HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE 8TH FIGHTER WING (1990-1995)

Award of Excellence: The Home & Hearth (4.0) The Cozy Corner of the Web

Silver Surfer Award (Gold) Shadow Run (4.5)

Acknowledgement: Thanks to HQ PACAF History Office and the 8th Fighter Wing History Office for their source materials. Another excellent site used to trace the history of the 8th Fighter Wing is 8FW Lineage of the Air University.

1990:

The following is from the conditions faced in 2002 -- and reflect the changes in activist thinking from the 1990 SOFA period. (Go to 2002: Protests for 2002 activists perspective of the plan)

In 1990, America started to make plans to disassemble its forces. In April 1990, the Bush administration sent a troop reduction plan, based on the Nunn-Warner East Asia Strategy Evaluation Report, to the US Congress. At first, the American forces were slated for a 25% reduction, but the South Korean government still feared North Korean intentions and was opposed to the 'high' rate of reduction. It preferred instead a more gradual rate of reduction. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was renegotiated in 1990 with a significant increase in the Korean portion of the defense expenditures. Seoul accepted Washington's intention to withdraw about 5,000 noncombatant troops from the American force of more than 43,000 soldiers in South Korea as part of Phase One of its plan. At the end of 1990, 39,317 American military remained in Korea. The original plan called for 2,000 Air Force and 5,000 non-combat ground troops would be withdrawn from Korea starting in 1991 and completed by 1993. Since 1993, the troop strength has remained at about 37,000 without further talks of troop withdrawals.

The cancellation of the orginal plan was due in part to the Korean government's opposition, but also because there was a change in the US policy in East Asia. The US policy makers had decided to maintain a minimum force level of 100,000 troops in East Asia. Thus the orginal plan stopped implementation after Phase One.

Phase Two of the original plan planned to reduce the troop strength in Korean to about 30,000 between 1994-1995. Unfortunately, the North Korean nuclear crisis that pushed the peninsula to the brink of war stopped the implementation. This crisis shelved any further troop reduction plans and since that time there have been no changes to the manning in Korea.

To many activists, this is looked upon as a lost opportunity to rid the peninsula of the Americans. (See The 'Crisis' on the Korean Peninsula and the US Troops in Korea.) Under the original plan, upon completion of Phase One and Phase Two, Phase Three would be implemented to turn over the defense of Korea to the Korean military. They envisioned the withdrawal of troops from Korea starting in 1996 and completing in 2000. The dream of being rid of the Americans evaporated when Kim Il-Sung practiced his brand of brinksmanship and brought the peninsula to the brink of war. Phase Two never materialized -- and with it no Phase Three.

A growing number of Americans legislators have come to believe that America has been footing the defense bill for Korea for too long. More and more pressure was brought to bear as Korea progressed up the ladder to a G-12 nation. Feeling the pressure, Korea started on an ambitious military upgrade program in the 1990s and continues to progress towards weening itself away from America. (See Korea Continues to March to Its Own Drummer for ROK military hardware programs.) As of 2002, the disparity between the two Koreas has begun to embarrass even some ROK analysts. Privately, many acknowledge that the American presence no longer is needed to deter the North.

Some activists state that the belief that US troop withdrawals from Korea will destabilize the region is a myth. The activists believe that the North is too weak to pose a danger to the military might of the South and the Americans are just scaring up boogie-men to justify their presence in Korea. The USFK view agrees with them somewhat, but points out that North Korea is really not interested in conquest -- it is interested in staying in power, even if it must sacrifice its people. (See USFK: North Korean Strategy for details.)

The activists feel that entrenched military and industrial interests in Washington wish the military levels to remain the same -- and there is some truth in this as military hardware sales is a very profitable business. You can't sell fighters without a spectre of war around the corner -- and the Koreans understand this point very well as they anticipate a booming export business with their new Golden Eagle advanced trainer/fighter. However, all the key political figures -- both Korean and American -- keep mouthing the appropriate phrases of "mutual defense," "shared security concerns," and "provide stability in the region" to maintain the U.S. forces in Korea.

Activists proudly point to a 2002 MBC Poll that shows only 27.5% of Koreans want the Americans to stay while 16.8% say "leave now" and 55.6% say "start packing up." (NOTE: In the 1995 Sejong Poll, 41.5% wanted the Americans to stay.) Activists seem blithely unaware that there is a growing grassroots movement to disengage from Korea -- that has been slowly increasing momentum since 1978 when Jimmy Carter was elected President based upon that promise. The activists may not be watching the U.S. polls on CNN that showed 65 percent of the Americans favored disengagement from Korea. Less than one-third of Americans support the current Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Korea. The American movement for disengagement proposes that Seoul and Washington should negotiate a phased withdrawal of American forces and termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty, replacing them with a cooperative military and political relationship among equals. In other words, the Americans want out!!!

The activists say, "If Korea is reunited and the Cold War ends in the Korean peninsula, the public opinion in the US would shift toward US disengagement from Korea and Korea will soon be forgotten. The American people would demand their troops out of Korea." The answer to is YES!!! Given the opportunity, the U.S. would be out of the door in no time flat -- without one shed tear and no looking back. More and more Americans are now seeing the Korean situation as simply that a KOREAN situation -- without any national security interests for America involved. For most Americans, a war between North and South Korea would be just that--a war between North and South Korea. The obvious humanitarian tragedy would generate few security concerns for the U.S. Presumably, it is for this reason that a majority of Americans oppose the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea; less than one-third support the current defense guarantee. Indeed, the U.S. ultimately will be more secure if its allies take the lead in dealing with potential conflicts that have minimal relevance to America.

In the foreseeable future, America will remain the largest trading partner with the region; retain significant cultural, historical, and political ties; and will cooperate militarily with allied states. The U.S. even could intervene militarily if it believed American vital interests were threatened--say by a potential hegemon that could not be contained by allied powers. To do so, Washington need NOT maintain an alliance and force structure created in a different era to achieve different ends. Nor need it intervene promiscuously in response to every instance of instability in a world in which some instability is inevitable. In other words, the U.S. will continue to exert influence throughout Asia, but as the only super-power left in the world, it need not stay in Korea to protect its interests. If you look closely at George Bush's vision for a 21st Century fighting force, having a stationary target on Korean soil (2d ID) is really not part of the stripped down mobile force that he envisions.

However, the activists may be right on one point. Though some analysts contend that America's presence in Korea offers an important base to promoting regional stability, others feel the ROK has just MODEST strategic value for the U.S. To many analysts it is felt that Washington could maintain whatever air and naval forces it desired in the region without bases in Korea, as well as a cooperative relationship with South Korea even in the absence of a defense guarantee and units based on Korean soil. (See Korea Marches to Its Own Drummer for details.)

Unfortunately, despite all assurances to the contrary, the activists feel that the U.S. wants to remain in Korea forever -- and has done everything to ruin the North-South reconciliation in order to retain its foothold in Korea. The logic here does not seem reasonable. Simple weight of numbers of the North could lead to the destruction of Seoul even if North Korea ultimately (and quickly) lost the war. There are a lot of safer ways to maintain your influence in the region than to risk the lives of tens of thousands of Seoul civilians -- as well as the bulk of your military force.

SOFA The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was renegotiated in 1990 to increase the Korean portion of the defense expenditures. As Korea had a favorable balance-of-payments ratio in foreign trade starting in 1986 that was rapidly increasing, it was certain that Korea could afford the cost.

This FIRST renegotiation of the SOFA created a storm of protests as it was the first to recognize Korea as being able to afford its share. Up to this time, the Koreans had been under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and used the U.S. as their defense shield. The money saved was pumped into the Korean "chaebol" conglomerate protectionist system. This economic aid was what made possible the Miracle of the Han and transformed Korea into one of the Four Dragons of Asia. Korea did not start its modernization programs in the 1990s until almost 12 years after North Korea started its upgrade programs.

This renegotiation put Korea on notice that America was serious about leaving. It made the point that though all the folks could mouthe words like "regional stability" and "mutual defense," the truth was that any war between the Koreas had very little to do with the U.S. security risks in the region. Only North Korea with its nuclear capability was a concern for the US -- NOT the potential war between the Koreas.

Initially, the Koreans ran around crying "Why is my BIG BROTHER doing this to me?" and "We are a POOR country. Why are you doing this to me?" After many months, these cries diminished and soon the Koreans started to get a different world view. They started to reconsider their place in the world -- and never looked back. After 1990, when the costs of a military program was discussed, you would never hear a Korean saying "We are a poor country. We can't afford it. " Instead, they would comment on programs with "It costs too much!"

After this time, Korea started on an ambitious hardware upgrade program to gain technology and build up its own home-grown defense. Though it had entered many high-tech high value added industries such as microchip production, it had not geared up for military buildup. Its shipyards were still cranking out tankers, but it lacked the technology to start a buildup of its military hardware. It looked to Germany, France, Russia, Japan and the U.S. for its technology transfers. In 1900, the plant at Sochon started up the production lines for the KF-16s. The Germans were approached for submarine designs. By 2002, it was building its own destroyers, cruisers, submarines, KMA-1 Main Battle Tanks, launched its KR-III sub-orbital "research" rocket, possessed OFFENSIVE missile capabilities with the ATACMS, and so forth. The 1990 renegotiation forced Korea to march to its own drummer.

The SOFA's legal provisions of allowing the Korean police for the first time to demand jurisdiction over crimes that were committed off-base was the first opening of a highly bothersome issue. Prior to this negotiation, the USFK basically had all the control. Minor crimes occurring on-base or were line-of-duty accidents remained under the jurisdiction of the USFK. For major crimes, the wording was that the ROK COULD demand the jurisdiction rights over cases involving serious crimes (murder, rape, arson), but the US at this time still retained custody of the suspect until tried. Though the ROK police COULD demand jurisdiction for minor crimes, they never did. This is a key difference as the Korean system allowed questioning of the suspect without charges or presence of a lawyer -- and without this provision, the prosecutor's office's found it hard to conduct their style of investigation.

The activists despised this SOFA calling it "unjust" but at this time the majority of Koreans believed the U.S. forces were essential to the defense of Korea. Only years later would the Koreans start to feel that they did not need the U.S. for their defense -- and in fact started to feel the U.S. was blocking their unification efforts.

The following is from the conditions faced in 2002 -- and reflect the changes in activist thinking from the 1990 SOFA period. (Go to 2002: Protests for 2002 activists perspective of the plan)

Many activists view the increased cost-sharing for Korea as some sort of insult and any increases are labeled "protection money" as though the U.S. were a thug. To the activists, the US is "demanding more money from Seoul so that the doves who oppose US presence in Korea for economic reasons may be silenced. In 1989, Seoul paid the US 45 million dollars for its presence in Korea. This was the first time Seoul had to pay the US for protection. This protection money increased to 70 million dollars in 1990, 150 million dollars in 1991, 180 million in 1992, 220 million in 1993, 260 million in 1994, and 300 million in 1995. The protection money stayed at the 1995 level for awhile because of the economic meltdown in the late 1990's."

The activists fail to mention that the "Miracle of the Han" was made possible when Korea followed the Japanese "kiretsu" conglomerate model and built up their "chaebol" conglomerates while living under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The ROK Ministry of National Defense acknowledges that Seoul did not begin its "force improvement program" until "12 years later than North Korea." Instead, South Korea "concentrated on its economic and social development" despite the dire military threat from the North. Instead of funneling its monies into military buildup, it funneled it into its designated "chaebols." This protectionist economic strategy worked. The ROK has about 24 times the GDP of North Korea.

However, there was growing resentment from the American taxpayers after Korea became one of the "four dragons of Asia" and STILL would not pay what America considered its fair share for its defense. As late as 1986, Washington still was providing significant amounts of security-oriented aid. On top of this was the direct American military subsidy in the form of the defense commitment and troop deployments. All the while, the ROK invested the cash that it saved into the South Korean economy. In 1990, the U.S. demanded the Korea start paying its way as their economy could easily afford it. The SOFA was renegotiated and their share significantly increased. When the "IMF Crisis" hit in 1995, the Koreans immediately started to "poor mouth" and the costs remained static at 1995 years until 2001. After the IMF had given Korea a clean bill of health, the U.S. again readdressed the cost-sharing formula.

The activists complain that the US "demanded" 440 million dollars in 2001 and wants to increase the share by 10% per year to 600 million by 2004. To Americans, the activists are using a different accountant than the U.S. side. The activists claim that "Seoul's share of the US expenses in Korea was less than a third of the total direct costs in 1990 but it will shoot up to more than 50% by 2004-2005. Here we are addressing direct costs only. When indirect costs - such as land use and subsidized utilities - are added on, Seoul's share of the costs amounts to more than three billion dollars a year."

Unfortunately their viewpoint is a bit skewed. (See Korea Should Start Paying Their Own Way for an enlightening 1999 article that covers the inequity of the ROK cost sharing.) The U.S. pays about $15 billion dollars annually to maintain their troops in Korea -- with Korea reaping the benefits. The article states, "All told, Americans spend as much to defend the ROK--about $15,000,000,000 annually--as the South Koreans do." When you talk about percentage of GNP for defense from a developed nation, you will see that Korea is getting better, but is STILL SIGNIFICANTLY behind such countries as Finland who have no enemies now that Russia is gone.

However, when we start comparing Japan and Korea dealing with the SOFA costs, we see a facet of the Koreans that is very irksome. The activists complain that in the 1990s, "the U.S. troops in Japan and Korea cost about 30 billion dollars a year. Korea and Japan paid the U.S. about 2 billion dollars and 20 billion dollars, respectively." Though we may quibble with the figures here, the point is the disparity in the payments between Korea ($2 billion) and Japanese ($20 billion). The Koreans constantly complain about the inequity of the Korean SOFA when compared to Japanese SOFA, but they REFUSE to pay the same percentage as the Japanese. The activists when confronted with the question as to why they shouldn't increase their share, one usually hears a cop-out response like "Americans are here to further their national interests in Asia, so why should we pay for them." The topic is always closed at that point.

Return of Yongsan to Korea: The ROK and the US agreed in principle to transfer the USFK base at Yongsan to a provincial city. However, these would soon explode in everyone's faces between 1991-1993 when Pyongtaek refused to accept more military within their city; Osan was not large enough to accomodate all the people from the 8th Army relocation; and Pusan offered a ridiculous offer to get Camp Hialeah in exchange for a flood plain with no infrastructure. Later the golf course was returned to the Korea as well as portions to create a park. The rest returned to a "Status quo" situation.

Because of this, relations between the two nations on military issues have been cool at best. The Koreans want to grow strong, but the Americans do not wish it to have an offensive capability. However, at the same time, the Americans continue to seek ways to disengage from the Korean conflict without weakening the military resolve. This contradiction has resulted in some interesting developments. On one hand, the Koreans want the Americans to go and on the other, they want them to stay. Likewise, the Americans want to leave, but as the Philippines is closed to them and the Japanese antipathy increased -- along with demands for shrinking their presence increased in Japan -- they are forced to remain in Korea.

The following is from the conditions faced in 2002 -- and reflect the changes in activist thinking from the 1990 SOFA period. (Go to 2002: Protests for 2002 activists perspective of the plan)

Another item that remains unaccomplished was that the ROK and the US agreed in principle to transfer the USFK base at Yongsan to a Seoul City. However, between 1991-1993 Pyongtaek refused to accept more military within their city; Osan was not large enough to accomodate all the people from the 8th Army relocation; and Pusan offered a ridiculous offer to get Camp Hialeah in exchange for a flood plain with no infrastructure. This part of the plan was shelved and remained in a "status quo" situation until the Land Partnership Plan formalized in 2002 returned land to the ROK in exchange for new lands in the south-east part of Korea. Seoul City still has plans drawn up for Yongsan and still clamors for its return.

