On 23 May, the Japanese Daily Asahi stated that the U.S. forces in Japan were making more reconnaissance flights and had beefed up security for them by adding F-15 fighter escorts and using AWACS aircraft. The move was a response to the threats to a RC-135S "Cobra Ball" aircraft North Korea made in March.

The U.S. forces also began night flights in May -- which coincided with the unusual amounts of night flights from Kunsan AB by both USAF F-16s and Marine FA-18s. The USAF in Japan has had five spy planes, including RC-135Ss and WC-135Ws, making regular flights since January, when the North Korean nuclear crisis pitched up. Also, the number of E-3 AWACS active in the effort rose from one to three. The E-3s were flying almost every day along with two F-15s - which is unprecedented. The flights used to be staged only during daylight hours, but beginning in May the RC135S started making night flights -- possibly to monitor missile launches at night by North Korea.

The night flights was also probably prompted by the increased threat by North Korea to strike out at Japan with missiles. The almost irrational fear in Japan over a possible North Korean missile strike prompted the Japanese Diet in May to amend their constitution for war-powers contingencies -- with the major concerns being human rights infringements with the government's assuming war powers. This was a preliminary step to amending the "peace" constitution altogether as a direct result of the North Korean missile threat. Though the South continues its head-in-the-ground belief that their North Korean "brother" would never send missiles or WMD against their brethen, the Japanese have an irrational fear of a missile attack from North Korea -- especially one with a nuclear warhead. Because there is no effective early warning system for missiles at present -- as the promised Missile Defense System is years away -- and Patriot PAC-3 systems and SDF Aegis destroyers provide only limited coverage, an early warning of any launch is essential to increase shootdown probabilities. The Japanese have two spy satellites monitoring North Korea and plan to launch two more.

The tensions seemed to abate around the end of May when 7th AF declared an extra day holiday for all USFK air force personnel. On about 28 May the 7th AEW with its B-52s and B-1s along with the 18th Squadron of F-16s and WC-130Hs were gone from Guam. The Marine FA-18s departed Kunsan at the end of May. The F-117As departed about 5 June from Kunsan.

Army Units from the 1st ID (Task Force 2-34) The "small Army Task Force" is the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, an element of the 1st Infantry Division which arrived in Korea to participate in Foal Eagle in late February. Fort Riley, the base that the 2-34 Armor is from, indicated that between 400-500 soldiers were involved in the movement. (Go to GlobalSecurity.org: Order of Battle: Korea for details.) This unit is what is called a "round-out" unit in that it provides fills to personnel needs within an organization temporarily. (Go to GlobalSecurity.org: 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment for details on this unit.)

On 4 May, a story in the Pacific Stars and Stripes reported that the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor had received orders to return to Fort Riley in May and that it would begin to depart South Korea soon. As it turned out they would not leave until the 28th of May.

According to GlobalSecurity.org, "It turns out that the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment is not the only element of the 1st Infantry Division's 1st Brigade in Korea right now. Some unknown element of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment is also in Korea having deployed with the 2-34th for Foal Eagle according to the 19th Theater Support Command paper. According to the article the Task Force withdrew enough equipment for 2 armor companies, 1 mechanized infantry company, a field artillery battery, a headquarters element, and equipment for a forward support battalion." (SITE NOTE: We find this interesting that on 27 May, the U.S. conveyed a plan to Korea to preposition assets for a heavy brigade where it would be stored on transport vessels. The equipment would comprise 130 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and 110 other vehicles, along with supplies and ammunition. This would offset the loss of the 148 M1A1 Abrams in Korea if the U.S. pulled off the DMZ.)

Throughout the USFK soldiers and airmen were involuntarily extended due to the Iraq War siphoning off all the replacements. Similarly retirements were also held off in critical specialties. According to GlobalSecurity.org, "1,800 soldiers whose overseas rotation had been extended prior to the Iraq war have had their tours extended again. It is still not clear if this means that there has been an increase in the number of soldiers deployed to Korea or if that number has remained static."

According to GlobalSecurity.org,"Task Force 2-34 returned from South Korea on May 28, 2003. The unit was believed to have had nearly 1,000 soldiers deployed."

USS Kitty Hawk and USS Carl Vinson The USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) left the Persian Gulf on 16 April for return to Yokosuka, Japan on 6 May. The USS Carl Vinson remained "in the area" until the USS Kitty Hawk was in the Pacific. However, in May 2003, reports from the Associated Press and Bremerton papers on May 15 indicate that the Navy has confirmed that the Carl Vinson's deployment had been extended until fall.

The USS Kitty Hawk returned to Yokosuka on 6 May and the USS Carl Vinson was expected back in Yokosuka in early May. The USS Carl Vinson returned to Yokosuka -- the first visit of a nuclear carrier since 1997 -- and was said to be in place while the Kitty Hawk undergoes "repairs." The Kitty Hawk entered the Yard on 12 May. (See GlobalSecurity.org: Carrier Location for updates.) It was announced that a Marine squadron of FA-18s were at Kunsan AB about the same time the Kitty Hawk entered the Yard for repairs on 12 May. The USS Carl Vinson returned to Bremerton in Sep 2003. The USS Nimitz was to depart the Persian Gulf region and head to the Sea of Japan/East Sea to replace the Carl Vinson until the USS Kitty Hawk is able to deploy.

7th AEW at Guam Military pressure on North Korea was being exerted by the 7th Air Expeditionary Wing that deployed to Guam after standing by in CONUS because of South Korean apprehensions. (See GlobalSecurity.org: Air Expeditionary Force for make up.) However, when an RC-135S was intercepted over the East Sea, the aircraft were deployed to Guam in March. (See North Korean Crisis: March for details.)

B-52H Stratofortress

The bombers started arriving at Guam on 6 March after being held in CONUS due to South Korean misgivings. However, on 14 April Typhoon Kujira cropped up. Even though Typhoon Kujira never directly hit Guam, all of the B-52 Stratofortresses, B-1B Lancers and their respective support to include airmen, equipment and aircrews were evacuated from the airfield in preparation for the storm April 14. The B-52s went to Fairchild AFB -- a former B-52 base -- and the B-1B went to Hickam. The aircraft are part of the 7th AEW that was assembled for the North Korean crisis. By 23 April, nearly all of the aircraft that had been evacuated from Andersen AFB have returned to Guam. Some aircraft were still at Fairchild and at Hickam due to maintenance issues but soon returned to Guam.

B-1B Lancer

The 7th AEW also included a Detachment, Helicopter Combat Support Sq with MH-60S. Also included was the 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron with 100 airmen to support the squadron's WC-130H aircraft was ordered to deploy to Guam until December 15, according to the Clarion-Ledger on April 22, 2003.

According to GlobalSecurity.org, "The May issue of Air Force Magazine revealed that the United States had sent some undisclosed number of F-16s to Andersen Air Force Base from the 18th Fighter Squadron of the 354th Fighter Wing on March 24, 2003 in an effort to improve the airbases "devensive posture in the Pacific region." A story in the Pacific Daily News on March 28, 2003 confirmed the story indicating that a squadron had deployed to the base but did not identify which squadron."

The placement of the 7th AEW at Anderson AFB, Guam created a problem with transportation, housing and logistical support. The base was not equipped to handle such a large number of personnel. To offset some of the problems, members of the 7th AEW were integrated into the host base transportation pools and supply to assist with the overloads. This prompted the host base to create a "Contingency Group" to plan for future taskings.

By May 27, 2003 nearly all of the bombers that had been sent to Guam were sent back to the United States. GlobalSecurity.org stated, "A report from Australian Broadcasting Corporation and a report from Reuters confirmed that all 12 B-52s from the 2nd Bomb Wing had returned and that 8 of twelve B-1Bs from the 7th Bomb Wing had returned to the US as well, with the remaining 4 to depart the island in the coming days." As of June 2003, there were no bombers on Guam.

Marine 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment: On 22 May U.S. forces carried out a training exercise to move a Marine battalion stationed in Okinawa, Japan, to the Korean Peninsula. More than 600 Marines took part in the exercise designed to move the force rapidly by high speed vessel from Okinawa to the North Gyeongsang city of Pohang in less than 24 hours as part of a routine exercise conducted twice a year. This was the first to use the High Speed Vessel, which cut the time needed for deployment -- up to three days by amphibious vessels -- to less than half of that. The Korea Herald reported on May 23, 2003 that the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment along with some element of the III Marine Expeditionary Force had arrived in South Korea for the Korean Incremental Training Program (KITP) which would take place May 28 through June 19. The KITP 03 consisted of live-fire and maneuver training designed in a building-block approach to culminate in a battalion-level field exercise. Units attached to 3/8 include a detachment from Truck Company, 3d Marine Division; Combat Engineer Platoon, Combat Assault Battalion; and Combat Service Support Detachment-33, 3d Force Service Support Group. The training lasted approximately three weeks at the 2nd Infantry Division's training ranges north of the Han River.

On 24 June more than 500 U.S. Marines from 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, III Marine Expeditionary Force departed for their base in Okinawa, Japan, and will make the transit in less than 24 hours using the High Speed Vessel. The HSV is capable of transporting approximately 1,000 passengers in comfortable reclining seats, along with more than 400 tons of cargo. The cargo deck can easily hold the numerous supplies, trucks, combat vehicles, tractor-trailers, water tankers, and other equipment needed by a Marine unit. According to Marine Lt. Col. Kenneth R. Martin, III Marine Expeditionary Force HSV Project Officer, the HSV is a transformation from how the Marine Corps has traveled in the past. The normal transit to or from Okinawa aboard ferry or amphibious shipping would take two to three days. Moving a Marine infantry battalion by air would take up to 17 days. "With use of the HSV, a battalion-sized unit with all associated vehicles and equipment can travel to its destination in one HSV run and arrive within 22-31 hours throughout most ports in the Area of Responsibility," said Martin.

Though the KITP is a semi-annual exercise and is not related to any current world events, from this experience, on 19 Jun, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee said that U.S. Marines in Japan could reach South Korea in just two days if there was an armed conflict on the peninsula. "They could be there in two days if there were a war," said Wolfowitz.

On May 27, two British warships arrived to engage in combined naval exercises with the Korean 3rd Fleet. As part of the defense against the North's missile threat, a Japanese SDF Aegis destroyer patrolled the Sea of Japan (East Sea) between Japan. U.S. naval forces were also involved in this effort.

(SITE NOTE: The units on the buildup have returned home in late May and early June, but we believe that the exercise was more than simply a one-time shot contingency. Guam has announced that there will be a Contingency Group set up and there are rumors that B-52/B-1 bombers may be assigned there on a rotational basis. At Kunsan, $2 million in permanent facilities for "follow-on storage" or billeting and "shower/shave" facilities are under construction by the 554th Red Horse. We still believe the 90th FS with their F-15s were at Kwangju rather than Osan, but we can't prove it. Regardless, those facilities have been constantly used by the 90th on past deployments and has billeting as well as hardened shelters and combat-turn servicing facilities (and pre-positioned refuel trucks). Regardless of whether they were used or not, the bottom line is that these facilities are ready to house future deployments on short notice. Paul Wolfowitz, deputy Defense Secretary, stated that the Marines from Okinawa could be back in Korea within 24 hours.)

USS Carl Vinson arrives in Pusan

USS Carl Vinson at Pusan (15 Mar 03)

With the carrier USS Vinson's visit to Pusan, it seemed that there is a distinct impression given to the North that the U.S. was no longer taking a hands-off role favored by South Korea. There may be some truth that the U.S. was positioning its forces for a war footing. However, on 13 Mar Admiral Fargo of the Pacific Command told Congress that the possibility of war was "low." New York Times story on 13 Mar Admiral Fargo said, "We've arrayed forces to deter, not provoke a conflict."

After the Foal Eagle 03 exercises, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) remained "in the area." The following article was from Kashmir Times on 13 April. The USS Carl Vinson was still "in the area" but involved in the exercise Tandem Thrust 03 in Guam.

US carrier watches N.Korea, crew ready for action

By Masako Iijima

ABOARD USS CARL VINSON, Western Pacific, April 13 (Reuters) - More than a hundred times a day, fighter jets catapult with a mighty roar from this aircraft carrier, deployed to keep an eye on secretive North Korea and its suspected nuclear ambitions.

"What we're doing here is providing strategic deterrence. You don't have to drop a bomb to make a point," said 31-year-old Lieutenant Chad Gerber.

"Nations that are considered a threat know what kind of training we have and that's what keeps the stability," added the F/A-18C "Hornet" pilot, who dropped bombs on Afghanistan a year and a half ago in operation "Enduring Freedom".

The world's attention may be on Iraq, but the crew of the USS Carl Vinson plying the waters around Japan and the Korean peninsula to fill in for the USS Kitty Hawk, now deployed to the Gulf, are preparing for the day they may be called into action.

The presence of the floating, nuclear-propelled warplane airport, a squad of B-52 and B-1 bombers which has been deployed to Guam, and several F-117A "Stealth" fighters on assignment in South Korea, are all part of a U.S. effort to remind Pyongyang that Iraq is not the only concern on its security radar.

Tensions on the divided peninsula rose last year, when U.S. officials said North Korea had admitted to pursuing a secret nuclear arms program in violation of a 1994 pact.

The crisis escalated after North Korea restarted a mothballed nuclear facility capable of making weapons-grade plutonium, test-fired missiles and intercepted a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft patrolling international airspace.

SAME ROUTINE, DIFFERENT WORRIES

The five-vessel Carl Vinson battle group launched some of the first Tomahawk missiles into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and about 60 percent of the 5,200 crew members currently on board the aircraft carrier took part in that military operation.

They may be veterans, but the 18 pilots on board still practice dropping cement-filled bombs each day.

Mechanics work round the clock to repair damaged aircraft in the hangar under the airstrip where planes land with a thud, sending shudders through a vessel as tall as a six-story building.

"Anyone with a desire to hurt someone is dangerous regardless of what fire power they may have," said Lt Aaron Parks, another veteran "Hornet" pilot.

"Brush off that threat and you are in a dangerous situation."

The battle group has just completed a month of war games with South Korea's military. Troops from the two countries, backed by warships and planes, practiced massive amphibious landings.

The annual "Foal Eagle" exercise sparked criticism from Pyongyang, which described the large-scale training as a rehearsal for a nuclear attack.

U.S. officials said North Korea test-fired a surface-to-ship missile of its own on April 1. Pyongyang has also used its official media to remind Tokyo that Japan is within range of North Korean military might.

"North Korea has the equipment to do more damage (than Iraq), they could get us if they tried. But we are ready for that, that is what we train for, that is why we are here," said Chief Petty Officer Mitch Palmer, part of an aircraft maintenance crew.

TONNES OF DETERRENCE

Efforts to break the deadlock between the United States and North Korea have so far failed.

Pyongyang insists on bilateral talks with Washington to solve the crisis, but the United States wants a multilateral forum that would include countries such as South Korea and Japan.

The United States has some 100,000 troops stationed in Asia with most of them in countries neighbouring North Korea.

About 37,000 of the region's U.S. military personnel are based in South Korea while Japan, which relies on the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" for a security deterrent, hosts around 48,000.

With the Carl Vinson forward deployed, if worse came to worst, the United States would be capable of striking North Korea's nuclear complex at Yongbyong or any other target.

"The carrier can go a long way in a short time and the aircraft on board can go a fair distance, so for us to go 500, 600, 700 km (435 miles) is certainly a do-able effort, if we wanted," said Rear Admiral Evan Chanik. But for the time being, the mission of the battle group is to monitor and prepare, not to provoke.

Said Captain Brian Neunaber, the "Airboss", who coordinates the jets, tanking aircraft and helicopters taking off and landing on the flight deck: "If parking an aircraft carrier off the coast of someone's country helps regional security, that is what we do."

Bolstered Forces Proposed:

(SITE NOTE: Many people keyed in on the "$11 billion" figure without asking the question of whether the "150 improvements" over the "next four years" would benefit the U.S. overall (world-wide) fighting capabilities or actually be a direct benefit to Korea. Though not privy to the complete plan for the improvements, we would guess that the $11 billion figure was the lump sum of EXISTING programs -- but released to give the impression they were something NEW. For example, the multi-million dollar Apache AH-64A upgrade was something ALREADY in the mill. Another example would be the $250 million recently committed by Congress was to lock the ROK into committing OFFICIALLY to procure land in Osan/Pyongtaek. If you add previously programmed construction and upgrade programs stretching to 2007 for equipment, facilities and real property, you would have a significant total. We think this is the "shell game" the USFK played with great impact and skill. They created the impression of some fantastic NEW program when it really is a rehash of the old. The USFK is playing hardball negotiating and using the press to its advantage -- with the "$11 billion" figure publicized throughout the world. This placed the ROK on the defensive and exactly into the negotiating position the USFK intended. The ROK was playing with a very weak negotiating hand -- and the "$11 billion" figure made it weaker.)

35th FS F-16 Crash On 8 Sep, an F-16C from the 35th FS crashed on a training flight at about 10:05 am, 56 miles (90km) south-west of Kunsan. The F16 was on a routine mission in southern South Korea. The pilot ejected and the plane plunged into the sea off the western coast near Kunsan, about 90 miles south of Seoul.

The pilot, Capt. Kevin Dydyk was on a routine training sortie. He safely ejected and was recovered by a Republic of Korea air force HH-47 from Chong Ju Air Base. 7th Air Force representative called a ROKAF representative who dispatched the helicopters for the rescue and recovery, said Col. Bill Coutts, 8th Fighter Wing vice commander.

South Korean rescue helicopters combed the area and a ROK team rescued the pilot. "This was my first real life rescue of a human life," said ROKAF Senior Master Sgt. Seo, Ki Ju, the man who actually dove into the water to hoist Captain Dydyk to safety. "The weather was a big issue, but I made eye contact with the pilot in the water and that was a big help."

