju, Cheju City, 14 July 1950. This order and the summary of this action are on display in the ROK Marine Museum in Seoul.) The ROK Marines had been organized in 1949 after the ROK Army communist rebellion in Yosu in October 1948. They were sent to Cheju to suppress the communist-led rebellion there. During the initial days of the War, there was little the ROK Marines could do as the NKPA advanced. These troops were hard with steel discipline...and battle-hardened from the Cheju Island counter-insurgency fight.

The story is told in an article entitled "The Ghost Catching Marines: The ROK Marines Before the Inchon Landing" written by Major James F. Durand, USMC, in the Marine Corps Gazette, Sept 2000. It stated, "The Commandant formed a battalion-sized unit under the command of Maj Ko Kil Hoon and dispatched the unit ot Kunsan. The Marines sailed from Cheju on 15 July, landing at Kunsan the following day and moving east toward Chang Hang. There the Marines fought the 13th Regiment of the 6th NKPA Division, surprising the North Koreans who had expected little resistance. For the next 4 days the Marines fought the North Koreans in a series of violent engagements around Kunsan and Iri, killing an estimated 40 NKPA soldiers and wounding another 250 while suffering 20 deaths and 10 injuries. Having forced the enemy to fight in the coastal area, the Marines delayed his advance into the Cholla Provinces. On 20 July the Marines broke contact with the 13th Regiment and withdrew south."

There have been persistent rumors of atrocities committed at Kunsan Air Base when the base fell. These all center around Americans being killed, but in truth there were NO Americans in Kunsan. Camp Hillenmeyer had been turned over to the Korean Constabulary in 1949 and the American KMAG was stationed in Pupyong (Seoul) in what was called "ASCOM City." In the 1960s, rumors repeated by Robert Koester (then of the 3rd Bomb Wing from Japan) told of captured Americans being hung up on hooks in the ROKAF Hangar. Unfortunately, there was no ROKAF hangar there at the time. It was a rice paddy area in 1950 and was later filled in and built up by the 808th EAB in 1953. Another rumor in 1978 dealing with the ROKAF Hangar was passed on by Bruce Ebert (then of the 8th TFW). It said that the 14th FIW personnel were caught hanged from the rafters of the ROKAF hangar by the North Koreans. Again there were NO Americans at Kunsan. Another rumor in the 1960s dealt with "Marine Hill" (which is now called "Small Coyote"). The rumors were that the Marines had fought there to the last man in the North Korean invasion. The truth is that it was the hill where a portion of the Marine GCI unit MACS-1 was stationed between 1951-1953. They were relocated to the "Signal Hill" (at the top of what is now called "Gunsmoke Hill" near Wolfpack Park) in 1953.

In John Moench's book Taking Command, he has a picture of a North Korean "execution pit" discovered on the base in 1951, but it most likely a grave excavation so the 808th EAB could use the hill for land fill. The accompanying picture shows Lt. (later Col.) Philip Chase (808th EAB) standing next to some excavated remains. In addition, Moench also relates a rumor of the final Americans to "bugout" (evacuate) from Kunsan being ambushed at Wolmyong tunnel by the North Korean sympathizers from the "North Korea" village near the tunnel. Fact is that there were NO Americans at Kunsan to bugout...and that "village" he speaks of did not exist at the time. After Kunsan was recaptured the town's population exploded to 100,000 mainly with North Korean refugees who built up mud wattle houses right up to the tunnel entrance. Before that time, the area near the tunnel was clear of buildings as shown by 1951 photos by 3rd Bomb Group personnel. This rumor is probably a reshaping of the factual 1940 executions of Korean dissident farmers by the Japanese. The farmers were herded into the tunnel and machine gunned. Despite all the denials, the false rumors amongst the American servicemen at Kunsan AB persists till today.

There have been no documented cases of atrocities committed to the Kunsan population that remained in Kunsan...though, there were most likely were some executions. The Constabulary and government leaders had all fled south knowing full-well that they would be executed if caught.

