8th Fighter Bomber Group at Itazuke AB, Japan (1948-1950)

The Occupation fighter/interceptor forces in Japan included one fighter bomber wing, one fighter bomber group, and two interceptor groups with one reconnaissance squadron. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing (12th, 44th, and 67th Squadron) was based on Okinawa; the 51st Interceptor Group (16th, 25th, and 26th Squadrons) was based in Naha, Okinawa; the 49th Fighter Bomber Group (7th, 8th, 9th Squadrons) was based in Misawa, Japan; the 8th Fighter Bomber Group (35th, 36th, and 80th Squadrons) was based in Itazuke, Japan ; the 35th Interceptor Group (39th, 40th, and 41st Squadrons) and 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron based in Yokota, Japan.

In 1948, F-80Cs began to reach operational units in mainland Japan with the 51st Interceptor Wing. In 1949, the 8th Fighter Bomber Group (35th, 36th, and 80th Squadrons) based in Itazuke, Japan received their F-80Cs. On 22 December 1949, the 36th landed its first F-80 at Itazuke. Maj Richard A. McNees, the commanding officer, and three other pilots had flown F-51s to Misawa AB where they exchanged them for the F-80s for the return trip home. The wing would fly the F-80Cs from 1949-1953.

(NOTE: The aircraft designators were changed to F-38G and F-51D after the U.S. Air Force came into being in 1949. This was an interim period as the Air Force had entered the "Jet Age". Starting in 1946, units were being equipped with the new Lockheed F-80 "Shooting Stars" -- with the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing in Okinawa being the first in the Pacific. Interestingly, early in the Korean Conflict, the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing gave up its F-80 jets for Mustangs, perhaps one of the few occasions in history in which a combat outfit traded in its jets for piston-engined aircraft. The Mustangs were instrumental in halting the North Korean advance, giving United Nations forces enough time to build up sufficient strength to be able to go over onto the offensive. Later the 18th reconverted to F-80s and in 1953, converted to F-86s.)

During this time at Itazuke, the military returned to a peacetime operation. Many military members had side jobs to make ends meet. Because of the collapse of the Japanese empire, the cost of living was very cheap -- making the military paycheck go a lot further than if stationed stateside. Living conditions were not luxurious, but most military families found living in Japan a rewarding experience and enjoyed being in the Orient. Though there was a massive Reduction in Force (RIF) at the end of the war, the USAF retained only the most experienced of pilots -- of those that wished to remain in service.

At Itazuke, the transition to the F-80Cs had taken place and the pilots were just getting used to their new aircraft. Some of the older F-51 Mustangs were still in the unit with their machine guns removed -- and used as tow target aircraft. Training became standardized and would later prove to have been unrealistic in meeting the perils of the Korean War. For example, instead of basic navigation training, pilots simply followed the roads or familiar landmarks to their destinations -- and punched holes in the sky to fulfill their flying-hour commitments.

Primary training was centered around alert commitments for Japan. Under the Japanese "Peace" Constitution forced on Japan by the MacArthur Military Government, Japan could have no military whatsoever -- thus the defense role fell to the U.S. With the worldwide spread of communism, Japan became the model for Democracy in Asia. Japan's experiment with democracy HAD TO succeed at all costs. During this time, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) became THE major command in the Air Force that got all the priority. All units' missions were intended to support SAC. Remember that at this time, the US was worried about the long-range bombers of the Soviets and maintained their interceptor forces to counter this threat. Fighters were on alert to scramble to intercept these bombers. Conventional air-to-ground close air support training was relegated to a secondary role.

P-51D Mustang

The following extracted from Aviation History .

In late 1939, with the likelihood of full scale war in Europe a major concern, the British Royal Air Force was looking seriously at methods of quickly increasing its fighter strength. In April 1940, the British Air Purchasing Commission approached North American Aviation with the intent of having them build P-40's for the R.A.F. Instead, North American offered to build an entirely new fighter using the same Allison V-1710-39 engine as the P-40. The British agreed only on the stipulation that a prototype be on hand within 120 days. North American designers Raymond Rice and Edgar Schmued immediately set about meeting the requirements. Schmued had been a part of Willy Messerschmitt's design group in Germany; no doubt the somewhat angular lines of the new fighter came from this relationship.

The Allison-powered prototype NA-73 was assembled within the specified period, but the engine was not yet ready, causing a delay of some six weeks before the NA-73 could fly. In the meantime, on May 4, 1940, the U. S. Army released the design for export sales with the condition that two of the planes be delivered to them for evaluation. At this time the NA-73 was assigned the XP-51 designation. The first and tenth airframes were sent to the Army for testing; these were given the serial numbers 41-38 and -39. An order for 150 P-51's followed. These planes were named "Apache" for a short time, but later the name "Mustang" was adopted for the P-51.

The P-51 was an immediate success. It outperformed even the Spitfire, but the Allison engine placed limitations on the performance. In England, a mock-up was devised to use the Rolls Royce Merlin in the P-51 airframe. One concept was to locate the new engine behind the cockpit, but this idea was rejected and the Merlin was mounted in the conventional position in the nose. Four airframes were adapted in England to take the Merlin engine. These planes had deep intakes below the engine for carburetor air. In the meantime, North American had undertaken a similar conversion project and was building two Packard Merlin-powered Mustangs. The results of the British tests were passed on to North American; and even before the Army's Merlin -powered Mustangs had flown, the U. S. Army ordered 2,200 of the more powerful fighters. For a short time, this model was designated P-78, then reclassified as P-51B.

To say the Merlin Mustangs were successful would be an understatement. The P-51 became one of the aviation world's elite. The total number of 14,819 Mustangs of all types were built for the Army. American Mustangs destroyed 4,950 enemy aircraft in Europe to make them the highest scoring U. S. fighter in the theater. They were used as dive-bombers, bomber escorts, ground-attackers, interceptors, for photo-recon missions, trainers, transports (with a jump-seat), and after the war, high performance racers.

The Merlin -powered P-5lB and its Dallas-built twin, the P-51C, began operations in December 1943. A further improvement to the Mustang was introduced when a graceful teardrop canopy was installed to eliminate the dangerous blind area created by the faired cockpit. First tested on two P-51B's, they became standard on the P-51D and all later models. The P-51D became the version produced in the greatest quantities, 7,954 being completed. The "D" model carried six .50 cal. machine guns instead of the four mounted in the "B's"; and other refinements, such as moving the wing forward slightly and providing for rocket launchers, were included. The first "D" types were delivered without dorsal fins but this feature was added to compensate for keel-loss when the bubble canopy was adopted.

Later developments to the P-51 series included the final production type, the P-51H with several changes which made it the fastest production variant with a maximum speed of 487 mph at 25,000 feet. Five hundred fifty-five P-5lH's were delivered before VJ Day led to cancellation of the P-51 production program.

The P- 51 D represents the typical Mustang configuration. It had a 37-foot wingspan with an area of 233 square feet and was 32 feet 3 inches long. Height was 13 feet 8 inches. The Packard-built Merlin V-1650-7 was capable of delivering 1,695 hp which provided a speed of 437 mph at 25,000 feet. Weights were 7,125 lbs. empty and 10,100 lbs. normal gross, but an additional 2,000 lbs. could be carried. Internal fuel capacity was 105 gallons, giving a range of 950 miles at 362 miles per hour at 25,000 feet. Armament was six .50 cal. wing-mounted machine guns with 1,880 total rounds.

The P-51 was one of the first fighters to use a laminar-flow airfoil, a high-speed shape which became standard on most later high performance fighters.

According to Vectorsite Net :

After the end of WW II, piston-engine fighters were rapidly phased out of front-line service in favor of new jet fighters, such as the P-80 Shooting Star. The USAAF retained a few squadrons of P-51Hs, but the older P-51Ds were passed on to the Air National Guard (ANG). As late as 1952, the ANG would still have 68 squadrons flying the Mustang, though the last of them would be gone in 1957.

Most of the remaining Mustangs were either sold to foreign operators or scrapped. In the early summer of 1950, the USAF had three fighter groups operating in Japan that had converted from the F-51D to the F-80, and the old F-51Ds were sitting in storage, waiting to be scrapped.

When the war broke out on 25 June, the USAF realized that the F-51Ds were what was needed to help stem the North Korean offensive. The North Koreans, as noted, had no advanced aircraft, and the F-51D had better endurance and warload than the F-80, though some Air Force officers worried, with good reason, about the Mustang's traditional vulnerability to ground fire. The P-51D could also operate more effectively than jets from primitive airfields. The three fighter groups traded their F-80s back in for their old F-51Ds and were thrown into the battle.

The USAF also withdrew 145 F-51Ds from ANG units and rushed them to Japan on the carrier USS BOXER, which arrived in Tokyo on 23 July 1950. Two squadrons were equipped with the new arrivals, and were quickly flying dozens of sorties a day from rough airstrips behind the front lines in Korea. A squadron each of Mustangs was provided by Australia and South Africa. F-51Ds were also supplied to the South Koreans.

The Mustangs struck at enemy columns with machine guns, bombs, HVARs, and napalm. Since the bombs and rockets were not particularly accurate, napalm was the preferred weapon for attacking formidable North Korean T-34 tanks, since a napalm bomb saturated a wide area with fire.

The attacks were made at low level, however, and Mustang attrition was high. The notorious vulnerability of the Mustang's cooling system was a particular problem. Some thought was in fact given to fielding a squadron of Republic F-47N Thunderbolts, which were better close-support aircraft, but the aircraft were simply not available.

By the fall of 1950, the North Koreans were on the run, and the Americans and their allies were pursuing them into North Korea. Mustangs ranged freely with little air opposition. They scored five kills during this time, their only air combat victories of the war.

In early November, Mustangs began to encounter Chinese MiG-15s, and it was only due to the skill of the Mustang pilots and the inexperience of the enemy that the F-51Ds were able to survive.

By the time cold weather set in, Chinese forces were pouring into North Korea, driving the Americans and their allies south in a fast retreat that stopped at the South Korean border. The front lines stabilized there and a static war of attrition followed.

With the USAF countering the Soviet MiG-15s with the North American F-86, the air combat environment became increasingly too dangerous for piston engine fighters like the F-51D. Most units equipped with the Mustang converted to jets, and by the end of the war in July 1953, only one USAF squadron and some South Korean units were operating the Mustang.

A total of 194 F-51Ds were lost in the war. 172 were destroyed by ground fire, 10 were shot down by enemy aircraft, and 12 were lost to unreported causes. This is said to be the highest loss ratio of any aircraft operated by the Americans and their allies in the Korean War.

Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star

The following is extracted from Aviation History .

Few airplanes in the history of aeronautics have been as successful as the Lockheed Shooting Star. It was the first operational jet fighter in the United States when it went into service in 1945. It emerged as victor in the world's first all-jet combat, and it won the distinction of remaining in production for a full 15 years after the experimental model was first flown.