Some activists state that the only reason the U.S. will not relinquish Yongsan is that it wants to turn it into the regional military center...while a lot of American servicemen bust out laughing. This may hurt many Korean's feelings, but Korea is NOT a nice country to be in. Most soldiers in the US Army would prefer an assignment ot Bosnia or even the Middle East to a tour in Korea. (See Not Surprising News: "US Soldiers Avoid Service in Korea" for details.) There are a lot of other exaggerated claims.

Upgrade of Military Hardware Increased Priority: In the past, the Koreans had been steadily upgrading their military hardware. However, the Koreans started in 1990 on an ambitious plan to upgrade their military hardware in all areas. The Korean Fight Plane (KFP) project was well underway building the F-16 designs in Korea -- with the first KFP aircraft rolling out in 1995. Korea continued in its search for foreign technology transfer. The ROK and France Ministers of National Defense concluded a treaty on mutual support for the Chonma missile project. Armored carriers were exported and a main battle tank was being developed. The biggest of these projects though was the Koreans' goal to build a "blue water" navy similar to the Japanese -- through the building of its own destroyers and submarines. They had the money and the manpower, but their stumbling block was the transfer of weapons technology. Thumbing their noses at the Americans who refused to transfer critical technology, the Koreans turned to any country who was willing to transfer their technology to Korea...including the Russians. This only increased the tensions between the U.S. and Korea. However, after the "IMF Crisis" hit in 1995, Korea shelved many of these ambitious plans...but you can bet that they will be resurfaced at a later date.

As part of Korea's dream to become a "blue water" navy, the Koreans sought out opportunities to exercise their navy to gain experience in naval operations. The ROK Navy first participated in RIMPAC exercises in 1990.

Within Korea, Under a new joint force system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created. Changes in the ROK procedures reduced the age limit of homeland reservists from 35 to 33.

Tensions over Tunnel 4: The tensions between the north showed some progress. The first South-North high-level talks were held in Seoul. However, the discovery of Tunnel No. 4 soon cooled discussions. There had been persistent complaints of sounds of digging in the northern provinces but there was nothing discovered.



Desert Storm: Desert Storm erupted. For the Koreans, the working-level negotiation team and on-the-spot investigation team were dispatched to Saudi Arabia with a mission to prepare for dispatching a medical care support team to Gulf War. The ROK Armed Forces Medical Care Support Group was dispatched to the Gulf. The medical team was sent to the south of Saudi Arabia far away from the combat zones.

1991:

Nuclear Strike Training and Nuclear Certification At Kunsan Air Base in 1991
U.S. 8th Tactical Fighter Wing
1991 History

Obtained under provisions of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) U.S. nuclear weapons deployments and policies in the Asia-Pacific region by Nautilus Institute October 1998

FOIA Documents
Source: U.S. Seventh Air Force, History of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 January-June 1991, pp. 22-23, 26-27, 49-50.

Explanation: The following excerpts are from the 1991 history of the U.S. 8th Tactical Fighter Wing stationed at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea. The information describes pilots undergoing nuclear weapons and other fighter-bomber strike training in the period January-June 1991. A total of 48 F-16C/D aircraft were stationed at Kunsan at the time, some of which were equipped with B61 nuclear bombs. The document also reveals how the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing was certified to store nuclear weapons at the base.

"(U) Air-to-surface training was divided into three sortie types: weapons delivery, nuclear strike and surface attach tactics (SAT). The first profile was used for event requalifications, manual deliveries or "back to basics" delivery training. The second profile, also referred to as WD-2 [Weapons Delivery 2], was used for the majority of weapons qualification sorties. The Final weapon delivery profile was used to train pilots in night weapons delivery missions in two-ship formations over a controlled range using ground illuminated targets. Nuclear strike training consisted of two flying profiles. The first was basically an introduction to nuclear strike normally flown by pilots during mission qualification training (upgrade training) to familiarize them with nuclear strike methods. The second nuclear strike profile trained pilots to fly single-ship nuclear strikes. Surface attack tactics (SAT) training was conducted using various levels of intricacy, from missions which stressed specific tactical skills, like low-level formation, to full scale tactical exercises that integrated those specific tactical skills with intelligence scenarios and live ordnance."

(Source: 8th Tactical Fighter Wing/HO, "History of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 January 1991 - 30 June 1991, Narrative, Volume I (U)," 22 October 1991, p. 22. Secret. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act.)

Apart from flying the aircraft themselves, nuclear strike training for the pilots also involved using a F-16 simulator.

"(U) [...] Common simulator profiles flown by wing pilots included local area orientation, emergency procedures evaluations (administered by wing stan eval personnel), nuclear strike and air-to-air procedures. Chemical warfare familiarization was also conducted with the use of the F-16 simulator." (Source: 8th Tactical Fighter Wing/HO, "History of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 January 1991 - 30 June 1991, Narrative, Volume I (U)," 22 October 1991, pp. 26-27. Secret. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act.)

Trained and equipped to deliver B61 nuclear bombs, the weapons division at Kunsan AB needed to pass specific Air Force training and inspections to be certified for the nuclear weapons to be allowed to be stored on the base. Such a nuclear inspection was passed during the first half of 1991:

"(U) The 8 TFW's weapons safety division was warded the United States Air Force's (USAF) explosive safety, missile safety and nuclear surety awards for outstanding performance in accident prevention in each of those respective categories. Personnel in weapons safety continually strived [sic,] to prevent any weapons mishap and, since 14 December 1989, the wing has not has a reportable weapons mishap."

(Source: 8th Tactical Fighter Wing/HO, "History of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 January 1991 - 30 June 1991, Narrative, Volume I (U)," 22 October 1991, pp. 49-50. Secret. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act.)

Kunsan Magnum Jeff Steele wrote, "I worked at Kunsan MAGNUM about a mile north of Kunsan Air Base. One other American and I lived on Kunsan, and we commuted by truck on a very poor road to and from work. I'm not sure how many MAGNUMS were closed all together, but a few remained active while I was there in 1991-92. Our Squadron Headquarters was at Taegu, and our Section Commander was at Kwang Ju. There was a team of senior NCOs from HQ that visited the MAGNUMs about once a month, and we drove to Kwang Ju about every quarter to meet with people from the other MAGNUMs and to show our faces."

He went on, "We were not a part of the 8th FW, but worked closely with them during exercises. The MAGNUM stored USAF munitions, that were under the control of the 8th EMS Munitions Accountability and Supply Officer (MASO). The ROKAF personnel used USAF equipment and technical data to handle, inspect and perform maintenance on the munitions. We often put on "dog and pony shows" for the "brass" visiting Kunsan, and liked to show off two of the biggest munitions storage structures in Korea."

The area Jeff is referring to is located out the North gate of Kunsan. Go to the intersection heading to the airport. Go through the intersection and the road continues north and soon turns into a dirt road. You will pass the ROK Army anti-aircraft artillery battery to your left. Continue on until you see a big gate with signs stating it is off-limits in both Korean and English. That is the MAGNUM. In 2002 it appeared to be under the complete control of the ROK.

Kunsan Airport: In 1989, a big change came about affecting Kunsan when then Korean President Roh Tae-Woo declared that Kunsan Air Base would become a civilian airport. There was a previous Seoul-Kunsan airline route that ran from August 1970-March 1974. (Note: The route was stopped supposedly due to the cost of oil, but notice that March 1974 was when the 8th TFW arrived to take over the base.)

Located near the north gate, the Kunsan Airport terminal adjoins Kunsan Air Base and is on the opposite side of the runway from the Main Base. On Dec. 7, 1991, they commenced construction of civil aviation facilities for the Kunsan Airport and on Dec. 12, 1992 the airport was opened. Soon afterwards Korean Airlines and Asean Airlines started domestic flights into Kunsan. Kunsan to Seoul is now only 20 minutes by plane -- compared to a 3-1/2 hour bus ride. This has been a great blessing to frequent travelers and businessmen. At first, the new airport seemed to be a godsend for everyone as it was extremely popular from the start. However, this would turn out to be the fly in the ointment later.

Student Protests and the Job Market Crisis: On the national scene, the student protests grew more strident throughout the country. AFKN TV was always filled with announcements about avoiding certain areas in the major cities. In Kunsan, the roads were periodically closed as student protests spilled over into the streets. The student demonstrations would start off with the same scenario as mentioned before at the Kunsan Main Gate, but now in addition to the "Molotov cocktails", the students were tearing up the sidewalks to get bricks to throw and carrying lead pipes. Riot policemen were starting to get hurt and the reaction was not one of tolerance, but rather violent reaction. The protests were getting larger and more violent. Pepper gas was now being used commonly.

But suddenly a crisis hit. The job markets dried up. What had once been full employment for all college graduates, suddenly turned sour. The reality of the new technical age had come to bear on Korea. In the past, the companies didn't care what one's degree was in as they would train them in house. Suddenly the reality of the modern technical world came to bear. The companies wanted science, math or engineering degrees to fill their technical positions...and most of the recent college graduates didn't have the qualifications for the jobs. Most Korean graduates were in the humanities area with few in the science or engineering areas.

Unemployment amongst recent college graduates doubled and the competition for the good jobs became fierce. This meant the students had to commit themselves to full time study to pass the companies' tests. Student activism waned. In addition, the government had gotten tired of the violence and started to arrest the student leaders. Communist ties were discovered for one group of national student leaders. After this, the student protest movement died and the Kunsan Main Gate returned to normal.

ROK Upgrade Programs: The Korean push to upgrade its military hardware continued. An MOU on the Korean fighter project was concluded between the ROK and US. Korea's first submarine (the Changbogo) was first procured from abroad (Germany) and was launched. A Korean military attaché office was set up in Russia. The ROK and Thailand concluded an MOU on logistical cooperation.

ROK General to Armistice Committee: A major change that happened to the Armistice Committee was that the US senior representative of the United States Forces to the Military Armistice Committee was replaced by a representative from the ROK. This appointment of a Korean General caused a great deal of screaming on the part of North Korea. In many people's views, the North Koreans were justified. South Korea was never a signatory of the armistice that ended the Korean War. As a result, the U.S. (signing as the United Nations Commander), China and North Korea were the only signatories. Following this logic, a Korean general would have been unsuitable for the Armistice Committee -- even if he was Commanding General of the Combined Field Army (CFA). In the end, his name was withdrawn.

Air Defense Artillery aligned under ROKAF: A major realignment took effect with the army's air defense artillery was transferred to the air force. The air force's Air Defense Artillery Command was established. Under this concept the aging Nike Hercules batteries were transferred to the ROKAF control. The old Camp Echo Hill at Kimje would be transferred to the ROKAF. (For Information on the Nike Hercules site at Kimje go to Camp Echo Hill: How It Was....) This alignment is the same that Taiwan accomplished in 1990 as well.

ROK responsible for DMZ: In 1991, ROK Armed Forces took full responsibility for guarding the entire 155-mile truce line. In truth, the ROK Armed Forces had already taken responsibility in 1970 for the guarding of the entire frontline of the DMZ -- with the exception of the Panmunjon Peace Village. In 1991, the ROK took control of the Panmunjon Peace Village as well. The ROK and the US concluded the Wartime Host Nation Support agreement.

However, this soon proved premature as the whole USFK troop reduction process was stalled by North Korea's nuclear programs in 1994. The U.S. forces remained as part of the 550-man JSA contingent of which 60 percent was ROK. It would not be until 2003 when the subject of the ROK taking over the JSA again surfaced and was again taken off the table by the U.S.

Nuclear-Free Korea: President Ro Tae Woo declared that South Korea was a nuclear-free zone. However, it was not until 1992 that the last of the nuclear weapons under U.S. control were removed from Korea. The nuclear weapons are assumed to be in Guam prepositioned for any altercation.

1992:

8th Tactical Fighter Wing becomes 8th Fighter Wing: On Feb. 3, 1992, the 8th TFW became redesignated as the 8th Fighter Wing (FW) in an Air Force-wide reorganization. At the same time, the wing reorganized from a tri-deputate system, which had deputy commanders responsible for different aspects of the wing's mission, to a multi-group structure that reported to the wing. This reorganization entailed the activation of the original 8th Fighter Group (WWII) with the designation 8th Operations Group. The primary effect was to streamline the chain of command by going from Deputy Commanders for Operations, Maintentance and Resource Management, to a four-group structure -- Operations, Logistics, Support and Medical -- that reported to the wing.

The 8th FW was comprised of the 35th Fighter Squadron (Pantons) and the 80th Fighter Squadron (Juvats) . The primary mission was to perform both air-to-ground and air-to-air missions in support of numerous taskings throughout the Pacific. There were 56 assigned F-16C/D aircraft, an annual budget of $78 million, and approximately 3,000 military and civilian members supporting its mission.

On 1 July 1992, the 8th Community Support Squadron received a new designation as the 8th Morale, Welfare, Recreation and Services Squadron.

New Main Gate: The new Main Gate structure opened. The concrete structure's roof was decorated with Korean temple designs. The new guard shack was larger and the lanes expanded to handle the truck and bus traffic.

Jim Segebarth wrote, "Here's the front page of one of the Wolfpack Warriors from July 92. It mentions the "recent" opening of the rebuilt main gate." Jim worked as a Gate Guard while at Kunsan. He wrote, "Kunsan was my first base (90-94). I was assigned to the 8th Security Police Squadron. The city grew quite a bit in the time I was there. The Kunsan commercial air terminal adjoining the base was built while I was there and the 4-lane road project from the city to the air terminal was well underway around 94. I didn't want to be there in the beginning but the country grew on me and I ended up getting married to a local girl that worked on base at the Defender's Den."

He continued, "It was a great assignment for field training exercises - as real as possible while still firing blanks. I actually enjoyed Foal Eagle in Oct-Nov 90 (I forget the exact start date). Even though I had just come off an F-16 crash site in the mountains outside Taegu the day before the exercise. It was also a great assignment for making friends. No matter what task was at hand it seemed like everyone always pulled together and got it done."

Jim Segebarth with a good case of helmet-head after 48-hours of no sleep during an exercise at Kunsan AB, 1993. This photo courtesy of "D." (Courtesy Jim Segebarth) Click on photo to enlarge	Sitting in the surveillance room, Kunsan AB, 1993. Watching the thieves in the base gas station. (Courtesy Jim Segebarth) Click on photo to enlarge
Jim, "D," and a ROKAP, 1993, at the Kunsan AB Main Gate. (Courtesy Jim Segebarth) Click on photo to enlarge	New Kunsan AB Main Gate (Wolfpack Warrior: Jul 92). (Courtesy Jim Segebarth) Click on photo to enlarge

Removal of Nuclear Weapons: In about 1992, all nuclear weapons were removed from Kunsan AB and reportedly prepositioned in Guam. But the truth is that the 8th Fighter Wing was not the first to stand nuclear alert at Kunsan. The 3rd Bomb Group from Japan started standing nuclear alerts at Kunsan AB (K8) starting in August 1958 until April 1964 when the unit was deactivated. (Go to 3rd Bomb Group .) During the next four years, the 39th Air Division F-100s (1960-1964) assumed the nuclear alert responsibility. After the 39th AD assigned F-100s departed, the nuclear alerts were handled by deployed units from the 27th TFW, 3rd TFW and 401st TFW. Between 1966-1968, Det 1, 612th TFS of Misawa handled the nuclear alert. In 1968, the 475th TFW Det 1 started standing nuclear alert at Kunsan Air Base. At that time, there were 8-10 F4C/D aircraft sitting in the bunkers of the "tree area" (now the ROKAF area) -- four uploaded on alert with the rest as spares. From 1968-1974, the PACAF Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Quick Reaction Alert commitment consisted of four F-4D aircraft sitting on alert fully-loaded with nuclear weapons at Kunsan. (Go to Detachment 1 475th TFW .)

According to the Nautilus Organization: July 19, 1999 release , after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, "the 3rd, 8th, and 18th TFW continued to play a major SIOP non-alert role." This means that the 8th TFW retained its nuclear weapons in a SIOP non-alert role. This meant the 8th practiced nuclear taskings as part of its exercises, but never stood alert. According to Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History by Bruce Cummins, 1997, (p479) the tactical nuclear weapons were to be used during the first hours of battle (H+1) to deny the North Koreans access to the corridors leading into South Korea. However, after Desert Storm, the US Army changed its mind about the use of the nuclear weapons. A high-yield conventional "smart bomb" are more useful than a messy and uncontrollable nuclear weapon.