The 6th NKPA division's two columns united in front of Chonju, thirty miles to the southeast, and quickly reduced that town, which was defended by ROK police. Reports of atrocities and executions were reported in Chonju. At the missionary hospital in Chonju, some nurses were summarily executed. Everywhere refugees fled the terror sweeping over southwest Korea with the advance of the North Korean Army and guerrilla units. An entry on 29 July in the diary of a guerrilla tellingly illustrates the reasons for panic: "Apprehended 12 men; National Assembly members, police sergeants and Myon leaders. Killed four of them at the scene, and the remaining eight were shot after investigation by the People's court."

South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter XIII (pp210-234) continued, "The N.K. 6th Division was now poised to make an end run through southwest Korea toward Pusan, around the left flank of Eighth Army. In all Korea southwest of the Taejon-Taegu-Pusan highway, at this time, there were only a few hundred survivors of the ROK 7th Division, some scattered ROK marines, and local police units."

Following the coastal roads through Koch'ang and inland roads through Kwangju, they swept southward. Their objective was Hadong where the UN forces put up a fierce defense. The North Korean mission was to capture Chinju and Masan as part of a pincer movement to capture Pusan.

However, the ROK Marines who had moved south from Kunsan delayed the North Korean advance. The Marine Corps Gazette (Sept 2000) article, "The Ghost Catching Marines: The ROK Marines Before the Inchon Landing" states, "Reaching Yosu, Maj Ko's unit joined with LtCol Mim Seung Un's Marines who had arrived from Cheju Island. The 500 Marines fought a series of delaying actions at Namwon, Unbong, and Jinju from 23 to 31 July."

The 6th Division departed Chonju on or about 20 July. At Kwangju on 23 July the three regiments of the NKPA division separated. The 13th went southwest to Mokp'o on the coast, the 14th south to Posong, and the 15th southeast through Sunch'on to Yosu on the southern coast. The division encountered little resistance during this week of almost constant movement. About 25 July, it reassembled at Sunch'on, ninety air miles west of Pusan, and made ready for its critical drive eastward toward that port. Logistically, the division was poorly prepared for this operation. Its supply was poor and rations were cut in half and on some days there were none.

Advancing next on Chinju, General Pang Ho San, commander of the N.K. 6th Division, proclaimed to his troops on the eve of the advance, "Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given us is the liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants of the enemy.... The liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to cut off the windpipe of the enemy."

However, again the ROK Marines stood in their way. The Marine Corps Gazette (Sept 2000) article, "The Ghost Catching Marines: The ROK Marines Before the Inchon Landing" by Major James F. Buran states, "On the afternoon of 1 August, Army Maj Gen Lee Ung Joon, commander of the Western Area Combat Command ordered the Marines to block and destroy enemy units moving east toward Chindongni. If the North Korean Army could capture this village, they would control the coastal road leading to Masan and Chinhae, where critical supply bases and port facilities were located."

"LtCol Kim led his Marines east, establishing his command post at Kosari late that evening. He positioned his 3d and 7th Companies on the high ground overlooking the road leading to road leading to Chongdongni after reconnaissance units reported that the North Koreans had departed Jinju. At 0700 on 3 August, an infantry company advanced towards the Marine positions. When the North Koreans came within range, the 7th company attacked; the Marines of the 3rd company supported with machine gun and mortar fire. While the 7th Company pursued the retreating North Koreas, an estimated 70 soldiers approached 3d Comapny's position. Again the Marines attaked, completely surprising an unsuspecting enemy. During the 2 engagements, the Marines killed 109 North Koreans and captured 3 prisoners. Although poised to continue the attack west, LtCol Kim was forced to move his Marines east to Chindongni, which was being threatened from the southweat. News of the Marine attack quickly reached President Rhee, who directed that all Marines in LtCol Kim's unit be promoted one rank, the first such distinction of the war."

"Resistance stiffened as more American forces poured into the Pusan Perimeter. Attempting to halt the arrival of reinforcements, the 7th NKPA Division renewed its efforts to capture Masan and Chinhae to cut off the vital sources of allied reinforcement and supply. Elements of the division seized the coastal village of Tongyoung to secure their right flank. Korean Navy and Marine Corps leaders were acutely aware of this village's importance. RAdm Son ordered the Navy and Marines to conduct an amphibious assault and capture Tongyoung for the sea."