The airplane had its origin in June 1943, when Lockheed was requested to design a fighter around the De Havilland turbojet engine developed in England in response to Germany's twin-engine jet fighter, the Messerschmitt Me 262. The XP-80 was designed and built in the amazing period of only 143 days--37 days less than the original schedule. It was flown for the first time on January 8, 1944, and its performance was considered sensational.

P-80 Shooting Star

"It was a magnificent demonstration," said Clarence Johnson, Lockheed's chief research engineer. "our plane was a success -- such a complete success that it had overcome the temporary advantage the Germans had gained from years of preliminary development on jet planes."

The Army Air Force planned to build the Shooting Star in large numbers. However, only two of the machines arrived in Italy before the end of the war in Europe, and these were never used in operations. Despite the cessation of hostilities, production was continued on a reduced scale.

Lockheed built 917 F-80A's and B's, one of which was modified for an attempt on the world speed record. on June 19, 1947, this plane set a speed mark of 623.8 miles per hour. Some of these modifications were retained in the F-80C, 798 of which were produced in 1948 and 1949. At the same time, Lockheed designed a two-seat version, the F-94 Starfire. This model was equipped with radar for all-weather operations.

F-94 Starfire

When war started in Korea, F-80's were sent to the battle area to help the South Koreans. On November 10, 1950, Lieutenant Russell Brown, flying a Shooting Star, made history when he destroyed a Russian MiG-15 fighter in the world's first decisive all-jet combat.

Final version of the plane was the T-33 trainer, which remained in continuous production until August 1959. The T-33A was a very hot fighter to handle, compared to slower piston engine aircraft, and an alarming number of airplanes were lost. The solution was a redesigned T-33A two seat trainer. Engineers at Lockheed called their operation the "Skunk Works", named after an imaginary factory in the "Li'l Abner" comic strip.

Early Problems

In the early years some T-33s were blowing up just after take-off. The T-33 (F-80) had a fuselage tank just aft of the cockpit, filled through a zeus fastened cover plate and tank cap. Some of the pilots and/or ground crews were not diligent in checking the door or the cap. The aircraft would take off and at about 120 knots, the airflow would create a vacuum immediately over this cover. If it and the cap were not properly closed, the kerosene would be sucked out of the tank.

Immediately behind the the filler tube were spring-loaded plenum chamber doors feeding extra air to the engine. These didn't close until the aircraft reached about 200 knots. The combustible mixture would ignite and cause the plan to explode. The problem was solved by placing two fins underneath the cover which had to mesh with the fin on the cap. The cover could not be locked if the cap wasn't secured. The pilots would always check the cover and it's zeus fastener after hearing the horror story once.

Dimensions were wingspan 38 feet 9 inches (without wingtip tanks), length 34 feet 5 inches, height 11 feet 3 inches, and wing area 237.6 square feet Weights were 8420 pounds empty, 12,200 pounds gross, and 16,856 pounds maximum takeoff. Maximum speed was 594 mph at sea level and 543 mph at 25,000 feet. Initial climb rate was 6870 feet/minute, and an altitude of 25,000 feet could be attained in 7 minutes. Service ceiling was 46,800 feet. Normal range was 825 miles, and maximum range was 1380 miles. Armament consisted of six 0.50-inch machine guns. An underwing load of 2000 pounds of bombs, napalm or rockets could be carried.

Creation of the 8th Fighter Wing (1948-1951)

Wing Commander: - Col Charles T. Olmsted, 18 Aug 1948;

Wing Commander: - Col Daniel A. Cooper, 22 Jan 1949;

Wing Commander: - Col John M. Price, 1 Mar 1949;

Wing Commander: - Col Charles W. Stark, 9 Dec 1950; (NOTE: Col. Stark, first CO of the 43rd Air Division, served in the Air Corps, AAF and USAF from June 1937 to his retirement in July 1961. He was shot down on his 32nd mission in a P-47 in Italy and spent the last 14 months of the war in Europe in a POW camp. During the Korean war, he commanded the 8th FBW on its first deployment to Korea and flew 86 combat missions there. He flew virtually every fighter the U.S. had, from the P-26 "Peashooter" to the F-104 Starfighter. He died in Olympia, Wash., in October 2006 at the age of 94.)

Wing Commander: - Col James B. Tipton, 3 Apr 1951; (See Maj Gen James Tipton.)

When the 8th Fighter Wing was created in 1948, the 8th Fighter Group continued on as a subordinate unit. There is some confusion caused by the wording in the 8th FW Fact Sheet : "The 8th Fighter Wing Wolf Pack traces its history back to Ashiya, Japan, where it was activated under its present designation Aug. 18, 1948. Using temporary bestowal, the wing also claims the lineage and honors of its predecessor unit, the 8th Fighter Group, which was activated at Langley Field, Va. April 1, 1931." This gives the impression that the 8th Fighter GROUP was deactivated at the same time as the 8th Fighter WING was activated. This is not the case. The Fighter Bomber Group continued in existence until 1957.

The 8th Fighter WING was created in 1948, but the 8th Fighter GROUP was never deactivated. The "wing" is a structural element one level higher than a "group." Basically, the Wing controls the base functions with dissimilar flying units under its umbrella. The WING was established as the 8th Fighter Wing on 10 Aug 1948 and activated on 18 Aug 1948. The 8th Fighter GROUP (containing the 35th, 36th, and 80th Fighter Squadrons) was attached to the 8th Fighter Wing starting 18 Aug 1948. On 1 Oct 1957, the 8th Fighter Group later became the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group and then later on became the 8th Operations Group . The USAF restructured under the Tri-Deputate system -- Deputy Commander for Maintenance; Deputy Commander for Logistics; and Deputy Commander for Operations under the Wing Commander. This eliminated the "group" from the USAF organizational structure. After 1957, the "Group" disappeared and the squadrons were directly attached to the wing. All the "temporary bestowal" means is that the 8th Fighter Wing can display all honors previously received by the 8th Fighter Group in World War II. The 8th Fighter Group has been "reborn" in 1992 and is now the 8th Operations Group of the 8th Fighter Wing.

The wing was redesignated as the 8th Fighter Bomber Wing (FBW) on Jan. 20, 1950. The 8th FBG initially consisted of 2 squadrons: the 35th FBS (Black Panthers) and the 36th FBS (Flying Fiends). The 80th FBS (Headhunters) was assigned on 11 Aug 1950. (See Jim James' 8th Fighter Bomber Wing (Hoboes) Page )

"BLACK PANTHERS" 35th FBS

"FLYING FIENDS" 36th FBS

"HEADHUNTERS" 80th FBS

F-51D Mustangs and Bout-One

As the events unfolded in Korea, all available fighter aircraft were pressed into service and the transfer of these aircraft was put on a hold temporarily. At least two squadrons of F-51 from Tsuiki AB, Japan in Fukuoka, Japan (the site of Itazuke AB -- the home of the 8th FBW) was sent to Korea with the 8th FBW "Hobo Squadron." The 8th FBW used the aircraft in combat and accounted for 3 F-51 kills up to 29 June 1950. The aircraft were transferred to the South Koreans on 3 July 50 and would eventually end up in the ROKAF 51st Provisional Squadron flying from Taegu in the early days of the war. The MiG-l5s had not entered the war so in the initial days of the conflict, the F-80s, F-82s and F-51s quickly cleared the skies. (Go to 8 FBW Kills in beginning days of the war.)

In History, 5th AF, Vol 1, Jun 25-Oct 31, 1950, p3 it stated that a number of ROK pilots had been selected just prior to the invasion for training on the F-51. With the outbreak of the war, the need for their services became great and a detachment, named "Bout-One," was formed out of the American 36th FBS to hasten their training on 27 June 1950. The F-51s were former tow target aircraft. The half-trained Korean pilots and their instructors, led by Maj Dean Hess, moved to Taegu (K-2) on June 30 and began flying combat missions almost immediately. In The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p89) stated, "General Partridge had feared that the Korean pilots might not be able to fly the ten Mustangs which he provided, and he had gotten permission to assign nine USAF instructor pilots to the project." It continued, "The Mustangs which "Bout-One" brought to Korea had been towing targets for several years in Japan and were in sad mechanical condition." Regardless, heavy demands were made on the pilots of Bout-One and they inflicted great damage on the enemy vehicles and troop movements.

ROKAF F-51s

General Partridge of 5th AF "manned ten Mustangs, which had been withdrawn from storage in Japan and sent them into combat. The pilots took the Mustangs off from Itazuke early on the morning of 10 July, flew initial combat strikes, and then landed at Taegu and replenished for several more missions during the day. Airlifted fuel and armament from Ashiya supported the forward area operation." These would form the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) and was authorized to take over the American personnel from "Bout-One" and the "Dallas" Squadron people which 13th AF was forming. (Go to ROKAF for historical details of the ROKAF from 1949-Present.)

Overview of the First Days

In Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea by James T. Stewart (p108) it states, "At the outbreak of hostilities, fighter bomber squadrons were deployed away from their home bases on training exercises or joint maneuvers. Most of the pilots, having recently survived an officer reduction-in-force, were experienced, stable, and seriously aggressive. They were just getting comfortably used to their new airplanes when orders came to proceed with aircraft to bases in southern Japan. All available fighter bombers converged on the Fukuoka area where Fifth Air force established an advance headquarters and a joint operations center at Itazuke Air Base."

"The first fighter-bomber missions were dispatched on 28 June 1950, just three days after the war began. These missions were in support of a hard-pressed UNC Army which was retreating toward southeastern Korea. They were mainly armed reconnaissance missions aimed at blasting moving columns of enemy equipment, supplies, and personnel."

"Even though bases of operation were as close as possible to Korea, the F-80Cs could remain in the target area only a few minutes. If FEAF aircraft were to have adequate endurance for Korean operations, there range must be extended or they must be based in South Korea. Range was extended by adding two cells to the standard wing-tip tanks, but the additional weight resulted in numerous wing failures."

"The two best Korean airfields, Kimpo and Suwon, were lost in the early ground actions, but K-2 at Taegu and K-3 at Pohang because usable as advance bases with the addition of pierced steel planking."

"At this time, consideration was given to replacing the F-80Cs with F-51s. F-51s were better suited for operations from rough Korean fields, even though the F-80 had proved to be a rugged aircraft; the F-51s had more endurance at low altitudes while on armed reconnaissance and close-support missions; F-51s used less fuel. For these reasons and because F-51s and spare parts were available from Air National Guard units, the change was made."

"By mid-July a joint operations center (JOC) and tactical air control center (TACC) were established at Taegu after a short stay at Taejon. Tactical air direction cents (TACSs) were not used because of a shortage of equipment and the lack of enemy air opposition. Eighteen tactical air command posts (TACPs) did yeoman service controlling strikes against the advancing enemy. A little later, airborne air controllers were put into service and did a wonderful job helping fighter-bombers find the most lucrative targets. At best all communication channels were overloaded, and the only control many missions had was the information given pilots at briefings."

In Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea (pp106-107) it states, "Conversion from propeller-driven F-51s to jet aircraft had posed many problems. One of the most serious problems was that wing brackets for attaching auxiliary fuel tanks and ordnance. So much difficulty had been experienced that a substantial percentage of F-80C aircraft could not carry either wing-tip tanks or bombs when the Korean War began. Other deficiencies which adversely affected transition to jets were shortages of oxygen masks and helmets for pilots and auxiliary ground power and fuel servicing units for the aircraft. Cross-country had been curtailed and most of the navigational flights had been between well-known bases which had adequate radio aids along the route. This training served little purpose when pilots went into combat where navigational aids were scarce. When dead reckoning navigation suddenly became necessary, few pilots were prepared. Rocket training was all but halted due to the economy program levied on the services. Some practice had been done with a sub-caliber aerial rocket but none with five-inch high velocity aerial rockets (HVARs), which were later used in combat."

"Since FEAF's mission had been one of defense, unit tactical training had mainly consisted of interception missions and exercises. There had been intermittent joint training maneuvers with the Eight Army, but these were canned problems conducted over well-known areas. They offered little in the way of combat conditioning for either air or ground elements."

This overview illustrates how ill-prepared the 8th was for the upcoming battles.

First Days of the Korean War

The official 8th FW Fact Sheet states, "On June 26, 1950, one day after the North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea, the wing flew air cover for the evacuation of Americans from South Korea, thus becoming the first wing to fly combat missions in that conflict ." Technically this is incorrect..."combat" was not authorized until the June 27th. There was a mix-up in the language of the orders and the first days involvement was considered a "show of force" -- and returning fire was NOT authorized. During the first days of the war, the fighters were in Korea to only provide air-cover for the evacuation as the authority of General MacArthur only extended to the waters' edge of Korea. It wasn't until the 27th when General MacArthur received approval to use the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) in an offensive role.

On 25 June at 1500 two Yak-9s sprayed Kimpo with cannon and machine gun fire. They exploded the fuel dump, destroyed a USAF C-54 and wiped out the remains of the ROKAF aircraft.

Freighters were standing by for the evacuation. In the early hours of June 26th General MacArthur ordered General Partridge (5th AF Commander) to provide fighter cover over Inchon during the embarkation and subsequent withdrawal. However, the fighters were NOT to venture over the Korean mainland, and were to engage in combat only if the freighters were directly threatened.

The tasking was levied on Colonel Jack Price, Commander of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing. The only aircraft suitable for the task because of the range was the F-82 Twin Mustangs of the 68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron. Unfortunately there were too few to carry out the patrols. The request to use the No. 77 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force was rejected. General Partridge ordered the 339th F(AW)IS to transfer its F-82s from Yokota to Itazuke, and also requested the 20th AF to dispatch eight F-82s from the 4th F(AW)IS from Okinawa.

According The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, His Korean War Diary (p40), this permission "to use arms if necessary to insure the safety of the evacuation movement" was limited to USAF and Navy units only. The book stated (p37) that on 26 June 1950 that Brig. Gen. Jarred V. Crabb had received instructions from GHQ (General Headquarters) about the evacuation of dependents from Inchon by freighter. "We are to provide fighter cover and are authorized to fire on enemy aircraft to protect these vessels. I told Crabb to put this in writing to the FAF (5th AF) and to send info copy to GHQ so that they may object to the language if it is inappropriate."

However, in another portion of the diary (p42), it states that until 27 June, the pilots of the 68th F(AW)S were operating under "normal instructions" to NOT return fire or engage in combat unless the freighter was directly threatened. According to History, FEAF, 25 Jun-31 Dec 50, pp 29-31 describes an incident when a F-82 evaded an attack. "Although authorized to fire on any enemy aircraft while performing this cover mission, the U.S. pilots did not return fire. " This event caused a flurry of messages as to why the F-82 had not returned fire. It appears the F-82s still considered this a "show of force" only...without permission to return fire.

According to MiG Alley, The Fight for Air Superiority by William T. Y'Blood, "On June 26, a pair of La-7 fighters bounced two F-82s near Seoul. When the Twin Mustangs turned into the attack, the enemy planes fled. Authorized to fire if the enemy attempted to disrupt the evacuation, the FEAF fliers refrained because the La-7s never got close to either the harbor or the Kimpo airport. The defenders were also unsure of the "rules of engagement," a term not used in the Korean War, but applicable here."

In Air War Over Korea (p15) states when the F-82s were attacked by a La-7 on the 26th while escorting the freighter Reinholte . "The American pilots took violent evasive action and and after this one firing pass the enemy fighter climbed steeply back into the clouds and disappeared. The F-82s continued to provide cover throughout the remainder of the day." They continued the cover of the freighter until the ship was met by an escort of American destroyers.

Paul Jeffreys of Whittier, California in the Korean War Project described an incident on the 26th of June involving an F-82: "I was one the 3 mechanics who worked on a damaged F82 the day before the police action started. LT Hutson was flying in a show of force over Kimpo when he was shot in the hor/stab and he managed to get back to Ashiya. The next day we were allowed to fire back and Lt Hutson went back up and shot the 1st Yak in the Korean War." (NOTE: He is referring to Lieutenant William G. Hudson.)

Finally, on the 27th of June General MacArthur received approval from the Joint Chiefs for the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) to be used in an offensive role. President Truman had announced that he had ordered the USAF to aid South Korea. A broad directive was given which in short licensed the American pilots to range over the ground between the front line and the 38th Parallel and shoot up everything that carried a red star. Then the turkey shoot began.

The following is the story of the 27th of June as related in MiG Alley, The Fight for Air Superiority by William T. Y'Blood.

"On the 27th, F-82Gs of the 68th, 339th, and 4th Fighter All-Weather Squadrons and F-80Cs of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing (FBW) took turns covering the ship evacuation from Inchon and the air evacuation from Kimpo airport. Four F-82s of the 68th orbited Kimpo and Suwon at 4,000 feet while a trio of 339th Twin Mustangs flew a mid-cover at 8,000 feet and four more 4th Squadron fighters flew above a thin deck of clouds at 12,000 feet. For nearly three hours the planes bored holes in the sky, seeing little except arriving and departing transports and slowly thickening clouds. Then, shortly after noon, as the F-82s were being forced lower by the clouds, one pilot called out, "They're shooting at me!"

"The Americans went into their breaks as several enemy planes flashed by, damaging 1st Lt. Charles B. Moran's plane in the process. The North Korean aircraft were not fast enough to escape, however, as several of the big F-82s "latched-on" to the attackers. First Lieutenant William Hudson and his radar operator, Lt. Carl Fraser, followed one of the enemy planes (identified as either a Yak-11 or a Yak-7U) through the clouds, knocking off chunks of fuselage and setting its wing afire. The Americans saw the enemy pilot climb out of his cockpit onto the wing and say something to his observer. Either dead or frozen in fear, the observer did not move. The pilot then pulled the ripcord on his chute, which billowed and yanked him off the wing. The Yak rolled over and dove into the ground, taking the observer with it."

"Meanwhile, after shaking off his attacker, Lt. Moran got behind what he identified as either a Yak or an La-7 and sent it straight into the ground. (Aircraft identification was a problem in Korea, just as it had been in World War II. North Korean Yaks had inline engines, while the Lavochkins had radials, quite obvious design differences.) Major James W. Little, the 339th's commander, also bagged an La-7, and two other enemy planes were claimed by the Americans as probables."

"All of these victories came almost simultaneously, and not until 1953 did the USAF credit Lt. Hudson with scoring the first kill of the war. Not to be outdone by their prop-driven compatriots, FEAF F-80Cs also scored on the 27th. That afternoon, a quartet of Shooting Stars from the 8th FBW's 35th Fighter Bomber Squadron (FBS) were orbiting Kimpo airfield when eight Il-10s darted underneath them and began strafing the field. Before the Americans could interfere, the enemy planes destroyed seven ROKAF aircraft caught on the ground. The North Korean's joy in their victories was short-lived. First Lieutenant Robert E. Wayne bagged two of the attackers as they pulled out of their runs, while Capt. Raymond E. Schillereff and 1st Lt. Robert H. Dewald each shot down an Il-10. The remaining enemy planes quickly scooted for home. The three Americans had scored the first jet aircraft victories of the war."

On the 27th of June, three units share the honors of the first air combat units in Korea: the 35th Fighter Bomber Squadron (8th FBW) of Itazuke AB; the 68th F(AW)S (347th F(AW)G) of Ashiya AB (attached to the 8 FBW); and the 339th F(AW)S (347th F(AW)G) of Yokota AB.

The paper "USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict," 25 Jun-1 Nov 50, USAF Hist Study 71, pp. 5-6. recounts these actions, "On 27 June the evacuation of American and other foreign nationals continued from Kimpo and Suwon Airfields at an increased pace. During the morning 3 North Korean planes fired on four American fighters covering the air evacuation and, in the ensuing engagement, the U.S. fighters shot down all 3 enemy planes near Inch'on. Later in the day, American fighter planes shot down 4 more North Korean YAK-3 planes in the Inch'on-Seoul area.

During 27 June F-80 and F-82 planes of the 68th and 339th All-Weather Fighter Squadrons and the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the Fifth Air Force flew 163 sorties over Korea. " On June 27, four Shooting Stars from the 35th Fighter Bomber Squadron intercepted eight North Korean Ilyushin Il-10 Sturmovik ground-attack bombers and shot down four of them, scoring the first combat victories for an American jet fighter. On June 28, RF-80As began flying operational reconnaissance sorties, while the F-80Cs began to fly ground attack missions in support of the retreating South Korean forces. On June 30, the ban against air operations over North Korea was lifted, and the initial commitment of US troops was approved.

On the 27th of June, the 35th FS F-80Cs had returned to Itazuke to refuel and left the F-82 Twin Mustangs from the 68th All-Weather Fighter Squadron (F(AW)S) above the area. The F-82Gs were the only aircraft available in Japan that had sufficient endurance to fly to the battle area and operate for hours over the evacuation centers at Kimpo and Inchon. The evacuation of the C-47 and C-54 transports from Kimpo was in "chaos" when a flight of five North Korean Yak-7s appeared over the airport. However, before they could get to the transports on the ground, a flight of North American F-82 Twin Mustangs intercepted them. Three of the Yak-11s fell in flames before the others scattered for home. Lieutenant William ("Skeeter") Hudson and his radar operator, Lieutenant Carl Fraser, of the 68th F(AW)S scored the first kill of the day and also the first American air-to-air victory of the Korean War. (NOTE: Other sources claim the first kill was a Yak-7 instead of a Yak-11) Later the same day two other members of the 68th F(AW)S scored kills. Lieutenant Charles Moran shot down a Yak-9 a short time later, and Major James Little increased the day's score to three by destroying an La-7.