It is was an "open secret" that Kunsan Air Base stored nuclear weapons (the "Silver Bullet"). Does anyone remember the members of the 8th MMS who proudly wore their embroidered jackets with "Bandit" and an atom on the back?

However, Seoul and Washington persistently maintained an NCND (No Confirmation, No Denial) policy as far as the sensitive issue was concerned. In Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History (p483) it states "The weapons removed included forty 203-mm and thirty 155-mm nuclear artillery shells, plus large numbers of ADMs. Official spokesmen were silent, however, about some sixty nuclear gravity bombs for F-4 and F-16 bombers, reported in 1985 to be stored at an American air base at Kunsan." (NOTE: "ADM" stands for "Atomic Demolition Mine" that weighs 60 pounds but has a 20 kiloton explosive force.)

However, in an April 19, 2000 Korea Times (Hankook Ilbo) interview, former Korean President Roh Tae-Woo said that Kunsan was the only place in Korea where nuclear weapons were stored before the U.S. removed all its nuclear weapons from South Korea in the 1990s in keeping with Seoul's de-nuclearization policy. This contradicts information from the Nautilus Organization, a nuclear weapons watch group, that nuclear weapons were at Kunsan AB, Osan AB, Kwangju AB and various Army bases with heavy artillery.

In Sept 1991, it was believed by the nuclear watchdogs that about 100 nukes were at Kunsan. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists said, "Actually, according to our calculations there are about 100 U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea today. These are only army artillery projectiles and air force bombs, and they are stored at Kunsan airbase south of Seoul."

It continued, "According to secret Pentagon documents, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in the country peaked at about 680 in the 1970s and declined to about 150 by the beginning of the Reagan administration. Neutron warheads were never deployed there. Honest John and Nike Hercules missiles were removed from Korea in the mid- and late-1970s, and atomic land mines were removed in 1983-84. All warheads from these weapon types have since been retired from the U.S. stockpile. It is unclear whether nuclear warheads were deployed with two Lance missile launchers that were sent to South Korea in 1987." However, everyone assures everyone that they are gone now...

NOTE: By 1995, the NRDC Nuclear Notebook showed that the 151 weapons in Korea in 1985 was "O" and the 458 weapons in Guam in 1985 was also "0".

Where did they go? Not important...but most likely disassembled for "inactive stockpile" -- a category size not limited under the SALTII treaty. The new reality was that nuclear weapons (besides tactical artillery) do not play a prominent role in modern U.S. warfare strategy -- but is reserved for use as a "deterent."

The subs of the 7th Fleet still shows 50 weapons in Hawaii on their subs. Eighteen Ohio-class submarines constitute the current ballistic missile fleet. All Trident I submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are expected to be replaced with longer-range and more accurate Trident II D5s by 2006.

Louisiana now ranks second in the number of warheads deployed (1,010), and Barksdale Air Force Base is the single largest nuclear facility in the United States, storing bombs and cruise missiles to arm 56 B-52H bombers. Long-range tactical bombers could provide the coverage required versus permanently assigned overseas nuclear ordnance. The B-52H is scheduled to remain in operation until 2044. In addition to front-line air force personnel, in late 1997 the Pentagon approved certification of full-time personnel from the air force reserve for support of nuclear war plans. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) are equipped with the W80-1 warhead. Although only about 400 ALCMs are deployed, hundreds more are held in reserve. According to the air force, there are a total of 1,142 ALCMs in the inventory, a reduction of 251 since March 1997. This reduction is a result of the conversion of some ALCMs to conventional roles. (Two hundred ALCMs are also kept in long-term storage.) The advanced cruise missile (ACM) is also equipped with the W80-1 warhead. Originally, the Pentagon planned to produce 1,461 ACMs, but in January 1992 it announced that production would stop at 640 missiles. Programs are under way to extend the service lives of both the ACM and the ALCM until 2030.

As of 2000, B-52Hs can carry up to 20 ALCMs/ACMs (air-launched cruise missiles/advanced cruise missiles). Because the bomber force is shrinking, only about 400 ALCMs and 400 ACMs are deployed, with several hundred others in reserve. In 1999, the air force ordered the conversion of another 322 ALCMs to conventional cruise missiles. The last 50 will be outfitted with a deep penetration warhead to strike hardened targets. The missiles will be delivered from late 1999 through early 2001.

The B-2 bomber, the first of which was delivered to the 509th Bombardment Wing at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, on December 17, 1993, is scheduled to be replaced around 2040. A follow-on bomber program was begun in 1998. Currently there are 16 B-2 bombers and do not carry ACM or ALCM. The B-2 is configured to carry various combinations of nuclear and conventional munitions. The first 16 planes are "Block 10" versions, able to carry the B83 nuclear bomb (and the Mk 84 conventional bomb). These were followed by "Block 20" versions, able to carry the B61 bomb. The last two planes, "Block 30" versions, are able to carry both types of nuclear bombs and an assortment of conventional bombs, munitions, and missiles. Block 10 and 20 planes are being upgraded to Block 30 standards at the factory in Palmdale, California. Originally scheduled to be completed in 2000, the upgrade schedule will stretch to 2002 as a result of additional work.

As of 2000, the 500 Minuteman IIIs have been consolidated from four bases to three. Currently the 200 Minuteman missiles at Malmstrom are deployed in four missile squadrons of 50 missiles each as part of the 341st Space Wing. The 150 Minuteman missiles at Minot AFB, North Dakota, are in three missile squadrons belonging to the 91st Space Wing. The 90th Space Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, is home to 150 Minuteman missiles divided in three squadrons and one missile squadron of 50 MX ICBMs.

In addition to the active stockpile, an "inactive stockpile" (or "hedge") was created in early 1990 to provide extra warheads for reconstitution of part of the force in case arms control expectations failed to materialize. Also stored in the inactive stockpile are warheads used for quality assurance and reliability testing. As arms control agreements have reduced the active stockpile, the inactive stockpile--which is not covered in the agreements--has grown significantly, with the total stockpile in the 10,000 range. Most weapons removed from active status under START I will be placed in the inactive stockpile to meet the "lead and hedge" requirements contained in the NPR. As a result, although only about 5 percent of the total stockpile was in the inactive category before START I, under START II the inactive stockpile could increase to 50 percent or more.

Increased User Fees for Kunsan Airport: During 1992, a 1970 agreement was revised permitting the use of Kunsan Air Base by Korean carriers and increasing their flight frequency. The USFK said that such arrangements, which permit regular commercial airlines' access to U.S. Air Force bases outside U.S. territory, exist only in Kunsan and in Misawa, Japan. However, as soon as the aircraft traffic picked up, the USAF increased the landing fees due to the increased costs in repair/maintenance of the runways and added demands on USAF personnel/equipment to handle this traffic. Immediately there were howls of protest from the Koreans.

The problem with increased ROK civilian airlines use was the increase in damage to airfield equipment because of the Korean aircraft taxiing errors. In addition, the runway had just been repaired, but the increased traffic of "heavies" would soon cause the repair frequency of the runway to increase. The previous contracted repair costs had not been passed on to the ROK but rather footed by the U.S. However, the civilian airline usage increase was not programmed into the future repair budget. In addition, a gate was added to the taxi ramp to Kunsan Airport with fencing added to both sides of the ramp. This was to prevent unauthorized entry to the base.

Team Spirit Shelved: The Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it would not carry out the Team Spirit Exercise in 1992. This was the an attempt to appease the North Koreans and hopefully defuse the nuclear inspection situation with North Korea. The main reason was the sabre rattling done by the North Koreans that were threatening to derail any of the negotiations going on to open dialogues between the two countries. The Team Spirit Exercises first started in 1976 have not been held since.

ROK Upgrade Programs: The upgrade efforts for Korea's hardware continued unabated. The ROK and Spain concluded an MOU on acquisition and logistical support cooperation. The ROK and France concluded an MOU on defense industry and logistical support cooperation. The launching ceremony of the first domestic submarine, the Ichon, was held. The ROK-Italy concluded an MOU on logistical support and defense system cooperation. ROK Navy vessels made the first visit to Russia's Vladivostok port. The ROK and the United Kingdom concluded the MOU in the Sphere of Defense Industrial and Logistical Support. A Korea military attaché office was set up in China

Combined Field Army Dissolved: As for the ROK military structure, the ROK and US dissolved the ROK-US Combined Field Army (CFA). If one remembers about the experience with the ROK General being submitted for the Armistice Committee, one sees the problems involved with assigning a ROK General over American forces when the ROK is not a signatory to the armistice. Given the reductions in USFK forces and other problems, the elimination of the CFA was not a loss.

35th FS at RAAF Williamtown, Australia (Sep 1992) (Air Force Photo) Click on photo to enlarge (NOTE: In July 2005, Lt. Gen. Steven Polk, SAF/IG wrote: "Really enjoy your web site on the Wolfpack. The picture of a Panton F-16 at Williamtown shows a date of 1993 but actually was Sep 92. The picture is of the 8FW flagship. Many thanks for your great work! Cheers Steve Polk" We thank all the folks like Gen Polk for helping us keep the details of THEIR history straight.)

1993:

Antenna Farm. (Courtesy Tom Ritter) Click on photo to enlarge	Kunsan Mars Shack. (Courtesy Tom Ritter) Click on photo to enlarge
Antenna on Barracks Roof at Sunset. (Courtesy Tom Ritter) Click on photo to enlarge	Tom Ritter in war gear. (Courtesy Tom Ritter) Click on photo to enlarge

Tom Ritter and his Band at Kunsan.
(Courtesy Tom Ritter)
Click on photo to enlarge

1982nd Communications Squadron disbands: Under the new reorganization of the USAF Force structure, the 1982nd Communications Squadron (AFCC) turned over its duties to the 8th Operations Support Squadron (OSS). The Air Traffic Control, Rapcon and Navaids functions were assumed by the Wing. The unit had been stationed at Kunsan since just after the Pueblo Incident. (SEE 1982nd Comm Sq for the history of the Unit and photos of the 8th OSS Air Traffic Control/Rapcon.)

North Korea Nuclear Tension: Tension levels remained high at the 8th TFW over nuclear issues. In 1993 North Korea was believed to possess weapons-grade plutonium, though it had not yet succeeded in producing a nuclear bomb. North Korean leaders refused international arms inspectors access to some facilities and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Typical of North Korea's methods of "brinkmanship", it pushed the world to the brink of war. The rhetoric of the North turned away from reconciliation and reunification towards a more confrontational and aggressive stance. Squeezing money and aid for promises of nuclear inspection, the North continued to play its nuclear trump card. Finally in late 1994, an agreement was reached calling for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear facilities in exchange for nuclear reactors, possibly supplied by South Korea. Though the Clinton administration backed the North down in this confrontation, it came at a dear monetary cost (promises of nuclear generation plants). The problem of who is to pay for what in this four-party agreement (North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and U.S.) is still a ticklish issue today.

Surprisingly, in a May 2000 interview with the independent Hankyoreh Daily, former President Kim Yong-Sam insisted that President Clinton was ready to strike the North and had moved a carrier into position for a first strike action. Kim warned the US ambassador another war on the Korean peninsula would turn all of Korea into a bloodbath, killing between 10 and 20 million people and destroying South Korea's prosperous economy. "I told him that I would not move even a single soldier of our 650,000 troops (in case a war broke out because of the bombing of Yongbyon)," he said to the paper. He called Clinton and argued with him for "32 minutes." "I told him there would be no inter-Korean war while I was the president." He went on, Clinton tried to persuade me to change my mind, but I criticized the United States for planning to stage a war with the North on our land," he said. He credits former President Jimmy Carter with conveying to Kim Il-Sung the actual severity of the issue and bringing about a peaceful resolution.

Team Spirit Shelved: The "Team Spirit" exercises were not held in 1993 and finally cancelled altogether. In Korea, the USAF authorities explained that such exercises as "Ulchi Focus" or "Foal Eagle" would achieve the same goals without the expense. After twenty years, "Team Spirit" was like the old warrior...it simply faded away.

The first "Team Spirit" was held in 1978 and over the years caused numerous excuses for the North Koreans to engage in saber-rattling. Though it was necessary to show the U.S. resolve in Korea, by the mid-1990s economic considerations entered the picture. It was a very, very expensive exercise. In addition, the similar exercises could be accomplished elsewhere without international provocation.

However, there was a curious news release on March 16, 1993 indicating the Team Spirit '93 DID take place. Several F-117s from the 416th Fighter Squadron at Holloman AFB, N.M., along with about 90 members of the 49th Fighter Wing, deployed to Korea for a chance to define their capabilities in a different area. Or perhaps it was more an "operational exercise" as North Korea was upping the ante on the nuclear issue and President Clinton was ready to go to war over it. Who knows?

SUWON AB, Korea (AFNS) -- In its first Pacific deployment, the F-117 stealth fighter teamed up with the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB for Team Spirit '93. Several F-117s from the 416th Fighter Squadron at Holloman AFB, N.M., along with about 90 members of the 49th Fighter Wing, deployed to Korea for a chance to define their capabilities in a different area. U.S. and Republic of Korea forces stationed in Korea as well as other American forces deployed to the area participated in Team Spirit '93, which ends March 19. "Our pilots, maintenance crews and support personnel are receiving valuable experience working with the Kunsan team," said Lt. Col. Robert Marple, 49th FW deployment commander. With air refueling capability, the F-117 supports worldwide commitments and adds to the deterrent strength of the U.S. military forces. Team Spirit is a joint and combined training exercise designed to test the defensive capabilities of American and South Korean troops. This is the 17th Team Spirit exercise. The 1992 exercise was suspended in hopes of improving North and South Korean ties and reducing tensions on the peninsula. The first Team Spirit was conducted in 1976.

Kim Yong-Sam's Disastrous Presidency: On the national scene, President Kim Yong-Sam was elected in 1993 to serve a disastrous presidency filled with scandals, collapses of buildings and bridges with great loss of life, plane crashes, train wrecks, and every catastrophe imaginable. All that could be said of this presidency was that he threw the former Presidents Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo to the dogs to save his political party. They were convicted of accepting bribes and sent to jail. Right after they were sentenced, his son was sent to prison for extorting money from businesses.

Foreign Land Ownership: Prior to 1993, land ownership by veterans of the Korean War was possible, if they changed their name to Koreans and accepted Korean citizenship. In 1993, the law about government approval for ownership of land by foreigners was abolished in an attempt to attract foreign companies to the special trade zones. However, the restrictions and unattractive prices caused most foreign companies to post "not interested signs." They preferred to lease the land/buildings instead which to many was a wise move when they decided to pull out of Korean company mergers.At the individual level, many other restrictions for foreigners remained and only the wealthiest people in the upper 10 percent income of America could qualify for ownership. Essentially, nothing changed with Koreans still fearful that foreigners could somehow control Korea if they were allowed land ownership. Based upon Korea's history with foreign power domination, they may be justified.

Kunsan Downsizing and Attriting Korean Workers: At the base level, the base started to downsize its Korean staff through attrition. As they were retired, they were no fills. In addition, Korean civilian workers were being offered early retirement. The base manning was shrinking in size. The base facilities were being consolidated or closed. For example, the Class-six store, shoppette, Pacific Stars & Stripes book store were all incorporated into the BX.

However, this downsizing did not come without some angry protests from those being "retired." On August 7, 1993, twenty five Korean nationals demonstrated at the Kunsan Main Gate. According to the 8th Wing Historian, "The demonstrators penetrated onto the base before being escorted off the base." (NOTE: The "retirement system" for the local national workers is one whereby a pay differential is contributed to the paycheck of the employee every month. Therefore, when the worker retires, no further payments are given. More and more jobs are being converted from U.S. nationals to local nationals as "temporary" Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) positions to preclude retirement payments.)