"At 1800 on 17 August 1950, seven Navy patrol craft sailed from Chinhae and landed on the beaches of Changpyongni. Col Kim Seung Un's Marines quickly moved ashore and established defensive positions. Early the following morning, the Marines moved out and began to climb up Mount Maeil Bong. The Marines crested the hill as the summer sun's rays awakened the sleeping North Korean defenders. The Marines took the North Koreans by surprise, and those who were not killed immediately broke ranks and attempted to flee the attacking Marines. The Marines continued their advance toward Tongyoung, drove the North Koreans from the village, and established a defense perimeter outside the village. Desperate to regain the momentum, they had lost, battalions of the 7th NKPA Division repeatedly attacked the Marine positions, but the line never yielded."

"The amphibious assault at Tongyoung was a brilliant success and poignant affirmation of RAdm Son's decision to create the Marine Corps. Col Kim's Marines were disciplined, aggressive fighters, killing 469 North Korean soldiers and capturing 83 prisoners and 38 crew-served weapons while suffering 15 deaths and 47 injuries during the battle. The Marines' victory prevented the North Koreans from capturing Masan and Chinhae, contribuiting significantly to he defense of the western side of the Naktong River Defense Line." (NOTE: The name of Tongyoung was changed to Changwon in 1998.)

The Battle of the Kum River

The Kum River is the first wide, deep defendable stream south of the Han River in southwestern Korea. The Battle of the Kum River (Kumgang) was waged on 13-14 July 1950 (above Taejon) and many soldiers of the 24th ID were killed or captured. Even General Dean, the commander of the 24th ID, was cut off and eventually captured by the North Koreans.

Taejon fell on 20 July 1950 and the North Koreans advanced on Taegu. After the fall of Taejon, the N.K. 4th Division rested in the city for two days and took in 1,000 untrained replacements. On the morning of 23 July, it started south from Taejon on the Kumsan road. It was joining the 6th Division in an envelopment of the United Nations' left flank. The N.K. 6th Division moved on an outer arc around the left of the U.N. position, the N.K. 4th Division on an inner arc. The two divisions were engaging in a co-ordinated movement on a theater scale.

Everywhere refugees fled the terror sweeping over southwest Korea with the advance of the North Korean Army and guerrilla units. An entry on 29 July in the diary of a guerrilla tellingly illustrates the reasons for panic: "Apprehended 12 men; National Assembly members, police sergeants and Myon leaders. Killed four of them at the scene, and the remaining eight were shot after investigation by the People's court."

The North Koreans refused to fight a Western-style war, with units neatly connected. The Americans rarely knew where their enemy was. It was a new kind of war, with regular People's Army troops often fighting like guerrillas, changing into the white dress of farmers and striking from behind. There were atrocities committed on both sides.

By July 25, Eighth Army had reports of "10 enemy tanks and 500 infantry in Mok'po at the southwest tip of the peninsula; 26 trucks and 700 soldiers in Namwon; tanks, trucks, and 800 soldiers in Kurye; and 500 enemy troops engaging South Korean police in Hadong. The Eighth Army G-2 estimated at this time that the N.K. 4th Division was dispersed over 3,300 square miles of southwest Korea."

On July 26, the 34th Infantry Regiment, on orders from General Church, moved from the Kunwi-Uisong area north of Taegu to Koch'ang. At the same time the 24th Division headquarters and divisional troops moved to Hyopch'on, where General Church established his command post. Hyopch'on is 12 air mile west of the Naktong River, 25 miles north of Chinju, and 15 miles southeast of Koch'ang. It was reasonably well centered in the vast area the division had to defend.

On July 27, the first troops of the 19th Infantry Regiment from Okinawa arrived at Pusan, but it showed "how troops not ready for combat nevertheless suddenly found themselves in it." The two battalions would have a minimum of three days at Pusan to draw equipment and zero-in and test fire their weapons. Later these troops would be thrown into battle to capture Hadong, but were massacred in battle. When all the stragglers had come in, casualties were listed as 2 killed, 52 wounded, and 349 missing. An enemy soldier captured later said the North Koreans took approximately 100 American prisoners at Hadong. When American forces rewon the Hadong area in late September a search uncovered 313 American bodies, most of them along the river and in the rice paddies.