The official 8th FW Fact Sheet states, "The following day, June 27, 1st Lt. Robert H. Dewald, assigned to the 8th Fighter Bomber Wing's 35th Fighter Squadron, shot down an enemy aircraft. Flying an F-80, the lieutenant achieved the first enemy aircraft kill of that conflict , as well as the first confirmed U.S. Air Force kill from a jet aircraft." THIS IS DISPUTED . As was mentioned before, Lieutenant William ("Skeeter") Hudson of the 68th All-Weather Fighter Squadron laid claim to the first air-to-air kill of the conflict in his F-82 "Twin Mustang".

As to claim that 1Lt Dewald had the first USAF jet kill, it is also in dispute between 1Lt Dewald, 1Lt Wayne and Capt. Schillereff. After Lt Hudson got the first aerial kill on the 27th, three pilots of the 35th FBS got four more aerial kills in their F-80 "Shooting Star" aircraft. There is no dispute over whether the 35th FBS had the first jet kill, but there is a dispute over WHO actually made the first jet kill.

According to Crimson Sky -- The Air Battle for Korea (pp. 5-7), it was actually 1Lt Robert Wayne (of the 35th FBS) and his wingman 1Lt Ralph "Smiley" Hall who had the initial two kills of Il-10 Sturmovik ground-attack bombers ... only later did Capt. Ray Schillereff and 1Lt Robert "Slick" Dewald pick off one each of the fleeing group of bombers. There were four kills by the 35th FBS that day, two by Wayne and one each by Dewald and Schillereff. (Go to 35th Fighter Squadron History for the full story.)

However, according to U.S. Korean War Aces , Capt. Schillereff was the first to get a jet kill. The incidents of June 27, 1950 were as follows: "In June of 1950, in response to North Korean offensives, U.S. planes from the Fifth Air Force stationed in Japan were sent to South Korea. A handful of F-82 Twin Mustangs, the last piston-engined fighters to be purchased by the U.S. Air Force, and several F-80 Shooting Stars, the first U.S. jet fighters to be used in combat, were now patrolling the skies over Kimpo, South Korea."

"Around noon on that day, five Yaks flew in low over Seoul. They were met by the F-82s, and the result could only be categorized as a rout. In the dogfight that lasted less than five minutes the F-82s shot down three Yaks and drove off the other two."

"About an hour later the North Koreans made another attempt to disrupt the Kimpo airlift. Eight Russian-built Il-10 Sturmoviks, piston-engined ground-attack fighters, were headed to Kimpo. One pass was all the American pilots, flying F-80 Shooting Stars, needed to again rout the North Koreans. Capt. Raymond Schillereff was the first to splash a Il-10 into a rice paddy followed quickly by Lt. Robert Wayne with the second and third kills. Lt. Robert Dewald got the fourth and the rest turned tail, leaving Kimpo untouched. It was the first time American jets had fired their guns in combat and they had four kills to show for it."

In Air War Over Korea (p18) it states, "The biggest American fighter effort of the day was laid on in midafternoon, when F-80s of the 8th FIghter Bomber Wing, together with a flight of Mustangs, which were about to be turned over to the South Korean Air Force, orbited in relays over Suwon to cover the arrival of a C-54 carrying General MacArthur, who had decided to fly to Korea to make an on the spot survey of the situation. An hour after his arrival, MacArthur was treated to a grandstand view of an air battle as four Yak-9s attempted to attack Suwon airfield. The enemy fighters were intercepted by the Mustang Flight and not one of them escaped; two were shot down very quickly by Lieutenant Orrin R. Fox of the 80th Squadron, a third by Lieutenant Harry T. Sandlin of the same unit and the fourth by Lieutenant Richard J. Burns of the 35th Squadron."

The United States Air Force in Korea (pp30-31) states, "In deference to the Communist air threat, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing used its F-80 fighters in a novel employment. Fully loaded with .50 caliber ammunition (but carrying no external bombs or rockets), the F-80s flew to the Han and established patrol orbits at 10,000 feet. They remained on these stations for fifteen to twenty minutes, and if enemy aircraft appeared they engaged them. If not, the F-80s swooped over Seoul and made one or two passes against hostile road traffic before returning to Itazuke."

Air Combat website lists some of the early 8th FBG kills between June 27-30, 1950. Notice that some of the kills are from F-51 Mustangs. The 8th FBG had just converted over to the F-80s, but there were still F-51s in the squadrons being used for tow target missions. Before the North Korean attack, they were ordered to be prepared for shipment to the ROK -- even though they had no viable Air Force at the time. However, as events unfolded, they were rearmed by order of 5AF and immediately pressed into service. The older North Korean planes were no match for the F-80s, F-82s and F-51s. Later F-51 kills were after the ANG F-51s arrived from stateside and the 35th and 36th squadrons reconverted to the F-51. The 80th remained equipped with the F-80C.

NOTE (a) -- Names from Air War Over Korea . Also these events are detailed in The US Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p31). AFHRA Aerial Victories lists 1Lt Roy W. Marsh as 8th Squadron "MARSH ROY W 1LT 8 SQ US AO0762377".

NOTE (b) -- In the "Flying Fiends" website, "Twelve F-80s of the 36th encountered twelve Mig-15s over North Korea on 3 October 1951. Final score for the 36th: two Mig-15s killed, one damaged; Reds - zero!"

NOTE (c) -- According to Air War Over Korea (p28) between "July 17th and 20th, F-80 pilots of the 8th Group also destroyed six enemy fighters in the air-to-air combats along the front lines."

According to MiG Alley, The Fight for Air Superiority by William T. Y'Blood, "On July 17, enemy planes were again encountered, and in a brief skirmish, a Yak-9 fell to Capt. Francis B. Clark flying an F-80. Two days later, pilots of the 36th FBS on a close support mission tangled with a quartet of Yak-9s attacking the Taejon airfield. When the Americans spotted them, the Yaks were returning north. Jettisoning the rockets they were carrying for their ground mission, the Shooting Star pilots were quickly on top of the enemy planes. In quick succession, 1st Lts. Robert D. McKee and Charles W. Wurster and 2d Lt. Elwood A. Kees blasted three of the Yaks out of the sky. This victory was Wurster's second, and he became one of only three pilots to score more than one "kill" in all of 1950."

It continued, "July 20 saw Taejon fall. It also saw the rapidly enfeebled NKAF lose more planes. Captain Robert L. Lee and 2d Lt. David H. Goodnough, both of the 35th FBS, blasted two Yaks from the sky. As it turned out, these two planes would be the last enemy aircraft to fall for more than three months."

In The United States Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p101) it says, "...immediately north of the 38th parallel near Pyongyang, and some 25 planes were camouflaged under tree branches along the west edge of this field. The enemy was obviously not expecting an air attack when seven F-80s of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group, led by Lt. Col William T. Samways , the group's commander, dropped in at low level over Pyonggang during the midafternoon of 19 July. Making pass after pass over the airfield, the F-80 pilots destroyed 14 enemy fighters and one twin-engine bomber on the ground. The jet pilots also strafed seven other planes, but because they did not burn, these planes could be counted only as "damaged."

In the Appendix of Air War Over Korea , Lt.Col. William T. Samways of the 8th FBG flying an F-80 is credited with 4 kills, but these may have been aircraft destroyed on the ground. In the beginning of the Korean Conflict, FEAF at first awarded credit for destruction of enemy airplanes on the ground. For example, in one attack on the main Pyongyang airfield on July 19, seven 8th Fighter-Bomber Group (FBG) F-80s destroyed 14 enemy fighters and a twin-engine bomber on the ground. Another seven planes were damaged. These credits have been deleted from the current USAF Historical Research Center list. Lt. Col. Samways is NOT listed as having any aerial kills on this list.

The United States Air Force in Korea continued (p101) "Along the battleline jet pilots of the 8th Group shot down one Yak on 17 July, three on 19 July, and two more on 20 July. Excellent coordination by air-ground radio control was said to have been largely responsible for these successful interceptions. "We were attacking enemy targets when we were called by the ground controller and informed of the Yaks," explained one F-80 pilot on 19 July, "and that controller took us right to them although we were low on ammunition and just about ready to go back to our home base."

NOTE (d) -- Go to MiG Kills for details of the 10 May 1955 shoot down. 2 confirmed kills and one probable. One pilot identified as Lt. (later Maj. Gen.) James E McInerney by Ken Creasy, the crew chief of one of the jets involved.

NOTE (e) -- The United States Air Force in Korea (p296) "On 17 March, near Sonchon, three MIG's again engaged an 8th Group flight in a battle which ranged in and out of the overcast and ended when a MIG and an F-80 collided head-on, destroying both aircraft."

NOTE (f) - The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p414) states "On 9 November 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron F-80s tangled with three times their number of MIG's south of Nunu-ri and handled themselves well enough to shoot down two of the Reds. On the other hand, the MIG's downed one F-80 and three F-84's during the month."

NOTE (g) - 1st Lt Robert E. Wayne was the first pilot to be rescued from behind enemy lines, being saved by Lt Paul Van Boven in an H-5 helicopter on Septmber 4, 1950. According to The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, His Korean War Diary , edited by William T. Y'Blood, 1999, (p50) stated in Gen. Stratemeyer's words on 5 September 1950, "A Lt Wayne, who was recently on the cover of Life as having shot down the first two Yaks in the war (Lt Wayne was flying an F-80), was forced to bail out in a rice paddy, after the F-51 he was in was hit, behind enemy lines. A helicopter was dispatched immediately, it went back of the lines and rescued Wayne -- all of which was taking place under enemy fire. When Wayne arrived back at Itazuke, he discovered that his wife had had a baby." It continued, "General Lowe stated to General Partridge, relating the incident to him, that all participants should receive not less than the Medal of Honor." (The two 1l-10s the Wayne shot down are noted in The United States Air Force in Korea (p557).)

NOTE (h): According to According to MiG Alley, The Fight for Air Superiority talks of August 1950, "Over the next couple of days, Mustang pilots from the 8th FBG tangled with MiGs coming across the Yalu from Antung. Neither side scored in battles on the 6th, but combats on the 7th and 8th bore more positive results. In one bout on the 7th, four F-51s and four MiG-15s initially met head-on, then broke into a "yo-yo" action. The MiG pilots' gunnery was not good, but one of the Mustang pilots, Maj. Kendall Carson, scored a hit in one of the jets' wing roots. Carson's attention was quickly diverted when the other three MiGs swept past him back to Antung. When Carson looked back, burning wreckage on the ground marked the spot where the MiG-15 had crashed. No one had seen the fighter go in, so Carson did not receive official credit for the fighter's destruction.

"Other 8th FBG pilots also clashed with MiGs on the 7th. One fight took place at 10,000 feet, a good altitude for the Mustangs but not for the MiGs. In an action that lasted about seven minutes, three of the enemy planes were damaged. A fourth was seen disappearing over the sea, its guns still firing. Yet more MiGs attacked another Mustang flight later in the day, with no results on either side."
NOTE (i): The kills after Nov 50 taken from list UN Kills . Source: Air War Korea 1950-1953 , Robert Jackson, Motorbooks International, 1998

NOTE (j): AFHRA Aerial Victories lists this as a IL-10

NOTE (k): AFHRA Aerial Victories lists Orrin Fox as the 8th Squadron. "FOX ORRIN R 2LT 8 SQ US AO1909582" and credits him with 2 kills.