Capt Kevin Dydyk was taken to the Kunsan AB medical facility around noon where he was pronounced in good condition. He arrived at Kunsan at approximately noon and was transported to the 8th Medical Group clinic here. Captain Dydyk, remarkably, was virtually unharmed.

The cause of the crash was announced in Jan 2004 in the Wolf Pack Warrior. The investigation determined poor situational awareness and a poor technique for maintaining floor awareness was the likely causes of the crash into the Yellow Sea.

According to the 9 Jan 2004 Wolf Pack Warrior, "...Captain Dydyk was flying lead in a two-ship formation conducting degensive basic fighter maneuver training over the Yellow Wea when the mishap occurred. On the sixth, and final mission engagement of the day he unknowingly set-up and began the engagement just 800 feet above the briefed maneuvering altitude limit "floor" of 5,000 feet above the sea." The report concluded that both pilots were in a position to discover the low altitude condition but neither gained enough situation awareness early enough to prevent the crash.

The following is from a list at F-16C/D Fighting Falcon Serials. 89-2084/WP 1C-237 F-16CG Crashed, 09.09.03 (35th FS)

PAC-3 Deployed in Korea The promised PAC-3 deployment to Korea was completed in September. The anti-missile system can hit ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system was part of an $11 billion plan to enhance US defenses in the ROK. "The upgraded Patriot system will bring enhanced defensive capabilities to the peninsula as well as contribute to the overall deterrence US forces bring to the alliance (with South Korea)," the 8th US Army said in a statement. "Part of the upgrade and new enhanced capabilities include the hit-to-kill technology to destroy incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft," it said. An army public affairs official said the system had been deployed in July but had not been publicized until now because troops were being trained to operate the mobile air defense system. They are now trained. The PAC-3 fits 16 missiles into a launcher, compared with four on earlier versions. Each missile destroys its target through force of impact but also includes a conventional warhead that blasts fragments to destroy aircraft and cruise missiles.

The following was from the 17 Sep Choson Ilbo

USFK Completes Patriot PAC-3 Deployment

by Yoo Yong-won (kysu@chosun.com)

The U.S. Forces Korea has completed its deployment here of the latest Patriot PAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles, which have an improved missile-interception capability over the earlier generation PAC-2 model.

Steve Boylan, information officer of the U.S. 8th Army command, said Tuesday that the PAC-3s had replaced some of the old PAC-2 missiles at the first artillery battalion of 43rd anti-aircraft artillery regiment. He said that introduction of PAC-3 missiles is part of more than 150 plans on which the U.S. military will spend $11 billion by 2006 to boost its war-fighting capabilities.

The number of PAC-3 missiles deployed will not be disclosed, for security reasons, Boylan said.

The PAC-3 Patriot missile uses the direct-hit method - meaning it strikes the target and detonates rather than getting near the target and detonating, as the PAC-2 does. It features increased accuracy and is expected to improve the USFK's ability to intercept North Korean missiles such as the SCUD and Rodong-1. The PAC-3 is 5.2 meters long and 25 centimeters in diameter and can intercept ballistic missiles up to 20 kilometers away.

Since 1994, the USFK had deployed 48 Patriot missiles, or one battalion's worth, in Osan, Suwon and Gunsan. The 8th Army command will display the PAC-3 to the media on Thursday at Suwon Airfield.

The following is a 10 Oct 2003 Flash presentation from Tongil Newsof candid photos of ROK/US installations from the JSA to the Chinhae port. Attached to article of 50th Anniversary of the Korean War. Though anti-US in intent, there are some nice candid shots. Click here.

Shortages of Chemical Warfare Suits Chemical warfare suits are a way of life at Kunsan, but there is some disturbing news. In 2002, defects were found in one in ten suits, but there was no way of recalling them as the defect was internal. In the war in Iraq, the U.S. was lucky that there was no chemical attacks reported to find out who were the lucky ones with good suits.

Now a new problem...not enough suits in the future. The following was Associated Press report was on 23 SepL

DOD Still Short On Chemical Suits

Associated Press
September 23, 2003

WASHINGTON - The Pentagon doesn't have enough protective suits to keep U.S. troops safe from chemical or biological attacks, congressional investigators said Monday.

Inventories of the suits are millions short of what the Pentagon says it needs and the shortages will worsen in coming years under current spending plans, the General Accounting Office report said. The problem is compounded by the use of thousands of the suits during the war in Iraq and the looming expiration dates of some older suits, the report said.

The full report was classified, but the GAO released an unclassified summary. That summary said the Pentagon agreed with recommendations to consider stockpiling parts of the suits and to better determine how many of the suits are needed.

The Defense Department has had long-standing problems with inventories of protective gear. The Pentagon recalled about 800,000 defective suits in 2000 but had accounted for only about 550,000 of them by last October, Defense Department officials testified at a House subcommittee hearing then. Congressional investigators also have documented the military's problems with keeping track of the suits and their expiration dates.

Raymond Decker of the GAO said at the October hearing that those problems put American troops at risk in a chemical or biological warfare environment.

Although President Bush said he ordered the invasion of Iraq because Saddam Hussein's regime had chemical and biological weapons, none were used and none have been found. U.S. troops often used their protective suits during the Iraq war because of false alarms, however.

Before the war in Iraq, the military had about 4.5 million of the protective suits, including about 1.5 million of the newest and safest version.

The military says it needs a stockpile of about 7 million suits, the latest GAO report said. The current stockpile is set to increase to about 6 million next year, but then fall back to about 4.5 million by 2007, the report said.

Several factors increase the Pentagon's risk of not having enough protective gear, the report said. The military relies on foreign suppliers for some critical components of the suits. Inconsistent and unpredictable yearly funding means large numbers of suits will expire at the same time.

The ability of suit manufacturers to quickly increase production in a crisis is unclear, the report said. That means there could be a delay between when the military ran out of suits in a major war and when the companies could make enough replacement suits, the report said.

Friction Between the DOD and Chiefs of Staff There is a lot of politics involved in the "New Army." The new Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, was brought out of retirement and jumped over numerous and still-active Army generals generals waiting in the wings. (NOTE: This is only the second time this has been done. President Kennedy brought Gen Max Taylor out of retirement during the Cuban Missile Crisis.) Schoomaker retired as a four-star General in 2000 as commander in chief of United States Special Operations Command (USSOC). This move, which passed over numerous Army generals, revealed Rumsfeld's intent to change the shape and direction of the Army as well as the rest of the military.

In the past, there was a lot of bad blood between the Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz and the Chiefs of Staff. Rumsfeld had systematically chopped off the Chiefs of Staffs for each of the services at the kneecaps. They no longer were free to appoint their own staffs. The best example of the bad blood is how Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had been at odds with the previous Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki. Rumsfeld announced General Shinseki's replacement 15 months early thereby rendering Gen Shinseki into a lame duck and effectively tossing his vision to transform the Army into the trash can. The bad blood went so far that both Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz failed to attend Shinseki's retirement ceremony -- something unheard of in recent times.

The head-butting was over a multitude of issues from equipment procurement to manning. For example, in late February 2003 Gen. Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thought "something in the order of several hundred thousand" troops would be needed to occupy Iraq. "We're talking about a post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems," Shinseki said. Two days later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told a House committee that Shinseki's projections were "wildly off the mark" and added that it was "not a good time to publish highly suspect numbers." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later said that Shinseki "misspoke himself." Shinseki, through a spokesman, declined to back down. Shinseki has since been proven right. Former Army secretary Thomas White, forced out because of his frequent run-ins with Rumsfeld, said in an interview in Jun 2003 that senior Defense officials "are unwilling to come to grips" with the scale of the postwar U.S. obligation in Iraq.

In addition, there has been a lot of friction over Rumsfeld's vision and how the Army wanted to operate. Though Rumsfeld's primary objective is to streamline the military into a information-based 21st Century fighting force, he also has the objective of reasserting civilian control over the Pentagon and reining in a Joint Staff that the defense secretary believed had become too powerful and independent of civilian control. Rumsfeld felt that officers were acting at times as though they were not subordinate to their civilian bosses.

In fact, one of the first acts that Rumsfeld fielded was to proclaim that there was only one CINC (Commander-in-Chief) -- the President. The traditional titles for military commanders was banned -- and the image was that Rumsfeld was subordinating the military to civilian governance. (NOTE: Interestingly Gen Schoomaker's resume shows him as "CINC-USSOC".)

As they came into office before the 9-11 incident, the Bush team had a wrecking ball and aimed to take out a lot of military personnel. Notably missing from the 2003 Defense Bill was the Army's new mobile howitzer system, the Crusader, that Rumsfeld killed on grounds that it was too heavy to deploy to distant battlefields; the F-22 stealth fighter; and Commanche attack helicopters. In 2002, we wrote that there were significant military program cuts and a growing rift caused by Rumsfeld's objective to not only modernize the military, but also reign in the Pentagon under civilian control. (See Cuts in Military Strength Shelved, Cuts in Military Hardware Continue & Growing Rift in Defense Department for details.)

After the Sept 11th attack, Bush backpedalled on his vision for the military and reshaped it to fit the new reality of the war on terrorism. Now, the military transformation promised by Bush is simply a high-tech addition to the existing military that many still believe is outmoded and designed to fight a Soviet Union that no longer exists. Traditional forces -- tanks, armored-personnel carriers and short-range attack jets -- may not be appropriate to fight elusive 21st-century foes, such as the al-Qaeda terrorist network. However, the carrier task forces that Bush sought to pare down proved to be the backbone of the Afghanistan effort. The military hardware of the past cannot simply be abandoned because unpredictable adversaries like North Korea with large conventional armies still exist.

There were substantial funding increases for precision-guided weapons, advanced communications equipment, spy satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles were approved. All of these advanced systems proved invaluable to the U.S. military in its war in Afghanistan. The idea is to improve intelligence gathering and shorten the time it takes for intelligence to reach fighter pilots or troops in the field. The budget also included increases for developing a national missile-defense system, a top priority for the president, and money to convert four Trident submarines from nuclear-weapons carriers to launch vessels for conventional cruise missiles.

The defense bill includes a 4.1 percent pay raise for military personnel and almost all the $7.4 billion Mr. Bush requested to keep developing a national missile defense system. The defense bill also provides $3.3 billion for 15 C-17 transport aircraft, $2.3 billion for two Aegis destroyers, $3.2 billion for 46 Navy F/A-18 E/F fighters and $3.5 billion to continue developing the Joint Strike Fighter. Another $249 million is allotted for Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles, a prime weapon in the Persian Gulf War. Notably missing is the Army's new mobile howitzer system, the Crusader, that Rumsfeld killed on grounds that it was too heavy to deploy to distant battlefields; the F-22 stealth fighter; and Commanche attack helicopters.

Relocation of USFK Forces in Future:

"11 Jan 2002
USFK to Regroup Troops Into 7 Areas of the Country

The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) will regroup its troops into seven areas of the country, with Seoul and the vicinities having command and control and army training facilities. This was revealed by Col. Robert Durbin when he discussed the Master Plan 2010 of the USFK at a discussion meeting on the housing problem in Yongsan garrison held at the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses Friday afternoon. Under the plan, the USFK will have major command and control posts, including the joint Korea-U.S. command and control post, and army training grounds in two areas of Seoul and the vicinities and the air force command and control post and major army combat support facilities in two areas of Kyonggi Province. A major air force base will be located in Kunsan , while major naval support facilities and major army combat support facilities will be situated in two areas of North and South Kyongsang provinces. The USFK returned 97,099 pyong (one pyong is 3.3 square meters.) of the land in its use to South Korea in 1991 and will return 33,621 pyong more by closing seven additional bases and relocating some bases to areas south of the Han River under its land planning program , Col. Durbin said. The USFK's official position is that it is ready to relocate Yongsan base whenever the alternative base and facilities are available , he added. Seoul will see the number of families of USFK service people increase from 1,247 now to 1,567 in 2010, Osan from 286 to 509, Pyongtaek from six to 1,662 and North and South Kyongsang from 299 to 1,033, while Pusan will see no increase from the current 141 families , the colonel said. Accordingly, the number of USFK families will increase from 1,979 now to 4,912 in 2010 and the USFK service people living with their family members in the country, expressed as a percentage of the total, will increase from 10 percent now to 25 percent in 2010. The strength of the USFK fell from 41,000, with the single representing 70 percent, in 1970 to 37,000, with the married accounting for 60 percent, now. Only 10 percent of the married are provided with housing here in South Korea against 74 percent in Europe and 72 percent in Japan. This is why South Korea is the country U.S. service people, especially command-level officers, most hate to serve in, the colonel said." (Source: KPP20020111000074 Seoul Yonhap in English 1000 GMT 11 Jan 02)

Under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the USFK will close 28 of its 41 major installations and facilities, including three in Seoul. It will also shut down three training ranges in Paju, Tongduchon and Pochon. The operations will be consolidated into other "stable" camps. The USFK will return a total of 41.14 million pyong of land over the next 10 years -- more than half of the granted lands. Overall, the additional land to be returned is around 2.5 million square meters, while the US will get about 2.7 million square meters in the new agreement. According to the Korea Times on 29 March:

Cps. Grant, Stanton, Edwards, Howze, Greaves and Garry Owen in Paju will be consolidated with Cp. Casey or Cp. Stanley in Tongduchon, while the six small bases, including Cp. Kyle, which are located in Uijongbu and Tongduchon, will be merged with Cp. Casey or Cp. Stanley.

Cp. Colbern in Hanam, Kyonggi Province, and some part of Cp. Long in Wonju, Kangwon Province, will be consolidated with Cp. Humphreys in Pyongtaek, while 260,000 pyong of government-granted land outside the Kunsan Air Base will be returned to the government.

Meanwhile, the two sides agreed that 1.54 million pyong of new land would be granted in return for USFK's consolidation of bases and training facilities. The U.S. requested 500,000 pyong of new land in Osan, 300,000 pyong in Uijongbu, 240,000 pyong in Pyongtaek, 2,000 pyong in Inchon, 200,000 pyong in Ichon in Kyonggi Province, 31,000 in Chilgok and 100,000 pyong of land for a marine corps training facility in Pohang, North Kyongsang Province.

These articles were published in 2002 so it should not have been a shock when it was implemented in 2003. However, what changed was the North Korean nuclear issue. In October 2002, the North dropped its bomb shell and it has been going down hill ever since. At the same time, the anti-American campaigns were going full force and thus drove an anti-Korea backlash. Where it was fashionable before to shout "Yankee Go Home" when there was relative peace, it is quite different when the heat is turned up and a potential war is faced.

FEBRUARY 2003

U.S. Says No More 'Tripwire'

by Joo Yong-joong (midway@chosun.com)

WASHINGTON - A high-level official at the U.S. Defense Department said this week that the tripwire function of the U.S. forces near the Demilitarized Zone was outdated. The official, who requested anonymity, told Korean correspondents that the expression applied to the situation 10-30 years ago, and that Americans wanted such expressions done away with. The official said that if a war broke out here in this age of missiles, North Korea would target American air bases from the beginning.

The official also said that Washington wanted to relocate the Yongsan base in central Seoul as soon as possible, maybe within months, and that the two big bases north of the Han River should be relocated south of the river within years. Osan and Pyeongtaek were mentioned as possible relocation areas.

He stressed that the American defense treaty was stronger than ever but that if the Koreans wished, U.S. troops in Korea could leave tomorrow. Washington wants a new blueprint for the next 50 years of U.S.-Korea relations to be made before October, when the alliance turns 50, he said. Washington wants talks on how to make the relationship more balanced, as President Roh Moo-hyun has requested, but wants Seoul to take on added roles and responsibilities, the official said.

DoD Counters With Reports to Reduce Troop Levels: In an article carried on 19 Mar by Kyodo News Service, Pentagon spokesman Jeff Davis was reported to have said, "The Pentagon plans to reduce the number of U.S. troops in South Korea to about 30,000." However, on 20 Mar the DoD denied a report that Washington plans to reduce the 37,000-strong U.S. Forces Korea presence by 7,000 troops.

At the same time there are reports from other "U.S. defense official sources" about troop reductions. The Seoul government appears to be wary of recent remarks calling for a realignment and reduction of U.S. troops stationed here as the international standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program remains unresolved. In a meeting with Korean correspondents in Washington on 18 Mar, a senior U.S. defense official said the United States would be prepared to withdraw its troops from South Korea at any time if the Seoul government requests it.

According to the NK.Choson.com, South Korea and the U.S. will be discussing how to increase the former's role in their bilateral military alliance, including the transfer of wartime command to the South Korean side. Pentagon officials are active about discussing relocation of a U.S. Army garrison from downtown Seoul, and size readjustments in U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) will call for revisions in land lease agreements with the U.S. The following is from NK.Choson.com on 22 Mar:

USFK Bases to Be Relocated in Four Years

The Ministry of National Defense announced Thursday that Defense Policy Director Cha Yeong-gu and United States Undersecretary of Defense for East Asia Richard Lawless had discussed the agenda and dates for the joint policy consultation on the future Korea-America alliance to be held in April. Changes in the Korea-America alliance, the relocation and reduction of United States Forces Korea, and alterations in the line of command were addressed at the meeting.

Two bases in urban areas; Uijeongbu and Dongducheon will be moved south of the Han River initially, and the Yongsan Base in Seoul will be moved within four years, instead of the eight years, which had been set previously.

The US side met with Deputy Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Tae-shik in the morning, and is known to have exchanged opinions on the USFK relocation and Korean American cooperation in case of a war in Iraq.

By Yoo Yong-won (kysu@chosun.com)

Roh Will Not Discuss Reduction or Relocation of USFK Forces: On 21 March President Roh Moo-hyun that he would NOT discuss the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea until the North Korean nuclear situation is fully resolved. In addition, Roh assured the public there was no need to be concerned that Washington would target North Korea after the war with Iraq. He earlier claimed South Korea and the United States had entered a "transitional period" in their bilateral relationship.