F-16 Collision: Another incident was on 27 July 1993 when two 8th FW F-16s collided on the runway during heavy rainfall. One pilot ejected safely, while the other pilot received fatal injuries during the incident. According to F-16.net, on 27 Jul 1993 aircraft 86-0275 of 35th FS, F-16C Block 30D in poor weather, landed on top of F-16C (87-0335) which was trying to take off . The other aircraft was 87-0335 of 35th FS, F-16C Block 30J was preparing for take off when F-16C (86-0275) landed on top of it. Pilot Lt. Col. Ralph Earl "Bark" Gardner who had just arrived at Kunsan AB, Korea from MacDill AFB was killed. The 56th FW which was closing down had just enough aircraft to fly for his memorial.

Somalia Fiasco: On December 4, 1992 President George Bush announced he was sending up to 28,000 US troops to Somalia to help provide humanitarian relief in a strife-torn country where hundreds of thousands of people had died of starvation. Not quite a year later, shortly after a failed raid that took the lives of 18 American servicemen, President Bill Clinton announced an exit strategy for the United States.

In less than a year, the United States went from welcomed savior to embattled occupier. When the U.S. troops landed it was a media circus. The troops were photographed by CNN storming the beaches making them look like comical buffoons -- charging ashore fully armored for with little kids as the only "attackers." The mission to do the "morale" thing suddenly became nothing more than a Clinton photo opportunity shoot. But then things turned sour. The end result was eighteen soldiers killed and some of their bodies dragged through the streets. Despite military leaders pleas for action, President Clinton recalled the troops and sadly America's military was humiliated in the eyes of the world. This coverage was not lost on the young Koreans who watched -- America the invincible protector of Korea was not invincible. Korea needed to speed up on its plans to protect itself.

Peace Keeping Operations: Korea assembled a Peace-keeping Operations (PKO) at the request of the United Nations. The "Sangroksu" PKO unit (engineer battalion) was created to be dispatched to Somalia. This reflected the changed view of Koreans in how they view themselves as part of the global order. The withdrawal of the PKO engineer battalion was completed in 1994.

North Korea Peace Regime: In a surprise move by Kim Il-Sung in 1993, North Korea called for a "new peace regime" to replace the armistice. At this time, North Korea had been backed against a wall in dire economic straits. It desperately needed the financial and food aid from outside.

However, North Korea is famed for brinksmanship and most Koreans saw the "new peace regime" offer as a ploy to open negotiations. It was the carrot that the North could snatch away as it had done so often in the past. The Korean editorials started taking a hard look at the implications of the two Koreas uniting. The conclusions were that South Korea could NOT afford to combine with North Korea.

It was published in the newspapers that a phased time-table was discussed whereby the South and North would retain their own governments for ten-years if they should "combine" into a "Peace Regime." Suddenly all the past rhetoric from student radicals that America's presence was all that was standing in the way of the Korean reunification died. It has not been heard since. The reality of the situation started to sink in that South Korea was not like Germany in its reunification. This reunification would be far more expensive. Also learning from Germany's sad experiences of having to renege on many of its initial promises, South Korea started looking at reunification in another light.

ROK Military Undergoes Major Changes: Following all the new systems that were entering the ROK Armed Forces, new organization and major policy changes were required. The ROK service system of reserve forces was revised from the age limit system to the period system: the mobilization training period and time were reduced; the standby replacement system was abolished; the recruitment of standby reserves and public service personnel were newly established. Upgrading the military hardware continued with the ROK and Germany concluding an agreement on enhancing defense and military exchanges. The ROK and the Philippines concluded an MOU on logistics and defense industry cooperation.

1994:

Wing Commander: Colonel Hugh C. Cameron (later Brigadier General) (July 1994 - March 1995)

F-16 Crash: The following is from a list at F-16C/D Fighting Falcon Serials. The list's information is as follows: aircraft 87-0274 5C-535, F-16C-30, Crashed 06 May 94 (8th FW). According to F-16.net, on 6 May 1994 aircraft 87-0274 of the 80th FS, F-16C Block 30H, collided in mid-air over the Yellow Sea with an F-15C (78-0530) of the 67th FS which was 2 miles off Boryong, South Korea. The resulting crash killed the pilot, Captain John Kindred. The F-15 pilot ejected safely.

Patriots Arrive at Kunsan: On 15 April 1994, an advanced echelon of the 6th CAV 143rd ADA (Air Defense Artillery) for deploying Patriot missile forces arrived at Kunsan AB in response to increasing political tensions on the peninsula. The remainder of the unit would arrive in 1995. (Go to Patriot Missile Battery for more information on the unit.) Kunsan, which was previously outside of the effective range for the Scuds B/C, was now within the striking range of the Rodong-1 (No Dong 1) missiles. This single-staged liquid fuel missile can fire a 450-pound warhead up to 620 miles, although it has never been fired more than 310 miles. The Rodong 1 was test-launched in 1993 and entered service in 1994.

---

Tops in Blue play
from backstage at Kunsan (Christmas 1994)
(From Tops in Blue)
Click on photo to enlarge

---

8th Medical Group: On 30 September 1994, the 8th Medical Group was redesignated as the Headquarters, 8th Medical Group and activated the 8th Medical Operations Squadron and the 8th Medical Support Squadron .

Ambulance Parking	Emergency Room (Bldg 405)
Hospital Lab	Hospital Marketing Area

Kunsan AB Hospital (2000)
Click on photo to enlarge
(U.S. Air Force Photo)

These 1998 pictures of the 8th Medical Group facilities below were excerpted from the home page of Jeff Gatton's Homepage . Though not having anything to do with Kunsan AB, the site has some great shots of Wolmyong Park in Kunsan City.

Hospital Rooftop view (1998)

Hospital Rooftop view (1998)

Like in the Korean War days, Kunsan is viewed as a "rear support area" that is "safe" from the initial onslaught of the North Koreans. For this reason, the 3rd Medical Group of the 3rd Bomb Wing -- situated in the same location as the current hospital -- was large and well-equipped. In 1994, the 8th Medical Group received the first frozen blood equipment in PACAF giving the area access to blood that can be stored for as long as 21 years.

KUNSAN AB, Korea (AFNS) -- People stationed in Korea may get their share of frozen foods, but now thanks to a new medical program there's a frozen product on the peninsula which could save their lives. The new program -- the first frozen blood product depot in PACAF -- made its debut at the 8th Medical Group here, with the arrival of 260 units of frozen, red blood cells Oct. 28. The depot is designed to ensure blood would be available to support medical needs in case of a contingency on the peninsula, according to TSgt. Paul T. MacDonald, NCO in charge of the frozen blood program. Liquid blood units only have a 35-day shelf life and the red blood cells lose their ability to carry oxygen after that time and begin to die, MacDonald said. The frozen blood products offer a viable alternative. Frozen red blood cells are preserved with an antifreeze-type solution, and then stored at minus 85 C (approximately minus 121 F) until the blood is needed. This process ensures the products can be used for up to 21 years, said MacDonald. The extended shelf- life will be a positive asset if a war begins in Korea. "During the initial surge of a contingency when blood requirements are high and the supply is scarce, we can rely on the stockpile of frozen blood products to meet medical requirements," said MacDonald. The frozen products are not a replacement for liquid units, he added. The depot is there to provide basic blood requirements until the liquid pipeline is fully operational and airlift can bring in the pallets of liquid blood units. The pipeline -- units of blood donated by servicemembers -- are the backbone of the Armed Services Blood Program and its support of U.S. fighting forces, MacDonald added. Though the program is in its early stages, eventually PACAF will have the largest frozen blood product depot in the world, he said. Along with Kunsan, depots will be operated and manned at Osan AB, Kimhae AB, Camp Carroll and Camp Humphries, Korea; Yokota AB and Misawa AB, Japan; and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. Kunsan will store more than 1,200 units of frozen red cells and, depending on the scenario, may be able to supply other medical assets with the units. Future plans go one step further than the depot program, added MacDonald. "The ultimate goal of the Armed Services Blood Program is to have each person donate their own red cells, which would be freeze-dried. Then, during a contingency you would carry two packets of this product with you, along with two canteens of purified water. In case of an emergency, a medic could mix the packets and the water and you'd have a ready-made supply of your own blood, which could be easily infused," he said. The Kunsan depot will receive additional shipments of the frozen blood products in the coming months until it has approximately 780 units stockpiled. (Courtesy PACAF News Service)

"White Badge" Korean Movie Hit: A Korean award-winning movie about the Vietnam War experience by 300,000 Korean soldiers was released for the first time in the U.S. The movie is about the famed "White Horse" regiment's experiences as seen through the eyes of a writer who instead of experiencing a catharsis from his writing -- finds it turns into a nightmare with flashbacks of his experiences. The movie revealed the deep-seated anger over the sending of Korean troops to fight in a war which they had no stake -- and ended up with the Koreans just as disillusioned as the Americans about the war. The Koreans were "blackmailed" into sending troops when the U.S. threatened to pull out its troops from Korea to support Vietnam...and cut off aid to the dictatorship of Park Chung-Hee. The movie supported the anti-American feelings espoused by many Korean college students -- and fueled the sporadic protests at the base.

L.A. Times article on "White Badge"
(Click on photo to enlarge)
(Courtesy Gary L. Travis)

Major ROK Military Changes: In August 1994, the ROK and the US agreed that the US 7th Fleet would belong to the United Nations Command (UNC) in a state of war on the peninsula. What was significant was that in Dec 1994, the ROK Armed Forces took over peacetime operational command authority from the United Nations Forces. In other words, the ROK now controlled the complete defense of the DMZ and assumed control of its peacetime protection. It would only be during an invasion by North Korea that the USFK -- as the appointed head of the UN forces -- could exert any authority over ROK Armed forces.

This meant that they were open to discussion with their neighbors on territorial disputes such as Tokdo Island with Japan and the fishing grounds off Cheju Island with China. It continued its negotiations with its neighbors, but it appeared to most that they were unprepared and did not get the best of the negotiations.

Peace Keeping Operations: The ROK now started to expand its vision as a member of the world community. It's "globalization" efforts in the early 1990s had prepared its people to accept this new world vision for itself. In Sept 1994, the ROK Medical Care Support Group was sent to the Western Sahara. PKO troops were dispatched to Georgia as military observers. The PKO military observers were sent to India and Pakistan.

POW Released (March 1994): Former 2LT Cho Chang-ho, who had been a POW in North Korea since the Korean War, escaped from North Korea and returned to the ROK via China. Held a prisoner in a coal mine, he left a family behind in North Korea. He described his life as a "living nightmare" and stated that there were many other POWs who had not been repatriated. At the end of the war, the North had stated that all POWs had been repatriated...which is now known to be a lie. He was formally discharged from the military and received his pension. (For more information on Korean War POWs go to POW Issues.)

The following was excerpted from POW News (July 95).

Department of Defense
POW/MIA Bulletin
American Debriefing Report of Former South Korean POW,
Lieutenant Cho Chang-Ho

On February 14, 1995, U.S. officials debriefed retired 1Lt. Cho Chang-Ho, a former Korean War POW who escaped from North Korea to South Korea in March 1994. During the debriefing, Cho confirmed earlier reports that he did not observe any American POWs after following his initial month of captivity in late May, mid-June 1952. However, Lt. Cho did report he had heard from South Korean POWs in late 1952 that there were large numbers of American POWs being held at various wartime POW camps.

Other significant comments from Lt. Cho concerned the location of POW burial sites. He stated that several POWs were buried at the foot of an unnamed mountain.

This burial took place while South Korean and American POWs were marching away from the front lines to the rear POW camps.

Lt. Cho was captured alone by Chinese Army troops on May 18, 1951, In Hyon-ni, Inju-gun, Kangwon-do (east coast of South Korea).

A week later, he was turned over to the North Korean Army's Fifth Corps headquarters at Changansa (a Buddhist monastery) in Kumgang-san, Kangwon-do(north of the DMZ on the east coast). When he arrived at Changansa, Lt. Cho observed approximately 700-800 South Korean Army POWs and approximately 70-80 American POWs at the Fifth Corps headquarters. Lt. Cho, who knew that the U.S. Army's 7th Division was deployed in that area, surmised that the U.S. POWs were members of the 7th Division. They were young, approximately one-third were black.

Later, all of these South Korean and American POWs were moved on foot from Changansa to Sinan, Kangwon-do (30-40 miles from Changansa).

En-route to Sinan, Lt. Cho observed several American POWs who died after suffering from malnutrition and diarrhea caused by eating raw corn.

Fellow prisoners buried them at the foot of an unnamed mountain in shallow graves approximately one meter deep, and placed a piece of straw mat over the bodies, and covered them with soil.

After arriving at Sinan, the American POWs were separated from the South Koreans and taken by truck to an unknown destination. South Korean and American POWs were not permitted to talk to each other. Lt. Cho did not observe any American POWs other than those mentioned above. In the summer of 1951, still at Sinan, Lt. Cho was debriefed at military reception centers in Moranbong-guyok, Pyongyand and in Kaesong.

In May 1952, he attempted to escape but was captured and sent to a prison in Wonsan. Later, Lt. Cho was moved to different prisons in Hoechang, Tokchon and Manpo.

In late 1952, while he was at the Manpo prison, many South Korean POWs were sent there from different POW camps to serve prison terms because they were North Koreans who served in the South Korean Army. At that time, Lt. Cho heard from South Korean POWs that there were large POW camps controlled by the Chinese in Usi, Ch'olma, Pyoktong, and Ch'olsan, all located in P'yongan-pukto.

He also heard from South Korean POWs that there was a large number of U.S. POWs, together with South Korean POWs.

Kim Il-Sung (1912-1994): Kim Il-Sung, North Korea's leader, died suddenly in July 1994. In the midst of a nuclear crisis, that took former President Jimmy Carter's intervention to defuse, the charismatic leader's death left the whole area on pins-and-needles as to what would happen next. Rumors were running rampant. Kim Il-Sung's heir apparent did not take over the reins of government immediately and there were reports that there were cabinet reshuffles in the positions of power. North Korean army maneuvers increasing on the DMZ -- including incursions into the DMZ itself -- caused the South Korean Army to go on increased alert.

The following is excerpted from Infoseek:

Kim Il Sung , 1912-94, North Korean political leader, chief of state of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1948-94); originally named Kim Sung Chu. While fighting Japanese occupation forces in the 1930s, he adopted the name Kim Il Sung after a famous Korean guerrilla leader of the early 20th cent. He was trained in Moscow before World War II, and in 1945 he became chairman of the Soviet-sponsored People's Committee of North Korea (later the Korean Workers' party). In 1948, when the People's Republic was established, he became its first premier. Between 1950 and 1953 he led his nation in the Korean War. In 1972 he relinquished the premiership but retained his position as North Korea's leader by assuming the presidency under a revised constitution. Under his rule, North Korea increased its military forces, embarked on a program of industrialization, and maintained close relations with both China and the Soviet Union. His son, Kim Jong Il. [kim jông il] , 1942-, was groomed as his successor. Active in the Korean Workers' party leadership since 1964, Kim Jong Il became secretary of its central committee in 1973. In 1991 he was appointed supreme commander of the armed forces. Upon his father's death, Kim Jong Il took over leadership of the country. He was named secretary of the Communist party in 1997 and consolidated his power with the title of National Defense Commission chairman in 1998.

(NOTE: Kim Il-Sung constantly revised his "biography" and though he was only a Captain with the Korean forces in the Soviet Army stationed away from the fighting of the Japanese, he built up his myth through his official biographies. In the fifth and last biography, Kim Jong-Il was born in a log cabin on Paekdu Mountain -- a sacred place to Koreans -- while Kim Il-Sung, the glorious Freedom Fighter, was hiding from the Japanese. Nice touch but a complete fabrication. To add reality to the myth, a tourist "replica" of the house that Kim Il-Sung hid in (and Kim-Jong-Il was born in) on Paekdu Mountain has been "reconstructed." Combining religious and mystical symbology, Kim Jong-Il was supposedly born beneath two rainbows and a bright, previously undiscovered star. Kim Jong Il was actually born in Siberia in 1941 (or 42), but like his father, he has sought to embellish his image. He is reputed to have written hundreds of books, all epic masterpieces, and six operas in the course of two years.)