The Pusan Perimeter

The outnumbered U.S. forces retreated into the defensive line called the "Pusan Perimeter." The defense line was horseshoe-shaped with Taegu at the apex. The remnants of three defeated U.S. regiments (the 21st, 34th & 19th) -- each one little better than a battalion in size -- fell back to make their stand at the Naktong River and Taegu. The condition of the troops were dire. For example, the "34th Infantry, not having been able to re-equip since Taejon, did not have a regimental switchboard. There were only a few radios. The regiment was short of mortars, bazookas, and machine guns. Some of the men did not have complete uniforms, many had no helmets, most did not have entrenching tools. Every man, however, did have his individual weapon."

The Pusan Perimeter was established on August 4, 1950. The ROKs attempted to reorganize their shattered divisions into this defense line. The First Battle of the Naktong River Bulge was fought between August 5 - 19. "The establishment of the Pusan Perimeter may be considered as a dividing line in viewing and appraising the combat behavior of the American soldier in the Korean War. The Pusan Perimeter for the first time gave something approaching a continuous line of troops. With known units on their left and right and some reserves in the rear, the men showed a stronger disposition to fight. Before the Pusan Perimeter, all through July and into the first days of August, there was seldom a continuous line beyond a battalion or a regimental position. Both flanks were generally wide open, and enemy troops moving through the hills could easily turn a defensive position. Supporting troops were seldom within reach. American soldiers, realizing the isolated nature of their positions, often would not stay to fight a losing battle. Few in July 1950 saw any good reason for dying in Korea; with no inspiring incentive to fight, self-preservation became the dominating factor."

In three weeks, the North Koreans had occupied two-thirds of South Korea. Ignoring the advice of his subordinates, North Korea's Kim Il-Sung ordered an all-out assault on the Pusan Perimeter expecting to destroy General Walton Walker's Eighth Army. Between August 27 - September 5, 1950, the heaviest fighting of the war took place. In Mortal Combat, 1950-1953 (by John Toland) it says, "He had thrown everything available into this ambitious operation, but the troops who were to carry it out were already exhausted and running out of ammunition. Their tanks and vehicles had little gasoline. Moreover, UN air attacks had so badly damaged road and rail communications to the south that few reinforcements and supplies reached the frontline troops."

Between September 1-5, the North Korean Korean People's Army (Inmun Gun) attempted one last great Naktong Offensive. After the initial on-onslaught, the NKPA attack was stopped at Taegu and the Pusan Perimeter held. A major contributor was the FEAF (Far East Air Force) bombing and strafing missions that held the enemy in check. The North Koreans attacked relentlessly, but the rapid increase in UN reinforcements through Pusan helped to reinforce the line. On 7 September the North Koreans were escaping over the Nam River near its junction with the Naktong leaving more than two thousand of their dead behind. The outnumbered, outgunned enemy had fought fiercely but to no avail. The Pusan Perimeter was intact. The crisis was over.

This Kind of War -- The Classic Korean War History (by T.R. Fehrenbach, 1963) put it this way, "The NKPA had overrun all South Korea except one tiny toehold in the southeast corner -- but the toehold had given it unexpected trouble. Its timetable calling for the Communization of all Korea by 15 August had been wrecked. Worse, the Inmun Gun, the People's Army, had left the bones of its best men scattered along the Naktong River, and the survivors were rapidly bleeding themselves to death against American guns ..." Less than 30 percent of the old China veterans remained, and these were dirty, tired, hungry, and in rags. The NKPA had suffered about 60,000 casualties, most of which had been inflicted by ROK's. Its total combat strength could not have been more than 70,000 with only forty tanks left. On the other hand, the United Nations force had 141,808 of which some 82,000 were ROK's. American combat ground strength was 47,000.

THE INCHON ASSAULT AND THE PUSAN BREAKOUT

Meanwhile, MacArthur's staff constructed plans for an invasion at Inchon. From the outset, the Navy, the Marines and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed MacArthur's top-secret amphibious assault on Inchon. No one had a problem with the idea of an amphibious operation. Militarily, it was a logical action. Only the landing site was in question. The opposition viewed the invasion at Inchon as doomed to disaster as the channel to Inchon's harbor was narrow, treacherous, and easy to mine. Because of the predictable high tide conditions, an invasion's date could not be a secret. General Walker of the Eighth Army proposed a landing at Kunsan and a pincer action to trap the North Korean Forces surrounding the Pusan perimeter. However, this plan was scrapped during a meeting with the JCS in Tokyo mainly by MacArthur's eloquence as he convinced everyone that as soon as Seoul was taken the war would be over. U.S. Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction, The First Year by James F. Schnabel covers the politics and back and forth process of decision-making dealing with first a proposed landing and then the deceptive feint.