However, despite all that Roh WANTS, the Bush administration may have other ideas. Roh wanted to be treated as an "equal partner" and may soon find that "equal partner" means sharing the financial load "equally" as well. Roh wants a SOFA comparable to Japan, but where Japan provides housing for 79 percent of married personnel, Korea only has facilities for 10 percent. Korea has not done its share. If Roh's idea is for Korea to contribute little financial support for the USFK while the U.S. continues to foot the majority of the bill, he may find the troops being reduced whether he WANTS them to be left in Korea or not.

APRIL 2003

U.S. seeks troop pullback

Intends to redeploy 2d Division this year

The United States has officially informed South Korea that it intends to pull back its troops from inter-Korean border areas during the second half this year, government sources said yesterday.

“In a video conference on March 24, Richard Lawless, the Pentagon’s top policymaker on Korea, told his South Korean counterpart, Lieutenant General Cha Young-koo, about Washington’s intention to move the U.S. 2d Infantry Division to the area south of the Han River during the second half of this year,” a senior government official said on condition of anonymity.

Mr. Lawless, deputy assistant secretary for Asian and Pacific affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense, is the chief negotiator of the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative, established by the two countries’ defense ministers in December. General Cha, assistant minister for policy at the Ministry of National Defense, is the South Korean chief negotiator.

General Cha tried to persuade Mr. Lawless that relocating the 2d Infantry Division this year is impossible, due to the difficulty of finding an alternate site, the official said. General Cha also stressed that the relocation should be implemented after the North Korea’s nuclear aspirations are resolved.

Mr. Lawless reportedly did not mention any force cut.

The U.S. 2d Infantry Division, about 15,000 strong, is the largest American unit in South Korea. Most of the division is deployed in Dongducheon, Gyeonggi province, 25 kilometers (15 miles) southeast of the inter-Korean Military Demarcation Line. The division headquarters is in Uijeongbu, 35 kilometers southeast of the border.

Stationed within range of North Korea’s conventional artillery, the troops have been seen as a “tripwire,” an assurance of automatic U.S. involvement in the event of a North Korean attack. U.S. officials, however, recently have reacted sensitively to this description. Washington has long demanded that Pyeongyang withdraw its conventional weapons deployed along the border.

The Los Angeles Times reported Wednesday that the Pentagon wanted to start the realignment in the 2004 fiscal year, which begins in October.

The Pentagon hopes to begin moving its Yongsan garrison out of Seoul next year, Mr. Lawless reportedly told General Cha. Such a move would be possible in five years, due to budget and alternate site matters, but Seoul will try to advance the timetable, General Cha reportedly replied. The two governments have agreed on the relocation of Yongsan garrison, but never set a schedule.

Seoul is trying to convince Washington that the 2d Division’s move should wait until Pyeongyang’s nuclear ambitions are resolved. “Until then, we should refrain from demanding revision of the Status of Forces Agreement and discussing realignment and reduction of U.S. forces,” Chyung Dai-chul, acting chairman of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party, said yesterday before the National Assembly.

Meeting with President Roh Moo-hyun Thursday, security ministers encouraged the relocation of the Yongsan base, but showed concern about pulling the 2d Infantry Division away from the border zone.

Because realigning U.S. forces requires a major revision of the South Korea-U.S. joint operations plans to counter possible North Korean attack, Seoul asked Washington for a serious discussion to devise a feasible long-term plan. Mr. Lawless will visit Seoul Sunday for the first talks of the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative.

by Lee Chul-hee
myoja@joongang.co.kr

According to Korea Herald on 4 Apr: "In their preliminary talks in February, the nations came close to redefining the bilateral alliance in a way that would bolster Seoul's role. The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has taken a series of measures to improve its public image in the wake of last year's anti-U.S. sentiments following the acquittal of two U.S. soldiers whose armored truck struck and killed two Korean girls last June. Ranking U.S. military officials have also said the USFK will relocate its Yongsan base, which is currently situated in the heart of the Korean capital."

Pending these negotiations, Roh has embarked on a massive PR blitz by dispatching his Foreign Minister Yoon to the U.S. and Japan to discuss the North Korean issue. It is curious that former President George Bush, Sr. will visit Seoul on 14 April at the invitation of the business leaders. The image is that the Korean economy is in deep trouble with America and they need inside help.

The general impression from the amount of generals and key leaders transiting Korea in the past month is that the U.S.-Korea relationship is in deep trouble. VP Cheney is expected in Seoul in the near future though it is unknown whether it is for the discussions or simply to confer with President Roh. We will have to wait for the 8 April negotiations to watch for what develops from the discussions.

As a side note, two local civic groups in Uijeongbu said they will stage protest rallies in front of the Defense Ministry and a U.S. Army base in Yongsan, Seoul. Some 40 protestors will call on the military authorities to withdraw plans to build a new U.S. military base at Uijeongbu. (SITE NOTE: This will add ammunition to the DoD plans to relocate south of the Han.)

Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative Discussions (8-9 April): The first session of "Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative" was held at the Defense Ministry from 8-9 April. South Korea was led by assistant minister for policy Cha Young-koo while the United States was headed by Richard Lawless, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and the Pacific. The Korean team included Kim Sung-man, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's strategic planning division, Sim Yun-jo, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's North American affairs department and eight others. Washington sent eight senior officials, including the Department of State's special envoy Christopher LaFleur. Lawless and officials arrived on April 8 in Seoul.

Trying to piece together what was discussed is very difficult from the conflicting news stories. On the first day of the meeting at the Ministry of National Defense, the Chosun Ilbo on 8 April reported that the U.S. insisted on moving its troops south. It was evident that there were some very contentious points as the meeting lasted far longer than scheduled.

Headed by the ministry's policy planning chief, Cha Young-koo, and the U.S.'s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Lawless, the two sides agreed on the principle of moving U.S. troops off the central Seoul Yongsan base as soon as possible. The U.S. delegation suggested an immediate redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division to south of the Han River, while the Koreans insisted that the issue be shelved until the North Korean nuclear issue is solved.

Washington's defense officials argued that the 2nd Division's camps in northern Gyeonggi province are in urban areas and vulnerable to accidents, and should be moved south.

While the meeting was scheduled to end by 3:30 p.m., it continued through the evening due to difficulties in reaching agreements.

The Joongang Ilbo added more information of the discussions.

"Mid-level defense officials from Seoul and Washington have reportedly agreed again in principle to move the Yongsan Garrison, the headquarters for U.S. troops here, out of the Seoul area. The two sides differed, however, on a U.S. proposal to pull back its combat infantry division from front-line positions north of Seoul. ... Korean government sources said the United States wants to move the 2d Infantry Division south of the Han River; the Korean side asked that such a move be postponed until after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear arms issues. ... Another agenda item was a proposal to end the current agreement that U.S. military leaders will assume operational command of Korean forces in wartime, but the discussion stayed, sources said, on a theoretical plane. A U.S. official at the talks said the Americans want to reconfigure their forces here, noting that the United States had sent 27 divisions to the first Gulf War, but had mobilized a much smaller force for the war now under way in Iraq."

The interpretations of what was was discussed is very clouded based upon the choice of words reported in the various articles. For example, an official with the Ministry of Defense said, "The two teams did not make remarks about the REDUCTION in U.S. Forces in Korea and even on a TV conference ahead of the session, the U.S. side did not mention the need of reductions." However, a U.S. official said that the Americans want to RECONFIGURE their forces here. This is the same thing as the U.S. wanted a smaller stationary force in Korea in the future based on the U.S. vision for the mobile forces of the 21st Century. It is apparent that the U.S. pressed this point. However, it appears that they never got past the relocation issue because of South Korea's position.

The Donga Ilbo article on 9 April stated that the two sides failed to "narrow their differences in possible reshuffling of U.S. forces in Korea."

It is reported that at yesterday’s session, the two teams confirmed relocation of the Yongsan Garrison at the earliest possible date, but failed to narrow their differences in possible reshuffling of U.S. forces in Korea, such as repositioning the entire 16,000 strong Second Infantry Division.

"We accepted the U.S. proposal of advancing the date for relocating the Yongsan Garrison. Regarding the repositioning of the Second Infantry Division, we delivered our position that it is difficult to accept still considering its presence a deterrent against North Korea as well as massive relocation costs," an official with the Ministry of Defense said.

"The two teams did not make remarks about the reduction in U.S. Forces in Korea and even on a TV conference ahead of the session, the U.S. side did not mention the need of reductions," he added.

The U.S. side was reported to have suggested debate on relocation of U.S. forces in Korea, stressing that it is part of the U.S.’ world military strategy.

Yesterday’s session was said to have focused on ways to improve military capacity by introducing the newest information gathering and combat methods according to changes in battlefield environments.

"The U.S. sent smaller military forces to the current war with Iraq than it did to the 1991 Gulf War. As battlefield environments are changing, the focus was on the reshuffling of U.S. forces in Korea at the session," an American participant said.

On 9 Apr at a joint press conference at the conclusion of the discussions, it was reported that military officials from the U.S. and Korea agreed that the transfer of the Yongsan Garrison and relocation of troops north of Seoul would be done in a way that would not weaken Korea's security. The Defense Ministry's policy planning chief, Cha Yeong-gu, and the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Lawless, both said that a research body would be set up to keep the relationship up-to-date with the changing security situations on the peninsula.

Richard Lawless, Christopher LaFleur, and Cha Yeong-gu (8 Apr 03)

The Conservative Pro-USFK newspaper Donga Ilbo on 9 April reported that the U.S. wanted to relocate its troops (US Wants to Move Its 2nd Infantry Division Out Of Seoul/April 09, 2003/Sang-Ho Yun): It stated "Lawless` remark can be interpreted that although the two sides have agreed to relocate US 2nd division to an alternative site, they didn`t discuss whether they relocate it to the south of Seoul. It has been known that the U.S. side clearly expressed its intention of moving its infantry division to the south of Seoul at the meeting." It went on to say, "With regard to this issue, the Korean representatives delivered their government`s position that it is difficult to relocate the US 2nd division to the south of Seoul for the time being, considering enormous expenses for the relocation and difficulties in finding an alternative site. In addition, they said to the U.S. side that there are rising security concerns among Korean public worrying a possible withdrawal of U.S. infantry division from Seoul." In addition, the South Korean army would enhance its role of maintaining security on the Korean Peninsular, while U.S. forces would focus on securing stability in the Asian region. In addition, it stated it is clear that South Korea would have to increase defense expenses to strengthen military deterrence to North Korea`s attack if the U.S. reduces its role in defending the heavily fortified border line areas between the South and the North.

---

While the conservative newspapers talked of the U.S. desire to relocate its USFK forces, the liberal newspapers reflected President Roh's views and stressed how the force structure would be "realigned" and downplayed -- or denied -- references to relocation. The liberal Pro-Roh administration newspaper Korea Herald (GIs to be realigned, not weakened/April 10, 2003/Kim Hyung-jin) reported South Korea and U.S. top defense officials agreed to redeploy American forces "in a way that will not weaken the combined deterrent effect against North Korea." It stated the U.S. side empathized with the concerns of the Korean people regarding talk of relocating the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division away from the inter-Korean border. It also stated that the two sides would "establish a joint consultative body to discuss transferring to South Korea the wartime command of its armed forces, which is currently under the control of the U.S.-led U.N. Command (UNC)." However, in the article it stated that Richard Lawless stated, "There is going to be a realignment. And this will be something that both parties should agree on." It stated that troop reductions had not been discussed and that the meeting did not deal with the redeployment of the 2nd ID. It pointed out that the 10-point agreement, "the two sides agreed on the need to adapt the alliance to the new global security environment, which takes into account Korea's status as a prosperous democracy." It also stated that "the Korean forces' role in defense of the peninsula and beyond, and to enhance U.S. forces' contribution to regional stability." It stated the "two countries will consult on the modernization of the U.S. and Korean military capabilities in an effort to further enhance their combined defense posture and deterrent capabilities." It reaffirmed the relocation of Yongsan "as soon as possible." "We don't have any fixed time on the relocation, but we will get it done very fast," Lawless said. (SITE NOTE: Reading between the lines, the U.S. position is that Korea should pick up more of the defense role costs and Koreans would be picking up more responsibilities for their own defense. On the other hand, the U.S. promised its latest defense systems to the ROK or USFK.)

FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE POLICY INITIATIVE

Joint Statement on "Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative - 2003. 04. 09

1. The first meeting of the "Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative" was held in Seoul on April 8-9, 2003. Lieutenant General Cha Young Koo, Deputy Minister for Policy of the ROK Ministry of National Defense, Mr. Shim Yoon Joe, Director General, North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Mr. Richard P. Lawless, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Asia-Pacific Affairs, Mr. Christopher LaFleur, Special Envoy of the US Department of State, led their respective delegations, which included members of the ROK MND and the US Department of Defense, as well as the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the US Department of State.

2, The "Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative" was agreed upon by the ROK Minister of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense during the 34th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on December 5, 2002, to adapt the alliance to reflect changing regional and global security circumstances.

3. The US side conveyed the US Governments' special appreciation for the ROK's decision to dispatch engineer and medical units to support the Coalition's effort in Iraq.

4. Acknowledging that this year marks the 50th anniversary since the official establishment of the ROK-US alliance, the two sides assessed the bilateral relations between the ROK and the US, and concurred that the ROK-US alliance made significant contributions to national security and development of Korea. In order to further enhance deterrence through the solidarity of the 5. ROK-US alliance and to ensure a strong alliance for the future, the two sides agreed on the following basic principles for their joint consultation.

• i. Both agreed on the need to adapt the alliance to the new global security environment and to take into account the ROK's status as a prosperous democracy.
• ii. Both agreed on the need for both countries to invest in an enduring alliance.

5. The two sides shared a common view that the ROK-US alliance must be developed in ways to best contribute to security on the Peninsula and beyond. Accordingly, both parties agreed in principle to expand ROK forces' role in defense of the Peninsula and to enhance US forces' contribution to regional stability. In the context of the ROK's own military transformation, it will assume responsibility for selected missions. The US presented a plan to invest in the future of the alliance by further developing 21st century warfighting capabilities.

6. The two sides agreed to consult on modernization of the ROK and US military capabilities in an effort to further enhance the ROK-US combined defense posture and deterrence capabilities.

7. The two sides agreed to consolidate the USFK base structure in order to preserve an enduring stationing environment for USFK, to achieve higher efficiency in managing USFK bases, and to foster a balanced development of ROK national lands. Both sides agreed to continue discussion on the timing of the overall realignment process. The US side expressed an understanding of the concerns of the Korean people regarding the alignment of USFK, including 2ID. The two sides agreed that there would be no compromise in the combined deterrence of their forces throughout the process of realignment.

8. Recognizing the need to foster a balanced development of the Seoul Metropolitan Area, to resolve inconveniences to Seoul citizens, and to provide a stable stationing environment for USFK, the two sides agreed to relocate Yongsan Garrison as soon as possible.

9. As a part of this process, the ROK JCS and the US JCS will consult regarding key topics required in developing concepts related to changes in the security environment, such as the development of ROK and US combined military capabilities. Additionally, they will form a consultative group to conduct a study of the ROK-US combined command relationship in the mid and long term.

10. Assessing that the first meeting has contributed to further strengthening the ROK-US alliance, the two sides agreed to hold the 2nd meeting in the US in May.

BOTTOMLINE: The bottomline is that the U.S. is hell bent on relocating their forces south of the Han -- without reducing the numbers at this time. According to Naps Net: "According to several sources, the Pentagon would now like to see the realignment started in the 2004 fiscal year, which begins in October, with a move out of the Yongsan headquarters in Seoul to be followed by a redeployment of troops near the DMZ. "We would like to execute this as quickly as possible," said one diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. New ROK President Roh Moo Hyun does not want to see any changes until the DPRK nuclear crisis is resolved. But, said the diplomat, "that timetable is probably too slow for us."

Although Rumsfeld has publicly ruminated about moving some of the troops out of South Korea entirely, a more likely scenario is that they would move farther to the south of the peninsula, trying to get as far as possible from Seoul into less congested areas. There is no sense of a wholesale movement out of Korea, but the U.S. military want a less intrusive and more sustainable presence. For the Koreans, this is like the old saying that you should be careful what you wish for or you'll get it. They will end up having more responsibility for their own defense. In the discussions, it was agreed that some of the military responsibilities would be shifted to the ROK.

A Korea Times article on 12 Apr gave some highlights of the what the U.S. TOLD the Koreans at the Future Alliance Meeting.

• "The U.S. told South Korea that the relocation of its Yongsan Garrison will be started and finished next year" a U.S. source said.
• "Osan, where U.S. Air Force and other big camps are located, is preferred as the new home for the U.S. theater headquarters because it would reduce moving costs," the source said.
• "The Pentagon is seeing to it that there will be no repeat of a delay on the relocation of the garrison that happened in the early 1990s and the choice of Osan shows such U.S. determination." A Foreign Ministry official confirmed that the U.S. presented a timetable for the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison. A senior Seoul government official said, "Yongsan Garrison is set to move at any time." However, he declined to comment on whether the timetable was handed over during the Cha-Lawless meeting. The two sides agreed to move the U.S. base in Seoul as soon as possible without disclosing the exact timetable.
• Regarding the potential relocation of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division, 14,000-strong mainstay of U.S. commitment to deterring an invasion by North Korea, the two sides didn't reach agreement with Seoul wanting to postpone its relocation after the settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The U.S. wants to have both the Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division relocated at the same time.
• "The two sides disagreed on the timing of the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division, but, whenever it is moved, it will most likely entail a reduction in the number of U.S. ground forces," the U.S. source said, saying that it will be tantamount to rolling the suspended Nunn-Warner Amendment back into life.
• Under its present plan, called the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), United States Forces in Korea (USFK) will transfer the responsibility of defending one of the two main supply routes, which the North is bound to use in the event of its invasion, to South Korea, triggering speculation that the size of the 2nd Infantry Division will be halved into one infantry brigade with its support personnel. "However, the LPP itself is up for a change now and it is hard to tell what the USFK will come down to, considering the entire division will be taken out from its border area," a military expert said.