North-South Economic Ties: The two Koreas have begun to develop economic ties. Following a 1988 decision by the South Korean Government to allow trade with the D.P.R.K. (see, under Foreign Relations, Reunification Efforts Since 1971), South Korean firms began to import North Korean goods. Direct trade with the South began in the fall of 1990 after the unprecedented September 1990 meeting of the two Korean Prime Ministers. Trade between the countries increased from $18.8 million in 1989 to $174 million in 1992.

During this period, the chairman of the South Korean company Daewoo--Kim Woo Choong--visited the North, and an agreement was created to build a light industrial complex at Nampo. In other negotiations, there were discussions to develop tourism and build road and rail links in Korea. Economic contacts continued to develop until the spring of 1993, when North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT slowed the expansion of North-South economic cooperation.

South Korean President Kim Young Sam prohibited substantial direct investment in the North until the nuclear issue was resolved, although inter-Korean trade continued, with South Korea becoming one of the D.P.R.K.'s largest trading partners. With the signing of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. agreed framework on October 21, 1994, President Kim announced he would again allow discussions for investments.

1995:

Major General Sklute visits Kunsan AB:
Big Coyote demonstration of M-60 and Stinger

Cope Thunder (July) The exercise featured ANG, USAF, Navy, and Canadian aircraft -- and F-16s from the 8th FW. This exercise included a variety of aircraft and units from USAF, the Marines, Navy, Army, and Royal Air Force. The Cope Thunder established a first when members of the Japan Self-Defense Force trained alongside USAF Security Police forces in the use of the FIM-92A Stinger antiaircraft missile system. Back at Kunsan the Marine F/A-18Ds of the VMFA(AW)-121 did "back-fill" duty by providing coverage while the F-16s were deployed.

Loring Club: In January 1995, the PACAF commander approved a request to name the new Collocated Club after Medal of Honor recipient Major Charles J. Loring, Jr.

Major Loring received the Medal of Honor for his actions on 22 November 1952 while a member of the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing of Suwon AB, Korea. Major Charles Loring of the 80th FBS who sacrificed his life in action on 22 November 1952. While leading a flight of 4 F-80s on a close support mission, his aircraft was hit. At approximately 4,000 feet, he deliberately altered his course and aimed his diving aircraft at active gun emplacements concentrated on a ridge northwest of the briefed target, turned his aircraft 45 degrees to the left, pulled up in a deliberate, controlled maneuver, and elected to sacrifice his life by diving his aircraft directly into the midst of the enemy emplacements. He received the Medal of Honor for his actions. In ceremonies at the White House on May 5, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented the Medal of Honor to Loring's widow. On October 1, 1954, the former Limestone AFB, located in Limestone, Maine, was renamed Loring AFB in the Maine native's honor. (Go to the 80th Fighter Squadron for the citation. For more information on Major Loring go to 8th Fighter Bomber Wing.)

Though it was understandable that the base would want to honor "one of its own," it seemed strange that the 8th Fighter Wing selectively chose to "forget" about the Medal of Honor winner who earned the medal while flying from Kunsan AB. Capt. John S. Walmsley of the 8th Bomb Squadron, 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) earned the Medal of Honor for actions while flying from Kunsan AB (K-8) on 12 Sept 1951. We feel, the base has remained silent about this MOH winner as the lineal descendant of his unit is the 3rd FW of Elmendorf. We do not feel this is a sign of disrespect on the part of the 8th FW, but rather that the 8th FW's historical agenda deals with the wing, NOT the base. For more information on Capt. Walmsley go to 8th Bomb Squadron.

Capt. John Walmsley
Medal of Honor Winner
3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI),
Kunsan AB, Korea

Later on the Anniversary of the Korean War, the 8th Attack Squadron Association presented a plaque to the base to honor Capt. Walmsley. The plaque was presented by the Commander of the ROKAF 38th Fighter Group on behalf of the organization to the 8th FW Commander. The Services Squadron Commander at the time promised that it was to be placed in "a prominent spot" in the Loring Club. However, after the presentation, the plaque was never seen again...disappearing into a trophy case somewhere in places unknown. Capt. Walmsley is honored -- along with all the other MOH winners of the nation -- on a brass plaque in Kunsan's POW/MIA square. Capt. Walmsley remains one amongst many who gave their all.

MOH Plaque and POW/MIA Park
(Click on photo to enlarge)
(Christopher Shroyer)

Because of the ever reducing size of the population, the "All-ranks" club concept was undertaken. From the front, there are two entrances. The right is the Officers Mess and the left the NCO/Airmen Club. The Officer's mess has a pleasant dining room that overlooks the golf course. Between the two messes, there is the Cashiers cage, Manager's office and the Slot Machine Room. The NCO Club has a main club and bar.

The slot machine operations continued to provide a hefty amount of the revenues for the club's operations. In the past, the Officers club had always operated in the red and relied on the NCO club revenues from the Seabreeze Club to support it. However, with the decreasing enlisted population, the club system was hard pressed to make ends meet. Then the O-club kitchen in the BOQ area burned up and they decided not to rebuild. The Seabreeze Club became an all-ranks operation, but officers never drank at the club and only attended social events there.

The only real money maker was the slot machines in the Seabreeze Club -- which all commanders turned a blind-eye to as the place was always filled with Korean nationals -- especially on paydays. To eliminate this violation, the slot machines in the Loring Club was restricted to dependents and Club members, while the Yellow Sea Lanes (Bowling Alley) and the Oriental House (a restaurant that was known as the Officer's Club Annex) continued their open operations. In these places, the Korean nationals could congregate without entering the Loring Club in violation of regulations. Everyone was happy -- the Club made a lot of money, the Club operations was able to afford many frills it could not otherwise afford, and the Korean nationals (mostly on-base employees or contractors) were happy as they could gamble at a place where the win-ratio was about 200 percent higher than downtown. Everyone won -- but the "blind-eye" was always turned to the operations.

As the rank restrictions still prevented the lower enlisted personnel from owning cars, mountain bikes became both a practical means of transportation, as well as a recreational activity. It was -- and is -- common to see groups of bikers from Kunsan everywhere on the weekends. SSgt John "JC" Berlan wrote, "Only thing I can say is that I had a good time mountain biking around was probably the best part of the tour. Other than that catching the cattle car back home." However, the riding of the bikes in the three-mile exclusionary zone around the base was limited to the hours of daylight.

Ramifications of Death of Kim Il-Sung: Kim Il-Sung, North Korea's leader since 1948, died suddenly in July 1994. His son and heir apparent, Kim Jong-Il, stepped into the political limelight, but in the secretive North Korean politics reports of shakeups were heard adding to the tension. It would be almost three years before Kim-Jong-Il had consolidated enough power to be proclaimed "Great Leader" and take over the reins of government.

The following is excerpted from Korea Watch.

(NOTE: This report is the Pro-South Korean viewpoint. This probably has more than you really want to know about the Korean perspective of the North Korean hierarchy and potential for conflict...but, it is very interesting information from a historical standpoint. After Kim Il-Sung died suddenly in July 1994 -- and his son, the purported playboy with head injuries, Kim Jong-Il took over, but refused accept any of the honorific titles except Chairman of Defense. Rumors were running rampant. The North's refusal to comply with inspection of the nuclear sites had President Clinton considering making North Korea a smoking hole. Kim Young-sam's government was falling apart with disaster after disaster and fiascos and scandals everywhere. The whole Korean scene was one of chaos.)

The U.S. and the Republic of Korea on April 8, 1995, took major confidence-building measures in order to pacify the North Korean (DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Government in Pyongyang. Despite the harsh position of the DPRK in previous negotiations, Washington agreed to resume contacts on April 12. In order to reassure the DPRK of the safety of the South Korean nuclear reactor technology promised by the US to the DPRK, Seoul announced that the ROK was willing to admit North Korean experts to its nuclear power reactor, a standard-model light-water reactors at the nuclear power plant city, Ulchin.

Instead, the DPRK embarked on a series of moves which strongly suggest that Pyongyang was more interested in the escalation of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, than its resolution. By the end of April, US-DPRK negotiations were virtually collapsed, but already on April 8, in response to the South Korean offer, Pyongyang formally declared: "South Korea will never be allowed to play a 'pivotal role' in the provision of the lightwater reactors and the scheme to provide South Korean-model light-water reactors will eventually go bankrupt." Pyongyang stressed that the reactor issue was a profound political and strategic issue aimed at consolidating US- DPRK relations. "The DPRK has never invited South Korea to take part in the delivery of the light-water reactors nor expected it to play a 'role,'" Pyongyang asserted. "The South Korean puppets have no justification nor qualification to poke their nose into the DPRK-US negotiations."

Moreover, in order to increase pressure, Pyongyang formally notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, a United Nations agency) that it "was preparing to refuel a five- megawatt reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex." IAEA Director-General Hans Blix acknowledged that the DPRK had the right to do so considering that the implementation of the October 1994 agreement was off schedule. This political rhetoric and brinkmanship would have been just that, had Kim Jong-II not led the DPRK through profound military reforms which significantly enhance his ability to instigate crisis and even war.

Even as he is avoiding the formal assumption of the leadership titles, Kim Jong-II is rapidly implementing drastic reforms in the DPRK. Most important is the recent completion of the streamlining and modernisation of the High Command of the KPA (Korean People's Army) at the national-strategic level. As presently organised, the KPA High Command is better organised to go into action on the basis of the whims of Kim Jong-Il, with special emphasis put on special operations, covert actions, and international terrorism. Although these reforms have been gradually evolving since mid-1993, in the aftermath of the "Semi-War State'; it took a dramatic event to bring about their completion.

On February 25, 1995, O Chin-U -- the last of the genuinely powerful leaders of Kim Il-Song's generation -- died after a long struggle with cancer. Marshal O Chin-U was much more than Minister of Defence as well as senior member in a host of key defence and political bodies: he was the only man Kim Il-Song truly and wholly trusted since the early 1980s. Indeed, O Chin-U was trusted and revered by Kim Jong-II, who considered him as a father-like figure, an extremely important relationship in a society that places special emphasis on old age and wisdom. Indeed, on February 24, when it was dear that O Chin-U had only a few hours left, Kim Jong-Il paid him a farewell visit at his bedside. This visit was more than a clear expression of the unique place of O Chin-U in Pyongyang. Kim Jongo Il spent several hours with the dying O Chin-U. Reportedly, he emerged from the hospital with expressions of deep sadness on his face, and visible signs of crying. Significantly, it was not only O Chin-U who remained in power even as he was dying from cancer, but with him remained the entire institutions from which he was deriving political power.

Thus, with the death of Marshal O Chin-U -- "the most faithful revolutionary warrior of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-Song" (according to the obituary) -- the last impediment for the transformation of the KPA into Kim Jong-Il's military was removed. It is obvious that preparations for this day had long been in the works, for within a couple of weeks a new streamlined High Command -- befitting Kim Jong-II's personality -- emerged with many younger generals in prominent positions.

THE SIGNIFICANCE and potential ramifications of the new military reforms in Pyongyang must be assessed in the context of the personality and government style of Kim Jong-Il. Taking into considerations the peculiarities of his personality, the reason for these reforms becomes clear.

The Kim Jong-Il in power in Pyongyang is an individual who has been groomed and prepared to assume power for several decades, but whose personality has been altered since suffering brain damage in 1993. Kim Jong-Il suffered some brain damage in September 1993 in a traffic accident, when he crashed his car while speeding and probably drunk.

According to Chinese military medical experts, including senior brain surgeons, Kim Jong-Il even suffered damage to the skull bones in this car crash. These injuries came on top of a severe head injury which Kim Jong-Il suffered around June 1993 as a result of falling off a horse. Western medical experts suggest that such a succession of blows to the brain may result in dropping of brain cells, early atrophy, or even some shrinking of the brain. Such a condition leads to mood swings in the affected individual. A very unstable individual will display a greater tendency to lose his temper. With time, the impairment may grow further, but the individual will not notice the change. This danger is more acute especially if the affected individual is surrounded by sycophants.

Thus, the individual in question can act irrationally, primarily if there is no external restraint on him. Most important, individuals so affected tend to lose sense of continuity. They tend to concentrate on immediate actions in order to deliver immediate gratification. They gradually lose any sense of consequence or anticipation of results of one's actions.

These injuries are not known to have affected the overall routine performance of Kim Jong-Il as either a leader in the waiting, let alone as the de facto supreme leader. Indeed, since the early 1990s, Kim Jong-I1 has been maintaining his usual daily schedule. He is working until very late at night, usually the pre-dawn hours, and then sleeps late. During the day he makes frequent breaks in the work schedule in order to receive "special treatment and enjoyment" from a "pleasure-giving team" under dose and specific medical supervision. He also continues to watch foreign movies specially imported from the West for himself and close colleagues.

Most important are the many late night sessions in which Kim Jong- Il and a few of his most trusted loyalists debate key issues while enjoying the company of pretty women. Well-informed Japanese sources believe that the question of initiating a war with South Korea has been raised in these sessions during 1993-94. The discussion between Kim Jong-II and his confidantes reached the point of contemplating specific scenarios for provoking a major military clash with the South all the way to launching a surprise attack and a major regional war.

Moreover, since he assumed responsibilities for defence and foreign affairs in the early 1990s, Kim Jong-Il has developed a unique "reception-centre political style" -- similar to an informal kitchen cabinet -- made up of a few loyalists and confidantes whom he trusts most. It is noteworthy that these include mainly technocrats, experts, military people, scientists, and other professionals whose expertise can support state affairs. Kim Jong-Il clearly values their expertise and knowledge. Their late night discussion sessions are reportedly conducted in a relatively relaxed environment which promotes the free exchange of opinions.

Ultimately, Kim Jong-Il is being portrayed as being far less troubled by formalities than his father, a more open personality, who is preoccupied with substance. He does have political ability and was properly groomed for decision-making and crisis management. However, at the same time, these loyalists continue to display flattery in their relations with Kim Jong-Il.

In view of Kim Jong- Il's mental condition, and the sensitivity to lack of external restraint, the question remains how free, how objective, and how effective these sessions are. Furthermore, there remains the question of Kim Jong-Il's own decisionmaking capabilities, and especially the possibility of a growing tendency to take bold gambles for immediate effect, even though such steps may unleash a crisis and war.

IN MARCH 1995, the DPRK's Ministry of the Armed Forces was formally downgraded from an organisation of the National Defence Commission, chaired by Kim Jong-Il, to an agency of the State Administration Council. For as long as Kim Jong-Il-Song was alive but Kim Jong-Il was actually in power, the Defence Ministry was listed under the National Defence Commission chaired by Kim Jong-Il who was answering directly to Kim II-Song.

Now that Kim Jong-Il is in firm control of the party, military and Government, there is no longer any need for the DPRK to have such an extraordinary committee manned by the older guard, mainly O Chin-U's people. Thus, in March, Pyongyang reshaped the military bureaucracy to fit Kim Jong-Il's cementing his grip on the vitally important armed forces. What is very important is the technical change in the military structure, which does not mean a change in the importance or role of the military. It amounts to Kirn Jong-Il's assuming unchallengeable control over the KPA. This is a reflection of his growing confidence in the running of the country. Indeed, the new High Command is a small group of senior officers, all of them younger, answering directly to Kim Jong-Il as a kind of a Soviet Stavka, a wartime high command that cuts through all institutional constraints. Consequently, the military assumes responsibility to additional segments and aspects of the nation's economy and other functions.