Feint into Kunsan

Though the invasion had been decided to take place at Inchon, the Army and Navy pressed forward with a ruse to try to convince the North Koreans that an invasion was really coming to Kunsan. This feint was almost like an afterthought -- and hastily thrown together. It was ordered on 7 September by Vice Admiral Struble and the GHQ Raiders only had a week to get everything together.

In History of United States Naval Operations: Korea: Chapter 7, Back to the Parallelby James A. Field, Jr., it states, "Although the fast carriers had withdrawn to Sasebo on 5 September, following the strikes against the Pyongyang area, naval activity continued along Korea's western shore. Between Kunsan and the 38th parallel, aircraft from Triumph and Badoeng Strait scoured the land, concentrating on railroad bridges, rolling stock, and electrical transformer stations. While continuing to interdict coastal traffic, Admiral Andrewes' surface ships found opportunity to bombard Inchon on the 5th and Kunsan the next day. On the 7th, Triumph departed to the east coast for two days of operations off Wonsan, but with the arrival of Sicily on the 8th two-carrier operations were resumed. On the 10th, the last day on station prior to departure for replenishment, Admiral Ruble's Marine squadrons were ordered to burn off the western half of Wolmi Do. Double loads of napalm, to a total of 95,000 pounds, were ferried in during the course of the day, with resultant destruction of 90 percent of the top cover in the designated area, and presumable discouragement of the garrison."

It continued, "It might be thought that an attack of such unprecedented nature against a terrain feature of such localized strategic importance would have alerted the enemy to what was in prospect and given him five days for emergency redeployment. Perhaps it did, but his capabilities in this direction were limited, and in any case the larger security picture for the Inchon landing was problematical at best. In Japan, where there were plenty of enemy agents and no censorship, the situation was a highly compromising one, and the arrival of the Marines and the assembly and loading of troops were matters of common knowledge."

It went on, "Some efforts to delude the Communists were indeed carried out. Triumph was briefly shifted to the east coast. After dropping a bridge on the 9th at Kanggu Hang, below Yongdok, Helena and her destroyers ran north to 40 degrees to shoot up shipping and trenches at the island of Mayang Do. At Pusan the Marine Brigade was lined up and given a semi-public lecture on the hydrography of Kunsan; after replenishment at Sasebo, Triumph would concentrate her efforts in the vicinity of that port, as would the Fifth Air Force; in this region, where Bass' earlier beach survey had been detected by the enemy, a raid was scheduled by an Anglo-American force embarked in HMS Whitesand Bay. But the basic cover and deception appears to have been accomplished by CincFE himself, by his insistence on so improbable an objective and by his pressure for speed. The enemy, it would seem, concurred in the views of those who questioned the depth of the turning movement and the hydrography of Inchon. South of 38 parallel the heaviest days of his mining effort were at Mokpo and Kusan on the west coast, and in the neighborhood of Chumunjin in the east. At Inchon the effort was too little and too late."

In The Sea War in Korea by Commander Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Commander Frank A. Manson, USN, 1957 (p89) Vice Admiral Struble said, "In all the planning, it was my intention to so balance the air operation on the west coast that the finger of suspicion would not be heavily pointed at the Inchon area, but also the Kunsan area to the south and the Pyongyang area to the north. I also ordered an amphibious feint in the Kunsan area on 7 September."

"I felt that if we could keep the point of our landing concealed until the first bombardment of 13 September the enemy would not reach the conclusion that Inchon was to be invaded until it was too late."

The actions for the diversionary feint started on 7 September. Shadow Warriors: the Covert War in Korea, by William B. Breuer (p75) states, "During the second week of September, the deception spotlight focused even more brightly on Kunsan. For several straight days, the British cruiser Triumph bolted into Kunsan harbor and blasted the town and docks with her big guns."