The message was also sinking in to the Roh administration. On 10 April, President Roh acknowledged that the time had come to discuss relocating U.S. forces stationed in Korea, but that a troop reduction should be an issue pondered over the long term. Roh said that the public wanted the U.S. Forces Korea's (USFK) main garrison moved out of Yongsan as soon as possible but the issue of a forces reduction should be discussed after the North Korean nuclear situation was fully settled. The U.S. position was that it should be discussed NOW. The U.S. strategy was now becoming clear that they were going to remove U.S. forces from the DMZ and let the North sit and stew. If the North did not remove an equal number of forces from the DMZ, it would be viewed internationally as an aggressor and the U.S. could justify a preemptive strike if so desired.

To back this up, the U.S. would keep the F-117A stealth fighters from Holloman at Kunsan and the F-15s from Elmendorf at Osan AB according to USFK articles -- though the 90th FS usually operated out of Kwangju during its previous deployments. The USS Carl Vinson could possibly be retained in the "area" after the USS Kitty Hawk returned from the Persian Gulf in April. The 12 B-1 and 12 B-52 bombers would remain at Guam -- though later a weather evacuation forced the 7th AEW to relocate to Hawaii and Fairchild AFB, WA. There are also two nuclear submarines from Guam that could be added to this equation. In addition, the Japanese have added their Aegis cruisers as a backup to this military might. (SITE NOTE: The USS Carl Vinson was extended in the area until December when the USS Kitty Hawk will come out of the Yard after repairs. It entered the Yard on 12 May. There was a gradual buildup and then at the end of May there appeared to be a drawdown with the 7th AEW with its B-1 and B-52s returning to their homestations. The F-15s from Elmendorf also appear to have returned home at the end of May.)

It also appears that the ROK started on its "poor mouth" campaign of not enough funds and trying to shift the financial burden to the U.S. The ROK has done this consistently since the MOU was signed in 1990 to relocate the Yongsan Garrison. Then they said no one wanted the 8th Army Yongsan Garrison -- more pointedly the refusal of the Pyongtaek mayor to accept the forces in 1993 within his city. At that time, the cost of relocation was projected at $9.5 billion. Korea did not want to pay this cost and the Yongsan relocation returned to the status quo. Later Korea said that the U.S. had "padded" the figures. Korea then demanded changes to the SOFA and got it in 1991 with substantial increases in their share of defense. Unsatisfied, the Korean government demanded more changes dealing with jurisdiction and again their share went up -- much to the vocal objections of civic groups. After 1997, the Koreans had the audacity to try to renegotiate the cost share down blaming the IMF Crisis. Now in 2003 after a year of anti-Americanism pointed at the USFK, the U.S. was in no mood to banter over this point with a G-12 nation -- or in the U.S. words, "a prosperous democracy." When the topic was resurfaced again, the Korean government announced the relocation cost for Yongsan at $1.3 billion -- but this was NOT confirmed by the USFK. This was the starting volley of the Korean government wanting to negotiate the price down.

It is now apparent that the U.S. strategy is to first relocate the forces according to the Land Partnership Plan south of the Han and then seek a reduction of stationary forces. There will be no discussions on troop reductions until the relocation issue is settled. However, expect to see the latest hardware -- tested successfully in Iraq -- appear on the peninsula. At that time, there will be "silent reductions" such as leaving the authorized personnel numbers static, but not filling them with replacements. The changes are part of a worldwide restructuring designed to make US forces more flexible and more mobile -- as shown in Iraq. The idea that the U.S. will relinquish the control of a coalition (U.S.-ROK) to the minor player (ROK) is NOT in the cards. The question whether South Korea could defeat North Korea is a rather ridiculous case to argue. Even if the ROK won, the total confrontation would be fought across South Korea leaving the country devastated. With the U.S. presence, the possibility of it being a much shorter war -- with the outcome already decided in the U.S. favor. if China and Russia do not escalate it into a global confrontation. If the ROK wishes to demand control of forces in time of war, there is no need for a coalition -- and no need for the U.S. presence in Korea.

There were indications in some articles that Roh stated that Korea would "regain the rhetorical offensive" on the issue of relocating U.S. troops here. He said South Korea would not shy away from leading the discussions on repositioning the U.S. forces in Korea. Roh said during his daily meeting on 10 April with senior secretaries and other aides, "Until now, we have avoided even the mere discussion of the repositioning of U.S. troops. But it is time for us to make it known that we will play a major role in the matter after the North Korea nuclear issue is resolved.” What this implies is that the latest discussions had Korea at a severe disadvantage as the U.S. negotiators were armed with verified anti-Americanism; changes in U.S. military strategy (that has been validated by the Iraq War successes); agreed upon Land Partnership Plan initiatives; and previous agreements that have not been kept by South Korea -- such as the 1990 MOU for the relocation of Yongsan. What Korea wants, may not be what the U.S. wants -- and the U.S. has all the cards in its favor with the growing sense of isolationism in America following the 9/11 incident.

South Korean National Assembly Speaker Park Kwan-yong said on 11 April that the ongoing talks concerning relocation of U.S. forces in Korea should be connected to North Korea's reduction of its conventional weapons. Park met with Vice President Cheney in Washington who applauded the National Assemblies proposal that economic sanctions should be imposed as a carrot-stick approach to leading the North to giving up its nuclear program. Meeting U.S. congressional leaders during his Washington visit, Park emphasized that South Korean people do not question the alliance with the United States. Unfortunately, the latest U.S. flag burnings as part of the anti-war protests in April was sending some strong anti-American messages to the U.S. Congressmen as he spoke.

Roh Praises USFK for "Augmenting" South's Military Capability: On April 19, Yonhap News reported that President Roh said that "the purpose of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) is to augment South Korea's military capabilities and should not be seen as the core element of national defense. Speaking to newly promoted generals and other ranking officers at Cheong Wa Dae, Roh stressed that he supports the stationing of U.S. troops here because Korea reaps many benefits from the deployment." In effect, he has stated that the ROK military will bear the brunt of the nation's defense with a little help from the Americans. He has just slapped the Americans in the face again. In our opinion, President Roh needs a wake-up call that his game of "I'm your friend but..." is getting a little tiresome. (NOTE: On 1 May in a televised MBC broadcast, Roh made reference to a five-year plan to make Korea self-sufficient in its defense. It appears that the MND was tasked with this plan on March 15 and was to deliver it to Roh in May. Thus his statements of "augmenting" makes sense in he is trying to prepare the Korean populace for his plan. However, the plan is for the future and his statements were slurring the USFK in the present.)

Roh really needs to put a sock in his mouth -- or fire his speech writer. His new press guidelines for press briefings to insure that the correct information is released is definitely is not working. He keeps speaking off-the-cuff. Whenever he's "misquoted" his PR staff has to rewrite the English translation of what he said for media release. Immediately following the Yonhap News Report, the Korea Times "clarified" Roh's statements saying, "President Roh Moo-hyun expressed strong support for the United States Forces Korea (USFK), saying, its presence in Korea is not confined to the role of a deterrent in case of a North Korean invasion, but also to serve broader national interests."

Defense Minister Cho Young-kil said the ROK military needs to enhance the alliance's defense capabilities through the deployment of new U.S. weapon systems and that the Korean military would take charge of some U.S. forces duties. The truth is that the Koreans will be soon equipped with the ATACMS -- M39 Army Tactical Missile System (Army TACMS) -- along the DMZ which will change the battle environment dramatically. (See Korea Marches to Its Own Drums for ATACMS writeup. The THAD missile defense systems has been promised to Korea when it is perfected. As to surface-to-surface dangers of the North's SCUD missiles with the range to reach Kunsan AB, Korea relies on the U.S. Patriot batteries. Korea has the Patriot PAC-3 systems on order. In addition, recent requisitions of ATACMS will give the ROK capability to strike Pyongyang. South Korea will deploy 110 surface-to-surface ATACMS with a range of up to 300 km (187 miles) by early 2004. In addition, there are rumors that Korea has already developed a cruise missile of its own design. According to Global Beat , Center for Defence and International Security Studies, University of Lancaster, July 25, 1999: "On 14 July, Seoul News Plus (Ch'ollian Database version) magazine revealed that South Korea has nearly completed work on a 300 km/186 mile land-attack cruise missile. The missile is reportedly being developed to attack hardened North Korean targets.")

Under the current Oplan, the role of the ROK Army on the DMZ is to delay the North's blitzkrieg advance until the promised 640,000 follow-on American troops arrive. Despite Roh's inference that the U.S. was playing an "augmenting role", Kunsan's 8th FW, Misawa's 35th FW and Kadena's 18th FW, along with the Yokosuka's USS Kitty Hawk carrier group will be deeply involved in blunting the North Korean attack. This says nothing of the 17,000 USFK Army troops and their armor, artillery and attack helicopters.

USFK Finds "Tripwire" Terminology Offensive: On 20 Apr USFK Commander General Leon J. LaPorte condemned the term, `tripwire, the role of US 2nd Infantry Division stationed in Uijeongbu and Dongducheon as a `bankrupt` concept. "Tripwire" means US forces` automatic involvement in a war waged by the North. The USFK commander said, appearing on a MBC TV documentary program that `tripwire` is not only a negative term but also a derogatory one for 2nd ID. Furthermore, it is an old-fashioned concept. His remarks were in response to Prime Minister Goh Kun`s proposal of maintaining the USFK`s role as a `tripwire` that he suggested at the beginning of last month as a part of the principles for the US forces` relocation.

Gen LaPorte added, “With regard to North Korea`s military capability, its weapons system, particularly, missiles can attack us (referring to US and South Korean armed forces). We are within its missiles` range. He emphasized that it is inappropriate to call ` tripwire` military forces stationed in north of the Han River.

In addition, he said that the agreement between South Korea and the US on relocation of US forces, including Yongsan, was not spurred by rising anti-American sentiment among Koreans. However, there were few who believe that it wasn't a factor. Note that LaPorte used the term "rising" anti-American sentiment. On the 50-year-old military alliance between Seoul and Washington, the general said a study under way would "make a determination for the Republic of Korea to assume an increasingly dominant role in its national security."

On 22 Apr, Gen Laporte at a forum hosted by a local civic group, the Korea Freedom League, noted that the North Korean economy was on the verge of collapse. Regarding the planned relocation of the Yongsan Garrison, Laporte said that while in the past the army bases in Seoul needed to be physically near the truce line, that need has been reduced by today's improved technologies. He affirmed that U.S. policy to move the base, saying shifting it farther south would be most appropriate.

USFK Announces Relocation Plan Finally on 25 April the USFK announced its relocation plan that has been in the works. In the April "Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative" meeting, there was no decision on the "alternative site" that was put forth by the USFK. It now the "alternative site(s)" have become fixed -- at least for the USFK. Bottom line is that the USFK is moving -- with or without the Korean approval.

On 25 Apr in the Donga Ilbo, Maj Gen James Soligan said the U.S. will relocate the U.S. camps in 25 districts of South Korea to two areas. The first area is the Osan and Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province; the second area is Daegu and Busan in Kyeongsang Province. He also said that the US would realign the US forces in Korea focusing on the two areas on long-term basis.

If one looks at the strategy it makes sense -- FOR THE AMERICANS. Since the time of Jimmy Carter, the troops on the DMZ have limited the Presidential options in dealing with the North. The Americans will be safe but unfortunately Seoul will still be held hostage. The USFK troops moved south to Osan/Pyongtaek and Taegu will no longer be a "tripwire" -- or more truthfully, a "hostage" to nuclear threats.

(SITE NOTE: A Hankyoreh newspaper editorial on 28 April stated: "For Deputy Chief of Staff of U.S. Forces Korea Maj. Gen. James Soligan to announce unilaterally moving the 2nd Infantry Division to the Osan-Pyontaek area [south of the Han River] was very RUDE and ARROGANT. ... The more serious problem is that the US military is running the "Future of the US-ROK Alliance" talks by itself. On the one hand, we will be expected to shoulder a portion of the costs involved in the move, and on the other, there have been no discussions yet as to the readjustments in our defense costs that will follow as a result of the diminished role of USFK. Our government must demand that the USFK authorities officially apologize and retract what was said during [Gen. Soligan's] press conference." (translation). This is President Roh's PR newspaper so one knows that the South Korean government is very upset. It should be noted that during Roh's campaign for the Presidency, the Hankyoreh was calling for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. from Korea.)

With the movement of the 2d ID south of the Han, the USFK forces will be out of the range of the North Korean artillery and protected by the Patriot batteries from SCUDS. Gen Soligan added, "The US defense ministry is now considering plans for introducing a new weapons system including sophisticated smart bombs and upgraded Patriot Missile used during the Iraqi war to USFK." Patriot PAC-3 batteries can knock the SCUDS out of the skies as it did in Iraq -- and hopefully not friendly aircraft as it did in Iraq as well. Currently the PAC-2 is in use, but soon will be upgraded to the PAC-3.

Being South of the Han, the U.S. armour will have greater mobility to move if the North broke through the DMZ -- which some predict may happen. Along the DMZ, the Palladin mobile artillery system was just another stationary artillery piece. However, moved south, it could be used to its full potential. With its sophisticated radar tracking of incoming artillery, it can locate the enemy artillery and return fire to kill it. Then move on. This system is one reason why the Iraqis fired their heavy artillery in the Iraqi War only on a limited scale. To fire meant sure death.

The 2d ID armour would move to Pyongtaek and Taegu to augment the Koreans along the DMZ. From their position, it will be almost impossible for the North to fulfill its plan to encircle Seoul and consolidate its forces once it breaks through the DMZ. It was said that the U.S. forces along the DMZ would be destroyed within three hours. They were sitting ducks. Though it is not published, the game plan for the 2d ID armour once the conflict broke out was NOT to sit and calmly await their death. Their plan was to take the fight north immediately. The USFK units were going to head north as the North's tanks were heading south.

The statement by Gen Soligan also shows that the Command and Control facilities that were still being constructed in Osan in 2002 are now complete. The facilities are in new underground hardened facilities. There had been talk to leave the Joint USFK-ROK CFC command center in Seoul at Yongsan, but this seemed foolhardy. Yongsan base is already a target by the North -- and within artillery range -- so to place your command and control center there does not seem prudent.

Though we are not privy to any plans, the plan will most likely have the armour split into two forces. The smaller force from Pyongtaek would protect the Inchon corridor in case the North decided to run down the east coast using the (Seohan) highway route -- the same as it did in 1950. The other larger force would be situated in Taegu -- most likely Camp Walker -- to block any North movement towards Pusan -- the same as the Korean War. In addition, Taegu straddles the route from the eastern corridor over the mountains from Gangnung.

By moving south, the mobile artillery of the M109A6 "Palladin" artillery system will be enhanced with their ability to locate incoming rounds into Seoul and respond real-time. Where they were situated before at Camp Gary Owen and Camp Hovey, they were nothing more than stationary artillery pieces clearly marked in the sights of the North Korean artillery. In Iraqi, these tracking systems were the reason that the Iraqi Republican Guards did not use their artillery. Firing on the advancing Americans meant sure death.

Whether there are any forces in the Pusan area seems up for grabs. The follow-on packages have always been down in Kimhae so this seems to be the likely point that "Pusan" refers to. If there is armour, there was discussion before of a large training area in the Pohang area -- the general vicinity that the Foal Eagle joint exercises took place. The prime airbases would remain the same at Osan and Kunsan -- with Kwangju as the alternate for follow-on aircraft. Chinhae will be the primary port for use by the U.S. Navy in time of conflict. The port at Pyongtaek (Ansong) will provide an evacuation point for DOD dependents.

However, the main reason this idea is a winner is that the U.S. can now say to the North Koreans, we have removed our forces from the DMZ. Now it is your turn to do the same. This strategy has been often mentioned but only in the hypothetical sense. Now it would be different. The U.S. could say to North Korea, "If you do not remove an equal number of troops, you are going to be viewed by the U.S. as an aggressor nation -- and we will be justified to launch a pre-emptive strike." Dating back to Kim Young-sam, the South was NEVER going to join the U.S. in any preemptive strike. If such an action is decided on by the U.S., it will not be with the consent of the South.

The second reason is that the U.S. forces will finally be free of being held "hostage" by the SOUTH. The USFK was not on the DMZ because they thought it was a good idea, but to pacify the South in their justified terror of an attack on Seoul. However, the idea of a "tripwire" is outdated and the forward positioning of troops is an old-fashioned out-dated way to conduct warfare. Given the high-tech resources of the U.S., it is best suited to fighting a war from long-range.

This latest development also brings about the fear that the U.S. may be planning to act unilaterally again in Korea. Roh has been in office for only two months, but he and his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, made it very uncomfortable for the U.S. in Korea. In dealing with the North, the South has constantly back-stabbed the U.S. or thrown monkey-wrenchs into its plans. It is still doing it and the U.S. may have just said, "ENOUGH!"

The following story is from the Chosun Ilbo on 25 April.

AUGUST 2003

Students at Rodriquez Range (7 Aug 03)

See Tongil News and Voice of the People (Click on video link) for video of break-in to the Rodriguez Live Fire Range. Shots of burning of U.S. flag as is popular with students. One small group did enter the range and were chased down as they ran around with their banner. The Army showed great restraint in ejecting the students and cameraman from the range by simply tossing them out. The students tried to climb the fence again.

The students are sending some mixed messages -- as the Stryker is intended to replace the 2d ID "heavy" elements on the DMZ, "Stryker Go Home" means they want to keep the 2d ID on the DMZ, but at the same time saying the 2d ID should go home -- as they proclaimed on their banner, "US Troops Out of Corea."

Pyongtaek Civic Group Against Relocation An article in the Chosun Ilbo on 19 Aug had a civic group protesting the relocation of the USFK to Pyongtaek. This seemed strangely familiar with what happened in 1993 when Pyongtaek said it didn't want the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison. The only difference is that now the U.S. may simply reduce the numbers of its personnel if the ROK government does not fulfill its promise to procure land. The newspaper stated:

Pyeongtaek Opposes Relocation Plan

by Lee Tae-hun (libra@chosun.com)

A civic group in southern Gyeonggi province that was formed to discuss the possible relocation of U.S. troops to the region will not accept the move of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division there.