Indeed, there has been an increase in the prestige and centrality of the KPA elite, as demonstrated in the recent KPA conferences. Moreover, there is a streamlining in the military chain of command, enabling Kim Jong-Il to get results quickly.

ESSENTIALLY, since Kim Jong-Il was largely dominating the personnel system of the military since 1973 via the "three revolution teams", his loyalists have already grown inside the system. Therefore, there has been a smooth transition from one generation of senior officers to the other. Since Kim Jong-Il has controlled the military for a long time, there will not be drastic changes in doctrine or basic military concepts. The only major development since the death of O Chin-U is the clear expression of loyalty to Kim Jong-Il and the younger generation of the High Command.

Ultimately, Kim Jong-Il relies on technocrats who are personally loyal to him, and whom he knows and trusts professionally and politically. Of the 1,200 generaIs in the KPA, only 60 really have power. All of them are very dose to and personally loyal to Kim Jong- Il. Most, but not all, of them are younger.

At the very top of the military and intelligence/special operations establishment there is the "Troika" of the people most loyal to, and trusted by, Kim Jong-II: Generals O Kuk-Yol, Kim Tu-Nam, and Kim Kang-Hwan. Marshal Choe Kwang is also trusted fully, but not like the "Troika".

* General O Kuk-Yol (64) is the military confidant and right hand man of Kim Jong-Il. A highly educated former Chief of the General Staff, he is considered a leading expert in modern warfare and nuclear weapons. In mid-1993, O Kuk-Yol emerged as one of DPRK's most senior intelligence functionaries -- the Director of the Operations Department -- a most important intelligence arm. Under O Kuk-Yol, the North Korean intelligence system has undergone major changes which significantly increased its capabilities to operate in and against South Korea, conducting a host of activities ranging from data collection to widespread special operations and covert warfare.

* General Kim Tu-Nam (67) is "the military professor" of Kim Jong- Il, his special military tutor who prepared him for leadership and the High Command. Kim Tu-Nam developed a "special relationship" with his student. Subsequently Kim Tu-Nam carried out special projects on the behest of Kim Jong-Il. Most recently, Kim Tu-Nam was responsible for the modernisation of the irregular forces and the light infantry (special forces).

* Col.-Gen. Kim Kang-Hwan (63) is an aide and confidante of Kim Tu-Nam who worked with him when he was Kim Jong-Il's tutor. As deputy chief of the general staff, Kim Kang-Hwan took over many tasks from Kim Tu-Nam, especially the development of strategy and operational plans including the use of the intelligence and special forces in a host of possible contingencies ranging from covert actions to a major war. The overall character of the "Troika" of Kim Jong-II -- his closest confidants and senior commanders -- is that they really believe in the practice of special operations, international terrorism, covert operations, and other forms of "dirty war".

* The KPA Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Choe Kwang (77), is a rising political-military force in the DPRK. In 1988, Choe Kwang, a Kim Il-Song devotee, was suddenly promoted and nominated Chief of the General Staff. While in office, Choe Kwang proved himself as "a key supporter of Kim Jong-Il" all the way to the reorganisation of the DPRK's national military elite. Choe Kwang is known as "a believer in weapons" and "an expert on modern warfare". He is often described as "a man absolutely fixated on weapons and as such is a specialist with a keen understanding of modern warfare". Choe Kwang was the motivating force behind the DPRK's acquisition and production of new weapons. Kim Jong-Il respects Choe Kwang not just because of his devotion and loyalty, but because of his close relations with Kim Il-Song and O Chin-U. This special reverence was demonstrated during the funeral of O Chin-U. Although Kim Jong-Il was present in the funeral, Marshal Choe Kwang delivered the main eulogy speech. On the basis of his performance in O Chin-U's funeral and the KPA conferences of mid- March, Choe Kwang emerges as the likely successor to O Chin-U as the Minister of Defence.

The other key defence officials around Kim Jong-II -- those taking part in his "reception-centre political style" as needed -- are:

* Vice Marshal Kim Kwang-Chin (68) enjoys "the highest confidence of Kim Jong-Il". He is an artillery and rocket expert, distinguished in cooperation with the PRC on the development of the supergun and with the USSR on the development of the heavy MRBM with CBW warheads. The initial deployment of both projects was completed successfully in the Autumn of 1994.

* Kim Chol-Su (50 or 51) is an intelligence/special forces/terrorism senior official. Officially he belongs to the General Security Bureau -- Kim Jong-II's body guards -- but that force also carries out highly sensitive covert operations on Kim Jong-Il's behalf. His sudden and meteoric rise, as with the elevation of O Kuk-Yol in the intelligence and special forces, is an expression of Kirn Jong-Il's penchant for the "dirty war". Irrespective of the precise definition of his position, he holds a very important and sensitive position in the military/security forces. Kim Chol-Su is reported to be the eldest son of Kim Yong-Chu, Kim Il-Song's brother and presently a vice president of the DPRK. * General Yi Pong-Won (70) is a military ideological expert, and a candidate for director of General Political Bureau.

* General Cho Myong-Nok (65) is the commander of the Air Force and an expert on modern warfare. He is also instrumental in the strategic cooperation with Iran, as well as the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. * General Kim Il-Chol (67) is the commander of the Navy and expert on submarines and cruise missiles. He started his distinguished career as the commander of the seizure of the USS Pueblo. * Chon Pyong-Ho (69) is not a military man but an expert in national economy, mobilisation and production. The force behind the DPRK's war economy, he is responsible for the marked expansion of the munitions and military industries.

* General Yi Ha-Il (65) is the director of the Party's Military Department and enjoys the confidence of Kim Jong-Il, as well as that of the younger military leaders. He was instrumental in establishing the Kim Jong-Il personality cult system in the military. A former commander of a Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Brigade, he was promoted by Kim Jong-Il by several ranks.

* General Chang Song-U (67) is the director of Political Department of the Ministry of Public Security. He is Kim Jong-Il's loyalist and confidante in the ranks of the internal security apparatus. He also rose in the ranks of the intelligence and special forces.

* Kim Ha-Kyu (50s) is a kind of military aide to Kim Jong-Il who was noted escorting him during visits to military units.

Other rising stars who are yet to enjoy the same trust the senior officers above do include: O Yong-Bang, Kim Pong-Yul, Kim Myong-Kuk, Pak Chae-Kyong, Kim Chong-Kak, Yong Ho-Kyun, Yi Ul-Sol, and Kim Ha- Kyu. The only public appearance of the DPRK High Command was at the KPA conference in mid-March. There, the key senior officers on the rostrum were Marshal Choe Kwang, Vice Marshals Kim Kwang-Chin and Kim Pong-Yul, Generals Yi Ha-Il, Cho Myong-Nok, Kim Il-Chol, Pak Ki-So, Yi Pong-Won, Kim Myong-Kuk, and Col.-Gen. Pak Chae-Kyong. These senior officers are believed to be "the rising stars" of the KPA and confidants of Kim Jong-Il. They seem to have operational control, for they escorted Kim Jong-Il on some of his l0 visits to frontline units in early 1995.

THE DPRK LEAVES no doubt that it has resumed the active preparations for war. Since last Winter, the DPRK has been conducting the largest and most vigorous military exercises in recent years. These exercises are purely offensive, and demonstrated impressive capabilities to conduct swift deep offensive (blitzkrieg). These exercises began in December 1994 and were peaking toward March 1995 as the weather was improving. In mid-March, the exercises not only accelerated, but assumed a distinct Kim Jong-Il character.

The KPA Air Force embarked on a major war exercise, the largest since 1991. It was purely offensive in character. Most important were deep air strikes by fighter bombers, low-altitude night deep penetration by light aircraft (mainly An-2s delivering special forces), day and night mass para-drops and desant landings, as well as diversified deep bombing and aerial strikes missions. The aerial operations coincided with the wrapping up of a series of intense and rigorous special forces and naval exercises. At the same time, there was a sudden expansion and escalation of the brigade-level combined arms exercises, mainly combined arms deep offensive in terrain similar to South Korea.

It is ironic, but these exercises were largely made possible by the US delivery of oil in accordance with the October 1994 Geneva Agreement. Consequently, the DPRK could release large quantities of oil from its strategic military reserves to these exercises. Indeed, there is yet to be a discernible improvement in the availability of electricity to the North Korean civilian population for whom this US- supplied oil is intended.

Meanwhile, in recent months there has been an overall marked and discernible improvement in the non-nuclear capabilities of the DPRK Armed Forces. Among the main developments are the activation of a dozen or so ballistic missile bases, the deployment of over 20 "superguns" and some 40 heavy multiple-barrel rocket sites. Most of these long range artillery systems are aimed at the Seoul area. Moreover, in late March, the DPRK fired several up-graded anti-ship cruise missiles -- a Silkworm follow-up with a range of around 85km -- into the Sea of Japan. Japanese officials suggested that these missiles "were fired as part of a routine practice", even though the DPRK had not carried out missile launches of such magnitude since mid- 1993.

BY MID-MARCH, the KPA High Command began implementing Kim Jong-II's reforms and guidelines. On March 13, 1995, the KPA High Command had a milestone conference. Officially, the meeting was in commemoration of the 20th anniversary and the fifth anniversary of training programmes introduced by Kim Jong-Il. In reality, it was a milestone conference aimed at briefing the North Korean general rank officers on organising and consolidating Kim Jong-Il's High Command, and the activation of a new streamlined military system under his tight control. The conference was chaired by Marshal Choe Kwang and Generals Kim Pong-Yul and Kim Kwang-Chin. The opening speech was by Col.-Gen. Kim Chung-Kak, one of the fast- rising younger generals. He stressed that "the People's Army should repeatedly train itself and strengthen its combat ability in every way, so as to fulfil its sublime revolutionary mission for the times, the revolution, the fatherland, and the people."

Col.-Gen. Kim Chung- Kak anticipates troubles and crises for the DPRK in the immediate future due to external threats, but expresses confidence in the ability of the KPA to successfully resolve all challenges. "Although our revolutionary situation has been complicated in the past few days, our People's Army has crushed every one of the provocative moves of the US imperialists and the South Korean military fascist clique, and credibly defended the security of the socialist motherland and the happiness of the people." Col.-Gen. Kim Chung-Kak, and other speakers, stressed that the DPRK was once again on the verge of a major crisis in which the KPA might be called upon to save the motherland: that is, to fight the enemies of the DPRK.

On March 15, the conference was expanded into a mass gathering of "company commanders and company political officers": that is, the prime of the KPA tactical command echelons. It was a huge crowd. The opening session of the conference was attended by Kim Jong-Il, expressing the importance of the event. Sitting at the rostrum with him were Choe Kwang, Kim Kwang-Chin, Kim Pong-Yul, and Yi Ha-Il.

The opening statement was delivered by General Yi Pong-Won. He stressed the growing challenges facing the DPRK, and military loyalty to Kim Jong-Il as the source of salvation. The main address was delivered by Choe Kwang. It was a professional presentation, with Choe Kwang specifically stressing the military challenges facing the DPRK, and the urgent need to train strenuously to deal with impending challenges. Choe Kwang told the tactical commanders to prepare their troops to "live and fight in the revolutionary spirit of unconditionally fulfilling the orders of the supreme commander to the letter and complete the combat preparations of the companies to emerge ever victorious in the fight with the enemy".

Kim Kwang-Chin also delivered a professional report to the conference. He stressed the modernisation of the KPA companies, the increase in military might, and the growing importance of combined arms and high maneuvrability offensive operations at the tactical level. He also delved on the ability of the tactical units to defend their own bunkers and other fortified installations against overwhelming forces. There was an important sign in his speech. He emphasised that troops should be prepared to carry out missions at any price. He called on the commanders and political officers to embark on an indoctrination campaign in order to prepare their troops to sustain heavy losses and hardships. This kind of indoctrination is usually delivered at the last minute in order to prepare the soldiers for the challenges ahead, but simultaneously so as to prevent soldiers (young men) from delving on the prospects of imminent death for too long, a phenomena known to be drastically decreasing the troops' morale and combat capabilities. Therefore, Kim Kwang-Chin's preoccupation with the subject dearly reflects Pyongyang's belief that a major crisis is imminent.

INDEED, THERE HAS been a corresponding change in the political education of both the KPA and the North Korean population as a whole. Since early March, there has been a rapid resumption of the anti-US propaganda in the DPRK, again beating the drums of war. On March 1, Pyongyang announced that the intensified US aerial intelligence gathering activities from South Korea were a sure sign that "the US imperialists are watching for a chance to invade the North", despite Pyongyang's "forthcoming policies".

On March 10, Pyongyang attacked the US strategy in East Asia as the spark for a major conflagration. An "expert analysis" by a senior official concluded that the US was determined to go to war. The US Asia-Pacific strategy for the 21 st Century leaves no doubt that "the US ambition to stifle the DPRK with strength and dominate the world remains unchanged" despite political dynamics in the region. The US decision to keep forces in South Korea even after North Korea completely abandoned its military nuclear programme was proof that the US had no intention of complying with the October 1994 agreement. The senior official stated Pyongyang's conclusion: "The "security strategy" is aimed at permanently occupying South Korea and invading the DPRK. It is also a strategy for a military aggression to realise the US dominationist purpose."

Pyongyang then introduced its own alternative to the new Korean War. In mid-March, the DPRK revived its call for "reunification through confederation" as the key for the immediate reunification of Korea. Pyongyang cited at great length the specific writings of Kim Il-Song on the subject, thus giving the proposal the highest possible authority and importance. The new element added in the March 1995 proposal was Pyongyang's assertion that the people of South Korea were yearning for such a unification, but only the US was pressuring Seoul by force of arms not to continue on the path to reunification. By late March, Pyongyang further developed the theme of an impending crisis, and possibly a new Korean War, despite the stern efforts by the DPRK to make peace.

On March 24, Pyongyang formally warned that Washington's Korean policy was leading toward war. An expert analysis by a senior official warned that "The reckless military moves of the United States still leave the Korean peninsula in a state of military confrontation and bring tension to a higher pitch. The US outcries about 'threat' from the DPRK is nothing but a pretext used to justify its war moves." The analyst warned that conditions on the Peninsula were ripe for an eruption. "The DPRK and the United States are still in a belligerent state," he explained. Therefore, he warned, "the war gamble of the United States may develop into a war any moment". The senior official concluded with a threat. "The United States should ponder over the ensuing grave consequences of the reckless military adventure and quit acting rashly."

MEANWHILE, Pyongyang embarked on another course to improve its overall strategic posture in the brewing crisis. Pyongyang decided to remove Japan from the US-led coalition against it. In mid-March, Pyongyang formally added Japan to the list of potential military threats. Pyongyang explained that Japan changed its ostensibly defensive national doctrine to that of "pre-emptive attack" with emphasis on "long-distance attack capacity" of the air force, navy, and other quality arms. Pyongyang has no doubt who is the sole objective of this military modernisation. "The Japanese reactionaries now direct the sharp edge of overseas aggression to the Korean peninsula. They dream of invading Korea and, with it as the springboard, staging a comeback to Asia. This is, however, a foolish dream. Asia today is not what it was yesterday." Pyongyang concluded with a warning to Tokyo that the DPRK would not be able to sit idle as the regional balance of forces is changing so adversely.

Significantly, this virtual ultimatum came just as Tokyo was actually considering the resumption of talks on normalisation of relations with the DPRK. The Japanese Government was reluctant to pursue the talks while facing intense pressure from Washington to join and increase the sanctions and pressure on the DPRK in connection with the stalemated nuclear deal of October 1994. And then, on the morning of March 20, still unknown terrorists distributed Sarin nerve agents in the Tokyo subway. Irrespective of whom the actual perpetrators were, the Japanese Government suddenly remembered the DPRK. Within days, a Japanese delegation headed by former Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe arrived in Pyongyang. The Il-member group included lawmakers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its partners in the coalition, the Socialists and the Sakigake Party. Officially, their mission was "to resume talks aimed at normalising relations" between their parties and the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

There was no effort to hide their true objective. "Now is a good time for the two governments to resume negotiations aimed at normalising relations," Watanabe told Kim Yong-sun, WPK Secretary. Official Tokyo left no doubt that the Japanese Government knew exactly what it was doing. On March 28, Japanese officials acknowledged that "the current visit could hamper international efforts to break a deadlock over the DPRK's nuclear programme". A Japanese Foreign Ministry official said that Tokyo was "hoping that the delegation will not do anything to encourage North Korea to harden its stance . . . The timing is very delicate and important."