According to Ed Evanhoe, author of DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War, when asked about the bombardment of Kunsan, "... the U.S. Navy history of the Korean War says they did. However, short of starting a major fire, the amount of damage one or two ships could do would be easily reparable within a few days or few weeks at most." When asked about Bill Bruer's description of the TRIUMPH "bolting into Kunsan harbor", he wrote, ""My data says the British cruiser TRIUMPH did make a number of naval gunfire attacks on the Kunsan area during during the 1st two weeks of September. However, I strongly suspect Bill Breuer took "artistic license" in describing the TRIUMPH as having "bolted into Kunsan Harbor..." Given tidal conditions and the state of the approaches at that time it most likely stood offshore and fired from long range."

This would make sense as the The Sea War in Korea (p145) states the harbor entrance was mined. The mines had been shipped by railroad to Kunsan. The book states, "Korea's western coastline was a honeycomb of shallows, with the Korean rivers emptying into the Yellow Sea. Nowhere in the Yellow Sea was the water more than sixty fathoms deep; mean tidal range was twenty-one feet. While not ideal, the west coast was certainly mineable." In the book (p130) it states, "First of all, much of the Korean coastal area was shallow -- ideal for minefields. Secondly, the muddy waters offered near-perfect concealment. Thirdly, ocean currents in both the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea were of such a nature that floating mines launched at any North Korean port would traverse the entire length of the peninsula within 15 days. thus the drifter mine itself presented a constant danger to surface vessels." After the Inchon invasion, the Army called for support by sea to clear the mines at Kunsan.

Then on September 11-12 two commandoes from the U.S.S. Perch snuck on shore to plant incriminating evidence of the impending "invasion" at Kunsan. According to Ed Evanhoe, "The two guys mentioned in Breuer's book were probably from the 41 Commando team on board the USS PERCH. There is a note in the 41 Commando history that during the night of 11-12 September two men landed on the Korean shore to leave behind evidence suggesting the Americans were taking beach samples."

In Shadow Warriors: the Covert War in Korea (pp74-75), it states, "Kicking off the deception, two GIs, wearing dark clothing and with faces blackened, paddled a rubber raft ashore just below Kunsan on an especially dark night. Taking a standard U.S. army shovel and two pails, they stole along the beach and left the three items. It was intended that the North Koreans would deduce that Americans had visited the beach at night to collect sand samples but had been frightened off, leaving the shovel and pails behind."

"In Tokyo and Pusan, junior officers of the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps went barhopping. Feigning intoxication, they struck up conversations at random with civilian patrons, swore them to secrecy, then disclosed in conspiratorial tones that a large amphibious force was preparing to hit far behind North Korean lines - at Kunsan."

A diversionary landing was made on the night of 12 September 1950. The Sea War in Korea (p89) states, "The diversionary landing at Kunsan was carried out by the British frigate Whitesand Bay supporting U.S. Army Commandoes and the Royal Marine Commandoes." (NOTE: The reference is for 7 September, but this cannot be true.) According to Ed Evanhoe, "The HMS WHITESANDS BAY was the ship that landed the 1st GHQ Raider Company on ROBB ISLAND (OSHIK-DO most likely.) And, yes, the Brits were part of the landing force. 14 men from the 41 Royal Marine Commando went ashore with the 1st GHQ Raider Company." He continued, "From descriptions by the guys who landed, OSHIK-DO most likely was the landing site. This is based on: "Machine-gun fire from the mainland raked the island." and "the machine-gun fire was coming from the mainland to our east." (from several) plus "We began receiving artillery fire from an artillery battery located on the mainland to our northeast. This battery was on a point on the north side of the bay. " (Also from several of the guys.) These statements would apply to OSHIK-DO but not to KAEYA-DO. KAEYA-DO is northwest of the mouth so artillery would have been coming from the southeast, plus it is too far offshore (at that time) for machine-gun fire to be effective."