NOTE (l): AFHRA Aerial Victories lists Harry T. Sandlin as the 8th Squadron. "SANDLIN HARRY T 1LT 8 SQ US AO2101183 ".

NOTE (m): 8th Fighter Wing History: Appendix lists Major Little as part of the "339th FS." The 339th F(AW)S of Yokota was attached to the 8th FG between 26 Jun - 5 Jul 1950. Major Little shot down the Yak-7 with his F-82 on 27 Jun 50.

NOTE (Info): AFHRA Aerial Victories lists Richard Heyman as the 8th Squadron flying a B-26. He was part of the 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) flying with the 8th Bomb Squadron (L-NI).

NOTE (Info): According to the Headhunter's Website about the 80th FBS, "By December 1951, the squadron had flown 10,827 combat sorties. During the first year of the Korean War, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing and its flying units, the 80th FBS "Headhunter," 35th FBS "Pantons," and 36th FBS "Flying Fiends" were credited with destroying at least 45 enemy aircraft (of which the 80th got 17), 256 tanks, 1916 artillery positions, 4026 vehicles, 48 locomotives, 6026 buildings, and 14,684 enemy troops." These aircraft numbers may include the aircraft destroyed on the ground. At the start of the war, these aircraft were counted as aircraft kills, but later they were deleted from historical lists.

According to the AFHRA, "Introduction, Korean War Aerial Victory Credits" , "Headquarters Far East Air Forces (HQ FEAF), the organization responsible for awarding victory credits during the Korean Conflict, required proof of the destruction of enemy aircraft before issuing general orders to confirm claims. This proof usually consisted of witness statements, gun camera film, or the sighting of aircraft wreckage…. Following the policy used for apportioning victory credits in World War II, FEAF divided into fractions each credit awarded to more than one flyer. For example, if two fighter pilots shot down the same airplane, each received a half credit. Korean victory credits were never divided between more than two men."

First Kill of the Korean War Attributed to the 68th All-Weather Fighter Squadron

Some think the 68th All-Weather Fighter Squadron (F(AW)S) of Ashiya AB, Japan was PERMANENTLY assigned under the 8th Fighter Bomber Wing at Itazuke at the beginning of the Korean War. This is NOT true. The 68th F(AW)S was only temporarily ATTACHED to the wing from 1 March 1950 through 1 December 1950. It was part of the 347th Fighter All-Weather Group whose units were geographically separated throughout Japan.

The reason that the 68th was attached BEFORE the Korean War broke out (March 1950) appears to be that a major FEAF Air Defense exercise was scheduled for March 1950 at Ashiya AB, Japan. It was to test the FEAF's defense capabilities. The exercise was postponed due to inclement weather. Because of this, units like the 8th FBG -- with F-80s and F-82s -- and the 3rd Bomb Group with its two squadrons of B-26 invaders -- were prepositioned at Ashiya and able to enter the war immediately.

After the North Koreans invaded the South, the FEAF was caught with its pants down. Ill-trained and ill-equipped, it started consolidating all its assets under one wing. Not only the USAF units, but the RAAF Squadon 77 and VMF(N)-513 land-based Marine Night Fighters with their F4U-5N Corsairs were under the Wing.

The reason this point of the 68th F(AW)S being only attached is brought up is that the 8th FW Fact Sheet claims that the 8th FW had the first air-to-air kill of the Korean Conflict by lLt Robert Dewald. In another history, it states "...the wing flew the F-80, and also operated propeller driven aircraft such as the F-51 Mustang and F-82 Twin Mustang, with various squadrons attached to the wing during the first months of the war." It is in error for two reasons. First, on 27 June 1950, flying a North American F-82, lst Lt. William G. Hudson of the 68th F(AW)S destroyed a Yak-11 (some say Yak-7) near Seoul, the first enemy plane shot down in the Korean War. Second, as was mentioned before, the 8th FBG did NOT have any F-82s assigned, but only attached.

The confusion comes when the records that show the 8th FW flying the F-82 "Twin Mustang" in 1950. (See the Air University 8th Fighter Wing .) In addition, perhaps some of this confusion comes from the terminology used. In the definitive The United States Air Force in Korea by Robert F. Futrell (p3) it says "At Itazuke on Kyushu, southernmost of the main Japanese islands, was the 8th Fighter Bomber Wing, augmented by the 68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron." One could say that it "augmented" the mission of the 8th for air defense as the F-80C was not an all-weather fighter. However, the 68th F(AW)S was stationed at Itazuke (though other reports say Ashiya AB) as part of the 347th Fighter All-Weather Group. It was only attached to the wing from Mar 50-Dec 50. The best description is in The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, His Korean War Diary (p21), "...the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing (72/53 F-80Cs) was at Itazuke Air Base on Kyushu, along with the F-82s (10/6) of the 68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron".

The 68th F(AW)S flying the North American F-82 "Twin Mustang" was stationed at Itazuke, Japan (though some sources report Ashiya) before the Korean War. Its role was as an air-interceptor due to its longer range, longer-time over target, and all-weather capabilities. (For the history of the 68th go to 68 FS .) According to Twin Mustangs , "Three squadrons of F-82Gs were operating in Japan as part of the 347th Fighter (All Weather) Group, when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950." All of these squadrons were moved to Itazuke soon after the war began and attached to the 8th FBG for the first few months of the war. The units were: 68th F(AW)S of Itazuke; 339th F(AW)S of Yokota (26 Jun - 5 Jul 1950); and 4th F(AW)S of Misawa (26 Jun-13 Jul 1950).

The F-82s of the 4th and 339th remained at Itazuke, but the 68th's F-82s and the 8th FBG's F-51s became the 5th Air Force 8th Fighter Wing "Hobo Squadron" . They were deployed into Korea to provide Close Air Support (CAS) for the troops retreating into the Pusan perimeter in August 1950. Building and operating from makeshift runways hastily prepared with Pierced Steel Plate (PSP) runways, they finally ended up at Yonil Air Base in Pohang. (NOTE: Only one flight of the F-82s (3 aircraft) was at Yonil.) They operated from this base until ordered to return to Itazuke by the 5AF (over the objections of General MacArthur).

The 68th remained with the 8th through its return to Korea in October 1950 and subsequent retreat from Pyongyang on December 9, 1950. After the retreat from Pyongyang, the unit fell back to K-14 (Kimpo AB) and K-13 (Suwon) but on December 10, 1950 the 8th FBW F-51s returned to Itazuke. However, the 68th left for K2 (Taegu) where it was attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

In the early days of the war, the North Korean Air Force had no advanced jet aircraft, and the F-82Gs and Lockheed F-80 Shooting Stars quickly cleaned the North Koreans out of the sky. When the advanced MiG-15s entered the arena, the slow F-82Gs became obsolete in an air combat role. The F-82Gs switched their mission from air combat to night interdiction, using bombs and HVAR rockets to destroy North Korean armor and other targets. However, in this role, General Partridge (5th AF Commander) did not have much faith in them except for targets that were fixed and predetermined. Eventually, the night interdiction mission of the F-82G was taken over by the Douglas B-26 Invader, which was more heavily armed and better suited to the role. According to Vectorsite Net :

During their short lifetime, the F-82s achieved one major distinction: holding the line in Korea until reinforcements arrived. Three squadrons of F-82Gs were operating in Japan as part of the 347th Fighter (All Weather) Group, when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950.

The F-82Gs were the only aircraft available in Japan that had sufficient endurance to fly to the battle area and operate for hours over the evacuation centers at Kimpo and Inchon. On 27 June, Lieutenant William Hudson and his radar operator, Lieutenant Carl Fraser, scored the first air-to-air kill of the Korean War, shooting down a Yak-11. Lieutenant Charles Moran shot down a Yak-9 a short time later, and Major James Little increased the day's score to three by destroying an La-7.

The North Korean Air Force had no advanced jet aircraft at the time, and the F-82Gs and Lockheed F-80 Shooting Stars quickly cleaned the North Koreans out of the sky. The F-82Gs switched their mission from air combat to night interdiction, using bombs and HVAR rockets to destroy North Korean armor and other targets.



Eventually, the night interdiction mission was taken over by the Douglas B-26 Invader, which was more heavily armed and better suited to the role. The last assignment of the F-82Gs in Korea was to hunt down low-flying PO-2 biplanes that the North Koreans used for night harassment raids, but this was an exercise in frustration as the nimble biplanes were almost impossible to find, much less shoot down. The F-82Gs were finally replaced by Lockheed F-94B Starfires in 1952.

The 68th FIS returned to Itazuke in 1951 and transitioned to the F-94Bs in an air defense role against Soviet bombers. In 1951, it deployed two F-94s for strip alert at Suwon (alongside the 8th FBW). They were to be scrambled in case any enemy night intruders came South. However, the F-94 was totally ineffective against the slow Po2 biplanes and were replaced by 5AF with four F4U-5N Corsairs from the Navy at Suwon in late 1953.

8th Fighter Bomber Wing: From Pyongyang to Itazuke to Kimpo

It was not until June 30, 1950 that President Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur to dispatch air forces against targets in North Korea. Throughout the Korean Conflict, the wing primarily conducted air-to-ground operations, providing close air support for United Nations ground forces, and striking enemy resources such as supply centers and transportation assets.

In the "Flying Fiends" website, the history of the 36th TFS (written in 1980 by Capt Scott Miller, 36 TFS and TSgt John Sullivan, Wing Historian) gives an account of a 36th aircraft that occurred on the 30th of June. It says, "On 30 June 1950, the 36th recorded its first enemy aircraft kill of the Korean War as 1Lts John B. Thomas and Edwin T. Johnson narrowly escaped death in his F-80 which was damaged by antiaircraft fire and hit overhead cables following an attack against the marshaling yards near Suwon. The history of the 8th Group described his encounter and resulting predicament as follows:

"Both his tip tanks and the ends of each wing had been torn completely off. Each wing had three or four gashes almost all the way through. Most of his canopy and windscreen were gone. The upper half of his rudder and vertical stabilizer had been sliced off, as had half of the left elevator and horizontal stabilizer."

"At 13,000 feet, with the entire tail section moving back and forth as though it was about to fall off, Lt Johnson bailed out, hitting the right horizontal stabilizer, breaking it free from the plane. He landed near Suwon and was picked up and airlifted back to Itazuke that same afternoon, with one tremendous headache."

According to The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, His Korean War Diary , edited by William T. Y'Blood, 1999, (p50) stated in Gen. Stratemeyer's words on 2 July 1950, "Morale of 8th Fighter Wing and 3d Bomb Wing "superior". In spite of strenuous flying and fighting that has been done, they were all raring to go."