The Pyongtaek Citizens Committee on the Relocation of U.S Army Bases, headed by Pyeongtaek Mayor Kim Sun-ki and the city council chairman Lee Ik-jae, said Tuesday that considering national security and the situations of the region around the city, it would not accept the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division to the region. The U.S. Forces Korea asked the South Korean government last month to complete the construction of new facilities in Osan and Pyeongtaek for the relocating troops by 2008.

The committee said that it "basically opposed" the relocation to its area. But it added that if the relocation was inevitable, it should be considered from the view of the region’s development within the Seoul-Washington Land Partnership Planning agreement.

If the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division was still pursued, the committee said, it would refuse all other in-movements of U.S. military units and facilities, including the headquarters of the 8th Army.

The Costs of Self-Reliance

The government has singled out the military for as much as an 8 percent budget increase next year, this while freezing or reducing other areas. Next year's defense budget will be up W1.4 trillion ($1.2 billion) or 45 percent of the increases throughout the national budget. Still, on the one hand you have the Ministry of National Defense greatly disappointed, while others are upset at what they're calling an unreasonable increase in defense spending at a time when the economy is showing signs of long term recession.

The fundamental reason for the situation is the calls for "sovereign national defense" that have been getting main-stage attention since the beginning of the current government. President Roh Moo-hyun has consistently talked about sovereign defense since his inauguration, and has repeatedly said that he's going to increase spending in the area to 3 percent of the GDP. At his Liberation Day address, he announced an ambitious desire to "create the basis for our military to have the capabilities of sovereign defense within the next 10 years." The Ministry of National Defense, however, says it can't even dream about the idea with this kind of increase.

Our security environment is such that we have little choice but to spend a given amount to increase defense spending, no matter how difficult the economy may be. The problem is just how fully the country agrees with the increases. And it's all the more shocking when the money isn't being spent on things that would revive the economy, but that the increase itself won't even make up for the differences when the United States Forces Korea relocates farther from the front lines.

According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the cost of making the country able to defend itself without assistance would be W209 trillion over 20 years. It wouldn't be too much to say that figure is reason enough to tie up the economy and cause it to lose its vitality.

The government should stop using "sovereign national defense" to make the relocation or withdrawal of the USFK an established fact. It would be far wiser to consider the economic situation, the North Korean nuclear issue and other concerns together with defense, and employ all available diplomatic strength to coordinate the timing and speed of what happens in this area. The elements in our society who have led the way in opposing U.S. troops and in anti-Americanism need to tell the rest of the country exactly what their views are on the current situation, and bear responsibility for whatever may result.

SEPTEMBER 2003

Fourth Round of "Future of ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative" During the Fourth Round of "Future of ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative" (Sept 3-4) a news report was released claiming that the USFK had expanded its requirements to 40 percent of the 833 acres. This brought a cry of outrage from the Korean side.

In the Third Round, the US side had proposed to hand over 10 different types of duties to the ROK, of which both sides agreed that the ROK armed forces take over nine. Among them are guard against North Korean special forces' seaborne infiltration, elimination of contaminants in the rear area in time of CBR (chemical, biological and radioactive) warfare waged by NK. It was expected that Korea would have to substantially increase its military expenditure to meet the new requirements from the transfer of duties such as purchasing of equipment and assigning of additional personnel to perform the duties. Since that time, the results of the studies demanded by President Roh on his 15 August announcement to achieve "self-reliance" by 2010 was in. The ROK suddenly was smacked between the eyeballs with the cost. It was staggering -- W209 trillion over 20 years..

FIRST DAY: The first day ended with serious disagreement on key issues. South Korea and the U.S. failed to resolve differences over two defense agreements signed in 1990, which relate to the relocation of the U.S. garrison at Yongsan. Seoul had called the terms of the two agreements "unfavorable." In July the government asked the Pentagon to revise some clauses in the agreements at the third round of defense policy talks -- and referred the matter to the National Assembly in preparation of trying the matter in the court of public opinion.

The chief policymakers, including Richard Lawless, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, Asian and Pacific affairs, Christopher LaFleur, special envoy of the U.S. Department of State, and Cha from the Korean Ministry of Defense, were on the manifest.

Under the agreements, the South Korean government was held responsible for all relocation costs for the U.S. garrison in central Seoul. However, government officials have argued that no specific means of calculating the moving costs which were stated in the original agreements. The ROK government claimed that the U.S. had unilaterally estimated the cost and they had no way of confirming a final figure ($9.5 billion) calculated by the U.S. They stated that in 1991, the United States estimated that $1.7 billion would be required to relocate the base. In 1993, it raised the estimate to $9.5 billion. Seoul has estimated only $3.9 billion will be needed for the move. (NOTE: Go to 1990: Return of Yongsan to Korea for background on this matter.)

However, the USFK remained firm with its $9.5 billion estimate. However, Defense Minister Cho Young-kil said on 30 Jul that the planned reconfiguration of U.S. troops in South Korea will cost Seoul up to US$5 billion, dismissing worries that the expenses will amount to $15 billion -- $5 billion for Yongsan and $10 billion for the relocation off the DMZ by modest South Korean estimates. Again while the South was talking to themselves, the USFK maintained its $9.5 billion cost estimate for Yongsan alone.

The second point on contention on the relocation move was that Seoul was required to exempt U.S. military personnel from any civil liabilities arising from the relocation. For example, a South Korean supplier to U.S. forces would not have the right to file a civil case against the military if its contract was unilaterally revoked due to the move. The 1990 agreements also made Seoul responsible for losses to businesses operating inside the base during the relocation. This point was NOT very important as the bulk of the businesses will be offered a contract extension to their business once the USFK is relocated to Pyongtaek.

The U.S. negotiators were playing hardball and reportedly "demanded that the legal structure of the agreements be kept." In this way, the ROK would not be able to "renegotiate" the agreements. Instead, the negotiators wanted to have "an umbrella agreement" that would generally modify the two pacts -- much like an amendment without going through renegotiation process. The proposed agreement would state that ROK and U.S. would "study and evaluate all expenses related to the Yongsan garrison relocation before making a decision." On the other hand, the ROK desparately wants to renegotiate the costs down as well as slow down the relocation process. What was interesting was that the two sides agreed to ask "an outside, independent institute" to draft a master plan to relocate the Yongsan base. This most likely a contractor to handle all the planning, engineering and implementation work -- much like the system used to create the Inchon International Airport.

The major sticking point of the discussions was the size of land that U.S. troops would retain at Yongsan. Buildings will be turned over as they are vacated and a part of South Post will be integrated with the adjacent Ministry of National Defense -- and the remaining commands will be moved there over time. (See USFK to Keep 20 Percent of Yongsan for background.) The USFK has stated that 1000 persons would remain in Seoul as part of the Combined Field Command Headquarters and OTHER functions. The USFK stated in July that "163 acres would NOT be turned over to civilian control." However, under its "force protection" policy, all the USFK personnel and dependents should be within one camp. The USFK envisioned the Hanam Village area being returned to the ROK control, but in exchange they would need more area within Yongsan. The United States sought to retain about 327 acres of the South Post for housing for the 1,000 military personnel who will remain at Yongsan. In addition, the USFK sought to eliminate the ROK road separating the Main and South posts.

In addition, when the U.S. miliary and dependents moved within their area, South Korea would have to pay for the construction of residential units for the soldiers and their families. This is covered under the cost-sharing provisions under the SOFA.

There is also the problem that certain facilities support the USFK forces Korea-wide. For example, the 18th Medical Command with all its medical specialists and specialized facilities are located at Yongsan. These facilities are NOT "symbolic" to the operation of the USFK. To move such large facilities to another base on short notice will create an enormous expense and require long lead times for design/construction. The costs incidentally the ROK will have to foot -- and they have shown an unwillingness to spend any money.

Also what was not mentioned was how the Ministry of Defense is eyeing the land for sale to offset the cost of relocating the USFK -- and the prime real estate is on South Post's gently rolling hills. At the same time, the Seoul government has other plans for the land and has started to stake its claim. To complicate matters further, there is now a grassroots movement in Pyongtaek -- led by the mayor and city council -- to block the movement of the USFK into the city. All of these KOREAN issues can disrupt the relocation.

The ROK balked on the high cost of the relocation, creation of new housing and increased requests for land. However, the balking may backfire of the ROK as the USFK added the caveat that it was willing to "reconsider the relocation of Yongsan Garrison, if its request were denied."

A Sep 3 article in the Joongang Ilbo read:

U.S. now seeks to keep more of Yongsan base

A senior South Korean defense official says the United States is seeking to retain more of the land at Yongsan Garrison than it originally wanted after most U.S. troops stationed at the base are deployed to other areas of the country in three years.

By 2006, the United States Forces Korea agreed to move most of its soldiers to military facilities in Osan and Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi province.

U.S. military officials are seeking to keep about 40 percent of the 833 acres of land now occupied by its troops at Yongsan Garrison. The United States says it needs the extra land to house the forces that will stay on after the redeployment, the South Korean defense official said.

The United States wants twice the area that South Korean officials estimated a month ago. An official told the JoongAng Ilbo in July that the Ministry of National Defense had been expecting more than 80 percent of the site would be turned over to South Korea.

The official said the headquarters of the United Nations Command and the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command would remain in Seoul, and use about 163 acres of the compound adjacent to the defense ministry.

Yongsan Garrison consists of three areas: Main Post, South Post of 432 acres and a 12-acre transportation compound.

According to a high-ranking government source, the United States now seeks to retain about 327 acres of the South Post for housing for the 1,000 military personnel who will remain at Yongsan. U.S. miliary officials are also asking that South Korea pay for the construction of residential units for the soldiers and their families, the source said.

“The United States recently demanded nearly 40 percent of the land at the Yongsan Garrison to house its remaining forces when we had preliminary contacts for the fourth round of the Future Policy Initiative meeting between the two countries,” the official said. “The issue will be discussed hotly at the meeting.” The defense negotiation is scheduled to take place in Seoul today and tomorrow. In addition to wanting a larger site, the U.S. side asked South Korea to undertake construction of the new housing because U.S. troops are no longer able to use the military facilities at Hannam Village, the source said. The U.S. military changed its housing policy so that all facilities must be located inside bases. Hannam Village, a U.S. military lodge outside the Yongsan Garrison, thus will not qualify.

The U.S. side indicated its willingness to reconsider the relocation of Yongsan Garrison, if its request were denied. The Ministry of National Defense has reportedly rejected the U.S. efforts, citing financial difficulties. The ministry planned to sell the land that became available at Yongsan to the Seoul Metropolitan Government to help fund the moving cost of U.S. troops out of downtown Seoul.

SECOND DAY: The round was completed on 4 Sept though there appears to have been some open agenda items. It appears that the USFK is still "dictating" to the ROK its intentions and the ROK is reacting as best it can. With President Roh's "self-reliance" position on the ROK being completely self-sufficient in its defense needs -- though somewhat unrealistic -- the Ministry of Defense is operating from a weak position. Its shift in strategy in July to "drag its feet and conquer" has not worked. The U.S. is not accepting delays. (See Yongsan Relocation Price Tag Challenged: A New Strategy Emerging??? for our opinion in July.)

Both sides finally agreed to conclude an "umbrella agreement" next month aimed at revising a number of clauses that are causing problems in the two pacts signed in 1990, before proceeding to sign an additional pact on its implementation procedure. A FIFTH round of meetings would be held In October in Seoul to attempt to draft the new unified agreement, as well as agreements for implementation and engineering purposes. Once agreed upon, the umbrella agreement will be forwarded to the National Assembly for ratification. This "umbrella agreement" would then be formalized in the Security Consultative Meeting in Washington in October.

(NOTE: The "Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative" was agreed upon by the ROK Minister of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense during the 34th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on December 5, 2002, to adapt the alliance to reflect changing regional and global security circumstances. This is the all-important meeting that will reveal the future ROK and U.S. alliance.)

The ROK negotiating team seems to have resorted to a classic Korean strategem to stall until the last minute in order to force the other party to make concessions. They seem to be attempting to use the deadline for the October Security Consultative Meeting in Washington to force the U.S. side to make concessions. However, it appears at this point that the USFK will NOT be swayed by this technique. Though there will be intense pressure to conclude the work on the future of the alliance, the U.S. has already stated its position to remove or reduce its forces and move them south of the Han -- and if the ROK does NOT help, it simply act unilaterally to remove or reduce their forces. The ROK is in a very weak bargaining position. The ROK position is that they want the U.S. to remain in position as they need the U.S. high tech weaponry and military support -- while the Korea has NO strategic value to American interests abroad that will force it to remain forever in Korea. It also knows that the slightest hint that the U.S. is pulling out will drop the Korean economy into tailspin. Korea has no cards to play.

The fourth round meeting was reported to have made "significant revisions" on several agreements that were deemed "not to be sustainable in light of the possible security vacuum Korea might suffer as a result of the alignment of front-line U.S. forces." However, the major issues remain unresolved and failed to make significant progress.

The ROK-U.S. planned more discussions in October to seek an agreement over how much Seoul will pay to move garrison out of the capital. Ending two days of talks yesterday, the two sides agreed to work toward an umbrella agreement to modify two 13-year-old pacts on relocating the US military base outside of downtown Seoul. They have yet to agree on how to adjust controversial clauses in 1990 agreements, seen as "unfavorable" by Seoul. "The National Assembly did not ratify the existing agreements, and they contained flaws," Lieutenant General Cha Young-koo, deputy minister of policy at the Ministry of National Defense and Seoul's chief negotiator for the talks, said. (NOTE: This is part of the ploy to take the 1990 MOUs public. Though the MOUs were signed in 1990, the National Assembly never took the move seriously until now when it must come face to face with the dispute over the U.S. 9.5 billion cost estimate versus the ROK's $3.5 billion cost estimate.)

As if to highlight the disagreement, the U.S. did not appear at the press briefing following the meeting.

• In the Third Round, both sides agreed to the transfer of 9 of 10 missions to the ROK. Among them are guard against North Korean special forces' seaborne infiltration, elimination of contaminants in the rear area in time of CBR (chemical, biological and radioactive) warfare waged by NK. The two sides discussed the planned timeline of transfer of missions from US military to ROK forces. ROK will prepare to take over counter-artillery operations against DPRK's immediately, the two sides agreed. US and ROK will form a joint evaluation team for two annual assessments, starting in August 2005, in order to determine the timeline.
  
  The significance is that this frees up the 2d ID field artillery units for removal from the DMZ immediately. The other heavy armor -- M1A1 main battle tanks and Bradley Fighting vehicles -- are still up for discussion. In Rumsfeld's vision, these would be in "follow-on" packages with the equipment prepositioned on transport ships.
  
  Because the Stryker SBCT (replacement for the 2d ID) may go to Iraq instead of Korea as planned, Washington may have changed its strategy and implemented plans to slow down the removal of the heavy armor off of the DMZ. DoD has asked for Congressional approval to deploy the 3d Bde 2d ID SBCT to Iraq in July. Once in Iraq, the SBCT would be stuck there until 2004. However, if the Stryker SBCT should enter Korea earlier that 2004, it will change these negotiations dramatically. At this time, the 2005 time frame for relooking at the heavy armor issue may be realistic.
  
  However, what might be considered a major breakthrough is that the ROK for the first time has stated that there will be "reductions" along the DMZ. Even the U.S. has been mum on the issue of "reductions" pending the appearance of the 3d Bde 2d ID Stryker unit.
  
  
• The plan for Korea to single-handedly guard the Joint Security Area from 2005 was agreed upon in the Third Round. However, it was discarded in favor of "reducing the U.S. military presence" by reducing the numbers of US guards at the Joint Security Area, an 800 meter (1/2 mile)-wide enclave. On the part of the U.S., the decision to reverse itself and remain in the Joint Security Area is NOT a major move. The positions are more "symbolic" that anything else as the UNC Security Battalion is only a 550 man unit of which 60 percent is ROK Army. Actually it is to the U.S. advantage to have members in the symbolic unit to retrieve the remains of U.S. soldiers in the on-going search in North Korea for Korean War dead. They postponed the schedule that would have ROK soldiers defending the southern half of the JSA alone.
  
  
• Also discussed was the "environmental issue" which the ROK wishes added to the SOFA. However, the USFK has already stated that it will clean up the bases -- including Yongsan -- before return the bases to the ROK. Though it was not a specific provision of the SOFA, the USFK agreed to the item to speed up the relocation process. The ROK is pressing for more changes in the SOFA and the USFK has been "passive" on this issue -- meaning they don't want to discuss it at this time.
  
  
• Another outcome from the meeting was that the ROK will not have to make up for the financial losses to AAFES contractors. It appears that the USFK has agreed to foot the losses. However, the losses projected for the life of the contracts are probably minimal. In addition, as 7,000 personnel are slated to move to Pyongtaek, there will be an increased need for many of the services. One would expect that the USFK will be offering new contracts to the companies to continue providing their services in Pyongtaek. Losses will be minimal.
  
  
• The USFK stated in July that "163 acres would NOT be turned over to civilian control." However, under its "force protection" policy, all the USFK personnel and dependents should be within one camp. The USFK envisioned the Hanam Village area being returned to the ROK control, but in exchange they would need more area within Yongsan. The United States sought to retain about 327 acres of the South Post for housing for the 1,000 military personnel who will remain at Yongsan. In addition, the USFK sought to eliminate the ROK road separating the Main and South posts. The ROK balked on these items.
  
  The U.S. demanded that ROK build housing for U.S. soldiers who will remain. If the U.S. military and dependents are moved within the Yongsan area, South Korea would have to pay for the construction of residential units for the soldiers and their families. This is covered under the cost-sharing provisions under the SOFA. "But whether ROK will pay for it or not is a separate matter," according to General Cha Young-koo, deputy minister of policy at the Ministry of National Defense and Seoul's chief negotiator for the talks. This is a sticking point.
  