However, we may never know with certainty which island was the landing point though Oshik-do is the most logical. Ed Evanhoe stated, "I am still leaning towards Oshik-do even though you are right that it would have been too far offshore for accurate machine-gun fire. The key to this is "accurate." Having been on the receiving end of NK MG fire at night, it always looked like the tracers, and thus the main bullet stream, were passing within a few inches/feet/yards of where I was even though the bullet stream was nowhere near. I suspect this is what happened in Raider's descriptions of "machine-gun fire raked the island." These were "green" troops and this was their first combat. Tracers and bullets impacting on the island or passing overhead would give the impression the island was being "raked" even though the enemy MG fire was actually random and inaccurate. (Just a personal observation.)"

He continued, "I understand that all three Raider KIAs were killed by either a mortar or artillery fire, not machine-gun or rifle fire (which is not surprising, given it was a night and the NK's wouldn't have been able to see what they were firing at so would have been shooting blind in hopes of a lucky hit.) Anyway, guess we will never know with absolute accuracy which island it was."

The following is excerpted from Ed Evanhoe's site, The Korean Warunder "United Nations Special Operations in Korea, GHQ 1ST RAIDER COMPANY". It stated, "On 7 September 1950, Far East Command organized the Special Activities Group (SAG) and appointed Colonel Louis B. Ely to command the new unit. The 1st Raider Company became one of the group's units. The other units were: 41st Royal Marine Commando and the "UK and the Royal Navy Volunteer Group."

"On 12 September 1950, the 1st Raider Company saw its first action. It was taken to Korea aboard the HMS Whitesands Bay, a British frigate, and landed on a small island at the mouth of Kunsan Bay (approximately 100 miles south of Seoul.) The mission was intended as a "deception ploy" to draw North Korean troops away from the Inchon area where an invasion was planned for 15 September 1950.

"The raid at Kunsan did not go exactly as planned. Soon after landing the unit came under machine-gun fire but for some unknown reason grenades had not been issued so the machine-gun had to be engaged with ineffective rifle fire. During this battle three Raiders were killed: 1st Lt. James W. Clance, Corporal John W. Maines and Corporal Raymond E. Puttin. Clance and Maines were killed on the island and their bodies left behind when the unit was withdrawn because of heavy shellfire from artillery on the mainland. Puttin was evacuated to the HMS Whitesands Bay where he died of wounds a few hours later and was buried at sea. Corporal Maines' body was recovered when the area was retaken by U.N. troops but Lt. Clance's body had never been found. He is carried "Missing In Action."

"Following their withdrawal from Kunsan, the 1st Raider Company proceeded to Inchon where they were to land by rubber boat on the Kimpo Peninsula and attack the airbase there. The mission was canceled when someone realized that it would be impossible to land using rubber boats because the tides and strong tidal currents in the Inchon area. As a result, the unit landed in the 36th Wave at Inchon, then proceeded toward Kimpo Airbase. The Marines had already taken Kimpo so the Raider Company was used as security and "clean up."

(NOTE: We appreciate Ed Evanhoe's help in providing this information about the GHQ Raiders (which we had no access to) along with his invaluable insights.)

Robert Sizemore wrote on Usenet on 23 Jan 2001, "I was a member of the 1st GHQ Raider Company. We made a rubber boat visit from the British Ship HMS Whitesand Bay to Kunsan, Korea on the night of Sept 13, 1950. We were on a reconaissance mission and was to leave if attacked. After landing on the beach, it wasn't long until the shooting started. My Platoon leader was lst Lt. Al Noreen. His radio call sign was Alibi Al. Another platoon landed on a small island to the south of us. We were told to "retract" as soon as the shooting started and I, along with all others, headed for the water to get our boats in the water. We had too many guys in our boat and Lt. Noreen called for some of us to get into his boat. I jumped into the water and went to his boat and climbed in. We tried hard to row the boat into the water with no luck. The Lt. said to get in the water and he and I and one other guy tried to "swim" it out. At that time, the machine gun found our range and ruined the boat and Al Noreen said to swim for it. I went under deep to escape the bullets. When I got back to the surface no one was around. I began swimming out to the ship and was picked up by another rubber boat about 20 minutes later. I didn't see Lt. Noreen until morning back at the ship. I asked him what happened to him and he said he and the other guy swam over to the island. He told me that he had seen Lt. Clancey (as I recall the name), who had been hit badly in the abdomen and couldn't be moved. Two other men were laying dead near him. Lt Noreen told me that he gave Lt Clancey (they were very close friends) morphine to relieve his pain. He also left him a loaded pistol and told him goodbye. Lt Noreen and some others were picked up at a special rendevous point later. Lt Noreen told me that as he was leaving and was some distance away when he heard a small arms firing. It was one shot."