Official Tokyo was quick to raise a smoke screen. On March 29, Tokyo acknowledged that "Japanese and North Korean politicians are close to signing a declaration on restarting efforts to normalise diplomatic relations between their two countries". Japanese politicians in Pyongyang acknowledged that "the two sides had agreed in principle that formal bilateral talks on setting up diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo should restart". The Japanese also reported that the "North Koreans said they needed to discuss the proposed agreement before deciding whether to accept the Japanese proposal".

Indeed, Japan and the DPRK had already reached an agreement on March 28. Ostensibly, it was an agreement between the WPK and the coalition of Japanese political parties. In this agreement, North Korea dropped its demands for massive reparations for the colonial era and World War II in return for quick tangible gains, especially anti- US activities. Significantly, Tokyo promised to help Pyongyang resist Washington's pressure in the row over what type of light-water reactor the DPRK will get. Tokyo will also assist Pyongyang to overcome the present economic crisis and food shortages as a humanitarian gesture and without any linkage to the nuclear crisis. Since Japan had to carry most of the burden of this agreement, Tokyo expected some political concessions from Pyongyang. However, once in Pyongyang, the Japanese delegation "suddenly" decided not to challenge the DPRK's proposals and quickly reached an agreement. Indeed, officials in Seoul and Tokyo believe that "Japan and North Korea have already concluded a secret agreement on normalisation.

PYONGYANG WAS AWARE Of the ultimate outcome of the negotiations with the Watanabe delegation: that is, that there would soon be major cracks in the US-led coalition against the DPRK from the very beginning. This knowledge can explain Pyongyang's steadfast refusal to break the deadlock on the implementation of the October 1994 agreement. The impasse reached new height in the intense but ultimately futile negotiations on-March 25-27 in Berlin.

The North Koreans adamantly refused to accept reactors manufactured in South Korea. US officials insist the only possibility is South Korean reactors since Seoul was expected to foot most of the bill. However, on March 29, Pyongyang announced that it had submitted an "epochal proposal" in Berlin in order to resolve the reactor and all other issues. Official Pyongyang stressed that "the matter was now in the hands of the United States".

Pyongyang left no doubt that the very existence of the agreement now depends on Washington's acquiescence to its proposal. "At the negotiations, the DPRK side set forth an epochal proposal to tide over the present deadlocks concerning the question of light water reactor model and the US side promised to study our proposal," Pyongyang explained. "Since we have made our best for the progress of the negotiations, prospect for the solution of the question entirely depends on the sincerity of our dialogue partner."

According to Japanese and South Korean sources, the essence of the North Korean "epochal proposal" is for the US to impose the reunification of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the "reunification through confederation" program Pyongyang revived in mid-March. Essentially, Pyongyang argued that the only way a reactor made in Korea could be built in the North is if it is the product of a single, unified Korea.

The precondition for such a reunification is the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK and the establishment of a peace and security pact between Pyongyang and Washington. "The basic strategy to implement the Geneva Agreement is to pull out US troops from South Korea, a major reason behind the military confrontation between the US and the DPRK, and to set up a new peace and security status between the US and the DPRK," a North Korean official told a Japanese counterpart. Once the US troops are withdrawn, Pyongyang is confident the road would be open for a quick "reunification". The pact with Washington would prevent the US from actively intervening in the "reunification process", especially through the use of military means.

On March 30, Pyongyang pointed out the alternative, accusing Washington of instigating a war in Korea. Pyongyang argued that recent US military activities prove that Washington "is to make a fait accompli the provocation for a new Korean War by the United States and that the United States is hurrying its preparations". The DPRK stressed that the military solution was acceptable for Pyongyang. "We are ready for dialogue as well as war," Pyongyang said. "The United States must by no means doubt our people's steadfast will. If the United States continues to move toward the adventurous road of war by clinging to the policy of strength as it was regardless of our repeated warning, it will have to be wholly responsible for all consequences arising therefrom." Of course, Pyongyang would love to see Washington acquiescing to the "epochal proposal" and the ensuing "reunification through confederation" of the Korean Peninsula.

However, Kim Jong-II's Pyongyang knows better. The real objective of DPRK negotiation tactics is to instigate the catalyst and excuse for the crisis they really seek in order to break the deadlock in the region. Such a strategy fits closely with Kjm Jong-Il's personality and approach to decisionmaking. As discussed above, there is a growing tendency in Kim Jong-Il to take bold gambles for immediate gratification, even though such steps may unleash a crisis and even a war.

Meanwhile, South Korean experts are increasingly worried that the DPRK might "provoke a limited war" in the near future. They base their analysis on the characteristics of the recent military exercises and build-up in the DPRK, as well as the latest reforms in the KPA High Command. These experts believe that Pyongyang is reluctant to embark on a full-scale war unless the economic isolation becomes intolerable to the point that it threatens the stability of Kim Jong- Il.

The deal with Tokyo significantly reduces this possibility. At the same time, Kim Jong-Il is determined to reach a quick and dramatic breakout of the deadlock. According to the South Korean experts, Pyongyang believes that "a limited war will be possible if North Korea feels it necessary to create tension for political purposes: to remove factors leading to its own internal unrest." "Since North Korea is now imputing its own economic difficulties to having to increase its armaments in preparation against a possible provocation by the ROK and the United States, it is possible younger commanding officers in the North Korean military will launch a military provocation against the South out of desperation."

They warn that the DPRK might well embark on such a provocation even if there is a chance that a limited war would escalate into "an accidental war" amounting to "a total, planned military provocation against the South". A spate of terrorism, subversion, as well as special and covert operations, fits very closely with both the DPRK's perception of a limited war, and the penchant of Kim Jong-Il and his "Troika" for the "dirty War. There is an aura of self-confidence and great anticipation at the highest levels in Pyongyang.

In late March, rumours of a dramatic breakout were prevailing among senior DPRK officials with access to visiting foreigners (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) in Pyongyang. These DPRK officials anticipated that Kim Jong-Il would finally assume formal power in October 1995. They stressed the importance of the date as both commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the WPK, and, the national triumph in the aftermath of a great national achievement and overcoming of a major trial they are certain the DPRK will endure later this year. It should also be remembered that both Kim Il-Song and Kim Jong-Il declared 1995 to be the year of reunification.

Disastrous Floods and Famine Strikes North Korea: To add to the unreality of the Korean situation, a disastrous flood and famine struck North Korea. The North Korean economy was stagnant. The Red Cross stepped in to help with disaster relief. Unbelievably, North Korea increased its troops to 1.04 million and there were numerous claims that North Korea was diverting international food aid to its military. To aid in the humanitarian relief, South Korea at first sent rice aid for "humanitarian reasons", but when the North sent spies who were tracked down and killed in Sochon, 22km away from Kunsan, the South's position changed. The negotiations between the U.S. and North continued with many ups and downs...and twists and turns...with nothing resolved.

Slowly North Korea was losing the last of its supporters. Poland withdrew from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom under the pressure of withdrawing from Pyongyang. In the 1980s, the hopes by Pyongyang that a large-scale military conflict would break out between NATO and the countries of the Warsaw Pact in western Europe, thus permitting them a diversion so that they could assure its victory over South Korea, did not come to fruition.

On the contrary, at the end of the 20th Century there was a mass crackup of the Communist regimes and the countries enjoying the "Friendship of the USSR". Nevertheless, there was no longer a USSR itself, and even "apologists for Communism" in Albania and Rumania, who had once avowed loyalty to their "big brothers". In the Far East, China and Vietnam also slowed down, but in truth have veered away from Marxist ideology.

Not counting Cuba and several African countries, among whom are those negotiating with the West, there is no other country which remains as purely Communist other than the singular DPRK. Ignoring the loss of nearly all of their allies and increasing pressure on the part of the "free world" which nearly totally surround it, North Korea is still convinced of the ultimate victory of Communism which separates it from other countries.

Unfortunately, ideology doesn't impress Mother Nature and the famines worsened. There were reports of people searching for millet seeds (grass) on the hillsides. During the rainy season, there were reports of mudslides and areas being flooded ruining the rice crops. Reports of starvation and cholera outbreaks increased. Though humanitarian aid was sent through the Red Cross, there were allegations that some of these were being diverted for private use by some.

There were increased reports of North Koreans defecting to China because of the famine conditions -- and hiding out in China. There were some contacts by South Korean relatives who visited them in China that were televised on local TV. North Korea complained to China demanding the return of the "defectors." There were contacts with the Korean Embassies in China asking for political asylum in South Korea.

However, it was decided to admit the people based on a case-by-case basis. First, the South feared an open door policy to accept the "defectors" would lead to a mass defection and overloading of the South's welfare systems. In addition, it was found that the North Korean defectors in the past had not fared well in the south because of different technological levels and educational standards. Second, the situation of "defectors" was a hot potato diplomatically. China retained diplomatic relations with both North Korea and South Korea. To formally accept the "defectors" from China -- officially referred to as a "third country" -- might place China in an untenable position that would force it to root out all the defectors in the Northern Provinces and return them to North Korea as North Korea requested. These people would face almost certain death if returned to North Korea.

The South Koreas started direct shipments of food aid to North Korea, but it was an off-and-on process every time each other's national pride got in the way. For example, ships of South Korea were required to remove their flags before they entered the North Korean ports. Some members of the South Korean crews were accused of spying -- and perhaps they were. However, if taking a picture of a port is spying, the reality is that the photo would be of limited value as satellite imagery could do the job with much better results. The whole process was fraught with stumbling blocks thrown up by both sides.

For an interesting travelogue of North Korea's Pyongyang by an Australian, Paul Bakker, go to March 1995.

North-South Aviation Pact: In early 1995, the DPRK signed an international agreement for "Open Skies" which opened up its air space for passenger flights of foreign aviation companies. In concert with this, North Korean aircraft which were selected to make cross-border flights received civil aviation markings for the Choson Min Hang Aviation Company, but they were still manned and flown by military crews. This also aided the North to gain much needed capital from the "over-flys" which in turn saved fuel costs for South Korean airliners that previously had to take a longer route to land at Kimpo.

KEDO: The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was set up. A LWR (Light Water Reactor) treaty was concluded between KEDO and North Korea. These negotiations to construct nuclear reactors where the plutonium produced cannot be reused for weapons.

The following is from AFX News:

"North Korea, KEDO sign accord for supply of nuclear reactors."

AFX News December 15, 1995, Friday - 11:47 Eastern Time - "North Korea, KEDO sign accord for supply of nuclear reactors." NEW YORK (AFX) - The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) and North Korea have signed an accord for the supply of two light-water nuclear reactors to North Korea in a deal involving a halt to North Korea's existing nuclear program, officials said. The meeting initially was announced in Seoul by a South Korean government official after the cabinet approved providing 70 pct of the financing for the reactors, an estimated 4.5 bln dlrs.

However, the problems started arising over the inspection of their sites to ensure that no weapons grade materials had been produced by their North Korean reactors. The North Koreans simply said "we have none. Believe me...and you can't look." The tensions continued to grow -- particularly over cost sharing.

The KEDO site states, "The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is an international, non-profit organization established to carry out two key provisions of the Agreed Framework negotiated in 1994 by the US and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)."

Specifically, in exchange for the DPRK freezing and eventually dismantling its nuclear program, KEDO is:

a) Supplying the DPRK with two proliferation-resistant light-water reactor (LWR) units and
b) Heavy fuel oil (HFO) for heating and electricity.

KEDO's staff of approximately forty people, based in New York City with a representative office at the LWR construction site in the DPRK, is comprised of nationals from Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the US (KEDO's founding members) and the European Atomic Energy Community. An Executive Director and two Deputy Executive Directors oversee KEDO's seven divisions: Policy and DPRK Affairs; Project Operations; Nuclear Safety and Quality Assurance; Finance and HFO; General Affairs; Legal Affairs; and Public and External Promotion and Support.

In addition to financial and in-kind support from its four Executive Board members, KEDO also relies on contributions from its members and other governments to carry out its mission. The non-Executive Board members of KEDO are: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Indonesia, New Zealand, Republic of Poland and Uzbekistan. KEDO has received contributions in support of its work from the following countries: Brunei, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom.

ROK Upgrade Programs: The ROK continued its aggressive military buildup with international military exchanges, especially for logistics and technology transfers. The ROK and Canada, Poland and Israel concluded an MOU in order to increase military exchanges and cooperation. The ROK and Indonesia concluded an MOU on defense logistics and defense industry. The christening ceremony and the trial flight of the first domestically-made military aircraft, the KT-1, Ung-bi.

Peace Keeping Operations: The ROK continued its Peace Keeping Operations role. PKO engineer battalion was dispatched to Angola.

ROK Women in Academies: A significant step forward for ROK women was that a part of the law on the establishment of academies was revised to open the door for the admission of women. Women would be allowed into the academies.

Female ROKAF Academy cadets visit Kunsan (2 Dec 1999)

North Korean Missile Threat: At Kunsan, chemical warfare training was intensified as news of the deployment of the Rodong-1 intermediate range ballistic missile was released. Kunsan, which was previously outside of the effective range for the Scuds B/C, was now within the striking range of the Rodong-1 (No Dong 1) missiles. This single-staged liquid fuel missile can fire a 450-pound warhead up to 620 miles, although it has never been fired more than 310 miles. The Rodong 1 was test-launched in 1993 and entered service a year later. Yonhap (Kyodo News Service) reported in Sept. 1995, that the Rodong-1 intermediate range ballistic missile was being deployed.

The first flight of the Taepo Dong 1 two-stage, liquid fuel missile significantly increased the range of North Korea's rocket forces. According to Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, the Taepo Dong 1 (Daepodong 1) could deliver a 450-pound warhead up to 1,250 miles -- far enough to reach any target in Japan and most major cities in China. A payload of that size is large enough to carry nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as conventional explosives. A much larger variant being developed could possibly send a 680-pound warhead up to 3,750 miles, or as far as southern Alaska. Yonhap (Kyodo News Service) reported in Sept. 1995, that between 50 and 200 North Korean engineers were said to be have been trained by state and private Chinese entities, and North Korea is believed to have received technical support from Chinese defense and technology firms. The Rodong missiles are said to be of similar design to China's CSS-2, and the Taepo Dong types to be similar to the newer Chinese Dongfeng.

6th Cavalry Regiment


ADA Badge
(From 1-43ADA Homepage)

Patriot Missile Battery: To offset concerns over possible missile attacks from North Korea, Patriot missiles were deployed to Korea. Army Patriot Missile units of the 1st Battalion, 43rd ADA (Air Defense Artillery), 6th Calvary were deployed to Kunsan and became responsible for the base's air defense against potential missile attacks from North Korea. Nicknamed "Blackhorse," the unit prides itself on its calvary heritage and sports black calvary headgear for formal formations.

1-43rd ADA
(From 1-43ADA Homepage)

The 1-43 ADA Homepage states, "Welcome to the 1st Battalion (PATRIOT) 43rd Air Defense Artillery, the largest and most forward deployed Patriot Battalion in the world. With a long and distinguished history earning 24 campaign streamers starting at the Battle of St. Mihiel in World War I to the UN Summer-Fall Offensive 1953 in the Korean War, the 1st Battalion (Patriot), 43d Air Defense Artillery continues to live up to its motto of “Freedom’s First Defense” and prestigious heritage through hard work and dedication to the defense of the Korean Peninsula. The 1st Battalion (Patriot), 43d Air Defense Artillery is assigned to the 6th Cavalry Brigade. The inclusion of the 1st Battalion (Patriot), 43d Air Defense Artillery into the 6th Cavalry brigade arsenal has provided a potent, deadly combat team."