  The announcement by the Ministry of Defense that U.S. needed "10-20 percent" of Yongsan is a negotiating stance. The lower figure means the ROK is going to attempt to downsize the USFK land requirements through negotiations -- entering the negotiations with a low figure of "90 acres" (10 percent) for USFK use.
  
  
• The USFK has never waivered on the costs being around $9.5 billion, but the ROK wishfully thinks the relocation costs can be in the $3.2 billion range -- and wants to renegotiate the costs. Under the agreements, the South Korean government was held responsible for all relocation costs for the U.S. garrison in central Seoul. However, government officials have argued that no specific means of calculating the moving costs which were stated in the original agreements. The ROK government claimed that the U.S. had unilaterally estimated the cost and they had no way of confirming a final figure ($9.5 billion) calculated by the U.S. This remains open.
  
  Both sides agreed to ask "an outside, independent institute" to draft a master plan to relocate the Yongsan base. This most likely a contractor to handle all the planning, engineering and implementation work -- much like the system used to create the Inchon International Airport.
  
  The ROK wanted to renegotiate the entire package, but the U.S. stood firm on an "umbrella agreement" to modify conditions. "The two sides agreed to draw up an umbrella agreement to modify the flaws, and we will ask the Assembly to ratify it before the end of this year." The umbrella agreement will stipulate the outline of the policy involving the relocation of Yongsan Garrison.
  
  Any new agreements will not override the existing 1990 pacts, which will remain binding. The U.S. negotiators "demanded that the legal structure of the agreements be kept." The U.S. negotiators wanted to have "an umbrella agreement" that would generally modify the two pacts -- without affecting the legal force. On the other hand, the ROK continues to desparately seek ways to renegotiate the costs down -- as well as slow down the relocation process.

According to the Choson Ilbo on 5 Sep there are some major differences that the USFK is still hassling over. The article mentions the land issue.

Yongsan Base Relocation Plans Updated

by Yoo Yong-won (kysu@chosun.com)

Korea and the United States have begun to sketch a new "unified agreement" that will replace two agreements made in 1990 for the relocation of the Yongsan base. The two old pacts were subjects of controversy, as critics said they were unfair and perhaps illegal. The new agreement will be sent to the National Assembly for ratification this year.

Both countries agreed at the fourth round of the meetings themed "Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative," which ended Thursday, that large portions of the 1990 agreements were unrealistic. Korean representative Cha Young-gu, chief policy-maker at the Defense Ministry, said that a fifth round of meetings would be held next month in Seoul to draft the new unified agreement, as well as agreements for implementation and engineering purposes.

The 1990 agreements state that when relocating the U.S. Army base, Korea must take full responsibility for consequent losses incurred by businesses on the base, such as the PX commissaries. Critics also pointed out that the old agreements contain no mention of U.S. responsibility for environmental damage. Korea has promoted an all-out revision but the U.S. Forces Korea has taken a passive attitude concerning the revision of certain provisions.

The two nations said that the specific amount of land from the Yongsan base to be returned, and the number of remaining soldiers and facilities in that area, would be thoroughly discussed as soon as the end of this month.

The Korean government plans to reserve 10 to 20 percent of the 833 acres of land in Yongsan for the USFK. But differences in opinion are expected, as the USFK reportedly may ask for a larger portion for the purpose of housing and building schools and hospitals.

The USFK also wants the U.S. quarters outside of the Yongsan base, such as the Han-nam Village complex which houses 600 households, to be relocated inside the base, in accordance with U.S. anti-terror measures. But the Korean government said it would be difficult to solely bear all the expenses for the housing construction necessary.

Both sides agreed that the transferring the main headquarters of the firepower conflict execution committee, set up to prepare for a North Korean long-range missile attack, would begin with a joint Korea-U.S. evaluation team. In August 2005, the team would assess whether Korea had the independent abilities in terms of military strategies, and make a decision on the question of handing over the headquarters. If Korea were found to be lacking in its preparations, the evaluations will be held every six months afterward.

New deal on Ammo Disposal The ROK and USFK decided to revise the memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the ``ammunition demilitarization process'' as it has been under fire for being "unfair" to the South Korean side. Under the 1999 accord, the pact required the South Korean military authorities to hold prior consultation with the U.S. military before disposing of its own ammunition. This item has been an arguing point with politicians and activists, but in truth it is really only a hassle point.

Under the new agreement signed on 4 Sept, Korea may dispose of their own outdated munitions without notifying the USFK. Signing the agreement were Choi Dong-jin, chief of the ministry's acquisition office, and Charles Campbell, U.S. Forces Korea chief of staff. (NOTE: The term "outdated munitions" or "spent munitions" implies that these items are WRM ordnance that has not been fired and has exceeded their shelf life for safe storage.)

The significance may not seem apparent until you consider that over 70 percent of all the ROK War Readiness (WRM) munitions are provided by the U.S. (NOTE: This startling fact is from the ROK's own assessment in March 2003 of its ability to be "self-reliant" by 2010.) Reading between the lines, it appears that they have just split the accounts to allow the ROK to handle their WRM munitions on their own. If this is true, this means that the U.S. would transfer their WRM munitions assets gratis to the ROK -- and resupply would have to be renegotiated. In this way, the USFK and ROK would each replenish their own WRM stocks through their own supply sources.

A joint-use WRM account provided the bulk of the munitions up till now. However, with this new agreement, the ROK would handle their own WRM assets and therefore, it would be logical that the ROK would have the ability to dispose of its assets without reporting to the U.S. for accountability purposes. If true, the ROK will start picking up the cost of its own WRM munitions in the future -- something that is long overdue.

Also remember that the USFK Air Force Units are to increase its stocks of precision joint direct attack munitions (JDAMS). The JDAMS is already being built up in Korea with praises over its ease of assembly as well as reduced inspection times after buildup. The ROK has yet to switch over.

As for the Army, the USFK is preparing to remove its M1A1 Main Battle Tanks and Field Artillery units and replace the 2d ID units with the Stryker Interim Brigade Combat Team -- a medium infantry concept. The "heavy" infanty units are envisioned by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the "follow-on" packages with the equipment stored on transport ships.

Under current Oplans, the bulk of the munitions stored in the area for "follow-on" forces are to be stored in Korea in the new multi-million dollar storage igloos that were built throughout the country between 2001-2003. The forces in Japan and Okinawa are scripted in Oplans to simply show up with their aircraft/heavy armor and personnel and start fighting. As a result the "follow-on" WRM munitions for U.S. "follow-on" forces should best be stored under USFK control alone.

In addition, under the new pact, ROK and USFK officials agreed to revise a controversial ammunition disposal agreement in a "fair and environment-friendly way" according to the Ministry of Defense. Under the old 1999 accord, U.S. forces in South Korea were allowed to "detonate or incinerate" their ammunition, not only from its bases in the South but also from other nearby overseas bases such as Okinawa.

The importation of outdated munitions from Japan or Okinawa for disposal is NOT a major concern. Though the provision was in effect, the U.S. has NEVER imported munitions for disposal. On the opposite side of the coin, transporting the outdated munitions out of Korea for disposal would be prohibitively high if sent to the nearest safe disposal sites in the Pacific. It would be better to construct facilities in Korea and dispose of it in-country. For the U.S. to contribute fifty-percent to the cost of constructing such a facility ($21 million share) would simply be cost-effective.

Once built, the new facilities will be capable of reprocessing more than 10,000 tons of used ammunitions annually. Currently, the two nations store and incinerate the used materials but the new facility is expected to save up to 120 billion won in expenses for dealing with the used ammunition over the next 15 years. The site for the facility is yet to be selected.

The following appeared in the Chosun Ilbo on 5 Sep.

New Deal Reached for Destroying Old Ammo

by Yoo Yong-won (kysu@chosun.com)

The Defense Ministry said Thursday that Korean and U.S. authorities had revised elements of their agreement on the disposal of outdated ammunition, which critics say is unfair for Korea.

Signing the agreement to change the War Reserved Stock for Allies system were Choi Dong-jin, chief of the ministry's acquisition office, and Charles Campbell, U.S. Forces Korea chief of staff. The revision calls for a suspension of the normal methods of disposing outdated ammunition - burning or detonating it - and the construction of high-tech facilities to recover reusable components and safely treat the rest.

According to the new agreement, the United States will no longer be able to bring in for disposal here old ammunition from U.S. forces based outside of America or Korea. Also, ammunition owned by the USFK but judged dangerous for the environment cannot be treated in the new facilities.

Also, the Korean military will be allowed to dispose of its ammunition without consulting the USFK, which it had to do in the past.

The new environmentally-friendly treatment facilities will be built by 2006 and cost W49.6 billion ($42 million), half paid by Washington, half by Seoul. They will be able to treat up to 10,000 tons of old ammunition, and will save W120 billion won over the next 15 years by eliminating management and storage costs.

Costs to ROK for Relocation off DMZ The following is an article from the Chosun Ilbo on 22 Sep:

Counting Cost of USFK Relocation

by Heo Yong-beom (heo@chosun.com)

If the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division is withdrawn from its positions near the North-South border, the costs to replace its equipment will total W5.5 trillion ($4.6 billion), if the South is to maintain the war-fighting potential there. The figure is about 31.5 percent of this year's defense budget of W17.4 trillion.

A Grand National Party lawmaker and member of the National Assembly's defense committee, Park Se-hwan, said Monday that the equipment of U.S. forces that would need to be replaced included $2.6 billion in ground equipment, $1.8 billion in air equipment and $51.9 million in anti-air weapons such as missiles. This includes M1A1 tanks, M2 armored vehicles, 155? self-propelled guns, MLRS/ATCMS (multi-engine rockets), AH-64 Apache helicopters, OH-58D scout helicopters, UH-60 helicopters, stinger missiles and avenger missiles.

"If we include emergency ammunition, entrainment equipment, support brigades and engineering brigades, it will take at least minimum of $5 billion," Park said.

Park pointed out that the Ministry of Defense has estimated that it would cost $3-5 billion if the 2nd Division moves south of the Han River. But that represents only pure transition costs, not costs for replacing the military capability.

"The Ministry of Defense presented a defense budget that is 3.2 percent of the GDP," Park said. "However, the government reduced this to 2.8 percent because of a lack of funds. Taking into consideration the tremendous costs for substitute equipment, we should consider postponing the repositioning of the 2nd Division for as long as possible."

Extra 10.5 million Square Meters for Relocation The ROK started claiming that "extra" land was being required and that it was "almost" agreed upon and it would agreed upon during the October US-ROK SCM. The following article appeared in the Donga Ilbo on 23 Sep:

Extra 10.5 million Sq. Meters of Land Needed for Relocation of USFK

As the Yongsan garrison and the U.S. second infantry division are to be relocated, the Korean government will have to provide 10.2 million to 10.5 million sq. meters of land to the U.S. Forces in Korea.

During the National Assembly`s National Defense Committee`s inspection session held at the Ministry of Defense on September 23, defense minister Cho Young-kil said, "For the relocation of the USFK, Korea and the U.S. almost agreed that Korea would provide 10.2 million to 10.5 million sq. meters of land, in addition to the land of the existing U.S. bases in Osan-si and Pyeongtaek-si, Gyeonggi. He also said that it would be finally confirmed at the US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) scheduled for next month.

Therefore, the Ministry of Defense set aside 250 billion won for the purchase of land in the ministry`s next year budget. However, the Ministry explained that it is too early to disclose how much it will cost to purchase extra land for US military bases.

The defense minister said that if the national sends around 3,000 troops to Iraq, it would cost approximately 200 billion won every year.

However, he replied that it was not an exact figure because extra costs, such as wages and equipment cost, were not added, when Millennium Democratic Party Rep. Lee Man-sup asked about the expected spending.

(Irrelevant material clipped)

OCTOBER 2003

S.Korea to Buy Land for Relocation of Yongsan Base Next Year Seoul, Oct. 4 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government will begin purchasing land south of Seoul early next year to move the U.S. military headquarters out of Seoul, officials. Earlier this year, the allies agreed to relocate the U.S. Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek and Osan by 2006. The prominent U.S. military presence in the capital's center has been a constant source of anti-American sentiment among South Koreans. However, there is a matter of timing as well.

The ROK Ministry of Defense has stated repeatedly that they will try to sell the Yongsan land FIRST to offset the costs of relocation. If they are intending to follow through on their pledge, how will they do so while the land issues are still unresolved as to the how much of Yongsan will remain in USFK control. This seriously smells like a ploy to get through the SCM scheduled for 28 October and then start on the renegotiation process under the classic "stall and conquer" strategy. During a succession of recent working-level consultations, the U.S. reportedly accepted most of South Korea’s demands on revisions of agreements that stipulate the conditions of the relocation. Seoul has insisted the memorandum of understanding (MOU) and memorandum of agreement (MOA), signed between the two sides in 1990, imposed an unfair financial burden on South Korea. The U.S. states that it is willing to bend, but the MOA will remain in efffect.

On 5 Oct Joongang Ilbo announced that the talks resumed on the USFK relocation from Yongsan. This is the fifth Future of ROK-U.S. Policy Initiative meeting scheduled to take place just prior to the SCM. It will attempt to finalize the agreement on the scale of the ROK-US CFC and UNC to remain at Yongsan AFTER the relocations are complete in 2006. According to the newspaper, "South Korean officials said that this week’s meetings would also discuss modifying agreements signed in 1990 that provide for financial compensation by the Korean government for losses incurred at the U.S. military post exchange and for cost sharing in environmental cleanups required on U.S. military bases." This is the hotly contested area with the USFK stating 9.5 billion while the ROK are stating 3.5 billion. That's a lot of disagreement. Defense Minister Cho Young-ki reported that about 1.3 million pyong of land (one pyong equals 3.3 square meters) will be needed for the new base to be built at a total cost of $3 billion. The Yongsan base currently occupies 870,000 pyong.

The negotiating teams were trying to reach an agreement that could be signed by the defense ministers of the two countries during the Security Consultative Meeting scheduled here on Oct. 24-25. On 7 Oct, it was announced that "at Washington's request" the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was being rescheduled. The reason cited was schedule problems of its defense minister Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush leaving the country for an APEC meeting during the same time period. Negotiations are under way at another military session here to reset the dates to sometime in mid-November. This definitely does not bode well for the negotiations -- meaning that there were serious disagreements between the U.S. and Korea that could not be ironed out in time for the SCM. Diplomatic sources said it was because Seoul needs to resolve its stand on Iraq first before the U.S. commits itself to negotiations.

The meeting was sending up signal flares everywhere as the U.S.-ROK team couldn't even agree of the joint message at the end of the session. Both sides refused to issue a joint communique on the meeting -- even to say that there was a problem. Most analysts thought the problem stemmed from money for the relocation and the U.S. refusal to consider the ROK's proposed revision of the MOU dealing with the relocation of Yongsan. What happens next is anyone's guess.

U.S. Seeks a Regional Role for USFK Forces According to the Joongang Ilbo on 10 Oct, the U.S. was seeking a regional role for the forces in Korea.

We were wondering when the U.S. would get around to addressing this issue. The new global strategy for the U.S. has the Stryker Brigades being highly mobile so that they could be deployed rapidly to hot spots. In June the idea was the Stryker to be stationed in Korea on a "rotational basis" but that was really out of the question if you're using it to justify reductions in USFK forces. If the SBCT is stationed at Pyongtaek, it would have to be committed to a regional role -- as well as forming the backbone of the USFK defense force.

"Regional" covers an area stretching from Taiwan to Russia -- but this is just the opening card. 7th AF assets have been deployed with regularity to South East Asia for exercises such as Cobra Gold in Thailand. Thus the term "regional" may be expanded later. Korea is a member of ASEAN and it could be argued that Korea is part of a much larger "region."

The ROK has agreed on the condition that the ROK defense is not degraded. The U.S. stated that it will replace any units removed with like defense coverage. The U.S. has done this for years to maintain the critical balance of power in the area -- though there have been periods when forces were split between Taiwan and Korea during simultaneous flareups in threatened hostilities.

Seoul also set forth conditions that South Korean forces must not be involved in overseas conflicts unrelated with South Korea. This is not a problem as ROK forces are under the command of the ROK during peacetime and only fall under the CFC during actual attack.

This is a sticky issue to say the least. Supposedly this was agreed upon and a letter would be sent to the SCM for both sides to ratify this change. The article was as follows:

U.S. said to seek regional role for forces in Korea

In what appears to be a major change in military ties between the United States and South Korea, Seoul defense officials have accepted a Pentagon plan that would expand the responsibilities of American troops in Korea in order to create a more regional force, a senior South Korean official said yesterday.

During the fifth round of talks over the future of the U.S.-South Korea alliance this week, the United States sought South Korea’s agreement for the use of U.S. forces in duties outside the peninsula, presumably covering Russia and Taiwan, the official said on the condition of anonymity.

South Korea reportedly expressed its understanding on the condition that any change would not disturb the two countries’ joint defense capabilities.

By accepting the regional role concept, South Korea apparently agreed to a fundamental reorganization of its half-century military alliance with the United States. The relationship began when the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty in 1953, and the U.S. troops have played the role of deterring North Korea based on the pact.

“When the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier left Japan in March to take part in the Iraq war, the USS Carl Vinson was dispatched to the waters off the peninsula,” a senior defense ministry official said. “As we can see, the United States will maintain the level of its deterrence against North Korea unless the threat is resolved.” Seoul also set forth conditions that South Korean forces must not be involved in overseas conflicts unrelated with South Korea, the official said. The U.S.-led Combined Forces Command has wartime operational command over South Korean troops.

South Korea also asked that Washington consult with Seoul in advance before dispatching its troops from the peninsula to foreign locations, the official said.