According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea , (pp 67-68) "Because of their proximity to Korea, the Kyushu bases of Itazuke and Ashiya became the primary fields for jet operations against the enemy. (At this time, the few Korean fields were ill-suited for these operations.) One squadron of the 49th FBG moved from Misawa to Itazuke on the 1st to join the 8th FBW, while a second squadron went to Ashiya. The group's last squadron remained at Misawa. Moving to Ashiya on July 6 was the 35th FIG, less its 41st Squadron, which went to Johnson AB for air defense."

The wing's F-80 Shooting Stars remained in Japan. As the war unfolded, the wing assumed operational control of other combat units. The 4th F(AW)S (26 Jun-13 Jul 1950) and 339th F(AW)S (26 Jun - 5 Jul 1950) from the 49th FBG at Misawa were attached to the 8th FW at Itazuke. The 77th Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force was also attached to the unit from July 2, 1950 - 10 Oct 1950. (Note: These RAAF troops were finishing up their tour of Occupation service and were just about to return home when the war broke out. They would be stuck in the Korean War for the duration.) These units remained attached to the wing only for a short time.

South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (p.257), it states, "By the end of July, the Far East Air Forces had flown as many as 400 sorties in a day. Altogether, it had flown a total of 8,600 sorties-4,300 in close support missions, 2,550 in close interdiction, 57 in two strategic bombing strikes, and 1,600 in reconnaissance and cargo sorties."

35th and 36th FBS F-51Ds Move to Tsuiki AB

The 35th and 36th Fighter Bomber Squadrons converted to the F-51s, while the 80th retained the F-80s. On August 11, 1950 the 8th FBW's 35th and 36th Squadrons were the last units to be converted to Mustangs. The "Flying Fiends" website states. "On 11 August 1950, the squadron moved to Tsuiki, Kyushu, Japan and converted back to F-51 aircraft. They were considered better than F-80s for useful operations over Korea."

5th AF 8th FBW "Hobo" Squadron

However, the pilots of the F-80s who remained at Itazuke were not convinced that the F-51 was a better ground-support fighter than the F-80. In U.S. Air Force in Korea (p112), the 8th wing historian noted, "A lot of pilots, had seen vivid demonstrators of why the F-51 was not a ground support fighter in the last war and weren't exactly intrigued by the thought of plying guinea pig to prove the same thing over again."

The Headhunter's Website has a slightly different twist to this conversion story that left the 80th with F-80Cs. "After the first few months of the war, the rest of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing reverted back to the F-51D Mustang because of problems associated with acquiring spare parts for the relatively new F-80s. But, always the exception, the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron became one of only half a dozen squadrons who retained the F-80. During the time the rest of the wing flew the Mustang, the 80th was attached to the 49th Fighter-Bomber Group and later the 51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, although the squadron continued to fly its bombing missions from Itazuke. When the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing re-equipped with the F-80 and moved to Kimpo, Korea in October 1950, the "Headhunters" rejoined the wing, and its attachment to the 51st FIW ended."

Pohang: "Hobo" Squadron Goes to Yonil Airfield

The book continued, "Meanwhile Air Force engineers had been working flat out to extend the runway facilities of an old wartime Japanese airfield near the town of Pohang, on the east coast of Korea. Their work was completed by July 14th, and two days later the Mustangs of the 40th Fighter Squadron flew in from Ashiya. This squadron was the first Fifth Air Force Unit to exchange its F-80 jets for piston-engined F-51s, and the pilots had completed their conversion to the older type in record time."

According to South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (p.329), "Some United States ground and air service troops had been at Yonil Airfield before the 40th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (35th Group) moved there on 16 July from Ashiya, Japan. On 7 August, the 39th Squadron moved to the field, and the next day the 6131st Fighter Wing was formed at the P'ohang base. But, even as these expanding air activities at Yonil were taking place, another and opposite current of events began. On 8 August, aviation engineers there received orders to evacuate their heavy equipment. In the next few days, as the North Koreans occupied the hills around P'ohang-dong and west and southwest of Yonil Airfield, FEAF officials became alarmed for the safety of their aircraft. They feared that enemy troops would be able to bring up mortars and artillery to bombard the strip, and that enemy infantry might overrun it." (Note: The 39th and 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons were part of the 35th Fighter Interceptor Group of Yokota AB, Japan. They had been deployed to Itazuke with their F-80s at the start of the war, but their F-80s limited range and time over station proved to be a liability. The unit reconverted to F-51s brought to Japan on the Carrier Boxer in July 1950.)

In South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (pp321-331), it talks about the Po'hang-dong area. It was a natural corridor here led straight to Pusan containing the lateral highway and railroad to Taegu. Though the area contained Kyongju, an important rail and highway center in the Taegu-P'ohang-Pusan triangle, it was militarily of slight importance. As a result, the eastern part of the Pusan Perimeter was not as strongly held as other parts of the line. Seeing that the mountains to the north in the P'ohang area were almost a trackless waste, General Walker thought it unlikely that the North Koreans could move forward heavy equipment and supplies in sufficient quantity to exploit a penetration there.

When strong North Korean army units made a sudden appearance near P'ohang-dong on 10 August, many American officers, including General Walker, were caught by surprise. Enemy forces first entered P'ohang-dong on 10 or 11 August and the town of P'ohang-dong now became a no man's land. The US Army tanks and ROK 17th Regiment elements were rushed to Yonil Airfield to provide for the defense of the airstrip.

On 11 August, the fighter planes at Yonil flew to another airfield for security, but returned the next day after the US Army tanks arrived. In South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu it states, "From hills to the south and southwest of the airstrip enemy troops delivered long-range, ineffective fire against it. Even though this fire did no damage, it created a state of alarm. The next day, 12 August, 28-year-old Colonel Kim Hi Chun, acting on General Walker's orders, in a successful attack eastward from An'gang-ni, led his ROK 17th Regiment into Yonil, greatly to the relief of everyone there."

Initially on 10 August 1950 ground elements of the 8th FBW Tactical Unit were dispatched to Taegu, but the worsening situation there caused them to be turned around and returned to Tsuiki. Instead, ground elements of the "Hobo Squadron" of the 8th Fighter Wing were sent to Yonil Airfield on 11 August 1950. The Tactical Unit with its F-51s and F-82s remained at Tsuiki AB, Japan.

John Glassford remembers that he was selected to go to Korea to prepare forward bases for the F-51 Mustangs. The unit he was with put down airfields for the F-51s anywhere with Pierced Steel Plates (PSP). He stated, "I was part of what was called the Hobo Squadron of the 5th Air Force 8th Fighter Bomber Wing when I was first assigned to Korea from Yokota AFB in Japan. My first base in Korea was Pohang where we got run out of during the Pohang Perimeter thing. Our home base at the time was in Fukuoka, Japan at Itazuke Air Base."

The prop-driven F-51s could operate from undeveloped bases, but the F-80 jets could only operate from Itazuke. The F-51s were providing Close Air Support (CAS) for the UN forces which were slowly being driven back from Taejon into the Pusan Perimeter. When he states that he was chosen because he was the "youngest Electronic Instrument Technician on the base", it was not because it was an honor. In the military there is a saying that "RHIP" (Rank Has Its Privileges) and also that "Shit rolls down hill". He was at the bottom of the hill. Later he wrote, "I had been 'voluntarily' sent over with a group from Yokota AFB, at the very first of the war. The reason I say 'voluntarily', is because I was the youngest 'electronic instrument specialist' on the base and they just volunteered me."

Rich Neer added, "I am adding on to what John has already written. John was right "Shit does roll down hill" and we were to find out how much, how fast and how soon."

"As I recall Tsuiki AB ,where the 6131st FBW gathered, was a very primitive base. Everyone lived in tents. The mess hall was in a old skeleton of a hangar. I was assigned to the 8th FMS engine build up shop. We installed build up kits on new V-1650 engines to be used as spares. There were F-51D aircraft all over the place. Our first shirt was MSgt Pottorff. Our C.O. was LTC Calahan. In the engineering section were MSgt Baxter, Bolan, Botcher and Beale. We called the four MSgts, "The Four Bs." Capt. Brant was Maintenance Officer and Lt. Desrosiers his assistant. Major Moganum was Supply Officer as I recall.

Sometime around late August 1950 we were alerted for movement to Korea. We were issued full field gear, steel helmets, and an M-1 Carbine rifle with bayonet. That bunch of intrepid warriors were loaded for bear and too dumb to be afraid. We were given a short course at the rifle range and that night we were ordered to the big hanger with our folding cots, duffle bag, field gear and weapons. We were told to stay in the hangar. No one was to leave. About 2 am loud shouts rang out from the rice paddies and rifle fire was heard. You guessed it -- some of those intrepid warriors had sneaked out to a small village and were enjoying Asahi beer, saki and female companionship. The MPs had a helluva time rounding everybody up. Next day we loaded in a C-47 and flew to Korea."

John Glassford wrote, "I was assigned -- volunteered -- by my CO, because I was the youngest Electronic Instrument Technician on the base at the time they decided to send a group to Korea in 1950. If I recall correctly, we were named "Hobo" at the beginning of that conflict. We would go around and gather up 'volunteer' locals and put an airfield down anywhere with those steel connecting plates. That's what we did at Pohang. We had P51's at the time. The old Mustangs."

He later wrote about his trip over to Yonil. He said, "Does it mention Francis J Woznicki anywhere in all that? He was our first assigned officer on our departure from Yokota. They told us we might have to fight our way in when we landed at Pohang and outfitted us with weapons etc. When we arrived, as I recall, the base was secured and protected by I think the 110th or something like unto that. We were in a C47 and after we were airborne, everyone just kind of wandered around talking to each other. THEN, the left engine began to belch and cough. Everyone ran for their seats and 13 (thirteen) parachutes were jerked open in the panic as none of us were too smart on what part of a chute to grab in an emergency. Have you ever been in plane where thirteen parachutes were opened? I remember looking over at our fearless leader for some comfort - there he was with his head bowed, his face bright red with excitement (fear I think) and he was furiously saying the rosary! That sure gave me comfort..... Needless to say the pilot somehow got us landed safely at Pohang after a perilous flight."

"When we disembarked, (ready to fight for our lives) there were the Army guys to greet us. What a relief! We were bunked in those wooden based tents with a pot belly stove in the center and of course, we had wonderful outdoor facilities. I remember being marched down to the center of a village to a creek, given the order to strip and take a bath in the stream, while Korean women & girls offered to wash our clothes for a cigarette or candy. That was one of the most embarrassing days of my life. Here was an 18 year-old kid from Crown Point, Indiana, naked in the middle of a village out in the middle of no-mans land. We weren't raised to anticipate anything like that in good ole Indiana. I also recall that for a time we would fill our canteens out of the same creek, drop a pill in them, and that would be our drinking water. That was the beginning of sorrows on one of my first days with the 'hoboes'."