The 1st Battalion (PATRIOT), 43rd Air Defense Artillery. 1-43 ADA is a six firing battery, Echelon Above Corps PATRIOT Missile Battalion with a Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and a direct support maintenance company. 1-43 ADA assumed its mission in the Republic of Korea in October 1994. Currently, HHB, two firing batteries (Alpha and Bravo), and the 3rd Combat Support Company reside at Suwon Air Base. Charlie and Delta Batteries are at Osan Air Base, and Echo and Foxtrot Batteries are at Kunsan Air Base.

The Battalion Command Group consists of the Commander; Executive Officer (XO); and Command Sergeant Major. Battalion Staff consists of: Battalion S1; Battalion S2; Battalion S3; Battalion S4; Battalion S6; Battalion Chemical Officer; Battalion Readiness Center; Battalion Electronic Missile Maintenance Officer; and Battalion Physician Assistant.

Battalion METL is: METL Task 1: Transition to War; METL Task 2: Conduct Air Defense Operations; METL Task 3: Protect the Force (ART 6.0); and METL Task 4: Sustain the Force (ART 4.0).

However, many people still remember the Patriot's not-so-stellar performance during the Gulf War in 1991. According to Non-Proliferation states, "During the war, many believed that the Patriot had achieved a near-perfect intercept rate, as was reported initially from the battlefield and Washington. After a congressional investigation, the Army revised its claims down from 96 percent to 52 percent, though noting that their data gave them high confidence in the destruction of only 25 percent of the Scud warheads."

This points out one of Murphy's laws for Air Defense Artillery pointed out on an ADA site: "People who have absolute confidence in Patriot's ability to destroy incoming scuds have never been in a Patriot unit." However, the improved Patriot system, or PAC 3, is designed to intercept Scud-type missiles of the type now deployed by potential Third World adversaries. These 300- to 1000-kilometer-range missiles will represent a challenge, but one which the PAC-3 should be capable of intercepting.

Many feel the deployment of the Patriot missiles to Korea and Japan were more to assuage the Korean and Japanese public fears of an attack from a North Korean scud missile. The diplomats have been pointing out repeatedly that the affected countries will be the first on the list for when the THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) system comes out. Unfortunately, the THAAD tests have only had a 12% success rate thus far. It may be a while.

Because of these stumbling blocks with the THAAD development, the deployment of the Patriot systems was also intended to open the door to sales of the Patriot systems to Korea and Japan until the THAAD was on-line. Korea seeks a four-target simultaneous engagement capability from short-listed SAM/ABM contenders. Korea is interested in procuring 14 Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Patriot PAC-3 fire units costing $4.2 billion -- along with the EUROSAM Aster-based Land system, and Russia's Antei S-300V (SA-12 "Gladiator"). Supposedly, both Korea and Japan have firm orders for the Patriot PAC-3s.

Echo Eagles Battery and Team Foxtrot Battery at Kunsan AB: The advance elements arrived at Kunsan in April 1994. The main elements arrived in 1995. Echo and Foxtrot Batteries are stationed at Kunsan Air Base. The nickname for the Echo Battery is "Soaring Eagles" and Foxtrot Battery goes by "Team Foxtrot."

The unit is set up on the south end of the base just past the Base Operations. For those military arriving at Kunsan AB via scheduled air transportation, the first sight they see as they taxi up to Base Operations are the Patriot missiles arrayed. As the KAL air liners land at Kunsan, the Koreans get a good view of the Patriots standing proud protecting the base. Clustered together, they can be dispersed in the event of an attack.

Foxtrot Battery Change of Command (Feb 2001)
Capt Bradley (left) hands guidon to LTC Buhidar (center)
for New Battery Commander Capt Church (right)
(Click on photo to enlarge)
(From Wolfpack Warrior)

In 2001, the U.S. Army transitioned to the black berets for all its personnel. Special ceremonies were held to mark the event. The distinctive headgear makes the folks of the Patriot batteries stand out on an Air Force base. In addition to the black berets, the distinctive "horse soldier" hats that the unit sports for formal events also sets them apart.

The unit's Army support personnel are integrated into the 8th Fighter Wing. In the hospital, you may be waited on by an Army Specialist in the records section or served your food at O'Malley's Dining Hall from Army Food Services personnel. The familiar black berets of the Army are seen everywhere from the BX to getting a hamburger at Burger King in the Food Court.

Though the unit remains separate in its mission, it has been accepted as an integral part of the 8th Fighter Wing wartime tasking. The 8th Fighter Wing fully realizes the SCUD threat from North Korea and practice with week-long exercises monthly to perfect their wartime skills. The folks of the 8th feel a little more confident that they have the edge against a SCUD missile attack with the Patriots standing watch. During exercises such as Foal Eagle, the Patriot batteries are integrated into the 8th FW scenarios dealing with base defense. However, the batteries are normally evaluated separately by Army inspectors in verification exercises to validate the unit capabilities.

History of the Air Defenses at Kunsan: The Echo and Foxtrot batteries follow in a long tradition of air defense units at Kunsan dating back to the Korean War. During the Korean War, the 76th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Battalion (AW)(SP) watched over the skies above Kunsan Air Base. Armed with half-track mounted Quad-50s and 40mm Bofors, they were spread out along the perimeter and the runway. Luckily, there was never a shot fired in anger, though a few pot shots were hurled at "Bed Check Charlie" (Popov biplanes used as "hecklers") that dropped hand-held bombs early on in the war. After the war, the Battery B of 30th AAA came up from Pusan to relieve the 76th AAA and remained until the 3rd Bomb Wing left in 1954.

After the Korean War, there was a nuclear alert, but no real anti-aircraft artillery protection except for the ROKAF Quad-50s and a Vulcan M-61 20mm cannon in the 1970s. The ROKAF first used the old AAA sites for their Quad-50s. However, after the guns became obsolete, they were removed and and mounted on trucks. They were positioned next to the F-86 ROKAF ramp. The Vulcan was on a towed trailer and first positioned next to the F-86 ramp, but later moved to the end of runway. (Go to ROKAF for pics of these guns.)

After the tensions heated up after the Pueblo Crisis, the 3rd Wing was sent to Kunsan AB and a Hawk Missile Battery deployed to a hill just outside Kunsan AB to protect the wing's assets. The Battery B, 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery was stationed at Kunsan from 1968-1980. Currently, a ROK AAA unit sits on the same hill providing aerial defenses for Kunsan AB.

In addition, there was the Battery E, 2nd Battalion, 44 Air Defense Artillery which was a Nike Hercules units in Kimje, about 40km south of Kunsan, that provided area coverage from 1962-1977. These Nikes were turned over to the ROK Army in 1977 and still provides coverage -- though aging rapidly -- now under the ROKAF.

6th Cavalry Regiment History: (Excerpted from 6th Cavalry Regiment website) Organized in 1861 in response to the need for additional cavalry in the Civil War, the 3rd CAV (redesignated 6th CAV in August 1861) took to the field in March 1862, serving in the Army of the Potomac. The 6th CAV served in 16 Civil War campaigns, including Antietam, Gettysburg, the Wilderness Campaign, and Appomattox.

After the Civil War, the 6th Cavalry moved west, spending more than thirty years policing the frontier and participating in 10 Indian War Campaigns, facing many hostile tribes, including the Comanches and Apaches.

In 1898, the 6th Cavalry Regiment sailed to Cuba, where it took part in the assault on San Juan Hill along with Teddy Roosevelt's "Rough Riders" of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry.

In 1900 and in 1907, the 6th Cavalry deployed to the Far East for 3-year tours. First the Cavalry went to China to participate in a 3-year relief expedition. Later, the 6th Cavalry posted its colors in the Philippines to defend our nation's interests. In 1909, the 6th Cavalry Regiment defeated the Moros in a major battle on Jolo.

In 1910, the 6th Cavalry returned to the United States and took up duty patrolling the Mexican border. In 1916, 6th Cavalry was sent into Mexico as part of the Punitive Expedition in order to capture Pancho Villa.

ADA Badge
(From 6th Cavalry Regiment)

In the spring of 1918, the 6th Cavalry Regiment deployed to France, serving in the rear echelon during World War I. After World War I, the 6th Cavalry returned to Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia where it remained until 1942.

In 1942, 6th Cavalry turned in the last of its horses and later reorganized as the 6th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, and the 6th and 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons. In 1944, they again deployed to Europe to fight in World War II. 6th CAV participated in 5 campaigns in Europe. After the war, the 6th CAV performed occupation duties in Germany. In 1948, the unit was reorganized as the 6th Armored Cavalry.

The 6th ACR returned to Fort Knox, Kentucky in 1957 where it remained until 1963, when it was deactivated

In 1967, the Regiment reactivated at Fort Meade, Maryland, where it served for four years. In June 1973, the Regiment was redesignated at the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat). 1st Squadron reorganized as an aviation unit under the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat). While at Hood, the brigade was a test bed for new concepts involving the use of attack helicopters on the modern battlefield.

In July 1996, the 6th Cavalry Brigade Headquarters and 3-6 Heavy Cav moved their flags from Fort Hood to Korea. 1-501 Attack Helicopter Battalion was reflagged as 1-6 Cav In December 1996, 1st Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery was assigned to the brigade, giving the Brigade critical force protection assets.

Today, the 6th Cavalry Brigade consists of a BDE HQ at Camp Humphreys, 1-6 Cavalry Squadron (Fighting) at Camp Eagle, 3-6 Cavalry Squadron (Heavy Cav) at Camp Humphreys, and 1-43 Air Defense Artillery Battalion (Cobra) at Suwon AB, Osan AB, and Kunsan AB. (Go to 6th Cavalry Regiment Homepage for more information on the units.)

1-43 ADA Battalion History: (Excerpted from 1-43 ADA page) The 43d Air Defense Artillery Regiment was constituted 29 June 1918 in the Regular Army as the 43d Artillery (Coast Artillery Corps). It was organized at Haussimont, France, from existing Regular Army units.

The Regiment participated in numerous campaigns throughout the First World War as part of the Railway Artillery in many important Allied offensives through 1918. Supporting the troops on the ground with massive prolonged barrages which demoralized the enemy. The intense fire that the Regiment contributed was key to the success of many offensives, particularly at St. Mihiel and St. Meuse-Argonne in September and November, 1918.

After the war, elements of the 43d Artillery Regiment were consolidated under the 64th Artillery Battalion, and soon found themselves at war in the Pacific. While providing artillery support to the 25th Infantry Division at Guadalcanal, the unit earned its first Presidential Citation in the first months of 1943. The intense fire provided by the unit was key to uprooting the Japanese from the island.

In mid-1950, elements of the Regiment found themselves again at war, this time in Korea. The Regiment earned its second Presidential Citation while defending the South against the communist invasion. Elements of the Regiment wiped out large portions of a North Korean attack with its withering indirect fire, and repelled the remainder with direct fire. Later, North Korean troops were repelled from the unit's position in hand-to-hand combat.

Later that year, a third Presidential Citation was awarded to the unit while defending its own position. Fighting a rear guard action, the Battalion found itself in danger of being overrun by communist troops. With fierce determination, the unit once again used its guns, and with indirect fire, repelled the attacks. The Battalion's actions allowed several units to safely withdraw from a position that was almost surrounded, saving them from certain destruction.

The unit was re-designated in 1971 as the 43d Air Defense Artillery Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 43d ADA received the first PATRIOT equipment at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 1982 and completed the Army's Follow On Evaluations to certify PATRIOT as a valid Air Defense Missile System. During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the 1-43d ADA Fire Direction Section deployed to Saudi Arabia to assist in coordinating HAWK and PATRIOT units in the Air Defense Task Force. The Fire Direction Section assisted in coordinating many SCUD intercepts. In 1994, the Battalion deployed to the Korean theater to relieve 2-7 ADA in the Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense of the peninsula.

Patriot Technical Specifications: Patriot is a long-range, all-altitude, all-weather air defence system to counter tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. Patriot (MIM-104) is produced by Raytheon in Massachusetts and Lockheed Martin Missiles in Florida. As well as the USA, Patriot is in service with Germany, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. It has been ordered by Greece and has been cleared for sale to Egypt.

MISSILE The Patriot missile is equipped with a track-via-missile (TVM) guidance system. Midcourse correction commands are transmitted to the guidance system from the mobile Engagement Control Centre. The target acquisition system in the missile acquires the target in the terminal phase of flight and transmits the data using the TVM downlink via the ground radar to the Engagement Control Station for final course correction calculations. The course correction commands are transmitted to the missile via the Missile Track Command Uplink. The high explosive 90 kg warhead is situated behind the terminal guidance section. The range of the missile is 70 km and maximum altitude is greater than 24 km. The minimum flight time is the time to arm the missile, which is less than nine seconds, and the maximum flight time is less than three and a half minutes.

PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY (PAC-3) A new Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile has increased effectiveness against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, through the use of advanced hit-to-kill technology. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor with Raytheon the systems integrator. The PAC-3 has a Ka-band millimetre wave seeker developed by Boeing. The missile guidance system enables target destruction through the kinetic energy released by hitting the target head-on. In January 2000, Lockheed Martin received a contract for the low rate initial production of 20 PAC-3 systems. In July 2000, the PAC-3 missile successfully destroyed a cruise missile target during trials. The US Army is planning to field the first PAC-3 systems by the end of 2002. The Netherlands and South Korea have requested sales of PAC-3 missiles and Lockheed Martin and EADS (formerly DaimlerChrysler Aerospace) have established a joint venture company for the production of the system for the German Air Force.

PATRIOT ANTI-CRUISE MISSILE (PACM) A further development, designed to counter threats from cruise missiles, is the Patriot Anti Cruise Missile (PACM), which is a PAC-2 missile with a dual mode seeker, adding an active radar seeker to the existing TVM guidance. Raytheon conducted the first flight and intercept test of the missile in July 1999.

M901 LAUNCHING STATION The M901 Launching Station transports, points and launches the Patriot missile. Each launcher has four missiles. The launcher is remotely operated via a VHF or fibre optic data link from the Engagement Control Station, which provides both the missile prelaunch data and the fire command signal.

ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION The AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control Station is the only manned station in a Patriot Fire Unit. The Control Station communicates with the M901 Launching Stations, with other Patriot batteries and the higher command headquarters. The Control Station is manned by three operators, who have two consoles and a communications station with three radio relay terminals. The digital Weapon Control Computer is located next to the VHF Data Link Terminals.

RADAR The AN//MPQ-53 phased array radar carries out search, target detection, track and identification, missile tracking and guidance and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) functions. The radar is mounted on a trailer and is automatically controlled by the digital weapons control computer in the Engagement Control Station, via a cable link. The radar system has a range of up to 100 km, capacity to track up to 100 targets and can provide missile guidance data for up to nine missiles.



TARGET ENGAGEMENT A target engagement can be carried out in manual, semi-automatic or automatic mode. When the decision has been made to engage the target, the Engagement Control Station selects the Launch Station or Stations and pre-launch data is transmitted to the selected missile. After launch, the Patriot missile is acquired by the radar. The command uplink and the TVM downlink allow the missile's flight to be monitored and provide missile guidance commands from the weapon control computer. As the missile approaches the target, the TVM guidance system is activated and the missile is steered toward the target. A proximity fuse detonates the high explosive warhead.

---

RETURN TO MAIN TABLE OF CONTENTS

Return to Top

---

For comments or inputs, contact Kalani O'Sullivan .

---

NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is unofficial and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there. The DOD, the Air Force, the 8th Fighter Wing or Mickey Mouse has endorsed none of this site. All Air Force links are publicly accessible through the worldwide web. If there is any discrepancy between eye-witness accounts and OFFICIAL DOD records, this site opts to lend credence to the eye-witness views.

---

Return to Top

19 June 2001 Links Purged: June 5, 2000 HTML Toolbox

---