South Korea will soon send the United States a letter to be signed by a senior Seoul official expressing the government’s position, the source said. The two countries reportedly planned to include such an expanded role for the United States Forces Korea in a joint statement to be adopted at the annual security consultation meeting scheduled to take place in mid-November. Top defense officials of the two countries will attend the meeting.

The United States has reportedly agreed to Seoul’s preconditions.

Maureen Cormack, U.S. Embassy press attache, said last night that U.S. officials here are not allowed to comment on or verify the issues associated with the ongoing negotiations. Kim Young-kyu, a USFK spokesman, also said he was not allowed to comment on the issue.

Defense experts said there had been indications that the United States was planning such a change. At the previous defense policy talks, the United States and South Korea agreed that 10 selective missions would be transferred to Korean troops from the American soldiers here.

The agreed realignment of the U.S. troops on the peninsula was also seen as an indication of U.S. preparation to reconceptualize its troops’ role in the region, defense experts said.

According to a draft of an agreement on the Yongsan relocation plan, released by the National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by USFK, a South Korean civic group, the two governments agreed in September that the headquarters of the United States Forces Korea would relocate to Osan Air Base.

The headquarters of the U.S. 8th Army would move to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, the draft said. The headquarters of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command would stay in the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul.

by Special Reporting Team

ROK Trying to Get Out of Yongsan Relocation MOA: The latest battle about the Yongsan relocation is going to be fought in the Korean press. The U.S. has taken a firm stand that the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) will stand. The ROK on the other hand does not want to foot the bill. They have even gone so far as to say that if they send troops to Iraq, they should get a "discount" reduction in costs. The Ministry of Defense has also linked the move to the sale of the land at the Yongsan Garrison to help pay for the relocation. The latest moves claims the U.S. "blackmailed" the ROK into signing the document. Undoubtedly this is incite the anti-American NGO groups to use this as "proof" to demonstrate against the U.S. The bottomline is that the ROK is attempting to renegotiate the MOA but the U.S. will not. Demonstrations by the NGO groups will not change this. The following article is from the Korea Times on 22 Oct 2003:

Yongsan Base Pact May Violate Constitution

The full text of a memorandum signed by South Korean and United States officials more than a decade ago on the Yongsan base relocation is under fire for containing clauses that favor the U.S.

The Korean edition of Newsweek yesterday unveiled a copy of a memorandum signed at the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) joint committee meeting on May 14, 1991, the content of which was not known until recently.

The paper recognizes the 1990 Memorandum of Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding on the relocation of the main U.S. military base out of Seoul as legal and binding documents.

The constitutionality of the two papers, signed by the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) commander and the South Korean defense minister, had been questioned even within government circles as it lacked the National Assembly approval needed for a major decision involving large amounts of government funds.

``It is requested that the agreement (the MOA) be hereby recognized by the Joint Committee as a legal and binding agreement,’’ the paper said.

``In addition, the basic MOA and its MOU will be effective in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA,’’ it added.

The document was signed by Ban Ki-moon, the incumbent presidential foreign policy advisor who served as the Foreign Ministry’s director-general on North American affairs at the time, and Lt. Gen. Ronald Fogleman of the USFK.

Rep. Ahn Young-keun of the New Party for Participatory Citizens on Monday said at the National Assembly that South Korea had been pressured into signing the 1991 memorandum cementing the controversial 1990 MOA and MOU.

He quoted an intelligence report made to the president at the time that said the contents of the 1991 memorandum must be kept a secret as it could incite fierce protests from the opposition parties and radical students.

According to the full text of the National Intelligence Agency paper obtained by Internet news provider Ohmynews, the U.S. knew of the problems in the 1990 papers and thus forced Ban of the Foreign Ministry to sign the paper.

``USFK vice commander Fogleman visited director general of American Affairs Bureau Ban Ki-moon on May 13 ... and forced him to sign the document drafted unilaterally by the U.S. side, which recognizes the legality of the MOA,’’ the internal report said.

The spy agency document, the veracity of which could not be confirmed, went on to say Ban, like others at the Foreign Ministry, may have been fearful of blackmail by the U.S. if he kept resisting the demands. ``Thus authorities need to take extra caution that the procedures involving the signature of the memorandum not be leaked to the press,’’ it said.

``We also need to soon develop logics against the paper’s unconstitutionality and inequality in case it is made public,’’ the memo added.

Seo Soo-min Staff Reporter ssm@koreatimes.co.kr
10-22-2003 18:09

Rumsfeld to visit Seoul in November The Yonhap News Agency reported on 25 Oct that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would visit Seoul in November for talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the planned redeployment of American troops in South Korea. Rumsfeld will likely take part in the Security Consultative Meeting according to Japanese sources.

NOVEMBER 2003

U.S. Proposes to Replace Armistice In Nov 2003, it was reported that the US has proposed creating a new multilateral peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula to replace the armistice according to the Japanese business daily, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun..

The US made the offer to the DPRK at the three-nation talks, which included the PRCin April. Washington has proposed the mechanism as a way to officially end the war and to break the impasse over Pyongyang's nuclear arms development -- an issue that continues to threaten East Asia's stability.

With Seoul never having signed the armistice that concluded the Korean War, the DPRK and the ROK technically remain at war. Washington has indicated it would negotiate such a framework on the condition that Pyongyang unilaterally abandons its nuclear weapons program and resolves other pending issues, such as concerns surrounding biological and chemical weapons and the test-firing of missiles.

The US is believed to be weighing a legally binding peace agreement or treaty signed by armistice signatories -- US, the DPRK, the PRC as well as the ROK and Japan, the daily said. It would also stipulate how the ROK and DPRK should co-exist. The ramifications of this could be far-reaching if pressed forward...including the removal of USFK forces from Korea if an Armistice between both Koreas is signed.

Marines Swap Ships in Chinhae The following is from USFK Press Release 05-20030612 (usfj.mil/NewsRelease_ChinhaeUSFK3Nov3.doc). The significance of this movement is that it starts to justify Donald Rumsfeld's plan to preposition assets off the cost of Korea -- which in turn would enable the heavy divisions along the DMZ to be reduced.

U.S. Marines swap ships in Chinhae

Cpl. Danielle M. Bacon
Marine Corps Forces Pacific

Republic of Korea Naval Base, Chinhae, Korea (October 29, 2003) — More than 300 U.S. Marines based out of Okinawa and 100 sailors from California are working to offload 11,000 items from Maritime Preposition Ships, in order to enhance the Marine Corps' ability to rapidly respond to emergencies where needed.

The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (forward), III Marine Expeditionary Force and 3rd Naval Beach Group, along with Republic of Korea Forces, are conducting an exercise, which involves an equipment exchange between two maritime preposition ships – the MV Pvt. Franklin J. Phillips and the SS Sgt. Matej Kocak. (NOTE: See USFK Website for Maritime Preposition Enhancement Exercise.)

The evolution started on Oct. 26 and is scheduled to be complete in 15 days, after which the service members will have transferred 680 combat vehicles, tanks, amphibious assault vehicles and 260 containers with ammunition, tools and spare parts between the ships.

The rapid-response Kocak is based with Maritime Preposition Squadron-1 located in the Mediterranean Sea, while the Phillips serves the Maritime Preposition Squadron-2 at Naval Support Facility, Diego Garcia, prepared for deployment in the Indian Ocean.

These squadrons are two of a three-squadron team. The third, Maritime Preposition Squadron-3, patrols the Pacific. While these squadrons are based in different regions, they can respond to different contingencies all around the world.

As part of the Maritime Preposition Force, each squadron can deliver equipment and supplies for an MEB of more than 17,000 Marines and sailors and sustain them for 30 days.

The Marine brigade can fly in from another location on short notice, offload the ships and be ready to conduct military operations in a matter of days.

Pre-positioning is not a new concept to the Corps -- it was started in the early 1980s to improve the response time for needed equipment and supplies to theater operations.

In 1979, then President Carter's Secretary of Defense approved the creation of a Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program supporting the Marine Corps in the Department of Defense Navy Program Objective Memorandum.

The first equipment-laden ships headed to the British island of Diego Garcia, where a staff maintained the ships in a high state of readiness so that they could deploy within 24 hours to possible contingency locations that include the Middle East and unite with the awaiting forces.

There are currently 16 ships, but the Military Sealift Command plans on adding more ships to each squadron.

"The MPF concept was proven during Desert Storm and revalidated in Operation Iraqi Freedom," said Lt. Gen. Wallace C. Gregson, Marine Corps Forces Pacific commanding general. "The MPF demonstrates our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and compliments the realignment of other U.S. forces on the (Korean) peninsula."

The above was part of a "fast deployment drill" by the U.S. Marines. The following article covers the same exercise.

US marines in South Korea for fast deployment drill

Wednesday, 22-Oct-2003 10:20PM PDT
Story from AFP Copyright 2003 by Agence France-Presse (via ClariNet)

SEOUL, Oct 23 (AFP) - Some 400 US military personnel have arrived at the southern navy port of Chinhae in South Korea for a drill aimed at speeding up deployment, US military authorities said Thursday.

The group, including 300 marines and 100 navy personnel, will spend some 15 days drilling the loading and offloading of two ships carrying equipment and supplies for a Marine expeditionary brigade.

The marine brigade can fly in from another location on short notice, offload the ships and be ready to conduct military operations in a matter of days, the US military said in a statement.

It said the "equipment exchange" drill would involve two US Maritime Preposition ships, namely the MV Phillips and the SS Kopak, both based with Maritime Preposition Squadron-2.

The two ships are "strategically positioned to rapidly respond to any crisis in the Pacific region, including the Korean peninsula."

The US marines involved in the drill are being deployed from Okinawa, Japan.

A US marine officer told AFP the exercise was "not specifically tied" to the crisis over North Korea's nuclear drive.

"But it is important to note that we could rapidly respond to a crisis on the Korean peninsula," he said.

(NOTE: For the Army Preposition Program go to Forscom. The Army will utilize Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships (LMSR Ro/Ro). There are other types of Preposition ships in the Navy inventory. Go to Preposition Ships for photos. ) The following are the US Sealift Forces from Orbat:

United States Sealift Forces
v.1.0 September 30, 2001

Ravi Rikhye
More detailed information is available at www.msc.navy.mil . Because of the current situation, the website is no longer providing information on movements of Sealift Force ships.
United States sealift forces come under the Military Sealift Command and fall into three categories:

• Afloat Prepositioning Program
• Sealift Program
• Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (covered next week)

Afloat Prepositioning Program
This program has 37 ships in three elements:

• Maritime Preposition Ships (US Marine Corps; 3 MEB)
• Combat Preposition Force (US Army, 1 heavy brigade)
• Logistic Preposition Ships (Fuel, ammunition, aviation support)

Maritime Preposition Ships
This element has 14 ships in three squadrons. Each squadron can support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 17,600 troops for 30 days.

• Maritime Preposition Squadron One – Mediterranean, five ships
• Maritime Preposition Squadron Two – Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, five ships
• Maritime Preposition Squadron Three – Pacific, Guam/Saipan, four ships

Three more ships will be added, one to each squadron.

Combat Preposition Force
This force has 13 ships and is building up to 15. It supports an Army heavy brigade of 6,000 for 15 days, plus initial combat support elements for 38. Its ships are dispersed under the command of the 3 Maritime Preposition Squadrons. At full strength, the force will consist of:

• 8 LMSRs
• 4 Container ships
• 2 Heavy lift ships
• 1 Crane ship

The LMSR is a Large Medium Speed Ro/Ro. By 2002, the total LMSRs will be 19. The balance11 will augment naval sealift capabilities. An LMSR can carry 100 tanks and APCs, which equip a tank battalion, and 900 vehicles.
Note on LMSRs: All 8 ships form Afloat Preposition Squadron 4, an asset of US 3rd Army. The ships have no permanent home-port and are stationed in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The HQ staff is at Diego Garcia.

Logistic Preposition Force
This force has 9 ships:

• 3 ammunition ships for USAF (2 at Diego Garcia and 1 in the Mediterranean)
• 1 USN ammunition ship (Diego Garcia)
• 3 POL ships for the US Defense Logistics Agency (2 at Diego Garcia, 1 in the Pacific)
• 2 Aviation Support Ships in reduced operating status, providing intermediate maintenance support for US Marine Corps aviation.

Sealift Program
This program has three elements. All ships are chartered to, or in wartime come under, Military Sealift Command:

• Dry Cargo Project Office (16 ships, carry engineer/construction equipment, military vehicles, aircraft, and ammunition).
• Tanker Project Office (15 tankers; more can be chartered as needed).
• Surge Project Office

Surge Project Office
This office has three elements:

• Fast Sealift Ships (96 hours readiness, 8 ships of 30+ knots, carry equipment for one mechanized division).
• Surge LMSR (96 hours readiness, 8 ships, increasing to 11, can carry a tank battalion's AFVs plus 900 vehicles)
• Ready Reserve Force

Ready Reserve Force
This has 76 ships maintained by the US Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration. Ships are on 4-day readiness (all Ro-Ros), 5-, 10-, and 20-days readiness. Ships on 4-day readiness generally have a permanent complement of 10 sailors. The ships are held at three sites:

• James River, Ft. Eustis (near Newport News, Virginia)
• Neches River (Beaumont, Texas)
• Suisun Bay (Concord, California)

Impatience Showing on U.S. over Korea Waffling There was growing impatience with America's reluctant ally. The ROK continued to waffle over its stance of the relocation of forces South of the DMZ. A 12 November article in the New York Times summarized America's feeling:

U.S. Awaits South Korea Plan on Troop Numbers in Seoul

November 12, 2003
By THOM SHANKER (NY Times)

W ASHINGTON, Nov. 11 — American and South Korean negotiators are close to agreement on a plan to relocate thousands of United States troops from Seoul. But as Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld prepares to visit the region, the deal is being held up while South Korea decides how many American forces, if any, it wants to remain in the capital.

Bush administration officials and diplomats based in Washington say an agreement for American troops to leave the Yongsan garrison, covering a giant swath of prime real estate in downtown Seoul, is all but ready for presentation to the South Korean Parliament for consideration and approval.

The remaining question, officials say, is whether the South Korean government will decide to ask the American military to maintain what is termed a "residual presence" in the capital, or whether all of the forces and their headquarters will relocate to two southern bases.

American officials and foreign diplomats said the South Korean military hopes that a contingent of 700 to 1,000 American military personnel will remain in the capital, serving as liaison with the South Korean military. Their presence also helps counter domestic political pressures on the South Korean military to move out of its own prestigious location in the capital to more secure locations in the south. A quiet minority also supports keeping an American military presence in the capital for symbolic reasons.

But voices calling for the removal of all American troops from Seoul dominate the public debate and are weighing on the government of President Roh Moo Hyun.

"We are not demanding a residual presence," said one Bush administration official. "We are ready to move south, and keep small numbers in Seoul. But we won't keep even those small numbers in Seoul if it creates a problem."

American officials and foreign diplomats say the question could be resolved with a clear statement by the South Korean government of its preferences. Then negotiations could be concluded and an "umbrella agreement" covering all issues involved in the relocation could be presented to Parliament before its scheduled adjournment in December.

Otherwise, those officials say, months could be lost before action is taken.

Administration officials said negotiators from the Departments of Defense and State agreed to remove onerous provisions contained in bilateral agreements from the 1990's, relieving South Korea of liabilities for such matters as lost revenues and severed contracts should the move go through.

Even so, the cost to the South Korean government of relocating American forces from the capital is predicted to be about $3 billion. In turn, the American government has told South Korea that it will invest more than $11 billion over four years on improving United States and South Korean defenses there.

About 8,000 American military personnel are based in Seoul, a source of friction with the local population as well as a security concern. When dependents, Defense Department civilians and contractors are included, the number swells to about 20,000 people.

The size and location of American forces on the peninsula, called "the footprint," have been under discussion since the 1990's, and the question is at the center of maintaining a healthy alliance 50 years after the Korean War.

The possible move out of Seoul is part of a broader discussion that includes a two-step plan to consolidate temporarily all of the American forces now stationed at many locations between Seoul and the demilitarized zone along the border with North Korea, before moving them to permanent quarters south of the capital. Although tentative planning discussions are also under way about reducing from 37,000 the number of American personnel while maintaining their combat punch and deterrent capability, Pentagon officials said that contentious issue would not be on Mr. Rumsfeld's agenda. No decisions are expected for months to come.

On 15 Nov, the chairmen of the South Korean and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff met in Seoul to discuss post-war Iraq and other pending military issues. South Korea's Kim Jong-hwan and his U.S. counterpart Richard B. Myers also reviewed a range of issues to be covered at next Monday's defense ministerial talks between the two countries. The reports indicated there was still major issues that were unresolved at the end of the meeting. Prime Minister Goh Kun said Friday that any redeployment of U.S. forces in Korea should be made in parallel with the progress in the North Korean nuclear issue at six-way talks.

SCM Protests Donald Rumsfeld arrived on 17 Nov with great pomp and ceremony only to be greeted outside with signs calling him a "warmonger." The SCM seems fated for a deadlock. Amid boisterous anti-war protests, the defense chiefs of South Korea and the United States began talks on 17 Nov which officials said were expected to focus on Seoul's troop dispatch to Iraq and Washington's plan to realign its military bases in the South. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld flew to Seoul on 16 Nov for annual security consultations with his South Korean counterpart, Cho Young-kil. He was to visit President Roh Moo-hyun and U.S. soldiers stationed in Korea before leaving on 18 Nov.

Officials said following the 17 Nov SCM meeting that they had hoped for a conclusive settlement of the issue of dispatching additional troops to Iraq and matters surrounding the redeployment of U.S. troops in South Korea. The latter has hit a snag over the size and makeup of the main U.S. garrison that will be left in Yongsan, Seoul. The United States wants to maintain a sizeable presence, while Seoul is desirous of a downsized base. The two allies agreed to move ahead with additional negotiations until the end of this year for the relocation issue, the planned relocation of Yongsan compound by the end of 2006 is unlikely to be achieved, observers said.