Later he wrote, "I was astounded to find that at the arrival, we had P-51's, which are I think called F-51's. The old Mustang. They didn't need any instruments as they would fly over the first hill, do their thing, and then return. I wandered into the supply tent one day to try to get some clothing and there sat Eugene Briedenbach at the typewriter, using one finger to order airplane parts etc. When I approached him for clothing, he told me he would have to finish all the parts stuff before he could do me any good. I asked him to move over and began typing (w/all 10) and pounding out requisitions. About 2AM, 2nd Lt Francis J Wosznicki came in and asked who the "H" I was. I told him and he exclaimed "you are now corporal Glassford, the official supply sergeant for the Hobo's." Later on he was replaced by Major Sam (Moganum) who was in charge during the rout."

When John was queried about the 8th FBW aircraft at Yonil, John replied. "As I recall, we did have some F82s at P'ohang. I think only a couple. We had more F51's. I remember at least 6 or 7 as at the beginning, I was into instruments and had to do some checking occasionally." (NOTE: The F-82s Twin Mustangs were from the 68th FIS attached to the 8th FBW as the other F-82 squadrons remained in Japan for air defense. In U.S. Air Force in Korea (p135), it stated the the USAF possessed no night-intruder organization. "During July, the Fifth Air Force used one flight of the 68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron's F-82's (three aircraft) for offensive night operations over Korea, but General Partridge did not think these planes had much value except against known and fixed targets, such as airfields and towns.")

"Even though U.S. infantry units and tanks were at Yonil on 13 August, FEAF on that day decided to abandon the field. The order came about noon. Not a single crater dented the runway as the F-51's took to the air to fly away. It appears that Colonel Witty, commanding the Air Force units at Yonil, recommended the evacuation of the field and was supported by General Partridge, commander of the Fifth Air Force. Army officials had no part in the decision to abandon the Yonil field. Army units remained at the field and it never was brought under effective enemy fire."

"The first news of the Fifth Air Force evacuation of Yonil Airfield came to General MacArthur's headquarters about 1600 that afternoon, 13 August, in the form of a United Press report, filed at 1320. This news report stated that an "Air Force spokesman announced that the Air Force was evacuating P'ohang air strip" because North Koreans were placing machine gun and mortar fire on the strip. A telephone call to Eighth Army headquarters at once disclosed that there was no mortar fire on the airstrip and that the report of enemy fire on the field was greatly exaggerated. It did, however, confirm that the Fifth Air Force Advance Headquarters had ordered the planes to leave the field. General MacArthur and General Almond, his Chief of Staff, were "much upset" by the evacuation of Yonil Airfield. MacArthur instructed one of his staff officers to inform FEAF that he intended to hold the airfield and did not want the planes to return to Japan. Nevertheless, the two squadrons of F-51's (forty-five aircraft) moved from Yonil to Tsuiki Air Base on Kyushu. " (Note: Tsuiki AB, Itazuke AB and Ashiya AB were all in Fukuoka Prefecture, Japan -- on the northern-most peninsula. Itazuke was at Itazuke City on the west side; Ashiya AB was on the northern tip at Ashiya City; and Tsuiki AB was on the east side at Tsuiki Town. The "two squadrons" in the reference above are the 39th and 40th Squadrons of the 35th Fighter Interceptor Group. John noted that there were 6-7 F-51 Mustangs flown by the 35 FBS and a few F-82 Twin Mustangs of the 68th F(AW)S at Yonil, but these were not the primary group.)

According to South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (p.329), "The heavy equipment at Yonil was taken to the beach and loaded on LST's. The bomb supply followed, and finally Fifth Air Force personnel at the base embarked on LST's and left the next day, 14 August. A considerable supply of aviation gasoline and petroleum products remained at Yonil. Occasionally after 13 August a crippled fighter plane came down at Yonil in an emergency landing, and many fighters refueled there as long as the fuel lasted."

Evacuation of Pohang

"When we evacuated P'ohang, we fled to Purang Dock or something like that where we boarded different size boats to leave the area. I got an old LSD that smelled like Kimchee and we set up our pup tents on deck. We were commanded at that time by some Army Officer that appeared to be in charge of the loading docks. He would sit up on the water tower and when he would fire his twin '45's, we would stop the traffic flow from one direction and let the waiting groups begin to board anything that would float. I recall that people were coming down 2 different roads carrying everything they owned. Some of the time, they would send a youngster back to get something else and by the time they returned, we stopped the flow from their direction and the boat would fill up and leave the kids standing bewildered on the shore waving at their parents. It was a controlled pandemonium!"

He recalls, "We were assigned to the streets with ROK soldiers and on constant guard duty with them while the loading took place. To my recollection, they were (ROK) a rough uncaring bunch and had little respect for the people they were supposedly fighting for. I remember one incident when this old timer (looked like one of those little statues that were popular in those days, with the goatee, bent over posture, and pulling a cart with all his belongings.) This soldier I was standing there with stopped him and searched his belongings and told him to continue, then he reached over and grabbed a bottle of booze off his cart. The old man railed at him verbally and the ROK knocked him down with his fist. The old guy got up and bowed humbly and began to leave and the ROK reached over and swiped a rolled up bamboo rug. The old guy railed at him again and this time the ROK picked up a piece of 2x4 and hit the old man across the back and sent him sprawling. He got up bowed humbly and began to leave again and the ROK reached over and swiped something off his cart. The old man railed on him again and the ROK grabbed him and took him by the arm and was leading him behind a small building and apparently was going to shoot him. That's when I stepped and placed the nose of my M-1 against his neck and he got the message. I took the old man and put his stuff back on his cart, brushed him off and sent him on his way. He was ever so gracious and grateful. The ROK wasn't too happy about all of it, but since we couldn't talk to each other, we just kept a good eye on each other for the rest of our time together."

After John had evacuated back to Japan, the embattled ROK 3rd Division fought its way to the seacoast, where on 16-17 August it was evacuated under cover of American air and the U.S. Navy. It was landed farther south to continue the battle. P'ohang-dong fell to the enemy.

In South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (p251), it states, "The refugee problem was a constant source of trouble and danger to the U.N. Command during the early part of the war. During the middle two weeks of July it was estimated that about 380,000 refugees had crossed into ROK-held territory, and that this number was increasing at the rate of 25,000 daily. The refugees were most numerous in the areas of enemy advance. In July and August 1950, the volume of refugees moving through U.N. lines was greater than at any other time in the war." By the end of July 1950, the South Korean government had established fifty-eight refugee camps, most of them in the Pusan-Taegu area, to care for the homeless people.

Pusan Perimeter

The Pusan Perimeter was established on August 4, 1950. The ROKs attempted to reorganize their shattered divisions into this defense line. The First Battle of the Naktong River Bulge was fought between August 5 - 19. "The establishment of the Pusan Perimeter may be considered as a dividing line in viewing and appraising the combat behavior of the American soldier in the Korean War. The Pusan Perimeter for the first time gave something approaching a continuous line of troops. With known units on their left and right and some reserves in the rear, the men showed a stronger disposition to fight. Before the Pusan Perimeter, all through July and into the first days of August, there was seldom a continuous line beyond a battalion or a regimental position. Both flanks were generally wide open, and enemy troops moving through the hills could easily turn a defensive position. Supporting troops were seldom within reach. American soldiers, realizing the isolated nature of their positions, often would not stay to fight a losing battle. Few in July 1950 saw any good reason for dying in Korea; with no inspiring incentive to fight, self-preservation became the dominating factor."

In three weeks, the North Koreans had occupied two-thirds of South Korea. Ignoring the advice of his subordinates, North Korea's Kim Il-Sung ordered an all-out assault on the Pusan Perimeter expecting to destroy General Walton Walker's Eighth Army. Between August 27 - September 5, 1950, the heaviest fighting of the war took place. In Mortal Combat, 1950-1953 (by John Toland) it says, "He had thrown everything available into this ambitious operation, but the troops who were to carry it out were already exhausted and running out of ammunition. Their tanks and vehicles had little gasoline. Moreover, UN air attacks had so badly damaged road and rail communications to the south that few reinforcements and supplies reached the frontline troops."

Between September 1-5, the North Korean Korean People's Army (Inmun Gun) attempted one last great Naktong Offensive. After the initial onslaught, the NKPA attack was stopped at Taegu and the Pusan Perimeter held. A major contributor was the FEAF (Far East Air Force) bombing and strafing missions that held the enemy in check. The North Koreans attacked relentlessly, but the rapid increase in UN reinforcements through Pusan helped to reinforce the line. On 7 September the North Koreans were escaping over the Nam River near its junction with the Naktong leaving more than two thousand of their dead behind. The outnumbered, outgunned enemy had fought fiercely but to no avail. The Pusan Perimeter was intact. The crisis was over.

This Kind of War -- The Classic Korean War History (by T.R. Fehrenbach, 1963) put it this way, "The NKPA had overrun all South Korea except one tiny toehold in the southeast corner -- but the toehold had given it unexpected trouble. Its timetable calling for the Communization of all Korea by 15 August had been wrecked. Worse, the Inmun Gun, the People's Army, had left the bones of its best men scattered along the Naktong River, and the survivors were rapidly bleeding themselves to death against American guns ..." Less than 30 percent of the old China veterans remained, and these were dirty, tired, hungry, and in rags. The NKPA had suffered about 60,000 casualties, most of which had been inflicted by ROK's. Its total combat strength could not have been more than 70,000 with only forty tanks left. On the other hand, the United Nations force had 141,808 of which some 82,000 were ROK's. American combat ground strength was 47,000.

"Hobo" Squadron Heads North

On September 15, 1950 the US 1st Marine Division, ROK marines and army troops led the "surprise" attack at Inchon. Despite this lack of secrecy, the landing met with little resistance and was resounding success with few casualties. As word of this spread to the North Korean forces, their forces completely shattered. On September 18, the U.N. broke out of the Pusan Perimeter. By September 23 the NKPA (Inmun Gun) was everywhere in full retreat. US, ROK, and UN forces launched counterattacks against the North Korean forces from the Pusan Perimeter in order to link with the UN forces at Seoul and Inchon.

Seoul was recaptured on September 26, 1950. On October 7 the U.N. Forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The U.N. sanctioned defeat of North Korea with the aim of reunification of the country. The airfields of Seoul were filled with Aircraft from all the UN nations. When the Tactical Group of the 8th Fighter Wing returned to Kimpo AB, Korea in October 1950, the 68th F(AW)S went along.