He continued, "I will never, never forget that night when I spent so much time staying afloat in the Yellow Sea just south of Inchon, Korea at Kunsan. We lost one boy on the way back to the ship. He was in another rubber boat and was helping to paddle the boat when a stray machine bullet from the shore hit him in the lower back. The men got him back to the ship and during the night several men gave blood to try to save him. Sometime the next day, Pfc Putnam died. (I had forgotten his name until I saw it in your notes on the web page for the 1st GHQ Raider Company) I am sure that was his name. He was buried at sea the next day. It was raining and everyone on board was standing watching the service. The wind was blowing from different directions and you could hear the service when the wind was coming toward you. The British Captain of the HMS Whitesand Bay read the service. I will never forget the service. It was a beautiful service. I even made an 8mm color movie film of the service. I thought it would be nice to give the film, some day, to his parents. (Unfortunately, when we finally landed and set our selves up at Kimpo Airfield, our baggage was being sorted out and someone stole my bag. In it was my camera and the most precious cargo of all - the film.) I will never forget when that young hero's flagdraped body was lowered to the deep. He was only a casual friend of mine, but on that day he was my brother. Whenever I think of it - it is like I am there, in the rain and wind, watching and listening to the service."

He went on, "Shortly after the raid, I sat in the Ship's mess with a cup of coffee while I wrote a letter to my brother in Ohio. A few years later he gave me the letter. It was written on HMS Whitesand Bay letterhead stationery. He had kept it for me. It was a word for word account of what happened that night on that raid. It tells every detail as I remembered it. I don't have it in front of me, so what I have written here is just from memory. I am 70 years old now, but then we were just a bunch of young kids doing what was right for our country. If I can know your address, I will make a copy of that letter. I just have to find it again but it is here. I will send you a copy if you would like it." -- With best regards, Robert M. Sizemore (Cpl) (212 South 4th Street, Richmond, IN 47374)

Starting on 13 September, the USAF started their raids on Kunsan. Shadow Warriors: the Covert War in Korea (p75) states, "At the same time, General Stratemeyer's Far East Air Force pounded railroads, bridges, and roads in a 30-mile arc around Kunsan. 48 hours before D-day, Stratemeyer's aircraft winged over Kunsan ... and dropped thousands of leaflets warning to flee to the interior to escape looming violence." (For examples of these types of propaganda pamphlets dropped by the 3d BG go to Korean War Reference.)

(NOTE: TSgt Stanley D. Gohl, 3rd Wing Historian, wrote to say that the "3rd Bomb Group flew attack missions against targets in the area in preparation of the land assault. In addition targets in and around Kunsan were attacked as a diversionary tactic to hide the main invasion at Inchon. My source is The West Point Atlas of American Wars Volume II 1900-1953.")

(Click on photos to enlarge) Top Right: An F-80 leads a formation of 3d BG B-26s against targets near Iri on September 16. White spots just to the left of the fighter and under its wing mark rockets just fired at some enemy tanks. Top Left: The bombers attack the Iri rail yards. Bottom Right: A parabomb floats toward a bridge near Iri. The North Koreans have spanned a destroyed portion of the bridge with a crude but effective earth and timber structure. Bottom Left: 3d BG Invaders wheel around to attack flak installations near Iri.

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• Go to Japanese Aviation Training Base (1938-1945)
  
• Go to Occupation Forces: 6th Infantry Division, 63d Infantry Regiment, 3d Battalion; A Soldier's Story (1945-1947)
  
• Go to Occupation Forces: 63d Service Company, Kunsan Harbor
  
• Go to Occupation Forces: Officer's Tour (1946-1947); Korean Constabulary (1949-1951)
  
• Go to Cholla Province Korean War History (1950-1951): North Korean Invasion and Military Actions in Cholla area
  
• Go to Cholla Province Korean War History (1951-1952): Invasion of Inchon and Retaking of Kunsan AB
  

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