According to the Chosun Ilbo on 18 Nov,

"On the issue of relocating Yongsan Garrison, the two parties failed to iron out differences over how much land the U.S. Army should return to Korea, and the narrower issue of moving the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command out of Seoul.

The two defense chiefs reaffirmed an earlier agreement between the two countries that the U.S, forces would be relocated in two regions south of the Han River through a two-phase relocation plans. They said the first-phase relocation would be carried out as early as possible, and for the second-phase plan, the chief executives of the two nations will have to decide later how to move forward. Commenting on the possibility of Washington's reducing its forces in Korea, Minister Cho said the two delegations did not discuss the issue, adding that it is premature for the two nations to begin talking about a troop cut.

Cho, however, said the United States has agreed to turn over eight of its 10 specific missions that its forces in Korea have been conducting over to the Korean army, according to the relocation plan. The remaining two missions are to be transferred to Korea in phases, in consideration of the Korean army's capability."

Rumsfeld "thanked" South Korea for deciding to send additional troops to Iraq and assured Seoul officials that Washington's plan to realign its military units here would not weaken South Korea's defense capability. He stated, "I thank President Roh Moo-hyun for his decision to provide reconstruction costs of $260 million by 2007 and for dispatching additional troops to Iraq. In order to ensure the smooth and timely dispatch, we will closely cooperate with Korea in sharing information and munitions plans." (NOTE: This is a back-handed slap as Japan has offered 5 billion in reconstruction aid and has already committed to sending SDF combat troops -- though it is reconsidering its decision in the face of current attacks.) In addition, Secretary Rumsfeld said in a joint press interview with the Korean Minister of Defense Cho Young-gil in response to a question raised as to whether they are accepting the 3,000-troop plan, "The issue of dispatch depends on the country's determination as an independent country, and I think there cannot be much difference in our opinions in dealing with a critical issue," and thus avoided a clear response with diplomatic jargonese.

After weeks of divisive debate, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun ordered the government to limit the size of more troops to Iraq to 3,000 -- and possibly to non-combatants. This is a very sticky point with the U.S. who needs combat troops who can take care of themselves to release its forces from the more secure areas of the country. Rumfield restated that the U.S. will not pull out U.S. military units from South Korea for operations in Iraq. The U.S. Department of Defense believes it is practically impossible to withdraw its troops from South Korea under the current security conditions, Radio Free Asia reported. In a recent intelligence report submitted to Congress, the Pentagon said a pullout of U.S. troops from South Korea would destabilize Northeast Asia.

On the issue of a troop dispatch to Iraq, the Korean delegation explained to its U.S. counterpart in the meeting that the Korean government has been considering two options: either sending about 3,000 non-combat soldiers, including engineers and medics, or sending about the same number of combat troops for peacekeeping missions.

However, there definitely is a strain in relations between the ROK and the US. On 11 Nov, Rumsfeld stated that South Korea should judge itself the details of its troop deployment to Iraq, including the type and number of troops. "We want Korea to do whatever it believes is right ... That is exactly what we would like. We do not want countries to do things they don't want to do." Rumsfeld repeated this statement at the end of the SCM. Though the U.S. wishes for a larger troop commitment of combat troops, it will live with whatever the ROK sends, but continued delays to NOT send troops will be viewed dimly after the promise received during the SCM.

An editorial in the Chosun Ilbo on 18 Nov stated, "The joint communique of twelve items issued after the meeting emphasizes, as in previous years, the importance of the alliance. Beyond the continuity on the surface, however, there were no small number of areas that lead you to think there was something clearly different about previous years when you look at the details of the negotiations. The best example would be the rare use of the word "regret" in reference to the question of moving the U.S. installation at Yongsan. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed gratitude at Korea's decision to send additional troops to Iraq, but you hear talk of how the United States is disappointed and has expressed displeasure with the Korean government's attitude, having changed so much as if pushed around by the situation, despite what the Americans said with open diplomatic rhetoric."


Rumsfeld Arrival: 17 Nov 03

Anti-SCM Protest: 17 Nov 03

Troops to shift from S. Korea The following is a news article from the Washington Times on 24 November by Richard Halloran who specializes in Asian military affairs. However, the USFK swiftly issued a rejection of this article's premise that troops were being removed from Korea.

However, immediately following the USFK rebuttal, it was announced that President George W. Bush said on 25 Nov that the United States would relocate U.S. forces stationed abroad, in order to cope with the threat of rogue states, terrorist activities and weapons of massive destruction. According to Bush, Washington would soon begin full-fledged discussions on the relocation with its allies. Immediately some analysts stated that this might lead to as many as 15,000 troops being withdrawn from Korea.

Troops to shift from S. Korea

By Richard Halloran

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

HONOLULU — The United States will reassign some troops from South Korea to Afghanistan and Iraq and shift most of the 7,000 people in its headquarters in Seoul out of the capital beginning within a year, military officials say.

Thought also is being given to disbanding the United Nations headquarters in South Korea and ending the practice of keeping a four-star general in command of operations in the country.

The moves are part of a gradual disengagement of U.S. land forces from Korea and a greater reliance on sea power to maintain the American security posture in Asia.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld flew through northeastern Asia last week, sprinkling clues about the future of U.S. military dispositions even as he reaffirmed U.S. treaty commitments to South Korea and Japan. Other officials filled in details.

A primary reason for pulling back from South Korea is that the United States needs the 17,000 soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Division elsewhere. As Mr. Rumsfeld and military leaders have said repeatedly, U.S. forces are stretched thin. The U.S. Army has only 10 divisions and cannot afford to have one tied down in Korea.

Mr. Rumsfeld told the Korean news agency, Yonhap, that the Pentagon has worked out a concept for adjusting force levels in Korea, that discussions have begun with the Korean government and that, within six months, the U.S. Congress will be informed of the plan.

He said the 2nd Division would not be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan but that individual soldiers serving in Korea almost certainly would be assigned to those nations. The division itself will move to posts south of Seoul to be near airfields where soldiers will prepare for contingencies elsewhere in Asia. The 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea today will be cut to an undetermined number.

Military officers said that the Pentagon will shift most of the 7,000 people in its headquarters in Seoul out of the capital, beginning within a year, and that an undisclosed number would be sent back to the United States. They said technology would permit the headquarters to operate with fewer people.

U.S. officials are negotiating terms of the transfer; the United States has long said it would move the headquarters out of Seoul if the Korean government would pay for the transfer.

Korean defense officials have been balking at that. In addition, they are said to fear a loss in operating ability if the U.S. headquarters were moved from its current location across the street from the South Korean Ministry of Defense.

The desire to make other use of the 2nd Division is enhanced by South Korea's rejection of a U.S. request that it send a division of 12,000 soldiers to secure a sector in Iraq.

Seoul will post only 3,000 troops, including the 700 already there. Most will be noncombatants, meaning the United States or another country might have to furnish forces to protect them.

Another reason for drawing down in Korea is the anti-Americanism that has become so widespread that moving U.S. troops out of Seoul and populated areas north of the capital will ease tensions only slightly. In a discussion of South Korea and North Korea, an American officer said, only half-joking, "Sometimes I wonder which one is really our adversary."

Moreover, President Bush and President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea disagree on how to dissuade North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, despite superficial agreement on tactics. The U.S. president advocates a firm approach, while the South Korean leader would be more accommodating.

Evidently no precise timetable has been set for the changes, but Mr. Rumsfeld suggested that they would be under way in the next five years.

In addition to headquarters and troop movements, U.S. officials have begun to consider disbanding the United Nations headquarters, which has been there since the Korean War of 1950 to 1953.

The Combined Forces Command, which gives the United States operational control over Korean troops, will be dissolved, ending a situation that has long irritated nationalistic Koreans.

Finally, the position of the four-star U.S. Army general, who today commands the U.N. mission, the Combined Forces Command, and U.S. troops, most likely will be abolished in favor of a lower-ranking commander. The four-star flag might be moved to the headquarters of the U.S. Army in the Pacific in Hawaii, as many senior Army officers have advocated.

Mr. Rumsfeld dropped clues about the changes during his flight to Guam, telling the traveling press that the Pentagon has been reviewing force deployments and "we're now at a stage where we can begin discussing [that] with our allies and with Congress."

Aboard the Navy command ship Blue Ridge in Yokosuka, Japan, Mr. Rumsfeld pointed to an increased reliance on sea power, saying: "I think those of you who are serving in the Navy are going to see the responsibilities of the United States Navy increase generally, and increase particularly here."

Addressing Americans in Okinawa, where most U.S. forces in Japan are posted, the defense secretary said, "We've got to continue to pull down deployments."

He said some peacetime overseas deployments would continue but added: "Once they do that job, they ought not to be there any longer." American troops have been in Korea since the Korean War.

The following is the rebuttal to Halloran's article by the USFK from the USFK Website on 25 Nov:

WRITER'S OPINION MISTAKEN FOR FACT

Seoul, Republic of Korea (USFK) Nov. 25, 2003 – An opinion piece by Honolulu-based Richard Halloran, a former New York Times foreign correspondent, is mistakenly being quoted in other publications as authoritative fact.

The writer's own conclusions and predictions first appeared in the Korea Herald on Nov. 21, 03, titled, "The Rising East: U.S. Disengagement from Korea," and were rewritten and published in the Washington Times on Nov.24, under the title, "Troops To Shift From S. Korea; U.S. to reassign some to Iraq, Afghanistan."

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs issued the following statements to correct the record:

• There have been no discussions about US troop reductions in South Korea, nor has the U.S. made any decisions regarding troop reductions.
  
  (SITE NOTE: This is technically correct. There presently are no negotiations because the ROK won't discuss the matter. Any action will have to be unilateral on the U.S. part.)
• In the Republic of Korea we are discussing, with that government, the realignment of our forces on the peninsula, in company with capabilities enhancement, but are not discussing any reductions in force levels at this time. (SITE NOTE: This is technically correct. They have been discussing this for over a year as part of the Future ROK-US Alliance Initiative that broke down, but the ROK does NOT want to discuss this at this time. In fact as late as a month ago, Prime Minister Goh stated he still felt that a "tripwire" presence was required. The ROK negotiations are like a snake that coils back upon itself...going forward an inch, but going backwards two. Any action would have to be unilateral on the part of the US.)
  
  
• We have agreed to move U.S. forces out of the Seoul Metropolitan Area and will continue to work with our allies to ensure that forces are positioned in a way that will provide the best-possible posture in defense of South Korea.
  
  
• Many options are being discussed as part of realignment of U.S. forces on the peninsula and these options will be discussed with the Republic of Korea as we move forward in this process. (SITE NOTE: Many options have been discussed, but the ROK has rejected, deflected, lied, bamboozled, squirmed, used violent public demonstrations, shaped public opinion to foster anti-Americanism and generally been an over-all pain-in-the-ass. The ROK's "word" on signed MOU/MOA's are worthless as demonstrated by their campaign to wiggle out of their monetary responsibilities under 1990 relocation MOU. This is a farce.)
  
  
• Any realignment of US forces in South Korea will necessarily involve close consultations with the government of the Republic of Korea. (SITE NOTE: The USFK needs to define "close consultations" where in the latest Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in November 2003, the ROK refused to discuss relocation matters. The annual SCM is a forum designed to "consult" on these matters. "Close consultations" with the ROK is a meaningless term at best.)
  
  

Details beyond these statements are speculative at best.

With regard to the assertion that troops now in Korea could be deployed, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld confirmed in a Nov 17 interview with Yonhap that there are no plans to deploy US troops or units to Iraq from Korea. (SITE NOTE: Technically this is correct. But the Halloran article stated that the Division will not leave, but most certainly individual soldier will. Historically, the military will simply not fill holes in the structure so that a unit can be only 75% manned, but still be considered combat capable. If a unit relies on follow-on support in a contingency, their manning could go even lower. We are also wondering -- with tongue in cheek -- if the 3d Bde (Stryker unit) of the 2d ID out of Washington State which was deployed in mid-Nov to Iraq could be "technically" considered an element of the 2d ID of Korea.)

For more information please contact Lieutenant Commander Flex Plexico, Asia Pacific Press Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense at (703) 697-1252/5131 or Fax: (703) 697-3501 or Mr. Kim Yong-Kyu or Lee Ferguson at USFK Public Affairs Office, at 7913-3113.

USFK Commander Agrees to Extend From the USFK Website on 18 Nov: "Seoul, Republic of Korea (UNC/CFC/USFK) – Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced yesterday that he has asked Gen. Leon J. LaPorte to extend for another year as the commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea and Gen. LaPorte has agreed. It is not uncommon for a commander in this region to extend. Gen. LaPorte took over as commander May 1, 2002"

U.S. Global Defense Plan Announced The following is from the JoongAng Ilbo on 27 Nov 2003:

Seoul content as U.S. presents defense plan

The Bush administration has officially announced its policy to reposition its forces around the world, including the 37,000 troops in South Korea. Officials in Seoul took the news calmly yesterday, saying the move was not a surprise.

"Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with the Congress and our friends, allies, and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our overseas force posture," U.S. President George W. Bush said in a statement released Tuesday in Washington. "We will ensure that we place the right capabilities in the most appropriate locations to best address the new security environment."

In a follow-up briefing, a senior White House National Security Council official explained that nothing had been decided on the possible reduction or relocation of the U.S. troops on the peninsula. He said the realignment plan could take years before being fully implemented and that the security of South Korea was assured and would not be disturbed by the repositioning of U.S. forces.

Mr. Bush and President Roh Moo-hyun had been discussing the issue since Mr. Roh's visit to Washington in May, the official said.

Ra Jong-yil, the Blue House national security advisor, said Condoleezza Rice, his counterpart in Washington, had informed him of the statement before Mr. Bush made the announcement.

There was no need for new talks between the two countries on the issue, Mr. Ra said.

Defense experts, however, said they expected the number of U.S. forces in Korea to be cut eventually under the new plan. In June, Guy Arrigoni, a senior intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, predicted that the reshaping of the U.S. military presence here will probably involve the departure of up to 15,000 troops.

They said reducing the number of troops and establishing stronger, more mobile units armed with advanced weapons is the U.S. strategy. Korea was not exempt from the plan, they said.

In May, the U.S. announced it would invest more than $11 billion in its forces here for the next four years, and experts said that plan could go hand in hand with a cutback in troop strength.

DECEMBER 2003

U.S. Determined to Pull out of Seoul According to The Korea Herald on 5 Dec 03, a Defense Ministry official said, "Washington has already informed us of its plan to move the CFC and UNC to locations south of Seoul as the two allies failed to work out details of the relocation terms of the U.S. Yongsan Garrison over the past year." Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Lawless recently delivered to his Korean counterpart Cha Young-koo the U.S. government's decision not to leave behind the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command in the capital when the Yongsan base pulls back to Osan and Pyeongtaek in 2006. (SITE NOTE: The year 2006 is significant as this is a change in the Seoul storyline. Seoul still wants to drag its feet on the U.S. withdrawal from Seoul -- while not giving up any land. Negotiations continue. On 15 Dec Yonhap News reported that high-level U.S. military officials reiterated that the U.S.plans to relocate its Yongsan Garrison from Seoul to Osan and Pyeongtaek by 2006.)

Seoul offered 170,000 pyeong of the 810,000-pyeong (320 hectares) Yongsan base to be used by the UNC and CFC. One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters. On the other hand, the U.S. side reportedly sought to keep 280,000 pyeong or some 30 percent of the total Yongsan plot, to build large-scale lodging facilities, hospitals and schools to support 1,000 personnel affiliated with the CFC and UNC, as well as their family members whose number could rise as high as 6,000. Koreans offered some 17 million pyong, while Americans want more than 28 million.

According to the Korea Times the Ministry of Defense said ``U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Lawless on Nov. 27 delivered his country’s hope for the relocation plan to Deputy Minister for Policy Cha Young-koo.’’ Washington seems to have given an ultimatum to Seoul during the negotiation to decide the size of the land that will continue to be occupied by the USFK in Yongsan.

The U.S. said during the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) last month it would rather move all their troops out of the capital if their space requirement cannot be met. The MND claims that no decision has been made in this area.

On 14 Dec the Chosun Ilbo reported that the USFK reconfirmed its intention to move all of the Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command south of Seoul. The Ministry of National Defense said that Lt. Gen. Charles C. Campbell, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, visited the ministry and reaffirmed the U.S. Army's original stance: that the ministry must provide 280,000 pyeong of land in Seoul or the army will move to Osan and Pyeongtaek.

The ministry said it informed Campbell that ROK government is open to partial negotiations on the size of the base, which it said Campbell declined. In consideration of public opinion, ROK government took a step back and devised a compromise proposal that would grant 200,000 of land for the USFK in Seoul.

The original position of ROK government was to give 170,000 pyeong. USFK commander General Leon LaPorte said on December 1 in a meeting with Shin Il-soon, the Deputy Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, that the official stance of the U.S. government is to move the Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command to Osan and Pyeongtaek by 2006.

In response to Shin's statement that ROK government wants the Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command to remain in Seoul, and proposed negotiations, LaPort said that there are no changes made in the decision of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to move the Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command to south of Seoul.

According to the Stars and Stripes, the U.S. Congress approved an additional budget for building new facilities in Camp Humphrey, Pyeongtaek, in order to fulfill an agreement between ROK and U.S. to move the Yongsan Base to south of the Han River by 2006.

Discussions on Troop Reduction On 4 Dec, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith said that the US and ROK would discuss changes in the size of US Forces Korea. However, he also stated that U.S. has not yet made any decision to reduce of change the number of troops in the country. Among the wide range of topics which the U.S. and ROK discussed were rationalizing the “footprint” of the USFK and combining units.

The important statement was that "relocating U.S. soldiers to south of Seoul would be an important part of achieving military objectives and resolving various problems with the Korean people." When the UN HQ & CFC HQ is to be moved is being up in the air. The size of the USFK is part of a global strategy to restructure the US forces with the possibility of decreasing the size of U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and Germany. The intent is for the US to have an equal number of armed forces stationed both at home and abroad.

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