Though Kimpo was in fairly good condition, Suwon had taken a beating. The runway was cratered and the tanks had torn up the flight surfaces. The 8th Fighter-Bomber Group and its 35th Squadron arrived by air and surface transport at Suwon Airfield on 7 October. The battered airfield was barely adequate for one Mustang squadron, and the 36th Squadron had to remain behind at Tsuiki. It states in Air War Over Korea (p51), "An engineer battalion patched up the field as best they could and laid down steel plank taxiways, and on October 7th the Mustangs of the 35th Squadron of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group flew in. Only half of Suwon's runway, however, was still usable and operating heavily laden Mustangs from it was a dangerous business. Eventually, at the end of the month, the 35th Squadron was authorized to move to Kimpo, where it was joined a few days later by another of the 8th's Group's units, the 36th Squadron. By this time the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group had also established itself at Kimpo with three Squadrons, the 16th and 25th Fighter-Interceptor and the 80th Fighter-Bomber." The "Flying Fiends" website states, "Following the success of the United Nations counter-invasion in September 1950, the 36th began a move into Korea. On 5 October 1950, about one-half of the squadron moved by train to Ashiya, Japan and them by transport to Suwon, Korea. On 29 October 1950, the remaining portion of the 36th and its F-51s moved to Kimpo AB, Korea, where the element that had been at Suwon joined them."

John Glassford Sr was there. He wrote, "I was a trained electronic instrument technician, but due to my typing abilities and the need for supplies, I ended up as a supply Sgt. Our first commander was a Francis J Woznicki, 2nd Lt." He remembers Seoul, "This was in the early part of the war and we were then sent to Seoul. The first time I went to Seoul, it was beautiful. There were planes there from every nation that was involved. The buildings were all intact and we lived in a nice brick building at the time. When the North invaded and we evacuated, from what I understand the order was given to drop 100 - 1000# bombs on the strips to keep the enemy from using them. I don't know if this is true or not, but at the time was told that somehow the message got confused and 100 10,000# bombs were delivered and literally destroyed the base at Seoul. Kimpo?. We evacuated by C119's at the time (they left the doors off) and were flown back to Itazuke in Fukuoka, which was our home base. Later on were sent back to Seoul with F80's and a few F84's. I remember the devastation that I witnessed. It was a crying shame the way they had mutilated Kimpo."

Rich Neer added: "On arrival at Kimpo AB, we loaded all our equipment onto 6bys and drove to the old beat up dependent housing someplace up on a hillside. We unloaded our STUFF in one big pile. 2d Lt.Wosniki was put in charge of that huge pile of HOBO boxes. We were dispersed to the empty housing that was in shambles. Someone had built a 6 HOLER out in the open for a latrine. Our steel helmets and little can opener would come in handy. We washed, shaved and bathed in our helmets. We were given C-rations to eat. All of us Peons were put on guard duty over that big pile of boxes. Not long after that we moved down onto Kimpo AB, we began building our maintenance shops next to a old burned out hanger. After we had completed our shops, we unpacked all our boxes and put the equipment inside.

We kept the empty boxes in our shops, just in case! That case happened sooner than later as by November US Forces were in Pyongyang N. Korea. We were alerted for movement to Pyongyang. Back in the boxes went our STUFF. The advanced party took off in truck convoy. We in the main body loaded a train, Hobo Style, and took off for Pyongyang. WE DID NOT GET THERE!"

In October 1950, Pyongyang was taken as the U.N. forces drove north as the U.N. sanctioned the defeat of North Korea in order to reunify the country. The Tactical group of the 8th Fighter Wing (Hobo Squadron) moved to Pyongyang on November 25, 1950. The aircraft operating out of Pyongyang were the F-51 Mustangs (flown by the 35th FBS and 36th) and the F-82 Twin Mustangs of the 68th F(AW)S. The F-80s remained at Itazuke as the could not fly off of undeveloped fields.

While waiting to go to Pyongyang, John Glassford Sr has a tale of seeing the misery war heaps on the people and the mercy of GIs. He wrote, "I was put in charge of a train in Yong Dong Po waiting to go to Pyongyang. I remember that we were waiting for an engine. You had to have so many cars to get an engine and I don't remember the exact number. At this time we lived in box cars and we would put our cots on hangars inside the box cars, which made them like upper and lower bunk beds. It was COLD and we would build fires and burn up old pallets or any thing that would burn. I remember standing by the fire one early evening and it was so cold that my boots froze to the ground close to the fire. I looked around at the 'guests' that would come to our fire and almost cried for them. They had little clothing as most of their stuff had been destroyed or stolen. I told 'my boys' "let's see if there is anything in any of these box cars that we can 'issue' to the locals to keep them warm". We found a box car with boxes and boxes of GI underwear (longies). The only problem was they had a big PW stamped on both tops and bottoms. Ah Weel, wat the hall? I began to 'issue' these to all who came. I had a line of locals coming from 'who knows where" to Yong Dong Po to get their longies. It was funny and I have no idea how many of those people were arrested as suspected PW's because of that little escapade. (I hope they ran out of time to prosecute if they read these tales)."

But there were other diversions at Yong Dong Po. He wrote, "We were never short of booze as there was an abandoned brewery at YongDongPo, which had three large vats full of green beer. We would full up 5 gal GI cans from there often."

As for going to Pyongyang...well, they never left Seoul. He wrote, "The train that pulled out before we got an engine priority was completely destroyed when the Chinese came into the war. The time I spent at the rail yards was just prior to their entry. We heard that that train had been devastated and the Chinese were on the move our way. We were shortly moved out of there back to Japan and never got headed north to Pyongyang, so some of us 'hoboes' never got there."

Rich Neer added to the tale, "As John Glassford put it, "We had to wait for an engine." In the meantime we enjoyed sightseeing in Seoul and free beer from a brewery discovered in Yongdongpo. However, that life style changed...sooner than expected. We didn't like living on those boxcars anyway."

"By now the Chinese Army had crossed the Yalu. Our trip was cancelled. We were taken to Seoul City airport which as I recall was a big open field. Back into the tents!"

"...and was it COLD. Winter had set in and it began to snow. We like to froze our ass off. I remember going to bed at night on our folding cots. We found some rice sacks made of straw which we put under our cots,then we put on all our clothes and covered up with our blankets and GI overcoat. We would stoke the potbellied stove till it was red hot then jump into bed. About 2am the cold began to seep through our clothes."

"I remember about 5am the clank, clank of mess kits, guys going to chow. Our chow hall consisted of a rickety table about 8 ft. long and chest high next to a mess tent and being served "Bully Beef" three times a day."

Arpad Ostheimer wrote in the Korea War Project , "I was a member of the 36th FBS when it was formed in 1950 before the Inchon landing. This squadron was formed to enable many of the pilots in the 8th FBW to go back to F-51D`s. The 8th received F-80`s in May 1950 and had very little on the aircraft when combat operations started. The loss rate was very high and in July and early August we lost three 8th FBW squadron commanders. The 36th FBSq. was formed and operating at Tsuiki air base in northern Kyushu. Our squadron commander was Major William O`Donnell. The unit followed the Inchon landing and set up operations at or near Yungdung Po. We then moved to either K-23 or K-24 near Pyongyang. The Chinese then threw us out and we moved back to Suwon. I was on the last flight out of Suwon (C-54) as the Chinese closed in on the strip. During the loading of the aircraft it squatted on its tail. The crew chief propped the tail up and ordered everyone to move forward against the pilots bulkhead. We took off in this configuration and the pilot actually pulled the gear out from under the aircraft. "

"Hobo" Squadron falls back to Itazuke

Air War Over Korea states, "The Red Chinese onslaught in North Korea, unprecedented as it was in size and fury, had made necessary the hasty reorganisation of some of the Fifth Air Force combat units deployed on forward airfields. the Mustangs of the 8th and 18th Fighter-Bomber Wings, for example, had exactly four days to get out of Pyongyang and pull back to new bases at Seoul and Suwon, and it was to the credit of pilots and ground crews alike that during the withdrawal the Mustangs continued to operate at maximum effort. However, much of the two Wings' supporting equipment and considerable quantities of supplies had to be abandoned."

The Hobo Squadron provided CAS for the withdrawal from Pyongyang, North Korea. After the Tactical Group (Hobo Squadron) pulled out from Pyongyang on December 9 , the wing was forced to fall back to K-14 (Kimpo Air Base) , South Korea. The Chinese continued their advance on Seoul. Paul Jeffreys of Whittier, California with the 68th F(AW)S responded in the Korean War Project about the withdrawal from Pyongyang: "...F-82s flying out of Pyongyang in the fall or winter of 1950. Our C/O Major West asked for volunteers to go to Pyong. to service our 82s that were going to fly out of there. About 10 or 15 of us from the 68th. sqdn. volunteered. WE were on are the way to Ashiya AFB to catch a C-54 to there. Our Sgt. in charge of this group on the way to Ashiya got into some trouble on the train to there and the MPs met us at station and took all of us back to Itasuke AFB. The Sgt. was put in the stockade. Our C/O got together another group to go to Pyong. The very next day he called the first group to his office and said that Pyong. was under attack and we would have to fly over to Kimpo AB in Korea with a new Sgt. in charge. A few days later that group came marching onto the Kimpo AB. A few days later they flew back to Itasuke AB. My group stayed at Kimpo until it fell to the North Koreans."

Rich Neer a member of the Hobo Squadron stuck in Seoul awaiting the movement north to Pyongyang when the Chinese invaded talked of living in box cars. He added, "But that all changed as we were alerted for evacuation to Japan. The Big Bug Out! Again we loaded all our HOBO boxes on C-119, C-54 and C-47 acft. and off we went to Japan."

On December 10, 1950, the "Hobo Squadron" moved back to Itazuke AB, Japan. The Wing was reunited with its tactical group. Air War Over Korea states, "The 8th Wing also moved back to Itazuke to re-equip with F-80C Shooting Stars, its serviceable Mustangs being re-allocated to other units." However, the 68th F(AW)S remained in Korea after the retreat from Pyongyang and deployed to K-2 (Taegu) where it was attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

Evan Rosencrans on wrote on 80th Headhunter Site

"I was in Korea from July 1950 to April 1951. On several occasions I had the opportunity to exchange firepower with the Mig-15s. At that time the Mig pilots were terrible gunners despite the sizable advantages of the Mig over our Shooting Stars.

About the seventh of December, 1950, I was leading a flight of four F-80s flying top cover for another flight of four F-80s which were bombing and strafing the Sinuiju Air Field, on the east side of the Yalu opposite Antung. We were being hosed by the triple A from China. We saw a bunch of Migs launch from Antung. Shortly after that the triple A stopped and there were 12 Migs about three thousand feet above us; four off the left wing, four off the right wing, and four behind us. A lively engagement followed.

At some time during that contest I saw my bullets hit one Mig from the intake to the tail pipe, along the center of the fuselage. When de-briefing I claimed one Mig damaged.

About two months later I mouthed off the my squadron commander, and as a reward I was sent off to be a forward air controller for six weeks. On return, I walked into squadron ops and the operations sergeant said, 'Lieutenant, you remember that Mig you damaged? Well, you shot it down. Radio reports say it was a kill.' The sergeant's last name was Purcell. This happened around April 1951.

You should find that during late June and early July 1950, Harry Sandlin and Arrin Fox shot down North Korean aircraft too.